lesser standard in Indiana

2018See Jones , 81 N.E.3d at 693 . [14] In its decisions, our supreme court distinguished the foreseeability component in the context of duty from the foreseeability component in the context of proximate cause, stating: " '[T]he foreseeability component of proximate cause requires an evaluation of the facts of the actual occurrence, while foreseeability as a component of duty involves a lesser inquiry which requires a more general analysis of the broad type of plaintiff and harm involved, without regard to the facts of the actual occurrence.' " 2 Goodwin , 62 N.E.3d at 391 (quoting Goldsberry v. G

2017Our Supreme Court distinguished the foreseeability component in the context of duty from the foreseeability component in the context of proximate cause, stating: “ ‘[T]he foreseeability component of proximate cause requires an evaluation of the facts of the actual occurrence, while foreseeability as a component of duty involves a lesser inquiry which requires a more general analysis of the broad type of plaintiff and harm involved, without regard to the facts of the actual occurrence.’ ” 5 Goodwin, 62 N.E.3d at 391 (quoting Goldsberry v. Grubbs, 672 N.E.2d 475, 479 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans.

2020See Baum, 533 N.E.2d at 1201 (“We therefore apply a lesser standard responsive more to the due course of law or due process of law principles which are at the heart of the civil post-conviction remedy.”); see also A.M. v. State, 134 N.E.3d 361 , 366–67 (Ind. 2019) (holding that Sixth Amendment Strickland standard did not apply in juvenile disposition-modification hearings).

2002Id. © Our supreme court has therefore applied a lesser standard responsive more to the due course of law or due process of law principles that are at the heart of the civil post-conviction remedy.

2020But foreseeability in this context—as a component of duty—is evaluated differently than foreseeability in proximate cause determinations: while the latter foreseeability analysis requires a factfinder to evaluate the specific facts from the case, the former “involves a lesser inquiry,” requiring a court, as a threshold legal matter, to evaluate “the broad type of plaintiff and harm involved, without regard Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-CT-88 | March 3, 2020 Page 4 of 13 to the facts of the actual occurrence.” Goodwin, 62 N.E.3d at 393 (citation omitted); see generally id. at 392 (reject

2020But foreseeability in this context—as a component of duty—is evaluated differently than foreseeability in proximate cause determinations: while the latter foreseeability analysis requires a factfinder to evaluate the specific facts from the case, the former “involves a lesser inquiry,” requiring a court, as a threshold legal matter, to evaluate “the broad type of plaintiff and harm involved, without regard Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-CT-88 | March 3, 2020 Page 4 of 13 to the facts of the actual occurrence.” Goodwin, 62 N.E.3d at 393 (citation omitted); see generally id. at 392 (reject

2019Fry v. State, 885 N.E.2d 742, 750 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted), trans. denied.

2019Fry v. State, 885 N.E.2d 742, 750 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted), trans. denied.

2020Where typically, the culpability requirement for the attempt of a crime is that of the specific crime attempted, for convictions of attempted murder our supreme court “has emphasized the importance of requiring specific Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1698 | April 6, 2020 Page 7 of 9 intent to kill . . . despite [] the culpability requirement for murder includ[ing] the lesser standard of ‘knowingly.’” Perez v. State, 872 N.E.2d 208, 211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. [15] Specific intent to kill “may be inferred from the intentional use of a deadly weapon in a ma

2015“However, our supreme court has emphasized the importance of requiring specific intent to kill before a defendant can be convicted of attempted murder, despite that the culpability requirement for murder includes Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1506-CR-592 | December 31, 2015 Page 5 of 8 the lesser standard of ‘knowingly.’” Perez v. State, 872 N.E.2d 208, 211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. [13] The State charged that on or about December 2, 2014, Davis “did attempt to commit the crime of Murder, which is to intentionally kill another human being, namely: George Po

2014Dughaish v. Cobb, 729 N.E.2d 159,166 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied.

2010Dughaish v. Cobb, 729 N.E.2d 159, 166 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) ("Before a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action may invoke the 'increased risk of harm' standard, the plaintiff must establish that it is within the class of plaintiffs to which the lesser standard of causation under Section 323 may be applied.

2012See Dokes, 971 N.E.2d at 180-81 (“Because of the difference between the burden of proof required to convict someone of a crime and the burden of proof required to revoke probation, the court could revoke probation after finding [defendant] not guilty based on the same evidence.”).

2012See Dokes v. State, 971 N.E.2d 178, 180-81 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (“Because of the difference between the burden of proof required to convict someone of a crime and the burden of proof required to revoke probation, the court could revoke probation after finding [defendant] not guilty based on the same evidence.”).

2009See State v. Akins, 824 N.E.2d 676, 677 (Ind.2005) (declining to apply a lesser standard of review where the issue presents a question of law). [2] Given our holding, we need not address DCS's alternative argument that, pursuant to Indiana Code § 31-40-1-2(e), it is not obligated to pay for services provided by a GAL where 1) the services are not eligible for federal assistance under either Title IV-B or Title IV-E of the federal Social Security Act; and 2) it has not recommended or approved those services.

2009See State v. Akins, 824 N.E.2d 676, 677 (Ind.2005) (declining to apply a lesser standard of review where the issue presents a question of law). .

2025The Court explained that “foreseeability as a component of duty involves a lesser inquiry which ‘requires a more general analysis of the broad type of plaintiff and harm involved, without regard to the facts of the actual occurrence.’” Id. at 393 (quoting Goldsberry, 672 N.E.2d at 479 ).

2018See Jones , 81 N.E.3d at 693 . [14] In its decisions, our supreme court distinguished the foreseeability component in the context of duty from the foreseeability component in the context of proximate cause, stating: " '[T]he foreseeability component of proximate cause requires an evaluation of the facts of the actual occurrence, while foreseeability as a component of duty involves a lesser inquiry which requires a more general analysis of the broad type of plaintiff and harm involved, without regard to the facts of the actual occurrence.' " 2 Goodwin , 62 N.E.3d at 391 (quoting Goldsberry v. G

2019See, respectively, Cowell v. State, 275 Ind. 252, 254 , 416 12The Court in Strickland referred to the Cuyler standard as a “limited” presumption of prejudice—not quite a per se rule of prejudice but a lesser standard than ordinary IAC claims. 466 U.S. at 692 .

2012Therefore, rather than applying the rigorous standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), we instead judge post-conviction counsel by a lesser standard based on due-course-of-law principles.

1998“However, we are not compelled to apply this lesser standard and may, in our discretion, decide the case on the merits.” Id. at 684-85 .

1995However, we are not compelled to apply this lesser standard and may, in our discretion, decide the case on the merits." Id. at 684 (citation omitted).

2026A theoretical chance of survival is not the ability to live outside the womb, and the legislature’s deliberate use of the word ability is not an invitation to substitute a lesser standard. [34] “It is well-settled that proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt does not exist where the evidence does no more than . . . establish a possibility or suspicion of guilt.” Wilson v. State, 455 N.E.2d 1120, 1122 (Ind. 1983) (citing Briscoe v. State, 388 N.E.2d 638 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979)).

2023Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328 (1987) (“A dwelling-place search, not less than a dwelling-place seizure, requires probable cause.”); United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1511 (11th Cir. 1991) (“Reasonable suspicion cannot justify a warrantless search of a house.”). [27] We agree with Nance that this was a rogue knock and talk, rather than, as the State claims, a knock and talk turned investigatory stop authorized by Terry.

2023Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328 (1987) (“A dwelling-place search, not less than a dwelling-place seizure, requires probable cause.”); United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1511 (11th Cir. 1991) (“Reasonable suspicion cannot justify a warrantless search of a house.”). [27] We agree with Nance that this was a rogue knock and talk, rather than, as the State claims, a knock and talk turned investigatory stop authorized by Terry.

2020And while I agree with the majority that businesses should not become 1 In conducting this foreseeability analysis, we consider the defendant’s knowledge, see Rogers, 63 N.E.3d at 327 , so it makes sense to consider (but not require) contemporaneous evidence of observed escalation, see, e.g., Certa v. Steak ‘n Shake Operations, Inc., 102 N.E.3d 336, 341 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied.

2020Where typically, the culpability requirement for the attempt of a crime is that of the specific crime attempted, for convictions of attempted murder our supreme court “has emphasized the importance of requiring specific Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1698 | April 6, 2020 Page 7 of 9 intent to kill . . . despite [] the culpability requirement for murder includ[ing] the lesser standard of ‘knowingly.’” Perez v. State, 872 N.E.2d 208, 211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. [15] Specific intent to kill “may be inferred from the intentional use of a deadly weapon in a ma

2020“Discharging a weapon in the direction of a victim is substantial evidence from which a jury can infer intent to kill.” Id. [16] Here, Neal admitted to Detective Kronewitter that he was armed with a gun when he arrived at Frank’s Place, and a gun matching his description was later recovered from the scene.

2019See, respectively, Cowell v. State, 275 Ind. 252, 254 , 416 12The Court in Strickland referred to the Cuyler standard as a “limited” presumption of prejudice—not quite a per se rule of prejudice but a lesser standard than ordinary IAC claims. 466 U.S. at 692 .

2019Indiana Supreme Court | Case Nos. 22S00-1601-PD-00009, 22S00-1608-PD-00411 | Oct. 24, 2019 Page 34 of 40 N.E.2d 839, 841 (1981); Thompkins v. State, 482 N.E.2d 710 (Ind. 1985); Hennings v. State, 638 N.E.2d 811 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), trans. denied.

2018See Jones , 81 N.E.3d at 693 . [14] In its decisions, our supreme court distinguished the foreseeability component in the context of duty from the foreseeability component in the context of proximate cause, stating: " '[T]he foreseeability component of proximate cause requires an evaluation of the facts of the actual occurrence, while foreseeability as a component of duty involves a lesser inquiry which requires a more general analysis of the broad type of plaintiff and harm involved, without regard to the facts of the actual occurrence.' " 2 Goodwin , 62 N.E.3d at 391 (quoting Goldsberry v. G