101 Pennsylvania opinions name it 10 courts 1974–2026 18 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Whren v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2016Furthermore, [w]hile it is argued the lesser standard will allow a vehicle stop to be made based on pretextual motives, the United States Supreme Court made clear that case law “foreclose[s] any argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved.” [Commonwealth v. ]Whren, [ 517 U.S. 806 ] at 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769 [(1996)]. 2016Furthermore, [w]hile it is argued the lesser standard will allow a vehicle stop to be made based on pretextual motives, the United States Supreme Court made clear that case law “foreclose[s] any argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved.” [Commonwealth v. ]Whren, [ 517 U.S. 806 ] at 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769 [(1996)]. | 8 | 9 |
Commonwealth v. Chasegreen2 sentences2015“While it is argued the lesser standard [reasonable suspicion] will allow a vehicle stop to be made based on pretextual motives, the United States Supreme Court made clear that case law ‘ foreclose [s] any argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved.’” Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d 108, 120 (Pa. 2008) citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); See also Commonwealth v. Foglia, 979 A.2d 357, 361-62 (Pa. Super. 2009) (Stating that observations made after the officer intends to stop the defen 2014“While it is argued the lesser standard [reasonable suspicion] will allow a vehicle stop to be made based on pretextual motives, the United States Supreme Court made clear that case law ‘foreclose^] any argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved.’” Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d 108, 120 (Pa. 2008) citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); See also Commonwealth v. Foglia, 979 A.2d 357, 361-62 (Pa. Super. 2009) (Stating that observations made after the officer intends to stop the defendan | 7 | 8 |
Commonwealth v. Fogliagreen2 sentences2015“While it is argued the lesser standard [reasonable suspicion] will allow a vehicle stop to be made based on pretextual motives, the United States Supreme Court made clear that case law ‘ foreclose [s] any argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved.’” Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d 108, 120 (Pa. 2008) citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); See also Commonwealth v. Foglia, 979 A.2d 357, 361-62 (Pa. Super. 2009) (Stating that observations made after the officer intends to stop the defen 2014“While it is argued the lesser standard [reasonable suspicion] will allow a vehicle stop to be made based on pretextual motives, the United States Supreme Court made clear that case law ‘foreclose^] any argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved.’” Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d 108, 120 (Pa. 2008) citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); See also Commonwealth v. Foglia, 979 A.2d 357, 361-62 (Pa. Super. 2009) (Stating that observations made after the officer intends to stop the defendan | 7 | 7 |
Apprendi v. New Jerseygreen2 sentences2025See, e.g., Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496 (recognizing the significant distinction between accepting the validity of a prior conviction resulting from a proceeding in which the defendant had the right to a jury trial and the right to require the prosecutor to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and allowing a judge to find a required fact under a lesser standard of proof). 2025Apprendi attempted to justify distinct treatment for prior convictions by referring to a “vast difference between accepting the validity of a prior judgment” where the defendant enjoyed full procedural safeguards, “and allowing the judge to find the required fact under a lesser standard of proof.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496 ; see also Majority Op. at 9-10 (quoting this passage). | 4 | 7 |
Wright v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2019The harmless error standard, as 164 set forth by this Court in Commonwealth v. Story, 383 A.2d [155], [(Pa. 1978)] (citations omitted), states that "[w]henever there is a `reasonable possibility' that an error 'might have contributed to the conviction,' the error is not harmless." This standard, which places the burden on the Commonwealth to show that the error did not contribute to the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt, is a lesser standard than the Pierce prejudice standard...." Spot; 84 A.3d at 315 (emphasis added). 2018"This standard, which places the burden on the Commonwealth to show that the error did not contribute to the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt, is a lesser standard than the ... prejudice standard, which requires the defendant to show that counsel's conduct had an actual adverse effect on the outcome of the proceedings." Id. | 3 | 5 |
Commonwealth v. Storygreen2 sentences2021The harmless error standard, as set forth by this Court in Commonwealth v. Story, 383 A.2d 155, 164 (Pa. 1978) (citations omitted), states that “[w]henever there is a ‘reasonable possibility’ that an error ‘might have contributed to the conviction,’ the error is not harmless.” This standard, which places the burden on the Commonwealth to show that the error did not contribute to the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt, is a lesser standard than the Pierce prejudice standard, which requires the defendant to show that counsel’s conduct had an actual adverse effect on the outcome of the proceedings 2009The harmless error standard, as set forth by this court in Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391 , 383 A.2d 155 (1978), states that ‘[w]henever there is a “reasonable possibility” that an error “might have contributed to the conviction,” the error is not harmless.’ This standard, which places the burden on the Commonwealth to show that the error did not contribute to the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt, is a lesser standard than the Pierce prejudice standard, which requires the defendant to show that counsel’s conduct had an actual adverse effect on the outcome of the proceedings. | 2 | 4 |
Commonwealth v. Gleasongreen2 sentences2023See Commonwealth v. Gleason, 785 A.2d 983 (Pa. 2001); Commonwealth v. Garcia, 859 A.2d 820 (Pa. Super. 2004). 2018See id. | 2 | 2 |
Skeen v. Stategreen2 sentences2017Dist. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St.2d 368 , 390 N.E.2d 813, 817-19 (1979); cf. Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis.2d 469 , 436 N.W.2d 568, 579 (1989) (determining that an "equal opportunity for education" is a fundamental right under the state’s education clause, but holding that the state’s education funding system was subject to rational basis review); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 313 (Minn. 1993) (similarly finding that education is. a fundamental right under the state charter and, while strict scrutiny should apply "in determining whether the legislature has met a student’s fundamental right to a genera 2017Dist. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813, 817-19 (Ohio 1979); cf. Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 579 (Wis. 1989) (determining that an “equal opportunity for education” is a fundamental right under the state’s education clause, but holding that the state’s education funding system was subject to rational basis review); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 313 (Minn. 1993) (similarly finding that education is a fundamental right under the state charter and, while strict scrutiny should apply “in determining whether the legislature has met a student’s fundamental right to a general and uniform system of publ | 2 | 2 |
Board of Education v. Waltergreen2 sentences2017Dist. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St.2d 368 , 390 N.E.2d 813, 817-19 (1979); cf. Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis.2d 469 , 436 N.W.2d 568, 579 (1989) (determining that an "equal opportunity for education" is a fundamental right under the state’s education clause, but holding that the state’s education funding system was subject to rational basis review); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 313 (Minn. 1993) (similarly finding that education is. a fundamental right under the state charter and, while strict scrutiny should apply "in determining whether the legislature has met a student’s fundamental right to a genera 2017Dist. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St.2d 368 , 390 N.E.2d 813, 817-19 (1979); cf. Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis.2d 469 , 436 N.W.2d 568, 579 (1989) (determining that an "equal opportunity for education" is a fundamental right under the state’s education clause, but holding that the state’s education funding system was subject to rational basis review); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 313 (Minn. 1993) (similarly finding that education is. a fundamental right under the state charter and, while strict scrutiny should apply "in determining whether the legislature has met a student’s fundamental right to a genera | 2 | 2 |
Kukor v. Grovergreen2 sentences2017Dist. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St.2d 368 , 390 N.E.2d 813, 817-19 (1979); cf. Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis.2d 469 , 436 N.W.2d 568, 579 (1989) (determining that an "equal opportunity for education" is a fundamental right under the state’s education clause, but holding that the state’s education funding system was subject to rational basis review); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 313 (Minn. 1993) (similarly finding that education is. a fundamental right under the state charter and, while strict scrutiny should apply "in determining whether the legislature has met a student’s fundamental right to a genera 2017Dist. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St.2d 368 , 390 N.E.2d 813, 817-19 (1979); cf. Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis.2d 469 , 436 N.W.2d 568, 579 (1989) (determining that an "equal opportunity for education" is a fundamental right under the state’s education clause, but holding that the state’s education funding system was subject to rational basis review); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 313 (Minn. 1993) (similarly finding that education is. a fundamental right under the state charter and, while strict scrutiny should apply "in determining whether the legislature has met a student’s fundamental right to a genera | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Quilesgreen2 sentences2015Further, the suppression court judge is entitled to believe all, part or none of the evidence presented.” Commonwealth v. Santiago, 980 A.2d 659, 664 (Pa. Super. 2009); See also Commonwealth v. Costa-Hernandez, 802 A.2d 671, 675 (Pa. Super. 2002); See also Commonwealth v. Quiles, 619 A.2d 291, 292 (Pa. Super. 1993) citing Commonwealth v. Smith, 577 A.2d 1387, 1388 (Pa. Super. 1990). 11. 2014Further, the suppression court judge is entitled to believe all, part or none of the evidence presented.” Commonwealth v. Santiago, 980 A.2d 659, 664 (Pa. Super. 2009); See also Commonwealth v. Costa-Hernandez, 802 A.2d 671, 675 (Pa. Super. 2002); See also Commonwealth v. Quiles, 619 A.2d 291, 292 (Pa. Super. 1993) citing Commonwealth v. Smith, 577 A.2d 1387, 1388 (Pa. Super. 1990). 10. § 4914. | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Costa-Hernandezgreen2 sentences2015Further, the suppression court judge is entitled to believe all, part or none of the evidence presented.” Commonwealth v. Santiago, 980 A.2d 659, 664 (Pa. Super. 2009); See also Commonwealth v. Costa-Hernandez, 802 A.2d 671, 675 (Pa. Super. 2002); See also Commonwealth v. Quiles, 619 A.2d 291, 292 (Pa. Super. 1993) citing Commonwealth v. Smith, 577 A.2d 1387, 1388 (Pa. Super. 1990). 11. 2014Further, the suppression court judge is entitled to believe all, part or none of the evidence presented.” Commonwealth v. Santiago, 980 A.2d 659, 664 (Pa. Super. 2009); See also Commonwealth v. Costa-Hernandez, 802 A.2d 671, 675 (Pa. Super. 2002); See also Commonwealth v. Quiles, 619 A.2d 291, 292 (Pa. Super. 1993) citing Commonwealth v. Smith, 577 A.2d 1387, 1388 (Pa. Super. 1990). 10. § 4914. | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Santiagogreen2 sentences2015Further, the suppression court judge is entitled to believe all, part or none of the evidence presented.” Commonwealth v. Santiago, 980 A.2d 659, 664 (Pa. Super. 2009); See also Commonwealth v. Costa-Hernandez, 802 A.2d 671, 675 (Pa. Super. 2002); See also Commonwealth v. Quiles, 619 A.2d 291, 292 (Pa. Super. 1993) citing Commonwealth v. Smith, 577 A.2d 1387, 1388 (Pa. Super. 1990). 11. 2014Further, the suppression court judge is entitled to believe all, part or none of the evidence presented.” Commonwealth v. Santiago, 980 A.2d 659, 664 (Pa. Super. 2009); See also Commonwealth v. Costa-Hernandez, 802 A.2d 671, 675 (Pa. Super. 2002); See also Commonwealth v. Quiles, 619 A.2d 291, 292 (Pa. Super. 1993) citing Commonwealth v. Smith, 577 A.2d 1387, 1388 (Pa. Super. 1990). 10. § 4914. | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Smithgreen2 sentences2015Further, the suppression court judge is entitled to believe all, part or none of the evidence presented.” Commonwealth v. Santiago, 980 A.2d 659, 664 (Pa. Super. 2009); See also Commonwealth v. Costa-Hernandez, 802 A.2d 671, 675 (Pa. Super. 2002); See also Commonwealth v. Quiles, 619 A.2d 291, 292 (Pa. Super. 1993) citing Commonwealth v. Smith, 577 A.2d 1387, 1388 (Pa. Super. 1990). 11. 2014Further, the suppression court judge is entitled to believe all, part or none of the evidence presented.” Commonwealth v. Santiago, 980 A.2d 659, 664 (Pa. Super. 2009); See also Commonwealth v. Costa-Hernandez, 802 A.2d 671, 675 (Pa. Super. 2002); See also Commonwealth v. Quiles, 619 A.2d 291, 292 (Pa. Super. 1993) citing Commonwealth v. Smith, 577 A.2d 1387, 1388 (Pa. Super. 1990). 10. § 4914. | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Platougreen2 sentences1983See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Platou, 455 Pa. 258 , 312 A.2d 29 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 , 94 S.Ct. 3183 , 41 L.Ed.2d 1146 (1974); Commonwealth v. Ware, 446 Pa. 52 , 284 A.2d 700 (1971), cert. granted, 405 U.S. 987 , 92 S.Ct. 1254 , 31 L.Ed.2d 453 (1972), cert. vacated and denied, 406 U.S. 910 , 92 S.Ct. 1606 , 31 L.Ed.2d 821 . 3 Because Common Pleas based its decision here upon a lesser standard of proof, 4 we vacate its order and direct it to hold a rehearing and thereafter decide the case under the proper standard. 5 As stated, appellee filed a petition to involuntarily terminate app 1983See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Platou, 455 Pa. 258 , 312 A.2d 29 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 , 94 S.Ct. 3183 , 41 L.Ed.2d 1146 (1974); Commonwealth v. Ware, 446 Pa. 52 , 284 A.2d 700 (1971), cert. granted, 405 U.S. 987 , 92 S.Ct. 1254 , 31 L.Ed.2d 453 (1972), cert. vacated and denied, 406 U.S. 910 , 92 S.Ct. 1606 , 31 L.Ed.2d 821 . 3 Because Common Pleas based its decision here upon a lesser standard of proof, 4 we vacate its order and direct it to hold a rehearing and thereafter decide the case under the proper standard. 5 As stated, appellee filed a petition to involuntarily terminate app | 2 | 2 |
Matter of Adoption of David C.green2 sentences1983See Matter of Adoption of David C., 479 Pa. 1 , 387 A.2d 804 (1978). 1983See Matter of Adoption of David C., 479 Pa. 1 , 387 A.2d 804 (1978). | 2 | 2 |
| Pennsylvania v. Platougreen | 2 | 2 |
| Heyne v. Nelson ex rel. Nelsongreen | 2 | 2 |
Cox v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railroadgreen2 sentences1983See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Platou, 455 Pa. 258 , 312 A.2d 29 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 , 94 S.Ct. 3183 , 41 L.Ed.2d 1146 (1974); Commonwealth v. Ware, 446 Pa. 52 , 284 A.2d 700 *167 (1971), cert. granted, 405 U.S. 987 , 92 S.Ct. 1254 , 31 L.Ed.2d 453 (1972), cert. vacated and denied, 406 U.S. 910 , 92 S.Ct. 1606 , 31 L.Ed.2d 821 . [3] Because Common Pleas based its decision here upon a lesser standard of proof, [4] we vacate its order and direct it to hold a rehearing and thereafter decide the case under the proper standard. [5] As stated, appellee filed a petition to involuntarily te 1983See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Platou, 455 Pa. 258 , 312 A.2d 29 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 , 94 S.Ct. 3183 , 41 L.Ed.2d 1146 (1974); Commonwealth v. Ware, 446 Pa. 52 , 284 A.2d 700 (1971), cert. granted, 405 U.S. 987 , 92 S.Ct. 1254 , 31 L.Ed.2d 453 (1972), cert. vacated and denied, 406 U.S. 910 , 92 S.Ct. 1606 , 31 L.Ed.2d 821 . 3 Because Common Pleas based its decision here upon a lesser standard of proof, 4 we vacate its order and direct it to hold a rehearing and thereafter decide the case under the proper standard. 5 As stated, appellee filed a petition to involuntarily terminate app | 2 | 2 |
Alleyne v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2021See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 496 (2000) (“[T]here is a vast difference between accepting the validity of a prior judgment of conviction[,] entered in a proceeding in which a defendant had the right to a jury trial and the right to require the prosecutor to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and allowing the judge to find the required fact under a lesser standard of proof.”). -6- J-A26025-20 In Alleyne v. U.S., 570 U.S. 99 (2013), the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Sixth Amendment requires that any fact—other than a prior conviction—that increases a mandatory 2021Id. (emphasis added); see also Apprendi, supra (holding Due Process Clause of Fifth Amendment and notice and jury-trial guarantees of Sixth Amendment, as applied to states through Fourteenth Amendment, requires any fact, other than a prior conviction, that increases maximum penalty to be submitted to jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt) (emphasis added). | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Wrightgreen2 sentences1999See Commonwealth v. Wright, 508 Pa. 25, 39 , 494 A.2d 354, 361 (1985), aff'd. sub nom. 1999See Commonwealth v. Wright, 508 Pa. 25, 39 , 494 A.2d 354, 361 (1985), aff'd. sub nom. | 1 | 2 |
Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Franciscogreen2 sentences1990Health and safety inspectors, and perhaps other categories of inspectors, may obtain warrants upon a showing that "reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an ... inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular [establishment].” Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 320 , 98 S.Ct. at 1824 (citing Camara, 387 U.S. at 538 , 87 S.Ct. at 1736 ). 1990Health and safety inspectors, and perhaps other categories of inspectors, may obtain warrants upon a showing that "reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an ... inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular [establishment].” Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 320 , 98 S.Ct. at 1824 (citing Camara, 387 U.S. at 538 , 87 S.Ct. at 1736 ). | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Waregreen2 sentences1983See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Platou, 455 Pa. 258 , 312 A.2d 29 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 , 94 S.Ct. 3183 , 41 L.Ed.2d 1146 (1974); Commonwealth v. Ware, 446 Pa. 52 , 284 A.2d 700 (1971), cert. granted, 405 U.S. 987 , 92 S.Ct. 1254 , 31 L.Ed.2d 453 (1972), cert. vacated and denied, 406 U.S. 910 , 92 S.Ct. 1606 , 31 L.Ed.2d 821 . 3 Because Common Pleas based its decision here upon a lesser standard of proof, 4 we vacate its order and direct it to hold a rehearing and thereafter decide the case under the proper standard. 5 As stated, appellee filed a petition to involuntarily terminate app 1983See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Platou, 455 Pa. 258 , 312 A.2d 29 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 , 94 S.Ct. 3183 , 41 L.Ed.2d 1146 (1974); Commonwealth v. Ware, 446 Pa. 52 , 284 A.2d 700 (1971), cert. granted, 405 U.S. 987 , 92 S.Ct. 1254 , 31 L.Ed.2d 453 (1972), cert. vacated and denied, 406 U.S. 910 , 92 S.Ct. 1606 , 31 L.Ed.2d 821 . 3 Because Common Pleas based its decision here upon a lesser standard of proof, 4 we vacate its order and direct it to hold a rehearing and thereafter decide the case under the proper standard. 5 As stated, appellee filed a petition to involuntarily terminate app | 1 | 2 |
| In Re DMgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Middletown Township v. Lands of Stonegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Clousergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Chambers v. Maroneygreen | 1 | 1 |
| South Dakota v. Oppermangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Howardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Wrecksgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Marshall v. City of Philadelphiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| In the Matter of: L.Z., Appeal of: L.Z.green | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Holmesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Marone v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensinggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Braceygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Karetnygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Anthonygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Griffithgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lanning v. Westgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Banner v. COM., DEPT. OF TRANSP.
green
2 sentences2016Id. 2016See Marone, 990 A.2d at 1190 ; Banner, 737 A.2d at 1207 . | 4 | 2010–2016 |
Petrovick v. COM., DEPT OF TRANSP.
green
2 sentences2001Appellants assert that the New Jersey statute permits a conviction when a motorist is merely under the influence of an intoxicant, a lesser standard than that specified in the Compact, i.e., the driver must be under the influence of an intoxicant "to a degree which renders [him] incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle." DOT disagrees with Appellants' contention that the New Jersey statute is not substantially similar to Article IV(a) of the Compact and directs this Court's attention to Breen v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 771 A.2d 879 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001), as well 2001Appellants assert that the New Jersey statute permits a conviction when a motorist is merely under the influence of an intoxicant, a lesser standard than that specified in the Compact, i.e., the driver must be under the influence of an intoxicant "to a degree which renders [him] incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle." DOT disagrees with Appellants' contention that the New Jersey statute is not substantially similar to Article IV(a) of the Compact and directs this Court's attention to Breen v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 771 A.2d 879 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001), as well | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Commonwealth v. Whisnant
green
2 sentences2001DOT contends that prior case law followed a stricter or equivalent standard of comparison between New Jersey and Pennsylvania DUI statutes, citing Commonwealth v. Whisnant, 390 Pa.Super. 192 , 568 A.2d 259 (1990), and that the New Jersey statute definitely would meet the less strict standard under a Petrovick analysis. 2001DOT contends that prior case law followed a stricter or equivalent standard of comparison between New Jersey and Pennsylvania DUI statutes, citing Commonwealth v. Whisnant, 390 Pa.Super. 192 , 568 A.2d 259 (1990), and that the New Jersey statute definitely would meet the less strict standard under a Petrovick analysis. | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Breen v. COM., DEPT. OF TRANS.
green
2 sentences2001Appellants assert that the New Jersey statute permits a conviction when a motorist is merely under the influence of an intoxicant, a lesser standard than that specified in the Compact, i.e., the driver must be under the influence of an intoxicant “to a degree which renders [him] incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle.” DOT disagrees with Appellants’ contention that the New Jersey statute is not substantially similar to Article IV(a) of the Compact and directs this Court’s attention to Breen v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 771 A.2d 879 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001), as well 2001Appellants assert that the New Jersey statute permits a conviction when a motorist is merely under the influence of an intoxicant, a lesser standard than that specified in the Compact, i.e., the driver must be under the influence of an intoxicant "to a degree which renders [him] incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle." DOT disagrees with Appellants' contention that the New Jersey statute is not substantially similar to Article IV(a) of the Compact and directs this Court's attention to Breen v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 771 A.2d 879 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001), as well | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Terry v. Ohio
green
2 sentences1990Such a temporary detention for questioning in the case of an airport search is reviewed under the lesser standard enunciated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and is permissible because of the “public interest involved in the suppression of illegal transactions in drugs or of any other serious crime.” Royer, supra, 460 U.S. [at] 498-499, 103 S.Ct. [at] 1324-1325. 1990Such a temporary detention for questioning in the case of an airport search is reviewed under the lesser standard enunciated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and is permissible because of the “public interest involved in the suppression of illegal transactions in drugs or of any other serious crime.” Royer, supra, 460 U.S. [at] 498-499, 103 S.Ct. [at] 1324-1325. | 2 | 1974–1990 |
Santosky v. Kramer
green
2 sentences1983Act of July 24, 1970, P.L. 620, No. 208, Art. 3, Sec. 311, 1 P.S. § 311 (Supp.1977). 2 The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), which held that a state must prove its case by clear and convincing evidence when it seeks to terminate parental rights, is binding on us as an authoritative statement of federal law and we are without authority to apply a lesser standard of proof. 1983Act of July 24, 1970, P.L. 620, No. 208, Art. 3, Sec. 311, 1 P.S. § 311 (Supp.1977). 2 The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), which held that a state must prove its case by clear and convincing evidence when it seeks to terminate parental rights, is binding on us as an authoritative statement of federal law and we are without authority to apply a lesser standard of proof. | 2 | 1983–1983 |
Illinois v. Somerville
green
2 sentences1983See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Platou, 455 Pa. 258 , 312 A.2d 29 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 , 94 S.Ct. 3183 , 41 L.Ed.2d 1146 (1974); Commonwealth v. Ware, 446 Pa. 52 , 284 A.2d 700 *167 (1971), cert. granted, 405 U.S. 987 , 92 S.Ct. 1254 , 31 L.Ed.2d 453 (1972), cert. vacated and denied, 406 U.S. 910 , 92 S.Ct. 1606 , 31 L.Ed.2d 821 . [3] Because Common Pleas based its decision here upon a lesser standard of proof, [4] we vacate its order and direct it to hold a rehearing and thereafter decide the case under the proper standard. [5] As stated, appellee filed a petition to involuntarily te 1983See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Platou, 455 Pa. 258 , 312 A.2d 29 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 , 94 S.Ct. 3183 , 41 L.Ed.2d 1146 (1974); Commonwealth v. Ware, 446 Pa. 52 , 284 A.2d 700 (1971), cert. granted, 405 U.S. 987 , 92 S.Ct. 1254 , 31 L.Ed.2d 453 (1972), cert. vacated and denied, 406 U.S. 910 , 92 S.Ct. 1606 , 31 L.Ed.2d 821 . 3 Because Common Pleas based its decision here upon a lesser standard of proof, 4 we vacate its order and direct it to hold a rehearing and thereafter decide the case under the proper standard. 5 As stated, appellee filed a petition to involuntarily terminate app | 2 | 1983–1983 |
Pennsylvania v. Ware
green
2 sentences1983See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Platou, 455 Pa. 258 , 312 A.2d 29 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 , 94 S.Ct. 3183 , 41 L.Ed.2d 1146 (1974); Commonwealth v. Ware, 446 Pa. 52 , 284 A.2d 700 *167 (1971), cert. granted, 405 U.S. 987 , 92 S.Ct. 1254 , 31 L.Ed.2d 453 (1972), cert. vacated and denied, 406 U.S. 910 , 92 S.Ct. 1606 , 31 L.Ed.2d 821 . [3] Because Common Pleas based its decision here upon a lesser standard of proof, [4] we vacate its order and direct it to hold a rehearing and thereafter decide the case under the proper standard. [5] As stated, appellee filed a petition to involuntarily te 1983See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Platou, 455 Pa. 258 , 312 A.2d 29 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 , 94 S.Ct. 3183 , 41 L.Ed.2d 1146 (1974); Commonwealth v. Ware, 446 Pa. 52 , 284 A.2d 700 (1971), cert. granted, 405 U.S. 987 , 92 S.Ct. 1254 , 31 L.Ed.2d 453 (1972), cert. vacated and denied, 406 U.S. 910 , 92 S.Ct. 1606 , 31 L.Ed.2d 821 . 3 Because Common Pleas based its decision here upon a lesser standard of proof, 4 we vacate its order and direct it to hold a rehearing and thereafter decide the case under the proper standard. 5 As stated, appellee filed a petition to involuntarily terminate app | 2 | 1983–1983 |
| Aktiebolaget Flymo v. Cody green | 2 | 1983–1983 |
Pennsylvania v. Ware
green
2 sentences1983See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Platou, 455 Pa. 258 , 312 A.2d 29 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 , 94 S.Ct. 3183 , 41 L.Ed.2d 1146 (1974); Commonwealth v. Ware, 446 Pa. 52 , 284 A.2d 700 *167 (1971), cert. granted, 405 U.S. 987 , 92 S.Ct. 1254 , 31 L.Ed.2d 453 (1972), cert. vacated and denied, 406 U.S. 910 , 92 S.Ct. 1606 , 31 L.Ed.2d 821 . [3] Because Common Pleas based its decision here upon a lesser standard of proof, [4] we vacate its order and direct it to hold a rehearing and thereafter decide the case under the proper standard. [5] As stated, appellee filed a petition to involuntarily te 1983See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Platou, 455 Pa. 258 , 312 A.2d 29 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 , 94 S.Ct. 3183 , 41 L.Ed.2d 1146 (1974); Commonwealth v. Ware, 446 Pa. 52 , 284 A.2d 700 (1971), cert. granted, 405 U.S. 987 , 92 S.Ct. 1254 , 31 L.Ed.2d 453 (1972), cert. vacated and denied, 406 U.S. 910 , 92 S.Ct. 1606 , 31 L.Ed.2d 821 . 3 Because Common Pleas based its decision here upon a lesser standard of proof, 4 we vacate its order and direct it to hold a rehearing and thereafter decide the case under the proper standard. 5 As stated, appellee filed a petition to involuntarily terminate app | 2 | 1983–1983 |
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Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.