lesser standard in Oregon

2010Our decision in Happy Valley is consistent with that understanding of the 1981 version of the statute. 2 In that case, we reviewed the legislative history concerning ORS 197.303 (1981) and ORS 197.307 (1981) and noted that “it seems reasonably clear that at least one purpose of ORS 197.303(2)(a) and (b) [(1981)] is to impose a lesser requirement on the smaller cities and counties * * * to meet specific housing needs.” Happy Valley, 66 Or App at 801 .

1994How those requirements are to be articulated in the first instance will be up to LCDC on remand.” 66 Or App at 799-801 .

2023State v. Middleton, 302 Or App 339, 352 , 459 P3d 918 (2020).

2023State v. Middleton, 302 Or App 339, 352 , 459 P3d 918 (2020).

2020State v. Holdorf, 355 Or 812, 823 , 333 P3d 982 (2014); see also State v. Walker, 277 Or App 397, 401 , 372 P3d 540 , rev den, 360 Or 423 (2016) (“[A]n officer may have ‘reason- able suspicion’ sufficient to justify an investigatory stop of a person even if the officer does not have sufficient reason to believe that it is probable that the person has committed * * * a crime.” (Emphasis omitted.)).

2020State v. Holdorf, 355 Or 812, 823 , 333 P3d 982 (2014); see also State v. Walker, 277 Or App 397, 401 , 372 P3d 540 , rev den, 360 Or 423 (2016) (“[A]n officer may have ‘reason- able suspicion’ sufficient to justify an investigatory stop of a person even if the officer does not have sufficient reason to believe that it is probable that the person has committed * * * a crime.” (Emphasis omitted.)).

2014Id. at 803 .

2013In light of our disposition, we need not resolve that question in this case. 10 See also Derry v. Commonwealth, 274 SW3d 439, 442 (Ky 2008) (since venue is not “jurisdictional,” it is “waived” by failing to raise the issue before trial); State v. Wood, 596 SW2d 394, 399 (Mo 1980) (“Having proceeded to trial without objection, appellant waived the issue [of venue].”); State v. Allen, 293 NW2d 16, 18 (Iowa 1980) (“considering first the time for ruling upon a defendant’s venue objection, we conclude that the defendant must secure a ruling by the trial court before trial after the parties have had

2010According to petitioner, LUBA instead created and applied a lesser standard and, thereby, acted contrary to “long recognized evidentiary standards, the express language and purpose of MCSO 5.030, ORS 92.044 and this [c]ourt’s” decision in Mountain West Investment Corp. v. City of Silverton, 175 Or App 556 , 30 P3d 420 (2001). 1 (Boldface omitted.) Further, petitioner argues, LUBA erred not only by applying the wrong standard, but in misapplying the standard that it did apply by requiring petitioner to establish reoresuitability, when the proper allocation of the burden is to require respondent

2010According to petitioner, LUBA instead created and applied a lesser standard and, thereby, acted contrary to “long recognized evidentiary standards, the express language and purpose of MCSO 5.030, ORS 92.044 and this [c]ourt’s” decision in Mountain West Investment Corp. v. City of Silverton, 175 Or App 556 , 30 P3d 420 (2001). 1 (Boldface omitted.) Further, petitioner argues, LUBA erred not only by applying the wrong standard, but in misapplying the standard that it did apply by requiring petitioner to establish reoresuitability, when the proper allocation of the burden is to require respondent

1985To the extent that they articulate a lesser standard, we overrule State ex rel McKee v. McKee, 237 Or 583 , 392 P2d 645 (1964), and State ex rel. v. Blackwell, 181 Or 157, 164 , 179 P2d 278 , 179 P2d 1023 (1947).

1985To the extent that they articulate a lesser standard, we overrule State ex rel McKee v. McKee, 237 Or 583 , 392 P2d 645 (1964), and State ex rel. v. Blackwell, 181 Or 157, 164 , 179 P2d 278 , 179 P2d 1023 (1947).

1985To the extent that they articulate a lesser standard, we overrule State ex rel McKee v. McKee, 237 Or 583 , 392 P2d 645 (1964), and State ex rel. v. Blackwell, 181 Or 157, 164 , 179 P2d 278 , 179 P2d 1023 (1947).

1985To the extent that they articulate a lesser standard, we overrule State ex rel McKee v. McKee, 237 Or 583 , 392 P2d 645 (1964), and State ex rel. v. Blackwell, 181 Or 157, 164 , 179 P2d 278 , 179 P2d 1023 (1947).

1983Although mere presence in a car where a crime is known to have been committed may not in itself constitute probable cause to arrest or to search a person incident to a justifiable search of the car, United States v. Di Re, 332 US 581 , 68 S Ct 222 , 92 L Ed 210 (1948), it certainly supports a suspicion that the person has committed a crime, a lesser standard.

1983Although mere presence in a car where a crime is known to have been committed may not in itself constitute probable cause to arrest or to search a person incident to a justifiable search of the car, United States v. Di Re, 332 US 581 , 68 S Ct 222 , 92 L Ed 210 (1948), it certainly supports a suspicion that the person has committed a crime, a lesser standard.

1983The only Oregon case to rely on the worker in the road doctrine was Graves v. Portland etc. Power Co., 66 Or 232 , 134 P 1 (1913).

1983The only Oregon case to rely on the worker in the road doctrine was Graves v. Portland etc. Power Co., 66 Or 232 , 134 P 1 (1913).

1983Occupants of a car, unlike customers in a tavern, see Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 US 85 , 100 S Ct 338 , 62 L Ed 2d 238 (1979), may reasonably be assumed to have some personal or business association, and knowledge that one of them is conducting criminal business in the car at least justifies a suspicion that the other occupants are participants in that business.

1983Occupants of a car, unlike customers in a tavern, see Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 US 85 , 100 S Ct 338 , 62 L Ed 2d 238 (1979), may reasonably be assumed to have some personal or business association, and knowledge that one of them is conducting criminal business in the car at least justifies a suspicion that the other occupants are participants in that business.

1977We reasoned that this follows from the fact that the proponent of quasi-judicial change has the burden of proof, Fasano v. Washington Co. Comm., 264 Or 574 , 507 P2d 23 (1973); and, therefore, denials based on findings to the effect that a local government was not persuaded by the proponent’s evidence are sufficient.

1977We reasoned that this follows from the fact that the proponent of quasi-judicial change has the burden of proof, Fasano v. Washington Co. Comm., 264 Or 574 , 507 P2d 23 (1973); and, therefore, denials based on findings to the effect that a local government was not persuaded by the proponent’s evidence are sufficient.

1977Because mobile homes are not allowed within the City of Bend outside of mobile home parks, mobile home subdivisions or other designated areas, allowance of this conditional use would likely create an inconsistent future use and thereby effectively interfere with the orderly and efficient transition from rural to urban use.” In past decisions, e.g., Dickinson v. Bd. of County *1072 Comm., 21 Or App 98 , 533 P2d 1395 (1975), and Marracci v. City of Scappoose, 26 Or App 131 , 552 P2d 552 , Sup Ct review denied (1976), this court has held that a lesser standard for adequacy of findings applies to

1977Because mobile homes are not allowed within the City of Bend outside of mobile home parks, mobile home subdivisions or other designated areas, allowance of this conditional use would likely create an inconsistent future use and thereby effectively interfere with the orderly and efficient transition from rural to urban use.” In past decisions, e.g., Dickinson v. Bd. of County *1072 Comm., 21 Or App 98 , 533 P2d 1395 (1975), and Marracci v. City of Scappoose, 26 Or App 131 , 552 P2d 552 , Sup Ct review denied (1976), this court has held that a lesser standard for adequacy of findings applies to

1977Because mobile homes are not allowed within the City of Bend outside of mobile home parks, mobile home subdivisions or other designated areas, allowance of this conditional use would likely create an inconsistent future use and thereby effectively interfere with the orderly and efficient transition from rural to urban use.” In past decisions, e.g., Dickinson v. Bd. of County *1072 Comm., 21 Or App 98 , 533 P2d 1395 (1975), and Marracci v. City of Scappoose, 26 Or App 131 , 552 P2d 552 , Sup Ct review denied (1976), this court has held that a lesser standard for adequacy of findings applies to

1977Because mobile homes are not allowed within the City of Bend outside of mobile home parks, mobile home subdivisions or other designated areas, allowance of this conditional use would likely create an inconsistent future use and thereby effectively interfere with the orderly and efficient transition from rural to urban use.” In past decisions, e.g., Dickinson v. Bd. of County *1072 Comm., 21 Or App 98 , 533 P2d 1395 (1975), and Marracci v. City of Scappoose, 26 Or App 131 , 552 P2d 552 , Sup Ct review denied (1976), this court has held that a lesser standard for adequacy of findings applies to

1974For these reasons a lesser standard than probable cause, — the standard of relevancy between the search and the arrest — is sufficient." 254 Or. at 15-16 , 456 P.2d at 73 .

1974For these reasons a lesser standard than probable cause, — the standard of relevancy between the search and the arrest — is sufficient." 254 Or. at 15-16 , 456 P.2d at 73 .

1969For these reasons a lesser standard than probable cause, — the standard of relevancy between the search and the arrest — is sufficient. [3] This case, in our opinion, is a stronger case for the state than Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 , 87 S.Ct. 788 , 17 L.Ed.2d 730 , reh. and modif. den. 386 U.S. 988 , 87 S.Ct. 1283 , 18 L.Ed.2d 243 (1967).

1969For these reasons a lesser standard than probable cause, — the standard of relevancy between the search and the arrest — is sufficient. [3] This case, in our opinion, is a stronger case for the state than Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 , 87 S.Ct. 788 , 17 L.Ed.2d 730 , reh. and modif. den. 386 U.S. 988 , 87 S.Ct. 1283 , 18 L.Ed.2d 243 (1967).

1969Frequently, the tools or fruits of the crime are discovered by a search of the person, car, room, or office of the person arrested.' For these reasons a lesser standard than probable cause, — the standard of relevancy between the search and the arrest — is sufficient. ③ This case, in our opinion, is a stronger case for the state than Cooper v. California, 386 US 58 , 87 S Ct 788 , 17 L Ed2d 730, reh and modif den 386 US 988 , 87 S Ct 1283 , 18 L Ed2d 243 (1967).

1969For these reasons a lesser standard than probable cause, — the standard of relevancy between the search and the arrest — is sufficient. [3] This case, in our opinion, is a stronger case for the state than Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 , 87 S.Ct. 788 , 17 L.Ed.2d 730 , reh. and modif. den. 386 U.S. 988 , 87 S.Ct. 1283 , 18 L.Ed.2d 243 (1967).

1969Frequently, the tools or fruits of the crime are discovered by a search of the person, car, room, or office of the person arrested.' For these reasons a lesser standard than probable cause, — the standard of relevancy between the search and the arrest — is sufficient. ③ This case, in our opinion, is a stronger case for the state than Cooper v. California, 386 US 58 , 87 S Ct 788 , 17 L Ed2d 730, reh and modif den 386 US 988 , 87 S Ct 1283 , 18 L Ed2d 243 (1967).

1969For these reasons a lesser standard than probable cause, — the standard of relevancy between the search and the arrest — is sufficient. [3] This case, in our opinion, is a stronger case for the state than Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 , 87 S.Ct. 788 , 17 L.Ed.2d 730 , reh. and modif. den. 386 U.S. 988 , 87 S.Ct. 1283 , 18 L.Ed.2d 243 (1967).