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17 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Alabama v. Whitegreen2 sentences2016While a full custodial arrest must be based on probable cause to believe a crime has been committed, see Terry, 392 U.S. at 24-26 , an investigatory stop is grounded on the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion, Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (“Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable t 2016While a full custodial arrest must be based on probable cause to believe a crime has been committed, see Terry, 392 U.S. at 24-26 , an investigatory stop is grounded on the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion, Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (“Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable t | 2 | 2 |
State v. Jason L.green2 sentences2016See State v. Jason L., 2000-NMSC-018 , ¶¶ 14, 20, 129 N.M. 119 , 2 P.3d 856 . 2016See State v. Jason L., 2000-NMSC-018 , ¶¶ 14, 20, 129 N.M. 119 , 2 P.3d 856 . | 2 | 2 |
Dick v. City of Portalesgreen2 sentences2012Dick v. City of Portales, 116 N.M. 472, 478 , 863 P.2d 1093, 1099 (Ct. 2 App. 1993 ). 2012Dick v. City of Portales, 116 N.M. 472, 478 , 863 P.2d 1093, 1099 (Ct. 2 App. 1993 ). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Juangreen2 sentences2011Id. ¶¶ 16, 19; see also 11 1 State v. Juan, 2010-NMSC-041, ¶ 1 , 148 N.M. 747 , 242 P.3d 314 (upholding the 2 denial of a lesser instruction where the conduct underlying the greater charge and the 3 conduct that would have supported the lesser included offense instruction were not 4 the same). 5 With those principles in mind, we now apply the analysis required by the 6 cognate approach to the record in this case. 7 C. 2011Id. ¶¶ 16, 19; see also 11 1 State v. Juan, 2010-NMSC-041, ¶ 1 , 148 N.M. 747 , 242 P.3d 314 (upholding the 2 denial of a lesser instruction where the conduct underlying the greater charge and the 3 conduct that would have supported the lesser included offense instruction were not 4 the same). 5 With those principles in mind, we now apply the analysis required by the 6 cognate approach to the record in this case. 7 C. | 1 | 1 |
Neitzel v. Stategreen2 sentences2005See Neitzel, 655 P.2d at 337 ("[T]he significant distinction is in the likelihood that a death will result from the defendant's act."); People v. Register, 60 N.Y.2d 270 , 469 N.Y.S.2d 599 , 457 N.E.2d 704, 707 (1983) (distinguishing between the required "grave risk of death" for depraved mind murder and the "lesser" standard of substantial risk of death); see also Ibn Omar-Muhammad, 102 N.M. at 278 , 694 P.2d at 926 (stating that the difference between the extreme recklessness requirement of depraved mind murder and ordinary recklessness "is one of degree, not of kind"). 2005See Neitzel, 655 P.2d at 337 (“[T]he significant distinction is in the likelihood that a death will result from the defendant’s act.”); People v. Register, 60 N.Y.2d 270 , 469 N.Y.S.2d 599 , 457 N.E.2d 704, 707 (1983) (distinguishing between the required “grave risk of death” for depraved mind murder and the “lesser” standard of substantial risk of death); see also Ibn Omar-Muhammad, 102 N.M. at 278 , 694 P.2d at 926 (stating that the difference between the extreme recklessness requirement of depraved mind murder and ordinary recklessness “is one of degree, not of kind”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ibn Omar-Muhammadgreen2 sentences2005See Neitzel, 655 P.2d at 337 ("[T]he significant distinction is in the likelihood that a death will result from the defendant's act."); People v. Register, 60 N.Y.2d 270 , 469 N.Y.S.2d 599 , 457 N.E.2d 704, 707 (1983) (distinguishing between the required "grave risk of death" for depraved mind murder and the "lesser" standard of substantial risk of death); see also Ibn Omar-Muhammad, 102 N.M. at 278 , 694 P.2d at 926 (stating that the difference between the extreme recklessness requirement of depraved mind murder and ordinary recklessness "is one of degree, not of kind"). 2005See Neitzel, 655 P.2d at 337 ("[T]he significant distinction is in the likelihood that a death will result from the defendant's act."); People v. Register, 60 N.Y.2d 270 , 469 N.Y.S.2d 599 , 457 N.E.2d 704, 707 (1983) (distinguishing between the required "grave risk of death" for depraved mind murder and the "lesser" standard of substantial risk of death); see also Ibn Omar-Muhammad, 102 N.M. at 278 , 694 P.2d at 926 (stating that the difference between the extreme recklessness requirement of depraved mind murder and ordinary recklessness "is one of degree, not of kind"). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Registerred2 sentences2005See Neitzel, 655 P.2d at 337 ("[T]he significant distinction is in the likelihood that a death will result from the defendant's act."); People v. Register, 60 N.Y.2d 270 , 469 N.Y.S.2d 599 , 457 N.E.2d 704, 707 (1983) (distinguishing between the required "grave risk of death" for depraved mind murder and the "lesser" standard of substantial risk of death); see also Ibn Omar-Muhammad, 102 N.M. at 278 , 694 P.2d at 926 (stating that the difference between the extreme recklessness requirement of depraved mind murder and ordinary recklessness "is one of degree, not of kind"). 2005See Neitzel, 655 P.2d at 337 ("[T]he significant distinction is in the likelihood that a death will result from the defendant's act."); People v. Register, 60 N.Y.2d 270 , 469 N.Y.S.2d 599 , 457 N.E.2d 704, 707 (1983) (distinguishing between the required "grave risk of death" for depraved mind murder and the "lesser" standard of substantial risk of death); see also Ibn Omar-Muhammad, 102 N.M. at 278 , 694 P.2d at 926 (stating that the difference between the extreme recklessness requirement of depraved mind murder and ordinary recklessness "is one of degree, not of kind"). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ortegagreen2 sentences1984See State v. Ortega, 77 N.M. 7 , 419 P.2d 219 (1966); State v. Upton, 60 N.M. 205 , 290 P.2d 440 (1955); State v. Folk, 56 N.M. 583 , 247 P.2d 165 (1952). 1984See State v. Ortega, 77 N.M. 7 , 419 P.2d 219 (1966); State v. Upton, 60 N.M. 205 , 290 P.2d 440 (1955); State v. Folk, 56 N.M. 583 , 247 P.2d 165 (1952). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Terry v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2016While a full custodial arrest must be based on probable cause to believe a crime has been committed, see Terry, 392 U.S. at 24-26 , an investigatory stop is grounded on the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion, Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (“Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable t 2016While a full custodial arrest must be based on probable cause to believe a crime has been committed, see Terry, 392 U.S. at 24-26 , an investigatory stop is grounded on the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion, Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (“Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable t | 2 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Neal
green
2 sentences2016While a full custodial arrest must be based on probable cause to believe a crime has been committed, see Terry, 392 U.S. at 24-26 , an investigatory stop is grounded on the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion, Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (“Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable t 2016While a full custodial arrest must be based on probable cause to believe a crime has been committed, see Terry, 392 U.S. at 24-26 , an investigatory stop is grounded on the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion, Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (“Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable t | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Cotter v. Novak
green
2 sentences2017To support his argument, 14 Plaintiff cites Cotter v. Novak, 1953-NMSC-093 , 57 N.M. 639 , 261 P.2d 827 . 2017To support his argument, 14 Plaintiff cites Cotter v. Novak, 1953-NMSC-093 , 57 N.M. 639 , 261 P.2d 827 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Sheehan
green
1 sentence2015Id. ¶ 26; 7 Sheehan, 2015-NMCA-021, ¶ 12 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
United States v. Knights
green
2 sentences2009Balancing these considerations, the Court found that the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion, not probable cause, "satisfies the Constitution when the balance of governmental and private interests makes such a standard reasonable." Id. at 121 . 2009Balancing these considerations, the Court found that the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion, not probable cause, “satisfies the Constitution when the balance of governmental and private interests makes such a standard reasonable.” Id. at 121 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Gomez
green
2 sentences2004We do not in any way intend by this holding to undermine or lessen this Court’s or our Supreme Court’s steadfast preference for warrants, see Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 36 , 122 N.M. 777 , 932 P.2d 1 , outside of clearly recognized exceptions, or in the probation context involving reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal conduct has occurred or is occurring. (4) Exigent Circumstances Are Not Required {44} Understanding that we might not require a standard more stringent than reasonable cause or reasonable suspicion, Defendant seeks to add the requirement of exigent circumstances to the lesse 2004We do not in any way intend by this holding to undermine or lessen this Court’s or our Supreme Court’s steadfast preference for warrants, see Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 36 , 122 N.M. 777 , 932 P.2d 1 , outside of clearly recognized exceptions, or in the probation context involving reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal conduct has occurred or is occurring. (4) Exigent Circumstances Are Not Required {44} Understanding that we might not require a standard more stringent than reasonable cause or reasonable suspicion, Defendant seeks to add the requirement of exigent circumstances to the lesse | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Boeglin
green
2 sentences2003The State now "cannot be heard to complain on appeal if [they have] gambled and lost." Boeglin, 105 N.M. at 251 , 731 P.2d at 947 . 2003The State now "cannot be heard to complain on appeal if [they have] gambled and lost." Boeglin, 105 N.M. at 251 , 731 P.2d at 947 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
State v. TONY G.
green
2 sentences2002For example, the revocation of a juvenile’s probation requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas adult probation revocations require a lesser standard of “reasonable certainty.” Tony G., 121 N.M. at 190 , 909 P.2d at 750 ; see Section 32A-2-24(B). 2002For example, the revocation of a juvenile’s probation requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas adult probation revocations require a lesser standard of “reasonable certainty.” Tony G., 121 N.M. at 190 , 909 P.2d at 750 ; see Section 32A-2-24(B). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Matter of D'Angelo
green
2 sentences1997In this case, “the record on appeal meets the clear and convincing evidence standard, which includes the lesser standard of a preponderance of the evidence____” Id. at 393 , 733 P.2d at 362 . (17) We therefore adopt the recommendation of the disciplinary board and find that respondent violated Rule 16-303(A)(1), by knowingly making a’ false statement of material fact to the Court of Appeals, Rule 16-804(C), by engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, Rule 16-804(D), by engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, and Rule 16-804(H), by 1997In this case, “the record on appeal meets the clear and convincing evidence standard, which includes the lesser standard of a preponderance of the evidence____” Id. at 393 , 733 P.2d at 362 . (17) We therefore adopt the recommendation of the disciplinary board and find that respondent violated Rule 16-303(A)(1), by knowingly making a’ false statement of material fact to the Court of Appeals, Rule 16-804(C), by engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, Rule 16-804(D), by engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, and Rule 16-804(H), by | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Powell v. Gutierrez
green
2 sentences1994The Maryland Court of Appeals construed a rule functionally similar to SCRA 1-041(E)(2) in Powell v. Gutierrez, 310 Md. 302 , 529 A.2d 352 (1987). 1994The Maryland Court of Appeals construed a rule functionally similar to SCRA 1-041(E)(2) in Powell v. Gutierrez, 310 Md. 302 , 529 A.2d 352 (1987). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
West Cent. La. Entertainment v. Leesville
green
1 sentence1993Entertainment, Inc. v. City ofLeesville, 594 So.2d 973, 976 (La.Ct.App.1992) (vagueness is governed by a lesser standard of definiteness when laws regulating business behavior are involved). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
United Nuclear Corp. v. Allendale Mutual Insurance
green
2 sentences1989Id. at 495 , 709 P.2d at 664 . 1989Id. at 495 , 709 P.2d at 664 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
State v. Upton
green
2 sentences1984See State v. Ortega, 77 N.M. 7 , 419 P.2d 219 (1966); State v. Upton, 60 N.M. 205 , 290 P.2d 440 (1955); State v. Folk, 56 N.M. 583 , 247 P.2d 165 (1952). 1984See State v. Ortega, 77 N.M. 7 , 419 P.2d 219 (1966); State v. Upton, 60 N.M. 205 , 290 P.2d 440 (1955); State v. Folk, 56 N.M. 583 , 247 P.2d 165 (1952). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
State v. Folk
green
2 sentences1984See State v. Ortega, 77 N.M. 7 , 419 P.2d 219 (1966); State v. Upton, 60 N.M. 205 , 290 P.2d 440 (1955); State v. Folk, 56 N.M. 583 , 247 P.2d 165 (1952). 1984See State v. Ortega, 77 N.M. 7 , 419 P.2d 219 (1966); State v. Upton, 60 N.M. 205 , 290 P.2d 440 (1955); State v. Folk, 56 N.M. 583 , 247 P.2d 165 (1952). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
State v. Morris
green
2 sentences1975In discussing suppressed evidence in terms of constitutional due process, State v. Morris, 69 N.M. 244 , 365 P.2d 668 (1961) refers to evidence “material to the guilt or innocence of the accused, or to the penalty to be imposed.” Trimble v. State, supra, does not approve a lesser standard because Trimble states: “Nothing which follows . . . conflicts with our holding in State v. Morris, supra.” Rule of Criminal Procedure 27(a)(5) is worded differently than the due process standard. 1975In discussing suppressed evidence in terms of constitutional due process, State v. Morris, 69 N.M. 244 , 365 P.2d 668 (1961) refers to evidence “material to the guilt or innocence of the accused, or to the penalty to be imposed.” Trimble v. State, supra, does not approve a lesser standard because Trimble states: “Nothing which follows . . . conflicts with our holding in State v. Morris, supra.” Rule of Criminal Procedure 27(a)(5) is worded differently than the due process standard. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.