48 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2026 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. McGeegreen2 sentences2024People v McGee, 258 Mich App 683, 698 ; 672 NW2d 191 (2003) (“Because this defendant’s conviction was based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt, we can surmise that had a preliminary examination been conducted, defendant would have been bound over to circuit court for trial since the lesser standard of probable cause is used at preliminary examination.”). 2024People v McGee, 258 Mich App 683, 698 ; 672 NW2d 191 (2003) (“Because this defendant’s conviction was based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt, we can surmise that had a preliminary examination been conducted, defendant would have been bound over to circuit court for trial since the lesser standard of probable cause is used at preliminary examination.”). | 2 | 8 |
Jarvis Christian College v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvaniagreen2 sentences2017However, it does not matter because the policy exclusion merely requires a gain to which the insured “is not legally entitled.” We agree with federal precedent3 that this is a lesser standard of wrongfulness than “illegal.” Jarvis Christian College v Nat’l Union Fire Ins Co of Pittsburgh, PA, 197 F3d 742, 749 (CA 5, 1999). 2017However, it does not matter because the policy exclusion merely requires a gain to which the insured “is not legally entitled.” We agree with federal precedent3 that this is a lesser standard of wrongfulness than “illegal.” Jarvis Christian College v Nat’l Union Fire Ins Co of Pittsburgh, PA, 197 F3d 742, 749 (CA 5, 1999). | 2 | 2 |
TIG Specialty Insurance v. PinkMonkey.com Inc.green2 sentences2017“A defendant is not legally entitled to an advantage or profit resulting from his violation of law if he could be required to return such profit.” TIG Specialty Ins Co v Pinkmonkey.com, Inc, 375 F3d 365, 370 (CA 5, 2004). 2017“A defendant is not legally entitled to an advantage or profit resulting from his violation of law if he could be required to return such profit.” TIG Specialty Ins Co v Pinkmonkey.com, Inc, 375 F3d 365, 370 (CA 5, 2004). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Greengreen2 sentences2017See People v Green, 310 Mich App 249, 255 ; 871 NW2d 888 (2015) (in a criminal -6- proceeding, a prosecutor must prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt). 2017See People v Green, 310 Mich App 249, 255 ; 871 NW2d 888 (2015) (in a criminal -6- proceeding, a prosecutor must prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt). | 2 | 2 |
New Jersey v. T. L. O.green2 sentences2010It is a well-accepted principle of law that school officials may search a student’s person or property on the school premises pursuant to the lesser standard of “reasonable suspicion.” See New Jersey v TLO, 469 US 325, 341-343 ; 105 S Ct 733 ; 83 L Ed 2d 720 (1985). 2010It is a well-accepted principle of law that school officials may search a student’s person or property on the school premises pursuant to the lesser standard of “reasonable suspicion.” See New Jersey v TLO, 469 US 325, 341-343 ; 105 S Ct 733 ; 83 L Ed 2d 720 (1985). | 1 | 2 |
People v. Darwichgreen2 sentences2026See People v Darwich, 226 Mich App 635 , 4 Because we discern no plain error regarding the trial court’s determination that the mistrial resulted from a cause unrelated to the prosecutor’s conduct, we need not address whether a lesser standard of proof is required to prove a double-jeopardy violation under the state constitution involving prosecutorial misconduct, which our Supreme Court is presently considering. 2026See People v Jennings, ___ Mich ___; 19 NW3d 329 (2025). -9- 638-640; 575 NW2d 44 (1997). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Carbingreen1 sentence2019See Carbin, 463 Mich at 600 . | 1 | 1 |
cluster 11180green1 sentence2015See United States v Magluta, 44 F3d 1530, 1535 (CA 11, 1995) (“[I]n order for law enforcement officials to enter a residence to execute an arrest warrant for a resident of the premises, the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the law enforcement agents, when viewed in the totality, must warrant a reasonable belief that the location to be searched is the suspect’s dwelling, and 2 See also United States v Thomas, 368 US App DC 285, 289 (2005); United States v Lovelock, 170 F3d 339, 343 (CA 2, 1999); United States v Veal, 453 F3d 164, 167 (CA 3, 2006); United States v Hill, 649 F3d 25 | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Salvador Magluta, A/K/A Sal, A/K/A Santiago Menendez, A/K/A Angelo Marettogreen2 sentences2015See United States v Magluta, 44 F3d 1530, 1535 (CA 11, 1995) (“[I]n order for law enforcement officials to enter a residence to execute an arrest warrant for a resident of the premises, the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the law enforcement agents, when viewed in the totality, must warrant a reasonable belief that the location to be searched is the suspect’s dwelling, and that the suspect is within the residence at the time of entry.”). 2015See United States v Magluta, 44 F3d 1530, 1535 (CA 11, 1995) (“[I]n order for law enforcement officials to enter a residence to execute an arrest warrant for a resident of the premises, the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the law enforcement agents, when viewed in the totality, must warrant a reasonable belief that the location to be searched is the suspect’s dwelling, and 2 See also United States v Thomas, 368 US App DC 285, 289 (2005); United States v Lovelock, 170 F3d 339, 343 (CA 2, 1999); United States v Veal, 453 F3d 164, 167 (CA 3, 2006); United States v Hill, 649 F3d 25 | 1 | 1 |
United States of America, Appellee/cross-Appellant v. Larry Risse, Appellant/cross-Appelleegreen1 sentence2015See United States v Magluta, 44 F3d 1530, 1535 (CA 11, 1995) (“[I]n order for law enforcement officials to enter a residence to execute an arrest warrant for a resident of the premises, the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the law enforcement agents, when viewed in the totality, must warrant a reasonable belief that the location to be searched is the suspect’s dwelling, and 2 See also United States v Thomas, 368 US App DC 285, 289 (2005); United States v Lovelock, 170 F3d 339, 343 (CA 2, 1999); United States v Veal, 453 F3d 164, 167 (CA 3, 2006); United States v Hill, 649 F3d 25 | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Hillgreen1 sentence2015See United States v Magluta, 44 F3d 1530, 1535 (CA 11, 1995) (“[I]n order for law enforcement officials to enter a residence to execute an arrest warrant for a resident of the premises, the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the law enforcement agents, when viewed in the totality, must warrant a reasonable belief that the location to be searched is the suspect’s dwelling, and 2 See also United States v Thomas, 368 US App DC 285, 289 (2005); United States v Lovelock, 170 F3d 339, 343 (CA 2, 1999); United States v Veal, 453 F3d 164, 167 (CA 3, 2006); United States v Hill, 649 F3d 25 | 1 | 1 |
People v. Longgreen2 sentences2015See People v Long, 246 Mich App 582, 586 ; 633 NW2d 843 (2001). 2015See People v Long, 246 Mich App 582, 586 ; 633 NW2d 843 (2001). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Hardingreen2 sentences2015While the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has stated that whether Payton’s “reason to believe” language creates a lesser standard than probable cause “remains an open question in our circuit,” the court did explain that “ ‘ [r] easonable belief is established by looking at common sense factors and evaluating the totality of the circumstances.’ ” United States v Hardin, 539 F3d 404, 420, 426 (CA 6, 2008), quoting United States v Pruitt, 458 F3d 477, 482 (CA 6, 2006) (alteration in original). 2015While the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has stated that whether Payton’s “reason to believe” language creates a lesser standard than probable cause “remains an open question in our circuit,” the court did explain that “ ‘[r]easonable belief is established by looking at common sense factors and evaluating the totality of the circumstances.’ ” United States v Hardin, 539 F3d 404, 420, 426 (CA 6, 2008), quoting United States v Pruitt, 458 F3d 477, 482 (CA 6, 2006) (alteration in original). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Joseph Lovelockgreen1 sentence2015See United States v Magluta, 44 F3d 1530, 1535 (CA 11, 1995) (“[I]n order for law enforcement officials to enter a residence to execute an arrest warrant for a resident of the premises, the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the law enforcement agents, when viewed in the totality, must warrant a reasonable belief that the location to be searched is the suspect’s dwelling, and 2 See also United States v Thomas, 368 US App DC 285, 289 (2005); United States v Lovelock, 170 F3d 339, 343 (CA 2, 1999); United States v Veal, 453 F3d 164, 167 (CA 3, 2006); United States v Hill, 649 F3d 25 | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Samuel Veal A/K/A Ice Samuel Vealgreen1 sentence2015See United States v Magluta, 44 F3d 1530, 1535 (CA 11, 1995) (“[I]n order for law enforcement officials to enter a residence to execute an arrest warrant for a resident of the premises, the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the law enforcement agents, when viewed in the totality, must warrant a reasonable belief that the location to be searched is the suspect’s dwelling, and 2 See also United States v Thomas, 368 US App DC 285, 289 (2005); United States v Lovelock, 170 F3d 339, 343 (CA 2, 1999); United States v Veal, 453 F3d 164, 167 (CA 3, 2006); United States v Hill, 649 F3d 25 | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Demetrius Pruittgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Burdick v. Takushigreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. $250,000 in United States Currency, (Two Cases) Appeal of Amador Rodriguez-Ramos (Two Cases)green | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. 5 S 351 Tuthill Road, Naperville, Illinois, Appeal Of: John Bochnewychgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Funds in the Amount of Thirty Thousand Six Hundred Seventy Dollars ($30,670.00), Antonio Calhoun, Claimant-Appellantgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. $159,880.00 in U.S. Currency, More or Lessgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Adamsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Schmuck v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Langworthyred | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Lámargreen | 1 | 1 |
| Chapin v. Coloma Townshipgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Champion
green
2 sentences2025If it did, why would we ever start by considering the lesser standard? 14 People v Jenkins, 472 Mich 26, 32 ; 691 NW2d 759 (2005), citing Terry, 392 US at 22 . 15 Id. 16 People v Champion, 452 Mich 92, 98 ; 549 NW2d 849 (1996). 7 who is in a motor vehicle if the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person is engaged in criminal activity.” 17 The trial court and the Court of Appeals both erred by failing to consider whether the police officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that justified an investigatory Terry stop, during which they discovered the illegal ha 2025If it did, why would we ever start by considering the lesser standard? 14 People v Jenkins, 472 Mich 26, 32 ; 691 NW2d 759 (2005), citing Terry, 392 US at 22 . 15 Id. 16 People v Champion, 452 Mich 92, 98 ; 549 NW2d 849 (1996). 7 who is in a motor vehicle if the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person is engaged in criminal activity.” 17 The trial court and the Court of Appeals both erred by failing to consider whether the police officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that justified an investigatory Terry stop, during which they discovered the illegal ha | 4 | 2010–2025 |
Terry v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2025If it did, why would we ever start by considering the lesser standard? 14 People v Jenkins, 472 Mich 26, 32 ; 691 NW2d 759 (2005), citing Terry, 392 US at 22 . 15 Id. 16 People v Champion, 452 Mich 92, 98 ; 549 NW2d 849 (1996). 7 who is in a motor vehicle if the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person is engaged in criminal activity.” 17 The trial court and the Court of Appeals both erred by failing to consider whether the police officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that justified an investigatory Terry stop, during which they discovered the illegal ha 2025If it did, why would we ever start by considering the lesser standard? 14 People v Jenkins, 472 Mich 26, 32 ; 691 NW2d 759 (2005), citing Terry, 392 US at 22 . 15 Id. 16 People v Champion, 452 Mich 92, 98 ; 549 NW2d 849 (1996). 7 who is in a motor vehicle if the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person is engaged in criminal activity.” 17 The trial court and the Court of Appeals both erred by failing to consider whether the police officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that justified an investigatory Terry stop, during which they discovered the illegal ha | 3 | 1979–2025 |
People v. Jenkins
green
2 sentences2025If it did, why would we ever start by considering the lesser standard? 14 People v Jenkins, 472 Mich 26, 32 ; 691 NW2d 759 (2005), citing Terry, 392 US at 22 . 15 Id. 16 People v Champion, 452 Mich 92, 98 ; 549 NW2d 849 (1996). 7 who is in a motor vehicle if the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person is engaged in criminal activity.” 17 The trial court and the Court of Appeals both erred by failing to consider whether the police officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that justified an investigatory Terry stop, during which they discovered the illegal ha 2025If it did, why would we ever start by considering the lesser standard? 14 People v Jenkins, 472 Mich 26, 32 ; 691 NW2d 759 (2005), citing Terry, 392 US at 22 . 15 Id. 16 People v Champion, 452 Mich 92, 98 ; 549 NW2d 849 (1996). 7 who is in a motor vehicle if the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person is engaged in criminal activity.” 17 The trial court and the Court of Appeals both erred by failing to consider whether the police officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that justified an investigatory Terry stop, during which they discovered the illegal ha | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Pierron v. Pierron
green
2 sentences2024Pierron v Pierron, 486 Mich 81, 89-90 ; 782 NW2d 480 (2010). 2024Pierron v Pierron, 486 Mich 81, 89-90 ; 782 NW2d 480 (2010). | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Davenport v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms Board of Zoning Appeals
green
2 sentences2022Davenport v Grosse Pointe Farms Zoning Bd, 210 Mich App 400, 405-406 ; 534 NW2d 143 (1995) (Courts “must give due deference to the agency’s regulatory expertise and may not ‘invade the province of exclusive administrative fact finding by displacing an agency’s choice between two reasonably differing views.’ ”). 1 Evidence indicated that approximately 85% of the planes utilizing the airport were VFR flights. 2 Importantly, the airport zoning board has a lesser standard when it comes to concerns for hazards than does the FAA. 2022Davenport v Grosse Pointe Farms Zoning Bd, 210 Mich App 400, 405-406 ; 534 NW2d 143 (1995) (Courts “must give due deference to the agency’s regulatory expertise and may not ‘invade the province of exclusive administrative fact finding by displacing an agency’s choice between two reasonably differing views.’ ”). 1 Evidence indicated that approximately 85% of the planes utilizing the airport were VFR flights. 2 Importantly, the airport zoning board has a lesser standard when it comes to concerns for hazards than does the FAA. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Kline
green
2 sentences2018“Because the effect of a partial closure does not reach the level of total closure, only a substantial, rather than a compelling, reason for the closure is necessary.” People v Kline, 197 Mich App 165, 170 ; 494 NW2d 756 (1992). 1 “A partial closure occurs where the public is only partially excluded, such as when family members or the press are allowed to remain, or when the closure order is narrowly tailored to specific needs.” People v Kline, 197 Mich App 165 , 170 n 2; 494 NW2d 756 (1992) (citations omitted). -2- Here, the trial court identified a substantial interest to be protected. 2018“Because the effect of a partial closure does not reach the level of total closure, only a substantial, rather than a compelling, reason for the closure is necessary.” People v Kline, 197 Mich App 165, 170 ; 494 NW2d 756 (1992). 1 “A partial closure occurs where the public is only partially excluded, such as when family members or the press are allowed to remain, or when the closure order is narrowly tailored to specific needs.” People v Kline, 197 Mich App 165 , 170 n 2; 494 NW2d 756 (1992) (citations omitted). -2- Here, the trial court identified a substantial interest to be protected. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Coblentz v. City of Novi
green
2 sentences2018Coblentz v City of Novi, 475 Mich 558, 572 ; 719 NW2d 73 (2006). 2018Coblentz v City of Novi, 475 Mich 558, 572 ; 719 NW2d 73 (2006). | 2 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Yost
green
2 sentences2017Id. 2017Id. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
United States v. Sokolow
green
2 sentences2010In People v Champion, 452 Mich 92, 98 ; 549 NW2d 849 (1996), our Supreme Court, citing United States v Sokolow, 490 US 1 ; 109 S Ct 1581 ; 104 L Ed 2d 1 (1989), noted, “Reasonable suspicion entails something more than an inchoate or unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but less than the level of suspicion required for probable cause.” An anonymous tip can provide reasonable suspicion if it is considered along with a “totality of the circumstances” that shows the tip to be reliable. 2010In People v Champion, 452 Mich 92, 98 ; 549 NW2d 849 (1996), our Supreme Court, citing United States v Sokolow, 490 US 1 ; 109 S Ct 1581 ; 104 L Ed 2d 1 (1989), noted, “Reasonable suspicion entails something more than an inchoate or unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but less than the level of suspicion required for probable cause.” An anonymous tip can provide reasonable suspicion if it is considered along with a “totality of the circumstances” that shows the tip to be reliable. | 2 | 2010–2010 |
People of Michigan v. Robert Monya Green
green
2 sentences2024This Court rejected defendant’s claim that he was prejudiced by the failure to hold a preliminary examination because that contention “ignore[d] the jury verdict.” Id. “[B]ecause defendant’s conviction was based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt, this Court can surmise that had a preliminary examination been conducted, as defendant argued for here, defendant would have been bound over to circuit court for trial since the lesser standard of probable cause is used at [a] preliminary examination.” Id. (quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted). 2024This Court rejected defendant’s claim that he was prejudiced by the failure to hold a preliminary examination because that contention “ignore[d] the jury verdict.” Id. “[B]ecause defendant’s conviction was based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt, this Court can surmise that had a preliminary examination been conducted, as defendant argued for here, defendant would have been bound over to circuit court for trial since the lesser standard of probable cause is used at [a] preliminary examination.” Id. (quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People of Michigan v. Tremel Anderson
green
1 sentence2020Although the lesser standard of probable cause allows for a magistrate to “legitimately find probable cause while personally entertaining some reservations regarding guilt[,]” all evidence presented by the prosecution must allow “a person of ordinary prudence and caution” to entertain “a reasonable belief of the accused’s guilt.” Anderson, 501 Mich at 188 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Shade v. Wright
green
2 sentences2019Defendant does not raise this issue on appeal, and we address it only to provide background and context for the arguments raised. -2- considered defendant’s motion under the lesser standard set forth in Shade v Wright, 291 Mich App 17 ; 805 NW2d 1 (2010), for analysis of a motion to modify parenting time, defendant still had not shown proper cause or a change in circumstances. 2019Defendant does not raise this issue on appeal, and we address it only to provide background and context for the arguments raised. -2- considered defendant’s motion under the lesser standard set forth in Shade v Wright, 291 Mich App 17 ; 805 NW2d 1 (2010), for analysis of a motion to modify parenting time, defendant still had not shown proper cause or a change in circumstances. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
In re VanDalen
green
1 sentence2016Importantly, respondent’s argument ignores that the trial court needed to find by clear and convincing evidence that statutory grounds existed to terminate her parental rights, VanDalen, 293 Mich App at 139 , but it only needed to find by a preponderance of the evidence—a lesser standard—that termination was in the child’s best interests, Moss, 301 Mich App at 90 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
In re Moss
green
1 sentence2016Importantly, respondent’s argument ignores that the trial court needed to find by clear and convincing evidence that statutory grounds existed to terminate her parental rights, VanDalen, 293 Mich App at 139 , but it only needed to find by a preponderance of the evidence—a lesser standard—that termination was in the child’s best interests, Moss, 301 Mich App at 90 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Grossman v. Brown
green
2 sentences2015Id. at 599 . 2015Id. at 599 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Santosky v. Kramer green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Moll v. Abbott Laboratories green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| People v. Kazmierczak green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Wilkie v. Auto-Owners Insurance green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Fire Insurance Exchange v. Diehl green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Schave v. Department of State Police green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Lothian v. City of Detroit green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| People v. Pearson green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Freedman v. City of Oak Park neutral | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Velmer v. Baraga Area Schools green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Shannon v. Howard S. Wright Const. Co. green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Koenig v. Patrick Construction Corp. green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Zerby v. Warren green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Coty v. U. S. Slicing MacHine Co. green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| People v. Adams neutral | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| United States v. Martinez-Fuerte green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| People v. Bryant green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.