lesser standard in Massachusetts

2017The Supreme Judicial Court has emphasized that "[a]n administrative 9 inspection warrant, granted under a lesser standard of probable cause than is required in traditional criminal searches and seizures, cannot be used as a device to seize evidence for use in a criminal prosecution." Commonwealth v. Frodyma, 386 Mass. 434, 438 (1982).

2001See also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Frodyma, 386 Mass. 434, 438 (1982), S.C., 393 Mass. 438 (1984) (“An administrative inspection warrant, granted under a lesser standard of probable cause than is required in traditional criminal searches and seizures, cannot be used as a device to seize evidence for use in a criminal prosecution”).

1980We look to the charge as a whole, see Commonwealth v. Watkins, 377 Mass. 385, 388 , cert, denied, 442 U.S. 932 (1979), here praised by McCown’s counsel as “very fair to the defendant.” As in Commonwealth v. Williams, 378 Mass. 217 (1979), where a question was raised because of the judge’s stress on the importance of dealing “firmly” with crime, “[considering the charge as a whole, we cannot conclude that the judge’s instructions could have caused the jury to convict on a lesser standard than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 234-235 . (b) Best now contends that the judge without prompti

1980We upheld the conviction in the Williams case because, considered as a whole, we could not conclude “that the judge’s instructions could have caused the jury to convict on a lesser standard than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 234-235 .

2025Employees, Council 31, 585 U.S. 878, 894 (2018), quoting Knox v. Service Employees Int'l Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 310 (2012).

2025Employees, Council 31, 585 U.S. 878, 894 (2018), quoting Knox v. Service Employees Int'l Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 310 (2012).

2025As a general rule, "[a] law that is content based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny." Reed v. Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 165 (2015).[8] Restrictions on commercial speech, however, are subjected to a lesser standard of review that the Supreme Court has recently termed "'exacting' scrutiny." Janus v. American Fed'n of State, County, & Mun.

2023"This is equivalent to the crime of assault," Commonwealth v. Robicheau, 421 Mass. 176, 183 (1995); was sufficient to show abuse beyond a reasonable 4 doubt, see id. at 182-183 ; and sufficed under the lesser standard of a preponderance of the evidence.

2023"This is equivalent to the crime of assault," Commonwealth v. Robicheau, 421 Mass. 176, 183 (1995); was sufficient to show abuse beyond a reasonable 4 doubt, see id. at 182-183 ; and sufficed under the lesser standard of a preponderance of the evidence.

2017"The proper scope of an administrative warrant . . . is limited by the purpose for which the warrant is sought." Commonwealth v. Jung, 420 Mass. 675, 685 (1995).

2016Rather, in light of the defendant's diminished expectation of privacy, and the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion, the facts in this case, including seemingly innocent activities, taken together were sufficient to justify a search of the defendant's home for Lewis, 71 F.3d 358, 362-363 (10th Cir. 1995) (police, armed with information deemed to be reliable that parolee was involved in drug activity, had reasonable suspicion on that basis alone to "justify[] the parole agents' warrantless search of his residence"); 2 W.R.

2016See Commonwealth v. Gomes, 453 Mass. 506, 511 (2009). 3.

2012See, e.g., Wright v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1098, 1105 (Ind. 1997) (preponderance); State v. Quimby, 589 A.2d 28, 30 (Me. 1991) (preponderance); People v. Bac Tran, 80 N.Y.2d 170, 175 (1992) (“prima facie case”); State v. Dorcey, 103 Wis. 2d 152, 157 (1981) (“prima facie showing”).

2012Goodchild v. Burke, 27 Wis. 2d 244, 265 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1017 (1966), but permit proof of facts preliminary to the admission of coventurers’ statements by a lesser standard.

2012See, e.g., Wright v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1098, 1105 (Ind. 1997) (preponderance); State v. Quimby, 589 A.2d 28, 30 (Me. 1991) (preponderance); People v. Bac Tran, 80 N.Y.2d 170, 175 (1992) (“prima facie case”); State v. Dorcey, 103 Wis. 2d 152, 157 (1981) (“prima facie showing”).

2012See, e.g., Wright v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1098, 1105 (Ind. 1997) (preponderance); State v. Quimby, 589 A.2d 28, 30 (Me. 1991) (preponderance); People v. Bac Tran, 80 N.Y.2d 170, 175 (1992) (“prima facie case”); State v. Dorcey, 103 Wis. 2d 152, 157 (1981) (“prima facie showing”).

2012See, e.g., Wright v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1098, 1105 (Ind. 1997) (preponderance); State v. Quimby, 589 A.2d 28, 30 (Me. 1991) (preponderance); People v. Bac Tran, 80 N.Y.2d 170, 175 (1992) (“prima facie case”); State v. Dorcey, 103 Wis. 2d 152, 157 (1981) (“prima facie showing”).

2011See Commonwealth v. Silva, supra. Articulable facts, then, must demonstrate a suspicion that the defendant possessed 14 more than one ounce of marijuana, because possession of one ounce or less of marijuana is not a crime.

2011See Commonwealth v. Silva, supra .

2010We have since pointed out that “decisions in these cases are highly fact specific” and that “[t]oo broad an application of this exception [in Fraser] would undercut the important principle that intrusions on a citizen’s liberty must ordinarily be based on reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Commonwealth v. Knowles, 451 Mass. 91, 99 (2008).

2003Conviction of a subsequent crime, whether as a result of a guilty plea or following trial, precludes a probationer from relitigating the issue in a revocation proceeding “based on the logic that, if the wrong was proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the Commonwealth need not be compelled to prove the case again on the lesser standard of proof.” Commonwealth v. Holmgren, 421 Mass. 224, 227-228 (1995).

2003The fact that, based on his plea of guilty, the defendant was subsequently convicted of the crime for which his probation was revoked “submerges any residual negative consequences of the probation revocation.” Commonwealth v. Fallon, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 473, 475 (2001).

2002We adhere to what was recently stated in Commonwealth v. Watkins, 433 Mass. 539, 546-547 (2001): “Because the Webster charge, apart from the term ‘moral certainty,’ defines reasonable doubt in a manner that conveys to a jury the need to determine guilt based solely on all evidence and to a state of near certitude, and avoids language that would permit conviction by a lesser standard of guilt or on factors other than the courtroom proof, the charge has always been, and remains today, the preferred and adequate charge on the Commonwealth’s burden of proof.

2001To determine the permissible scope of a regulatory inspection would require us to ascertain whether “the statutory program, in terms of certainty and regularity of its application, . . . providers] a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant. . . . [There must be a] proper limitation on the ‘time, place, and scope’ of the inspection in order to restrain the discretion of the inspectors.’’ Commonwealth v. Eagleton, supra at 204-205 (citation omitted).

2001See also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Frodyma, 386 Mass. 434, 438 (1982), S.C., 393 Mass. 438 (1984) (“An administrative inspection warrant, granted under a lesser standard of probable cause than is required in traditional criminal searches and seizures, cannot be used as a device to seize evidence for use in a criminal prosecution”).

1996Cf. Department of Youth Servs. v. A Juvenile, 384 Mass. 784, 792 (1981) (this court has recognized that “proof beyond a reasonable doubt is [not] constitutionally required in every commitment proceeding; the Legislature retains some leeway to provide for protective or rehabilitative confinement based upon a lesser standard of proof’).

1994It thus urges this court to apply a lesser standard of care to such “pre-” or “post-transit passengers.” It is undisputed by the parties, and well settled in Massachusetts, that “a common carrier owes to its passengers the highest degree of care in the anticipation and prevention of violence from its employees, other passengers, and even strangers, as is consistent with the nature and operation of its business.” Quigley v. Wilson Line of Massachusetts, Inc., 338 Mass. 125, 128 (1958).