lesser standard (Vermont) · Go Syfert
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lesser standard in Vermont

12 Vermont opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2020 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Vermont courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (12)

CaseFollowedCited
State v. Eric K. Manninggreen
vt · 2015 · cited in 3 Vermont opinions naming this issue, 2019–2020
2 sentences

2020“In determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to effectuate a seizure or extend an investigative detention, we look at the totality of the circumstances.” Manning, 2015 VT 124, ¶ 14 . ¶ 9.

2019State v. Tuma , 2013 VT 70 , ¶ 8, 194 Vt. 345 , 79 A.3d 883 ("[E]ven a minor traffic infraction can be the basis of a traffic stop."); see Manning , 2015 VT 124 , ¶ 12, 200 Vt. 423 , 132 A.3d 716 (stating that "an officer's reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation can form the basis for a lawful stop"); *493 State v. Lussier , 171 Vt. 19 , 34, 757 A.2d 1017 , 1027 (2000) ("[T]he law is well-settled that police may stop a vehicle and briefly detain its occupants to investigate a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a motor vehicle violation is taking place.").

23
State v. Lussiergreen
vt · 2000 · cited in 2 Vermont opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
2 sentences

2019State v. Tuma , 2013 VT 70 , ¶ 8, 194 Vt. 345 , 79 A.3d 883 ("[E]ven a minor traffic infraction can be the basis of a traffic stop."); see Manning , 2015 VT 124 , ¶ 12, 200 Vt. 423 , 132 A.3d 716 (stating that "an officer's reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation can form the basis for a lawful stop"); *493 State v. Lussier , 171 Vt. 19 , 34, 757 A.2d 1017 , 1027 (2000) ("[T]he law is well-settled that police may stop a vehicle and briefly detain its occupants to investigate a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a motor vehicle violation is taking place.").

2019State v. Tuma , 2013 VT 70 , ¶ 8, 194 Vt. 345 , 79 A.3d 883 ("[E]ven a minor traffic infraction can be the basis of a traffic stop."); see Manning , 2015 VT 124 , ¶ 12, 200 Vt. 423 , 132 A.3d 716 (stating that "an officer's reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation can form the basis for a lawful stop"); *493 State v. Lussier , 171 Vt. 19 , 34, 757 A.2d 1017 , 1027 (2000) ("[T]he law is well-settled that police may stop a vehicle and briefly detain its occupants to investigate a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a motor vehicle violation is taking place.").

22
In Re Walkergreen
vt · 1991 · cited in 1 Vermont opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
1 sentence

2014But the change from “adverse affect” under 24 V.S.A. § 4407(2) to “undue adverse affect” under § 4414(3)(A) evinces a distinction without a difference, since our Supreme Court has held “that the adverse effect test must be applied reasonably to prohibit only substantial and material adverse effects.” In re Miller, 170 Vt. 64, 69 (1999) (citing In re Walker, 156 Vt. 639, 639 (1991) (mem.)).

11
In Re Appeal of Millergreen
vt · 1999 · cited in 1 Vermont opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
1 sentence

2014But the change from “adverse affect” under 24 V.S.A. § 4407(2) to “undue adverse affect” under § 4414(3)(A) evinces a distinction without a difference, since our Supreme Court has held “that the adverse effect test must be applied reasonably to prohibit only substantial and material adverse effects.” In re Miller, 170 Vt. 64, 69 (1999) (citing In re Walker, 156 Vt. 639, 639 (1991) (mem.)).

11
John Doe v. Attorney Discipline Bd.green
ca6 · 1996 · cited in 1 Vermont opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008
1 sentence

2008Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791, 793 (1st Cir. 1992) (where university reached the “rationally justifiable conclusion that the available alternatives would result either in lowering academic standards or requiring substantial program alteration, the court could rule as a matter of law that the institution had met its duty”) (quotations omitted); Doe v. Attorney Discipline Bd., 78 F.3d 584 , 1996 WL 78312, at *3 (6th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision) (in bar discipline case under Title II of the ADA, “ADA does not require that we hold Doe to a lesser standard of conduct than any other attorney

11
Steven Wynne v. Tufts University School of Medicinegreen
ca1 · 1992 · cited in 1 Vermont opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008
1 sentence

2008Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791, 793 (1st Cir. 1992) (where university reached the “rationally justifiable conclusion that the available alternatives would result either in lowering academic standards or requiring substantial program alteration, the court could rule as a matter of law that the institution had met its duty”) (quotations omitted); Doe v. Attorney Discipline Bd., 78 F.3d 584 , 1996 WL 78312, at *3 (6th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision) (in bar discipline case under Title II of the ADA, “ADA does not require that we hold Doe to a lesser standard of conduct than any other attorney

11
Gadhue v. Marcottegreen
vt · 1982 · cited in 1 Vermont opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006
2 sentences

2006See Gadhue v. Marcotte, 141 Vt. 238, 241 , 446 A.2d 375, 377 (1982) (stating that, because of § 4468(a), the “claim that there is a less strict criterion for area or dimensional variances than for use variances has no merit”).

2006See Gadhue v. Marcotte, 141 Vt. 238, 241 , 446 A.2d 375, 377 (1982) (stating that, because of § 4468(a), the “claim that there is a less strict criterion for area or dimensional variances than for use variances has no merit”).

11
Matthew v. Smithgreen
mo · 1986 · cited in 1 Vermont opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006
1 sentence

2006Although some jurisdictions apply a lesser standard of scrutiny to dimensional variances, see, e.g., Matthew v. Smith, 707 S.W.2d 411, 416 (Mo. 1986), we do not distinguish between variances from use requirements and those from area requirements.

11
State v. Pollandergreen
vt · 1997 · cited in 1 Vermont opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005
1 sentence

2005Cf. State v. Pollander, 167 Vt. 301, 306-07 (1997) (holding that the State’s failure to prove defendant’s guilt at a criminal trial for drunk driving does not preclude State from relitigating defendant’s intoxication in a civil suspension hearing because of the differing standards of proof).

11
State v. Shabazzgreen
vt · 1999 · cited in 1 Vermont opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001
2 sentences

2001As we have stated previously with regard to claims of erroneous jury instructions, “[w]e will assign error only where the instructions undermine our confidence in the verdict.” State v. Shabazz, 169 Vt. 448, 450 , 739 A.2d 666, 667 (1999).

2001As we have stated previously with regard to claims of erroneous jury instructions, “[w]e will assign error only where the instructions undermine our confidence in the verdict.” State v. Shabazz, 169 Vt. 448, 450 , 739 A.2d 666, 667 (1999).

11
KEARNS-TRIBUNE, P. OF SALT LK. T. v. Lewisgreen
utah · 1984 · cited in 1 Vermont opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991
2 sentences

1991In Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Lewis, 685 P.2d 515, 524 (Utah 1984), the court extended the openness of trials to preliminary hearings, but held that preliminary hearings in criminal cases may be closed when openness presents "a realistic likelihood of prejudice" to a defendant's right to a fair trial.

1991In Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Lewis, 685 P.2d 515, 524 (Utah 1984), the court extended the openness of trials to preliminary hearings, but held that preliminary hearings in criminal cases may be closed when openness presents “a realistic likelihood of prejudice” to a defendant’s right to a fair trial.

11
In Re Bousleygreen
vt · 1972 · cited in 1 Vermont opinions naming this issue, 1975–1975
2 sentences

1975Id. at 299.

1975Id. at 299, 292 A.2d at 252 .

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Vermont. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (5)

CaseCitedYears
State v. Tuma green
vt · 2013
2 sentences

2019State v. Tuma , 2013 VT 70 , ¶ 8, 194 Vt. 345 , 79 A.3d 883 ("[E]ven a minor traffic infraction can be the basis of a traffic stop."); see Manning , 2015 VT 124 , ¶ 12, 200 Vt. 423 , 132 A.3d 716 (stating that "an officer's reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation can form the basis for a lawful stop"); *493 State v. Lussier , 171 Vt. 19 , 34, 757 A.2d 1017 , 1027 (2000) ("[T]he law is well-settled that police may stop a vehicle and briefly detain its occupants to investigate a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a motor vehicle violation is taking place.").

2019State v. Tuma , 2013 VT 70 , ¶ 8, 194 Vt. 345 , 79 A.3d 883 ("[E]ven a minor traffic infraction can be the basis of a traffic stop."); see Manning , 2015 VT 124 , ¶ 12, 200 Vt. 423 , 132 A.3d 716 (stating that "an officer's reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation can form the basis for a lawful stop"); *493 State v. Lussier , 171 Vt. 19 , 34, 757 A.2d 1017 , 1027 (2000) ("[T]he law is well-settled that police may stop a vehicle and briefly detain its occupants to investigate a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a motor vehicle violation is taking place.").

22019–2019
State v. Rutter green
vt · 2011
2 sentences

2020“Although seizures normally require that a law enforcement officer have probable cause to believe that the person being seized has engaged in criminal activity, the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion of either criminal activity or even a minor traffic violation can form the basis of a valid temporary stop.” Id. ¶ 59. “[A] reasonable and articulable suspicion of illegal activity . . . means there must be more than an unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal activity, but considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.” State v. Rutter, 2011 VT 13, ¶ 8

2020“Although seizures normally require that a law enforcement officer have probable cause to believe that the person being seized has engaged in criminal activity, the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion of either criminal activity or even a minor traffic violation can form the basis of a valid temporary stop.” Id. ¶ 59. “[A] reasonable and articulable suspicion of illegal activity . . . means there must be more than an unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal activity, but considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.” State v. Rutter, 2011 VT 13, ¶ 8

12020–2020
Shirley McGrew v. Zaring Homes, Inc. green
ca6 · 1996
1 sentence

2008Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791, 793 (1st Cir. 1992) (where university reached the “rationally justifiable conclusion that the available alternatives would result either in lowering academic standards or requiring substantial program alteration, the court could rule as a matter of law that the institution had met its duty”) (quotations omitted); Doe v. Attorney Discipline Bd., 78 F.3d 584 , 1996 WL 78312, at *3 (6th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision) (in bar discipline case under Title II of the ADA, “ADA does not require that we hold Doe to a lesser standard of conduct than any other attorney

12008–2008
Griffin v. Wisconsin green
scotus · 1987
2 sentences

1993Id. at 873-74 , 107 S.Ct. at 3168-69 .

1993Id. at 873-74 , 107 S.Ct. at 3168-69 .

11993–1993
State v. Dunkerley green
vt · 1976
2 sentences

1984This was based on our recognition of the constitutional requirement that a defendant has a right to representation by a legally qualified attorney, and "[t]o require a lesser standard of judicial authority would be to defeat that constitutional purpose." Id.

1984This was based on our recognition of the constitutional requirement that a defendant has a right to representation by a legally qualified attorney, and “[t]o require a lesser standard of judicial authority would be to defeat that constitutional purpose.” Id.

11984–1984

Where else courts name it

CA 182 (1906–2026) TX 127 (1970–2026) OH 118 (1973–2025) NY 114 (1933–2026) IL 112 (1962–2025) PA 101 (1974–2026) IN 75 (1974–2026) LA 70 (1967–2025) FL 69 (1974–2025) WA 55 (1980–2026) CT 51 (1976–2024) MI 48 (1979–2026) GA 42 (1924–2023) NJ 41 (1953–2026) MD 41 (1975–2026) DC 34 (1970–2024) MA 33 (1966–2025) VA 31 (1982–2024) AZ 29 (1977–2026) KS 27 (1977–2026) AL 22 (1979–2024) TN 21 (1989–2026) OR 20 (1969–2023) CO 19 (1979–2026) WI 18 (1925–2023) NM 17 (1975–2017) MN 17 (1980–2014) OK 17 (1962–2022) MO 16 (1987–2020) MS 16 (1987–2025) IA 15 (1974–2022) NC 14 (1958–2026) KY 13 (1964–2024) AR 12 (1983–2023) ID 12 (1980–2014) WV 12 (1979–2022) AK 12 (1977–2017) VT 12 (1975–2020) MT 11 (2005–2026) RI 11 (1983–2011) SC 10 (1989–2020) NE 10 (1982–2023) UT 9 (1929–2024) DE 9 (1973–2026) ND 9 (1990–2016) WY 9 (1990–2022) SD 6 (1979–2008) ME 6 (1981–2018) NH 6 (1980–2019) HI 5 (1984–2007) NV 5 (1997–2022)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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