55 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Rodney Sinclairgreen2 sentences2015Although criminal defendants should be given the benefit of the doubt and all fair inferences should be indulged, "there must be some rational basis for the lesser charge; otherwise it is merely a device for defendant to invoke the mercy-dispensing prerogative of the jury, and that is not by itself a permissible basis to require a lesser-included offense instruction." United States v. Sinclair, 144 U.S. App. D.C. 13 , 444 F.2d 888, 890 (1971) (footnote omitted) (citing Kelly v. United States, 125 U.S. App. 3 State v. Co 2015Although criminal defendants should be given the benefit of the doubt and all fair inferences should be indulged, “there must be some rational basis for the lesser charge; otherwise it is merely a device for defendant to invoke the mercy-dispensing prerogative of the jury, and that is not by itself a permissible basis to require a lesser-included offense instruction.” United States v. Sinclair, 144 U.S. App. D.C. 13 , 444 F.2d 888, 890 (1971) (footnote omitted) (citing Kelly v. United States, 125 U.S. App. D.C. 205 , 207, 370 F.2d 227 (1966)); see also Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 63-6 | 3 | 3 |
Carl S. Kelly v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2015Although criminal defendants should be given the benefit of the doubt and all fair inferences should be indulged, "there must be some rational basis for the lesser charge; otherwise it is merely a device for defendant to invoke the mercy-dispensing prerogative of the jury, and that is not by itself a permissible basis to require a lesser-included offense instruction." United States v. Sinclair, 144 U.S. App. D.C. 13 , 444 F.2d 888, 890 (1971) (footnote omitted) (citing Kelly v. United States, 125 U.S. App. 3 State v. Co 2015Although criminal defendants should be given the benefit of the doubt and all fair inferences should be indulged, “there must be some rational basis for the lesser charge; otherwise it is merely a device for defendant to invoke the mercy-dispensing prerogative of the jury, and that is not by itself a permissible basis to require a lesser-included offense instruction.” United States v. Sinclair, 144 U.S. App. D.C. 13 , 444 F.2d 888, 890 (1971) (footnote omitted) (citing Kelly v. United States, 125 U.S. App. D.C. 205 , 207, 370 F.2d 227 (1966)); see also Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 63-6 | 2 | 3 |
State v. Fernandez-Medinagreen2 sentences2014App. 192, 195 , 913 P.2d 421 (1996). 107 State v. Fernandez-Medina, 141 Wn.2d 448, 455-56 , 6 P.3d 1150 (2000). 108 State v. leremia. 78 Wn. 2009See State v. Fernandez-Medina, 141 Wn.2d 448, 454-55 , 6 P.3d 1150 (2000). | 2 | 3 |
State v. Fernandez-Medinagreen2 sentences2014App. 192, 195 , 913 P.2d 421 (1996). 107 State v. Fernandez-Medina, 141 Wn.2d 448, 455-56 , 6 P.3d 1150 (2000). 108 State v. leremia. 78 Wn. 2009See State v. Fernandez-Medina, 141 Wn.2d 448, 454-55 , 6 P.3d 1150 (2000). | 2 | 3 |
State v. Gunwallgreen2 sentences2006United States v. Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349, 1358 (1989). [28] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). [29] "[W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not." Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 , 52 S.Ct. 180 , 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). [30] State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash.2d 54 , 720 P.2d 808 (1986). [31] Gregory does not seem to assert, nor has he pointed 2006United States v. Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349, 1358 (1989). [28] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). [29] "[W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not." Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 , 52 S.Ct. 180 , 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). [30] State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash.2d 54 , 720 P.2d 808 (1986). [31] Gregory does not seem to assert, nor has he pointed | 1 | 2 |
In Re the Detention of LaBellegreen2 sentences2005The LaBelle court was “persuaded that the lesser standard of proof adopted by the Legislature strikes a fair balance between the [liberty] interests of the individual and the interests of the State.” Id. 2005The LaBelle court was "persuaded that the lesser standard of proof adopted by the Legislature strikes a fair balance between the [liberty] interests of the individual and the interest of the State." Id. | 1 | 2 |
Almendarez-Torres v. United Statesred2 sentences2003Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496 (quoting in part Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 230, 244 , 118 S. Ct. 1219 , 140 L. 2003Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496 (quoting in part Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 230, 244 , 118 S. Ct. 1219 , 140 L. | 1 | 2 |
In Re Andersongreen2 sentences2024The court also noted that “[w]hile such evidence may be insufficient to satisfy due process in a nonprison setting, because a lesser standard is required to satisfy the rights of prison inmates, due process in this case was satisfied.” Id. 2024See Anderson, 112 Wn.2d at 550 ; McGonigle, 144 Wash. at 257 . | 1 | 1 |
Walden v. City of Seattlegreen2 sentences2019As the language suggests, “probable error” is a lesser standard than “obvious error.”5 However, the decision of the trial court herein evinces nothing that would satisfy either requirement of RAP 2.3(b)(2). ~ Many Washington cases have conflated the two standards. ~ Glass v. Stahl ~, Siecialty Co., 97 Wn.2d 880, 883 , 652 P.2d 948 (1982) (“[W]e have determined the trial court committed obvious or probable error.”); Walden v. City of Seattle, 77 Wn. 2019App. 784, 790 , 892 P.2d 745 (1995) (“[W]e will grant discretionary review under RAP 2.3(b)(1) or (2) if obvious or probable error is shown regardless of whether the error renders ‘further proceedings useless’ or ‘substantially alters the status quo or substantially limits the freedom of a party to act.”). | 1 | 1 |
Glass v. Stahl Specialty Companygreen2 sentences2019As the language suggests, “probable error” is a lesser standard than “obvious error.”5 However, the decision of the trial court herein evinces nothing that would satisfy either requirement of RAP 2.3(b)(2). ~ Many Washington cases have conflated the two standards. ~ Glass v. Stahl ~, Siecialty Co., 97 Wn.2d 880, 883 , 652 P.2d 948 (1982) (“[W]e have determined the trial court committed obvious or probable error.”); Walden v. City of Seattle, 77 Wn. 2019As the language suggests, “probable error” is a lesser standard than “obvious error.”5 However, the decision of the trial court herein evinces nothing that would satisfy either requirement of RAP 2.3(b)(2). ~ Many Washington cases have conflated the two standards. ~ Glass v. Stahl ~, Siecialty Co., 97 Wn.2d 880, 883 , 652 P.2d 948 (1982) (“[W]e have determined the trial court committed obvious or probable error.”); Walden v. City of Seattle, 77 Wn. | 1 | 1 |
Sparf v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2015Although criminal defendants should be given the benefit of the doubt and all fair inferences should be indulged, “there must be some rational basis for the lesser charge; otherwise it is merely a device for defendant to invoke the mercy-dispensing prerogative of the jury, and that is not by itself a permissible basis to require a lesser-included offense instruction.” United States v. Sinclair, 144 U.S. App. D.C. 13 , 444 F.2d 888, 890 (1971) (footnote omitted) (citing Kelly v. United States, 125 U.S. App. D.C. 205 , 207, 370 F.2d 227 (1966)); see also Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 63-6 2015Although criminal defendants should be given the benefit of the doubt and all fair inferences should be indulged, “there must be some rational basis for the lesser charge; otherwise it is merely a device for defendant to invoke the mercy-dispensing prerogative of the jury, and that is not by itself a permissible basis to require a lesser-included offense instruction.” United States v. Sinclair, 144 U.S. App. D.C. 13 , 444 F.2d 888, 890 (1971) (footnote omitted) (citing Kelly v. United States, 125 U.S. App. D.C. 205 , 207, 370 F.2d 227 (1966)); see also Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 63-6 | 1 | 1 |
| Brinegar v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Arnold Sherlock and Ronald Charleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Bolandgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Brignoni-Poncegreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Hensleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Gresham
green
2 sentences2022“It is well settled that the erroneous admission of evidence in violation of ER 404(b) is analyzed 20 No. 83284-1/21 under the lesser standard for nonconstitutional error.” Gresham, 173 Wn.2d at 433 . 2019Bolanos argues that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of his prior convictions in the no-contact orders and failed to apply the redactions he requested, contrary to ER 404(b). "[E]rroneous admission of evidence in violation of ER 404(b) is analyzed under the lesser standard for nonconstitutional error." State v. Gresham, 173 Wn.2d 405,433 , 263 P.3d 207 (2012)(citing State v. Smith, 106 Wn.2d 772, 780 , 725 P.2d 951 (1986)). | 5 | 2014–2022 |
Apprendi v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences2016The rationale for excepting prior convictions from the jury requirement is explained in Apprendi as follows: [T]here is a vast difference between accepting the validity of a prior judgment of conviction entered in a proceeding in which the defendant had the right to a jury trial and the right to require the prosecutor to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and allowing the judge to find the required fact under a lesser standard of proof. 530 U.S. at 496 . 2006Id. | 4 | 2003–2016 |
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences2019Bolanos argues that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of his prior convictions in the no-contact orders and failed to apply the redactions he requested, contrary to ER 404(b). "[E]rroneous admission of evidence in violation of ER 404(b) is analyzed under the lesser standard for nonconstitutional error." State v. Gresham, 173 Wn.2d 405,433 , 263 P.3d 207 (2012)(citing State v. Smith, 106 Wn.2d 772, 780 , 725 P.2d 951 (1986)). 2019Bolanos argues that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of his prior convictions in the no-contact orders and failed to apply the redactions he requested, contrary to ER 404(b). "[E]rroneous admission of evidence in violation of ER 404(b) is analyzed under the lesser standard for nonconstitutional error." State v. Gresham, 173 Wn.2d 405,433 , 263 P.3d 207 (2012)(citing State v. Smith, 106 Wn.2d 772, 780 , 725 P.2d 951 (1986)). | 3 | 2012–2019 |
In Re WINSHIP
green
2 sentences2010Should, however, the continued viability of Standlee be directly presented to this court during my tenure on it, I believe that I would be inclined to advance the position admirably stated by former Justice Robert Utter in his dissent in Standlee , to wit: Where the sole reason advocated for petitioner’s violation of his parole is the commission of criminal acts upon which he has been adjudged not guilty by application of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard in the superior court of this state, to subsequently remove petitioner’s freedom by the application of a lesser standard seems to me to 2010Should, however, the continued viability of Standlee be directly presented to this court during my tenure on it, I believe that I would be inclined to advance the position admirably stated by former Justice Robert Utter in his dissent in Standlee , to wit: Where the sole reason advocated for petitioner’s violation of his parole is the commission of criminal acts upon which he has been adjudged not guilty by application of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard in the superior court of this state, to subsequently remove petitioner’s freedom by the application of a lesser standard seems to me to | 3 | 2010–2016 |
Gagnon v. Scarpelli
red
2 sentences2010Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 , 93 S.Ct. 1756 , 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973).(3) A lesser standard of due process is required in disciplinary proceedings when a prisoner is already incarcerated rather than on probation or parole. 2010Ed. 2d 656 , 93 S. Ct. 1756 (1973). (3) A lesser standard of due process is required in disciplinary proceedings when a prisoner is already incarcerated rather than on probation or parole. | 3 | 1983–2010 |
Prekeges v. King County
green
2 sentences2013Even applying the lesser standard of substantial compliance, U[t]he key to achieving substantial compliance with a procedural statute is the satisfaction of the substance essential to the purpose of the statute." Prekeges, 98 Wn. 2013Even applying the lesser standard of substantial compliance, “[t]he key to achieving substantial compliance with a procedural statute is the satisfaction of the substance essential to the purpose of the statute.” Prekeges, 98 Wn. | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Turner v. Safley
green
2 sentences2008Id. at 89 . 2008Id. at 89 , 107 S.Ct. 2254 . | 2 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Jacobson
green
2 sentences2000A similar reading of the perjury and false swearing statutes appeared in State v. Jacobson, 74 Wash.App. 715, 726 , 876 P.2d 916 (1994), where the Court of Appeals stated: Jacobson also claims the court erred in refusing to give the lesser instruction on false swearing. 2000App. 715, 726 , 876 P.2d 916 (1994), where the Court of Appeals stated: Jacobson also claims the court erred in refusing to give the lesser instruction on false swearing. | 2 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Cyr
neutral
2 sentences2026State v. Cyr, 195 Wn.2d 492, 505 , 461 P.3d 360 (2020). 2026State v. Cyr, 195 Wn.2d 492, 505 , 461 P.3d 360 (2020). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. McGonigle
neutral
1 sentence2024See Anderson, 112 Wn.2d at 550 ; McGonigle, 144 Wash. at 257 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Houston-Sconiers
green
1 sentence2021In State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1 (2017), the Washington Supreme Court, without extensive analysis, held that two offenders suffered prejudice even though defense counsel at sentencing argued mitigating factors based on youth. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
District of Columbia v. Heller
green
1 sentence2020We decline to determine where the independent constitutional reasonableness standard fits among the tiers of scrutiny used to evaluate the Second Amendment. 23 No. 53245-0-II In Heller, the Court held that Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to keep and bear arms, including firearms, in the home and in an “operable” condition, tied primarily to the core purpose of “immediate self-defense.” 554 U.S. at 635 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
In re Cottingham
green
1 sentence2020Appellants assume, without providing any support, that constitutional reasonableness is a lesser standard than strict scrutiny, or it is equal to or lesser than intermediate scrutiny. “[W]here no authorities are cited in support of a proposition, the court is not required to search out authorities, but may assume that counsel, after diligent search, has found none.” In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Cottingham, 191 Wn.2d 450 , 465 n.1, 423 P.3d 818 (2018) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Young, 89 Wn.2d 613, 625 , 574 P.2d 1171 (1978)). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Dukowitz
green
1 sentence2020State v. Dukowitz, 62 Wn. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Swinomish Indian Tribal Community v. Western Washington Growth Management Hearings Board
green
1 sentence2020Id. at 436 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Jorgenson
green
1 sentence2020Id. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Young
green
2 sentences2020Appellants assume, without providing any support, that constitutional reasonableness is a lesser standard than strict scrutiny, or it is equal to or lesser than intermediate scrutiny. “[W]here no authorities are cited in support of a proposition, the court is not required to search out authorities, but may assume that counsel, after diligent search, has found none.” In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Cottingham, 191 Wn.2d 450 , 465 n.1, 423 P.3d 818 (2018) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Young, 89 Wn.2d 613, 625 , 574 P.2d 1171 (1978)). 2020Appellants assume, without providing any support, that constitutional reasonableness is a lesser standard than strict scrutiny, or it is equal to or lesser than intermediate scrutiny. “[W]here no authorities are cited in support of a proposition, the court is not required to search out authorities, but may assume that counsel, after diligent search, has found none.” In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Cottingham, 191 Wn.2d 450 , 465 n.1, 423 P.3d 818 (2018) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Young, 89 Wn.2d 613, 625 , 574 P.2d 1171 (1978)). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Henderson
green
1 sentence2017Henderson, 182 Wn.2d at 736 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Arreola
green
2 sentences2015State v. Arreola, 176 Wn.2d 284 , 292 -93, 290 P. 3d 983 ( 2012). 2015State v. Arreola, 176 Wn.2d 284 , 292 -93, 290 P. 3d 983 ( 2012). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Cardenas-Muratalla green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Brightman green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Ieremia green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Munden green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Hernandez green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Kelsey Lane Homeowners Ass'n v. Kelsey Lane Co., Inc. green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Cowen green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Phillips v. King County green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Right-Price Recreation, L.L.C. v. Connells Prairie Community Council green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Phillips v. King County green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Right-Price Recreation v. Connells Prairie green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Standlee v. Smith green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Blockburger v. United States green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Miranda v. Arizona green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| United States v. Anthony J. Smalley green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| State v. Perez green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Arment v. Henry green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| In Re the Personal Restraint of Reismiller green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Julie Ann Giles v. Richard (Dick) J. Ackerman, Sheriff of Bonneville County green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| State v. Harris green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.