lesser standard in West Virginia

2017It is true that this Court has held that instructions which vary the reasonable doubt standard or attempt to explain it “are strongly discouraged, because they certainly confuse the jury as to the meaning of reasonable doubt and may by themselves be prejudicial to the defendant for the obvious reason that the jury is invited to convict on a lesser standard of proof.” Id. at 54 , 272 S.E.2d at 462 (quoting State v. Starr, 158 W.Va. 905 , 216 S.E.2d 242 (1975)).

2017It is true that this Court has held that instructions which vary the reasonable doubt standard or attempt to explain it “are strongly discouraged, because they certainly confuse the jury as to the meaning of reasonable doubt and may by themselves be prejudicial to the defendant for the obvious reason that the jury is invited to convict on a lesser standard of proof.” Id. at 54 , 272 S.E.2d at 462 (quoting State v. Starr, 158 W.Va. 905 , 216 S.E.2d 242 (1975)).

1982We stated in Syllabus Point 2 of State v. Keffer, 168 W.Va. 59 , 281 S.E.2d 495 (1981), that: “Where the State’s instructions attempt to define reasonable doubt and such definitions are in substantial variance from customary reasonable doubt language so that the jury may well have convicted on a lesser standard of proof, such instructions will constitute reversible error.” In Keffer , the trial court gave three State instructions defining reasonable doubt.

1982We stated in Syllabus Point 2 of State v. Keffer, 168 W.Va. 59 , 281 S.E.2d 495 (1981), that: “Where the State’s instructions attempt to define reasonable doubt and such definitions are in substantial variance from customary reasonable doubt language so that the jury may well have convicted on a lesser standard of proof, such instructions will constitute reversible error.” In Keffer , the trial court gave three State instructions defining reasonable doubt.

1982One of the State’s instructions in Keffer of which we disapproved is almost identical to State’s Instruction No. 5 in the present case. 15 We have repeatedly discouraged the giving of instructions which attempt to define the reasonable doubt standard beyond the traditional formulation. 16 State v. Keffer, supra; State v. Goff, 166 W.Va. 47 , 272 S.E.2d 457 (1980); State v. Starr, 158 W.Va. 905 , 216 S.E.2d 242 (1975); State v. Powers, 91 W.Va. 737 , 113 S.E. 912 (1922), overruled on other grounds, State v. Petry, 166 W.Va. 153 , 273 S.E.2d 346 (1980).

1980Va. 905 , 216 S.E.2d 242 (1975), we stated that instructions which vary the reasonable doubt standard or attempt to explain it “are strongly discouraged, because they certainly confuse the jury as to the meaning of reasonable doubt and may by themselves be prejudicial to the defendant for the obvious reason that the jury is invited to convict on a lesser standard of proof.” A similar admonition can be found in State v. Powers, 91 W.

2022The lesser standard adopted by the majority weakens citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights by allowing as a matter of routine the type a search that occurred herein – one in which police can enter a private home and search without a warrant based solely on a “‘dint of mere suspicion or uncorroborated information and without the benefit of any judicial determination.’” Brinkley, 980 F.3d at 386 (quoting Vasquez-Algarin, 821 F.3d at 480 ). 11 Significantly, the State conceded that probable cause did not exist in this case, and that it could not prevail under that standard because the only basis for s

2022The lesser standard adopted by the majority weakens citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights by allowing as a matter of routine the type a search that occurred herein – one in which police can enter a private home and search without a warrant based solely on a “‘dint of mere suspicion or uncorroborated information and without the benefit of any judicial determination.’” Brinkley, 980 F.3d at 386 (quoting Vasquez-Algarin, 821 F.3d at 480 ). 11 Significantly, the State conceded that probable cause did not exist in this case, and that it could not prevail under that standard because the only basis for s

2009In State v. Stuart, 192 W.Va. 428 , 452 S.E.2d 886 (1994), we were asked whether law enforcement officers must have actual probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed before making an investigatory stop of a motor vehicle, or whether the officers could rely on the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion without violating an individuals Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure.

2009In State v. Stuart, 192 W.Va. 428 , 452 S.E.2d 886 (1994), we were asked whether law enforcement officers must have actual probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed before making an investigatory stop of a motor vehicle, or whether the officers could rely on the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion without violating an individuals Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure.

2004The circuit court's construction of "clear," however, conforms to the commonly accepted meaning of "preponderance of the evidence" which is "more likely than not." As indicated above, this is a lesser standard than "clear and convincing." See Hovermale v. Berkeley Springs Moose Lodge No. 1483, 165 W.Va. 689 , 697 n. 4, 271 S.E.2d 335 , 341 n. 4 (1980) (stating that "[p]roof by a preponderance of the evidence requires only that a party satisfy the court or jury by sufficient evidence that the existence of a fact is more probable or likely than its nonexistence.").

2004The circuit court's construction of "clear," however, conforms to the commonly accepted meaning of "preponderance of the evidence" which is "more likely than not." As indicated above, this is a lesser standard than "clear and convincing." See Hovermale v. Berkeley Springs Moose Lodge No. 1483, 165 W.Va. 689 , 697 n. 4, 271 S.E.2d 335 , 341 n. 4 (1980) (stating that "[p]roof by a preponderance of the evidence requires only that a party satisfy the court or jury by sufficient evidence that the existence of a fact is more probable or likely than its nonexistence.").

1982One of the State’s instructions in Keffer of which we disapproved is almost identical to State’s Instruction No. 5 in the present case. 15 We have repeatedly discouraged the giving of instructions which attempt to define the reasonable doubt standard beyond the traditional formulation. 16 State v. Keffer, supra; State v. Goff, 166 W.Va. 47 , 272 S.E.2d 457 (1980); State v. Starr, 158 W.Va. 905 , 216 S.E.2d 242 (1975); State v. Powers, 91 W.Va. 737 , 113 S.E. 912 (1922), overruled on other grounds, State v. Petry, 166 W.Va. 153 , 273 S.E.2d 346 (1980).

1982One of the State’s instructions in Keffer of which we disapproved is almost identical to State’s Instruction No. 5 in the present case. 15 We have repeatedly discouraged the giving of instructions which attempt to define the reasonable doubt standard beyond the traditional formulation. 16 State v. Keffer, supra; State v. Goff, 166 W.Va. 47 , 272 S.E.2d 457 (1980); State v. Starr, 158 W.Va. 905 , 216 S.E.2d 242 (1975); State v. Powers, 91 W.Va. 737 , 113 S.E. 912 (1922), overruled on other grounds, State v. Petry, 166 W.Va. 153 , 273 S.E.2d 346 (1980).