lesser standard in New Jersey

2025As our Supreme Court has instructed: The Legislature's grant of authority to trial courts to permit a late notice in the exercise of their discretion does not equate with a grant of authority to override the statute's declaration of purpose or to substitute a lesser standard of proofs for the extraordinary circumstances demanded by the 1994 amendment to the statute itself. [D.D., 213 N.J. at 148 .] We conclude the court did not misapply its discretion in denying plaintiff's application to file a late tort claims notice.

2024As the Supreme Court has instructed, "[t]he Legislature's grant of authority to trial courts to permit a late notice in the exercise of their discretion does not equate with a grant of authority to override the statute's declaration of purpose or to substitute a lesser standard of proofs for the extraordinary circumstances demanded by the 1994 amendment to the statute itself." D.D., 213 N.J. at 148 .

1996Clearly, a lesser standard is required to sustain the exercise of specific jurisdiction, see, e.g., Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 323 , 558 A. 2d 1252 , and the test to be met is whether the defendant has "purposely avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state...." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-475 , 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2183 , 85 L.Ed. 2d 528, 542 (1985).

1996Clearly, a lesser standard is required to sustain the exercise of specific jurisdiction, see, e.g., Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 323 , 558 A. 2d 1252 , and the test to be met is whether the defendant has "purposely avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state...." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-475 , 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2183 , 85 L.Ed. 2d 528, 542 (1985).

2019A-1001-17T3 15 establish abuse or neglect under [N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21]." Id. at 42 .

2019Under Johnson, the court was required to find reasonable cause to 33 believe that “the defendant possesses or has access to a firearm or other weapon delineated in N.J.S.A. 2C:39-1(r)” and that his “possession or access to the weapon poses a heightened risk of injury to the victim.” See Johnson, 352 N.J.

2018A "not established" finding means "a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the statutory standard has not been met ...." Ibid.

2010The Court explained that “[w]e adopt this lesser standard because of the need to protect police officers and because of the minimal intrusion the requirement to exit the car imposes on the passenger.” Ibid.

2009The psychiatrist's report includes a statement that F.S. made to the police describing how "sometimes [J.M.B.] used to try to touch [F.S.'s] private parts." That statement by F.S. is not itself present in the record before us nor can we find mention of this allegation in the presentence investigation report. [3] J.M.B. never acknowledged the veracity of S.S.'s statement. [4] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed. 2d 694 (1966). [5] J.M.B. claimed that it actually was a phallus-shaped sexual device. [6] A related contempt charge also was dismissed. [7] The Appellate Divisio

2009The psychiatrist's report includes a statement that F.S. made to the police describing how "sometimes [J.M.B.] used to try to touch [F.S.'s] private parts." That statement by F.S. is not itself present in the record before us nor can we find mention of this allegation in the presentence investigation report. [3] J.M.B. never acknowledged the veracity of S.S.'s statement. [4] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed. 2d 694 (1966). [5] J.M.B. claimed that it actually was a phallus-shaped sexual device. [6] A related contempt charge also was dismissed. [7] The Appellate Divisio

2009To the extent that In re Civil Commitment of J.P., supra, 393 N.J.Super. at 18 , 922 A.2d 754 , suggests that the lesser standard of "substantial evidence” is sufficient, it is disapproved.

2009To the extent that In re Civil Commitment of J.P., supra, 393 N.J.Super. at 18 , 922 A.2d 754 , suggests that the lesser standard of "substantial evidence” is sufficient, it is disapproved.

2006As we observed in State v. Flynn , "the neutrality and thus the reliability" of an analysis performed at a State laboratory cannot be presumed because "a police laboratory exists to test and produce evidence for governmental prosecuting agencies," and the business of the governmental agency seeking the admission of the evidence is "the prosecution of the crime." Flynn, supra, 202 N.J.Super. at 219-20 , 494 A. 2d 350 .

2006As we observed in State v. Flynn , "the neutrality and thus the reliability" of an analysis performed at a State laboratory cannot be presumed because "a police laboratory exists to test and produce evidence for governmental prosecuting agencies," and the business of the governmental agency seeking the admission of the evidence is "the prosecution of the crime." Flynn, supra, 202 N.J.Super. at 219-20 , 494 A. 2d 350 .

2005Clearly, a lesser standard is required to sustain the exercise of specific jurisdiction____ [Citibank, N.A v. Estate of Simpson, 290 N.J.Super. 519, 526-27 , 676 A.2d 172 (App.Div.1996).] In the case of general personal jurisdiction, a state may exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant who has “continuous and systematic” contacts with the state even if the nature of the claim is not related to those contacts.

2005Clearly, a lesser standard is required to sustain the exercise of specific jurisdiction____ [Citibank, N.A v. Estate of Simpson, 290 N.J.Super. 519, 526-27 , 676 A.2d 172 (App.Div.1996).] In the case of general personal jurisdiction, a state may exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant who has “continuous and systematic” contacts with the state even if the nature of the claim is not related to those contacts.

2005Greenberg, supra, 99 N.J. at 564-65 , 494 A. 2d 294 .

2005Greenberg, supra, 99 N.J. at 564-65 , 494 A. 2d 294 .

2005Moreover, in light of the fact that parole itself is inherently subjective and in light of the fact that there is no right to parole, see Greenholtz v. Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 9-11 , 99 S.Ct. 2100, 2105 , 60 L.Ed.2d 668, 676-78 (1979); State v. Black, 153 N.J. 438, 447-48 , 710 A. 2d 428 (1998), the Parole Board urges us to apply a lesser standard of scrutiny in determining whether these special conditions are constitutionally infirm.

2005Moreover, in light of the fact that parole itself is inherently subjective and in light of the fact that there is no right to parole, see Greenholtz v. Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 9-11 , 99 S.Ct. 2100, 2105 , 60 L.Ed.2d 668, 676-78 (1979); State v. Black, 153 N.J. 438, 447-48 , 710 A. 2d 428 (1998), the Parole Board urges us to apply a lesser standard of scrutiny in determining whether these special conditions are constitutionally infirm.

2003Indeed, in Felder we stated: the inconsistency between the culpability standards of N.J.S.A. 20:33-2.1 and the ... [ordinance only underscores the point that the Code and the local ordinance deal with the same criminal conduct in a different manner, and consequently the ordinance is preempted. [ 329 N.J.Super. at 475 , 748 A.2d 163 .] The requirement of purposeful conduct may have been included by the Legislature in recognition of the difficult constitutional problems posed by prohibitions against offensive speech.

2003Indeed, in Felder we stated: the inconsistency between the culpability standards of N.J.S.A. 20:33-2.1 and the ... [ordinance only underscores the point that the Code and the local ordinance deal with the same criminal conduct in a different manner, and consequently the ordinance is preempted. [ 329 N.J.Super. at 475 , 748 A.2d 163 .] The requirement of purposeful conduct may have been included by the Legislature in recognition of the difficult constitutional problems posed by prohibitions against offensive speech.

2003In re Pennica, 36 N.J. 401, 419 , 177 A.2d 721 (1962); see also id. at 418, 177 A.2d 721 (“Acquittal of a member of the bar following trial of a criminal indictment is not res judicata in a subsequent disciplinary proceeding based on substantially the same charge or conduct.”); In re Rigolosi 107 N.J. 192 , 526 A.2d 670 (1987) (disbarring attorney for bribery despite acquittal on all criminal charges); In re Callahan, 70 N.J. 178 , 358 A.2d 469 (1976) (same); In re Hyett, 61 N.J. 518 , 296 A.2d 306 (1972) (same).

2003In re Pennica, 36 N.J. 401, 419 , 177 A.2d 721 (1962); see also id. at 418, 177 A.2d 721 (“Acquittal of a member of the bar following trial of a criminal indictment is not res judicata in a subsequent disciplinary proceeding based on substantially the same charge or conduct.”); In re Rigolosi 107 N.J. 192 , 526 A.2d 670 (1987) (disbarring attorney for bribery despite acquittal on all criminal charges); In re Callahan, 70 N.J. 178 , 358 A.2d 469 (1976) (same); In re Hyett, 61 N.J. 518 , 296 A.2d 306 (1972) (same).

2003In re Pennica, 36 N.J. 401, 419 , 177 A.2d 721 (1962); see also id. at 418, 177 A.2d 721 (“Acquittal of a member of the bar following trial of a criminal indictment is not res judicata in a subsequent disciplinary proceeding based on substantially the same charge or conduct.”); In re Rigolosi 107 N.J. 192 , 526 A.2d 670 (1987) (disbarring attorney for bribery despite acquittal on all criminal charges); In re Callahan, 70 N.J. 178 , 358 A.2d 469 (1976) (same); In re Hyett, 61 N.J. 518 , 296 A.2d 306 (1972) (same).

2003In re Pennica, 36 N.J. 401, 419 , 177 A.2d 721 (1962); see also id. at 418, 177 A.2d 721 (“Acquittal of a member of the bar following trial of a criminal indictment is not res judicata in a subsequent disciplinary proceeding based on substantially the same charge or conduct.”); In re Rigolosi 107 N.J. 192 , 526 A.2d 670 (1987) (disbarring attorney for bribery despite acquittal on all criminal charges); In re Callahan, 70 N.J. 178 , 358 A.2d 469 (1976) (same); In re Hyett, 61 N.J. 518 , 296 A.2d 306 (1972) (same).

2003In re Pennica, 36 N.J. 401, 419 , 177 A.2d 721 (1962); see also id. at 418, 177 A.2d 721 (“Acquittal of a member of the bar following trial of a criminal indictment is not res judicata in a subsequent disciplinary proceeding based on substantially the same charge or conduct.”); In re Rigolosi 107 N.J. 192 , 526 A.2d 670 (1987) (disbarring attorney for bribery despite acquittal on all criminal charges); In re Callahan, 70 N.J. 178 , 358 A.2d 469 (1976) (same); In re Hyett, 61 N.J. 518 , 296 A.2d 306 (1972) (same).

2003In re Pennica, 36 N.J. 401, 419 , 177 A.2d 721 (1962); see also id. at 418, 177 A.2d 721 (“Acquittal of a member of the bar following trial of a criminal indictment is not res judicata in a subsequent disciplinary proceeding based on substantially the same charge or conduct.”); In re Rigolosi 107 N.J. 192 , 526 A.2d 670 (1987) (disbarring attorney for bribery despite acquittal on all criminal charges); In re Callahan, 70 N.J. 178 , 358 A.2d 469 (1976) (same); In re Hyett, 61 N.J. 518 , 296 A.2d 306 (1972) (same).

2002This lesser standard has been held to pass constitutional muster because, rather than being a criminal investigation, "designed to uncover evidence or fruits of crime," it is more comparable to an administrative search "(w)here considerations of health and safety are involved...." State v. Burdin, 313 N.J.Super. 468, 473 , 712 A. 2d 1286 (Law Div.1998), quoting New Jersey Div. of Youth and Family Serv. v. *887 Wunnenburg, 167 N.J.Super. 578, 584 , 408 A. 2d 1345 (App.Div.1979).

2002This lesser standard has been held to pass constitutional muster because, rather than being a criminal investigation, "designed to uncover evidence or fruits of crime," it is more comparable to an administrative search "(w)here considerations of health and safety are involved...." State v. Burdin, 313 N.J.Super. 468, 473 , 712 A. 2d 1286 (Law Div.1998), quoting New Jersey Div. of Youth and Family Serv. v. *887 Wunnenburg, 167 N.J.Super. 578, 584 , 408 A. 2d 1345 (App.Div.1979).

2002This lesser standard has been held to pass constitutional muster because, rather than being a criminal investigation, "designed to uncover evidence or fruits of crime," it is more comparable to an administrative search "(w)here considerations of health and safety are involved...." State v. Burdin, 313 N.J.Super. 468, 473 , 712 A. 2d 1286 (Law Div.1998), quoting New Jersey Div. of Youth and Family Serv. v. *887 Wunnenburg, 167 N.J.Super. 578, 584 , 408 A. 2d 1345 (App.Div.1979).

2002This lesser standard has been held to pass constitutional muster because, rather than being a criminal investigation, "designed to uncover evidence or fruits of crime," it is more comparable to an administrative search "(w)here considerations of health and safety are involved...." State v. Burdin, 313 N.J.Super. 468, 473 , 712 A. 2d 1286 (Law Div.1998), quoting New Jersey Div. of Youth and Family Serv. v. *887 Wunnenburg, 167 N.J.Super. 578, 584 , 408 A. 2d 1345 (App.Div.1979).

2002While not positive on this record, Campbell probably was not a business invitee, requiring the highest standard of care, id. at 433 , 625 A. 2d 1110 , or a trespasser, requiring a lesser standard of care under the common law.

2002While not positive on this record, Campbell probably was not a business invitee, requiring the highest standard of care, id. at 433 , 625 A. 2d 1110 , or a trespasser, requiring a lesser standard of care under the common law.

2001Rodriguez, The Admissibility of Other Crimes, Wrongs or Acts Under the Intent Provision of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(B): The Weighing of Incremental Probity and Unfair Prejudice, 48 U. Miami L.Rev. 451, 457 (1993). [ 944 P. 2d at 1198 .] The court concluded that "[t]o allow a lesser standard in a criminal case is to open too large a possibility of prejudice." Ibid.

2001Rodriguez, The Admissibility of Other Crimes, Wrongs or Acts Under the Intent Provision of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(B): The Weighing of Incremental Probity and Unfair Prejudice, 48 U. Miami L.Rev. 451, 457 (1993). [ 944 P. 2d at 1198 .] The court concluded that "[t]o allow a lesser standard in a criminal case is to open too large a possibility of prejudice." Ibid.