lesser standard in Georgia

1994(Emphasis supplied.) Appellant urges that, by instructing the jury that “[reasonable certainty is all that can be expected in a legal investigation,” the trial court impermissibly reduced the State’s burden of proof and allowed the jury to convict him on a lesser standard than “beyond a reasonable doubt.” However, we have held that use of the phrase “moral and reasonable certainty” does not constitute reversible error when it appears in the context of a charge which “as a whole repeatedly and accurately conveyed to the jury the concept of reasonable doubt.” Vance v. State, 262 Ga. 236, 237 (2)

1994(Emphasis supplied.) Appellant urges that, by instructing the jury that “[reasonable certainty is all that can be expected in a legal investigation,” the trial court impermissibly reduced the State’s burden of proof and allowed the jury to convict him on a lesser standard than “beyond a reasonable doubt.” However, we have held that use of the phrase “moral and reasonable certainty” does not constitute reversible error when it appears in the context of a charge which “as a whole repeatedly and accurately conveyed to the jury the concept of reasonable doubt.” Vance v. State, 262 Ga. 236, 237 (2)

2005We do not address whether proof of the alleged prejudicial collateral consequence must meet the “concrete and continuing” standard in Spencer v. Kemna, supra, 523 U. S. at 7 , or whether a lesser standard, such as reasonable probability, will suffice, see Williams v. Ragaglia, 802 A2d 778, 782-783 (Conn. 2002), because appellants here failed to make any showing of adverse collateral consequences.

2005See OCGA § 15-11-58.1(b) (juvenile court may terminate an order of disposition of a child adjudicated as deprived prior to its expiration "if it appears to the court that the purposes of the order have been accomplished"). [8] We do not address whether proof of the alleged prejudicial collateral consequence must meet the "concrete and continuing" standard in Spencer v. Kemna, supra, 523 U.S. at 7 , 118 S.Ct. 978 or whether a lesser standard, such as reasonable probability, will suffice, see Williams v. Ragaglia, 261 Conn. 219 , 802 A.2d 778, 782-783 (2002), because appellants here failed to ma

2023The possibility of irresponsible harassment is something the medical profession should not be called upon to bear, dealing as it does with human life and human frailty.” Mims v. Boland, 110 Ga. App. 477, 484 (1) (b) ( 138 SE2d 902 ) (1964).

2023The possibility of irresponsible harassment is something the medical profession should not be called upon to bear, dealing as it does with human life and human frailty.” Mims v. Boland, 110 Ga. App. 477, 484 (1) (b) ( 138 SE2d 902 ) (1964).

2012Gold, supra at 1351, n. 10 .

2012Gold, supra at 1351 .

2005We do not address whether proof of the alleged prejudicial collateral consequence must meet the “concrete and continuing” standard in Spencer v. Kemna, supra, 523 U. S. at 7 , or whether a lesser standard, such as reasonable probability, will suffice, see Williams v. Ragaglia, 802 A2d 778, 782-783 (Conn. 2002), because appellants here failed to make any showing of adverse collateral consequences.

2005See OCGA § 15-11-58.1(b) (juvenile court may terminate an order of disposition of a child adjudicated as deprived prior to its expiration "if it appears to the court that the purposes of the order have been accomplished"). [8] We do not address whether proof of the alleged prejudicial collateral consequence must meet the "concrete and continuing" standard in Spencer v. Kemna, supra, 523 U.S. at 7 , 118 S.Ct. 978 or whether a lesser standard, such as reasonable probability, will suffice, see Williams v. Ragaglia, 261 Conn. 219 , 802 A.2d 778, 782-783 (2002), because appellants here failed to ma

2023Joseph’s, 313 Ga. at 568 (2) (c). 14 reasonable diligence.37 But regardless of whether a lesser standard is applicable here, the plaintiffs adequately pled reasonable diligence given their allegations that they only recently discovered “within the statutory period” the extent of the churches’ involvement.

2023Joseph’s, 313 Ga. at 568 (2) (c). 14 reasonable diligence.37 But regardless of whether a lesser standard is applicable here, the plaintiffs adequately pled reasonable diligence given their allegations that they only recently discovered “within the statutory period” the extent of the churches’ involvement.

2020See State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 13 (1) ( 838 SE2d 808 ) (2020).

2020See State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 13 (1) ( 838 SE2d 808 ) (2020).

2020“Since [some evidence] is a different and lesser standard of proof than beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial court did not apply the correct standard of proof in evaluating the evidence [in this case].” In the Interest of A. S., 293 Ga. App. at 712 (2).

2013See United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F3d 458 (4th Cir. 2011) (concluding a lesser standard than strict scrutiny is appropriate in evaluating laws that burden the right to bear arms outside the home); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010) (adopting intermediate scrutiny to review ban on possession of unmarked firearms that did not affect possession of marked firearms); Chester, 628 F3d at 683-684 (applying intermediate scrutiny to domestic violence misdemeanant’s claim that he was entitled to keep a weapon for self-defense in his home).

2013See United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F3d 458 (4th Cir. 2011) (concluding a lesser standard than strict scrutiny is appropriate in evaluating laws that burden the right to bear arms outside the home); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010) (adopting intermediate scrutiny to review ban on possession of unmarked firearms that did not affect possession of marked firearms); Chester, 628 F3d at 683-684 (applying intermediate scrutiny to domestic violence misdemeanant’s claim that he was entitled to keep a weapon for self-defense in his home).

2013See Eaves v. Harris, 258 Ga. 1, 4 (2) (b) ( 364 SE2d 854 ) (1988).

2013See Eaves v. Harris, 258 Ga. 1, 4 (2) (b) ( 364 SE2d 854 ) (1988).

2006Decisions on requests to charge involve trial tactics to which we must afford substantial latitude, and “they provide no grounds for reversal unless such tactical decisions are so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have chosen them.” (Citations omitted.) Henderson v. State, 252 Ga. App. 295, 299 (2) (b) ( 556 SE2d 204 ) (2001). (d) Finally, Lindo asserts that his defense counsel was ineffective because he did not object when the trial court charged the jury that “[cjriminal intent does not mean an intention to violate the law or to violate a penal statute but means simply t

2006Decisions on requests to charge involve trial tactics to which we must afford substantial latitude, and “they provide no grounds for reversal unless such tactical decisions are so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have chosen them.” (Citations omitted.) Henderson v. State, 252 Ga. App. 295, 299 (2) (b) ( 556 SE2d 204 ) (2001). (d) Finally, Lindo asserts that his defense counsel was ineffective because he did not object when the trial court charged the jury that “[cjriminal intent does not mean an intention to violate the law or to violate a penal statute but means simply t

2003Indeed, this Court stated in Adams v. State, 269 Ga. 405, 407 (1) ( 498 SE2d 268 ) (1998), that in the criminal context, the reasonableness of a search under the Fourth Amendment is measured with a “ ‘probable cause’ yardstick.” The reasonableness of a search under the Georgia Constitution cannot be measured under a lesser standard.

2003Indeed, this Court stated in Adams v. State, 269 Ga. 405, 407 (1) ( 498 SE2d 268 ) (1998), that in the criminal context, the reasonableness of a search under the Fourth Amendment is measured with a “ ‘probable cause’ yardstick.” The reasonableness of a search under the Georgia Constitution cannot be measured under a lesser standard.

1997Therefore, the two decisions are not necessarily inconsistent. [Cit.]” Earp v. Harris, 191 Ga. App. 414, 416 ( 382 SE2d 156 ) (1989).

1997Therefore, the two decisions are not necessarily inconsistent. [Cit.]” Earp v. Harris, 191 Ga. App. 414, 416 ( 382 SE2d 156 ) (1989).

1997In Williams v. State, 251 Ga. 749, 755 (4), 312 S.E.2d 40 (1983), we held that the State is required to show "sufficient evidence tying [the defendant] to the perpetration of the independent crimes...." Although we did not explicitly define "sufficient evidence," it is clear from a review of the strongly worded dissent of Justice Smith that "sufficient evidence" is certainly a lesser standard than "clear and convincing evidence." Williams v. State, supra at 816(1)(b)(2), 312 S.E.2d 40 (Dissent of Justice Smith).

1997In Williams v. State, 251 Ga. 749, 755 (4), 312 S.E.2d 40 (1983), we held that the State is required to show "sufficient evidence tying [the defendant] to the perpetration of the independent crimes...." Although we did not explicitly define "sufficient evidence," it is clear from a review of the strongly worded dissent of Justice Smith that "sufficient evidence" is certainly a lesser standard than "clear and convincing evidence." Williams v. State, supra at 816(1)(b)(2), 312 S.E.2d 40 (Dissent of Justice Smith).

1997“Certain constraints on personal liberty that constitute ‘seizures’ for purposes of the Fourth Amendment may nonetheless be justified even though there is no showing of‘probable cause’ if‘there is articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime.’ Such a temporary detention for questioning in the case of an airport search is reviewed under the lesser standard enunciated in Terry v. Ohio, [supra], and is permissible because of the ‘public interest involved in the suppression of illegal transactions in drugs or of any other serious crime.’ ” (Citations omitted.) Fl

1997“A law enforcement officer coming upon the scene of suspected criminal activity will conduct a general on-the-scene investigation and may detain temporarily anyone at the scene who tries to leave before the preliminary investigation is completed.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Daugherty v. State, 182 Ga. App. 730, 731 ( 356 SE2d 902 ) (1987).

1997“A law enforcement officer coming upon the scene of suspected criminal activity will conduct a general on-the-scene investigation and may detain temporarily anyone at the scene who tries to leave before the preliminary investigation is completed.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Daugherty v. State, 182 Ga. App. 730, 731 ( 356 SE2d 902 ) (1987).

1996See Clark v. State, 212 Ga. App. 486, 488 ( 441 SE2d 885 ) (1994).

1996See Clark v. State, 212 Ga. App. 486, 488 ( 441 SE2d 885 ) (1994).

1994See also Hicks v. State, 262 Ga. 756, 757 (3) ( 425 SE2d 877 ) (1993); Marion v. State, 263 Ga. 358, 359 (2) ( 434 SE2d 463 ) (1993).

1994See also Hicks v. State, 262 Ga. 756, 757 (3) ( 425 SE2d 877 ) (1993); Marion v. State, 263 Ga. 358, 359 (2) ( 434 SE2d 463 ) (1993).

1994See also Hicks v. State, 262 Ga. 756, 757 (3) ( 425 SE2d 877 ) (1993); Marion v. State, 263 Ga. 358, 359 (2) ( 434 SE2d 463 ) (1993).

1994See also Hicks v. State, 262 Ga. 756, 757 (3) ( 425 SE2d 877 ) (1993); Marion v. State, 263 Ga. 358, 359 (2) ( 434 SE2d 463 ) (1993).

1994See also Daniels v. State, 207 Ga. App. 689 ( 428 SE2d 820 ) (1993).

1994See also Daniels v. State, 207 Ga. App. 689 ( 428 SE2d 820 ) (1993).

1994See Wal-Mart Stores v. Hester, 201 Ga. App. 478 ( 411 SE2d 507 ) (1991).

1994See Wal-Mart Stores v. Hester, 201 Ga. App. 478 ( 411 SE2d 507 ) (1991).