22 Alabama opinions name it 3 courts 1979–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Whisenhant v. Stategreen2 sentences2000See Lewis v. State, 380 So.2d 970, 977 (Ala.Cr.App.1979) (‘the extent of sub-normal mental capacity [shown in support of this mitigating factor] does not have to measure up to the applicable test necessary to show ... insanity that makes one incapable of committing a crime’), cert. denied, 370 So.2d 1106 (Ala.1979); Whisenhant v. State, 370 So.2d 1080, 1095-96 (Ala.Cr.App.) cert. denied, 370 So.2d 1106 (1979) (a finding that a diminished capacity mitigating circumstance exists ‘may be based on evidence of a lesser standard that is necessary to find insanity’).” We further find, in addition to 2000See Lewis v. State, 380 So.2d 970, 977 (Ala.Cr.App.1979) (‘the extent of sub-normal mental capacity [shown in support of this mitigating factor] does not have to measure up to the applicable test necessary to show ... insanity that makes one incapable of committing a crime’), cert. denied, 370 So.2d 1106 (Ala.1979); Whisenhant v. State, 370 So.2d 1080, 1095-96 (Ala.Cr.App.) cert. denied, 370 So.2d 1106 (1979) (a finding that a diminished capacity mitigating circumstance exists ‘may be based on evidence of a lesser standard that is necessary to find insanity’).” We further find, in addition to | 3 | 3 |
Lewis v. Stategreen2 sentences2000See Lewis v. State, 380 So.2d 970, 977 (Ala.Cr.App.1979) (‘the extent of sub-normal mental capacity [shown in support of this mitigating factor] does not have to measure up to the applicable test necessary to show ... insanity that makes one incapable of committing a crime’), cert. denied, 370 So.2d 1106 (Ala.1979); Whisenhant v. State, 370 So.2d 1080, 1095-96 (Ala.Cr.App.) cert. denied, 370 So.2d 1106 (1979) (a finding that a diminished capacity mitigating circumstance exists ‘may be based on evidence of a lesser standard that is necessary to find insanity’).” We further find, in addition to 1998See Lewis v. State , 380 So.2d 970 , 977 (Ala.Cr.App. 1979) (`the extent of sub-normal mental capacity [shown in support of this mitigating factor] does not have to measure up to the applicable test necessary to show. . . . insanity that makes one incapable of committing a crime'), cert. denied, 370 So.2d 1106 (Ala. 1979); Whisenhant v. State , 370 So.2d 1080 , 1095-96 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 370 So.2d 1106 (1979) (a finding that a diminished capacity mitigating circumstance exists `may be based on evidence of a lesser standard than is necessary to find insanity')." 686 So.2d at 503 . | 3 | 3 |
Apprendi v. New Jerseygreen2 sentences2007In Apprendi, the Court held: “ ‘ “[Tjhere is a vast difference between accepting the validity of a prior judgment of conviction entered in a proceeding in which the defendant had the right to a jury trial and the right to require the prosecutor to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and allowing the judge to find the required fact under a lesser standard of proof.” “ ‘Id. at 496, 120 S.Ct. 2348 . 2004In Apprendi , the Court held: "`"`[T]here is a vast difference between accepting the validity of a prior judgment of conviction entered in a proceeding in which the defendant had the right to a jury trial and the right to require the prosecutor to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and allowing the judge to find the required fact under a lesser standard of proof.' "`" Id. at 496 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 . | 2 | 5 |
Whisenhant v. Stategreen2 sentences2000See Lewis v. State, 380 So.2d 970, 977 (Ala.Cr.App.1979) (‘the extent of sub-normal mental capacity [shown in support of this mitigating factor] does not have to measure up to the applicable test necessary to show ... insanity that makes one incapable of committing a crime’), cert. denied, 370 So.2d 1106 (Ala.1979); Whisenhant v. State, 370 So.2d 1080, 1095-96 (Ala.Cr.App.) cert. denied, 370 So.2d 1106 (1979) (a finding that a diminished capacity mitigating circumstance exists ‘may be based on evidence of a lesser standard that is necessary to find insanity’).” We further find, in addition to 1998See Lewis v. State , 380 So.2d 970 , 977 (Ala.Cr.App. 1979) (`the extent of sub-normal mental capacity [shown in support of this mitigating factor] does not have to measure up to the applicable test necessary to show. . . . insanity that makes one incapable of committing a crime'), cert. denied, 370 So.2d 1106 (Ala. 1979); Whisenhant v. State , 370 So.2d 1080 , 1095-96 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 370 So.2d 1106 (1979) (a finding that a diminished capacity mitigating circumstance exists `may be based on evidence of a lesser standard than is necessary to find insanity')." 686 So.2d at 503 . | 1 | 3 |
Joe Terry Poyner v. Erma Werke Gmbh and Insurance Company of North Americagreen2 sentences2006In support of their argument, the Holsombacks urge that the trial court properly applied a lesser standard in determining that Auxilio Mutuo had minimum contacts with Alabama because they agree with the trial court that the human organ placed in Alabama's stream of commerce was "inherently dangerous." In its order, the trial court relied on the holdings in Poyner v. Erma Werke GmbH , 618 F.2d 1186 , 1192 (6th Cir.1980), and O'Neil v. Picillo , 682 F.Supp. 706 (D.R.I.1988), which involved the placement of a handgun and hazardous waste, respectively, into the stream of commerce. 2006In support of their argument, the Hol-sombacks urge that the trial court properly applied a lesser standard in determining that Auxilio Mutuo had minimum contacts with Alabama because they agree with the trial court that the human organ placed in Alabama’s stream of commerce was “inherently dangerous.” In its order, the trial court relied on the holdings in Poyner v. Erma Werke GmbH, 618 F.2d 1186, 1192 (6th Cir.1980), and O’Neil v. Picillo, 682 F.Supp. 706 (D.R.I.1988), which involved the placement of a handgun and hazardous waste, respectively, into the stream of commerce. | 1 | 2 |
cluster 7891green1 sentence2024This lesser standard applies to a partial closure because a partial closure " ' "does not raise the same constitutional concerns as a total closure," ' " given that " ' "an audience remains to ensure the fairness of the proceedings." ' " Id. at 373 (quoting Ex parte Judd, 694 So. 2d 1294, 1296 (Ala. 1997), quoting in turn United States v. Osborne, 68 F.3d 94, 98 (5th Cir. 1995)). | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Juddgreen1 sentence2024This lesser standard applies to a partial closure because a partial closure " ' "does not raise the same constitutional concerns as a total closure," ' " given that " ' "an audience remains to ensure the fairness of the proceedings." ' " Id. at 373 (quoting Ex parte Judd, 694 So. 2d 1294, 1296 (Ala. 1997), quoting in turn United States v. Osborne, 68 F.3d 94, 98 (5th Cir. 1995)). | 1 | 1 |
Turner v. Stategreen1 sentence2011See Ex parte Dunn, 514 So.2d 1300 (Ala.1987); Watson v. State, 808 So.2d 77 (Ala.Crim.App.2001); Turner v. State, 924 So.2d 737, 782 (Ala.Crim.App.2002). | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Dunngreen1 sentence2011See Ex parte Dunn, 514 So.2d 1300 (Ala.1987); Watson v. State, 808 So.2d 77 (Ala.Crim.App.2001); Turner v. State, 924 So.2d 737, 782 (Ala.Crim.App.2002). | 1 | 1 |
KGS Steel, Inc. v. McInishgreen2 sentences2008Stated specifically in the context of a substantial-evidence standard of review required in a proceeding like the one before us, a cumulative-physical-stress/gradual-deterioration worker’s compensation case, the burden that an employee must bear was accurately stated by then Judge Mur-dock in his special concurrence: “[T]he evidence necessary for appellate affirmance of a judgment based on a factual finding in the context of a case in which the ultimate standard for a factual decision by the trial court is clear and convincing evidence is evidence that a fact-finder reasonably could find to cl 2008Stated specifically in the context of a substantial-evidence standard of review required in a proceeding like the one before us, a cumulative-physical-stress/gradual-deterioration worker's compensation case, the burden that an employee must bear was accurately stated by then Judge Murdock in his special concurrence: "[T]he evidence necessary for appellate affirmance of a judgment based on a factual finding in the context of a case in which the ultimate standard for a factual decision by the trial court is clear and convincing evidence is evidence that a fact-finder reasonably could find to cle | 1 | 1 |
Ts v. Jpgreen1 sentence2007Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982)." 674 So.2d at 537 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Cruse v. Stategreen1 sentence1990Cruse v. State, 489 So.2d 694, 696 (Ala.Cr.App.1986). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Santosky v. Kramer
green
2 sentences2007Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982)." 674 So.2d at 537 (emphasis added). 2007Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982)." 674 So.2d at 537 (emphasis added). | 3 | 1995–2007 |
C.E.G. v. A.L.A.
green
2 sentences2018Id. 2018Id. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
O'NEIL v. Picillo
green
2 sentences2006In support of their argument, the Holsombacks urge that the trial court properly applied a lesser standard in determining that Auxilio Mutuo had minimum contacts with Alabama because they agree with the trial court that the human organ placed in Alabama's stream of commerce was "inherently dangerous." In its order, the trial court relied on the holdings in Poyner v. Erma Werke GmbH , 618 F.2d 1186 , 1192 (6th Cir.1980), and O'Neil v. Picillo , 682 F.Supp. 706 (D.R.I.1988), which involved the placement of a handgun and hazardous waste, respectively, into the stream of commerce. 2006In support of their argument, the Hol-sombacks urge that the trial court properly applied a lesser standard in determining that Auxilio Mutuo had minimum contacts with Alabama because they agree with the trial court that the human organ placed in Alabama’s stream of commerce was “inherently dangerous.” In its order, the trial court relied on the holdings in Poyner v. Erma Werke GmbH, 618 F.2d 1186, 1192 (6th Cir.1980), and O’Neil v. Picillo, 682 F.Supp. 706 (D.R.I.1988), which involved the placement of a handgun and hazardous waste, respectively, into the stream of commerce. | 2 | 2006–2006 |
Defore v. Bourjois, Inc.
green
2 sentences2006Auxilio Mutuo and LifeLink 2 argue, and we agree, that a human organ is not an “inherently dangerous product” and, therefore, that the lesser standard applied in the trial court’s analysis was improper. 3 In Defore v. Bourjois, Inc., 268 Ala. 228 , 105 So.2d 846 (1958), this Court, in determining whether a perfume bottle was inherently dangerous, quoted the following definition of a product that is inherently dangerous to human life or health from 42 A.L.R. 1243 at 1244: “ ‘An article may be said to be inherently dangerous where the danger lies in the nature or character of the article. 2006Auxilio Mutuo and LifeLink 2 argue, and we agree, that a human organ is not an “inherently dangerous product” and, therefore, that the lesser standard applied in the trial court’s analysis was improper. 3 In Defore v. Bourjois, Inc., 268 Ala. 228 , 105 So.2d 846 (1958), this Court, in determining whether a perfume bottle was inherently dangerous, quoted the following definition of a product that is inherently dangerous to human life or health from 42 A.L.R. 1243 at 1244: “ ‘An article may be said to be inherently dangerous where the danger lies in the nature or character of the article. | 2 | 2006–2006 |
Ex Parte Easterwood
green
1 sentence2024This lesser standard applies to a partial closure because a partial closure " ' "does not raise the same constitutional concerns as a total closure," ' " given that " ' "an audience remains to ensure the fairness of the proceedings." ' " Id. at 373 (quoting Ex parte Judd, 694 So. 2d 1294, 1296 (Ala. 1997), quoting in turn United States v. Osborne, 68 F.3d 94, 98 (5th Cir. 1995)). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Watson v. State
green
1 sentence2011See Ex parte Dunn, 514 So.2d 1300 (Ala.1987); Watson v. State, 808 So.2d 77 (Ala.Crim.App.2001); Turner v. State, 924 So.2d 737, 782 (Ala.Crim.App.2002). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Cage v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences2003In Cage , the United States Supreme Court held that a jury instruction on reasonable doubt that defined that term by using together the three phrases "grave uncertainty," "actual substantial doubt" and "moral certainty," could have led a jury to believe that a lesser standard of proof was needed to convict than is required by the constitution. 498 U.S. at 41 , 111 S.Ct. 328 . 2003In Cage , the United States Supreme Court held that a jury instruction on reasonable doubt that defined that term by using together the three phrases "grave uncertainty," "actual substantial doubt" and "moral certainty," could have led a jury to believe that a lesser standard of proof was needed to convict than is required by the constitution. 498 U.S. at 41 , 111 S.Ct. 328 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Ivery v. State
green
1 sentence1998See Lewis v. State , 380 So.2d 970 , 977 (Ala.Cr.App. 1979) (`the extent of sub-normal mental capacity [shown in support of this mitigating factor] does not have to measure up to the applicable test necessary to show. . . . insanity that makes one incapable of committing a crime'), cert. denied, 370 So.2d 1106 (Ala. 1979); Whisenhant v. State , 370 So.2d 1080 , 1095-96 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 370 So.2d 1106 (1979) (a finding that a diminished capacity mitigating circumstance exists `may be based on evidence of a lesser standard than is necessary to find insanity')." 686 So.2d at 503 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
City of Birmingham v. Stacy Williams Co., Inc.
green
1 sentence1986City of Birmingham v. Stacy Williams Co., 356 So.2d 608 (Ala.1978). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
State v. Dixon
green
1 sentence1979In State v. Dixon, Fla., 283 So.2d 1 , we find the following language: "Extreme mental or emotional disturbance is a second mitigating consideration, pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 921.141(7)(b), F.S.A., which is easily interpreted as less *1096 than insanity but more than the emotions of an average man, however, inflamed." * * * * * * "Mental disturbance which interferes with but does not obviate the defendant's knowledge of right and wrong may also be considered as a mitigating circumstance. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.