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29 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1977–2026 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rainwater v. Rainwatergreen2 sentences2023On the contrary, courts have long recognized that “divorce often requires a lesser standard of living for both parties.” Rainwater v. Rainwater, 177 Ariz. 500, 504 (App. 1993). 2014To the contrary, and as we have said on another occasion, “divorce often requires a lesser standard of living for both parties.” Rainwater v. Rainwater, 177 Ariz. 500, 504 , 869 P.2d 176, 180 (App. 1993). ¶8 Wife contends that the court failed to consider that Husband earned more than $170,000 annually, they enjoyed a comfortable lifestyle, and they accumulated no debt. | 2 | 2 |
State of Arizona v. David James Yonkmangreen2 sentences2021Cf. State v. Yonkman, 233 Ariz. 369, 374, ¶ 15 (App. 2013). ¶14 Based on this evidence, a reasonable juror could infer that Reed promoted or facilitated the August 2016 transaction or provided the means for its occurrence. 2020Collateral estoppel requires that the “issue sought to be relitigated must be precisely the same as the issue in the previous litigation.” State v. Jimenez, 130 Ariz. 138, 140 (1981). ¶20 The collateral estoppel component of double jeopardy does not prohibit the State “from relitigating an issue when it is presented in a subsequent action governed by a lower standard of proof.” Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 349 (1990); see also State v. Lehr, 227 Ariz. 140, 148, ¶ 26 (2011) (“[A]dmission of evidence of other acts for which a defendant has been acquitted does not violate double jeopar | 2 | 2 |
Dowling v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2020Collateral estoppel requires that the “issue sought to be relitigated must be precisely the same as the issue in the previous litigation.” State v. Jimenez, 130 Ariz. 138, 140 (1981). ¶20 The collateral estoppel component of double jeopardy does not prohibit the State “from relitigating an issue when it is presented in a subsequent action governed by a lower standard of proof.” Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 349 (1990); see also State v. Lehr, 227 Ariz. 140, 148, ¶ 26 (2011) (“[A]dmission of evidence of other acts for which a defendant has been acquitted does not violate double jeopar 2013As the Supreme Court established in Dowling v. United States, the admission of testimony about acquitted conduct is not barred categorically by the Double Jeopardy Clause or the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution when such evidence is governed by a lesser standard than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 493 U.S. 342, 343-44, 348 , 110 S.Ct. 668 , 107 L.Ed.2d 708 (1990). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Moodygreen2 sentences2026Cf. State v. Snelling, 225 Ariz. 182, 186 ¶ 12 (2010) (stating that “a conviction precludes review of the finding of probable cause made by a grand jury” (quoting State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 440 n.3 ¶ 31 (2004))); A.R.S. § 13-202(C) (providing that proof of a greater culpable mental state establishes proof of a lesser culpable mental state). 2024See Muhammad, 253 Ariz. at 381, ¶ 44 ("Where 'a defendant has already been adjudicated competent, the court must be permitted to rely on the record supporting that previous adjudication.'" (quoting State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 443, ¶ 48 (2004))); Bishop, 162 Ariz. at 105 (according "some evidentiary weight" to an earlier finding, under "a lesser standard," that the defendant was competent to assist his counsel). ¶27 Second, plea counsel agreed to a competency determination based on Dr. Hurley's report and did not seek to have Sills re-evaluated before he was sentenced. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Piercegreen1 sentence2024See State v. Lopez, 110 Ariz. 198, 199 (1973) (finding no due process violation in the determination of the defendant's competence to plead guilty where the competency proceedings complied with statutory requirements and defense counsel agreed to a determination 8 STATE v. SILLS Decision of the Court based on written reports of psychiatrists); State v. Pierce, 116 Ariz. 435, 43839 (App. 1977) ("[U]nless counsel has indicated a contrary view on the record, the offering by an accused client of a plea of guilty should logically constitute a representation on the part of defense counsel that at le | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lopezgreen1 sentence2024See State v. Lopez, 110 Ariz. 198, 199 (1973) (finding no due process violation in the determination of the defendant's competence to plead guilty where the competency proceedings complied with statutory requirements and defense counsel agreed to a determination 8 STATE v. SILLS Decision of the Court based on written reports of psychiatrists); State v. Pierce, 116 Ariz. 435, 43839 (App. 1977) ("[U]nless counsel has indicated a contrary view on the record, the offering by an accused client of a plea of guilty should logically constitute a representation on the part of defense counsel that at le | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bishopgreen1 sentence2024See Muhammad, 253 Ariz. at 381, ¶ 44 ("Where 'a defendant has already been adjudicated competent, the court must be permitted to rely on the record supporting that previous adjudication.'" (quoting State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 443, ¶ 48 (2004))); Bishop, 162 Ariz. at 105 (according "some evidentiary weight" to an earlier finding, under "a lesser standard," that the defendant was competent to assist his counsel). ¶27 Second, plea counsel agreed to a competency determination based on Dr. Hurley's report and did not seek to have Sills re-evaluated before he was sentenced. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Banksgreen1 sentence2022See People v. Banks, 351 P.3d 330, 338 (Cal. 2015) (“The defendants’ actions in [Tison] and [Enmund] represent points on a continuum. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lehrgreen1 sentence2020Collateral estoppel requires that the “issue sought to be relitigated must be precisely the same as the issue in the previous litigation.” State v. Jimenez, 130 Ariz. 138, 140 (1981). ¶20 The collateral estoppel component of double jeopardy does not prohibit the State “from relitigating an issue when it is presented in a subsequent action governed by a lower standard of proof.” Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 349 (1990); see also State v. Lehr, 227 Ariz. 140, 148, ¶ 26 (2011) (“[A]dmission of evidence of other acts for which a defendant has been acquitted does not violate double jeopar | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jimenezgreen1 sentence2020Collateral estoppel requires that the “issue sought to be relitigated must be precisely the same as the issue in the previous litigation.” State v. Jimenez, 130 Ariz. 138, 140 (1981). ¶20 The collateral estoppel component of double jeopardy does not prohibit the State “from relitigating an issue when it is presented in a subsequent action governed by a lower standard of proof.” Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 349 (1990); see also State v. Lehr, 227 Ariz. 140, 148, ¶ 26 (2011) (“[A]dmission of evidence of other acts for which a defendant has been acquitted does not violate double jeopar | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bennettgreen1 sentence2017P. 32.2(a); see State v. Bennett, 213 Ariz. 562, 566 , 2 Luke asserts that, as a self-represented petitioner, he is entitled to be held to a lesser standard than a lawyer. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cornellgreen1 sentence2017Cf. State v. Cornell, 179 Ariz. 314, 331 (1994) (“[A] defendant acting in propria persona is subject to the same rules as an attorney.”). ¶10 Hazzard’s reliance on Smith also is misplaced. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Twenty-Four ThouSand Dollars ($24,000) in United States Currencygreen1 sentence2016See In re $24,000.00 in U.S. Currency, 217 Ariz. 199, 202, ¶ 8 (App. 2007). | 1 | 1 |
Hasten v. Stategreen2 sentences2014See Hasten v. State, 35 Ariz. 427, 430-31 , 280 P. 670, 671 (1929) (noting that a 1927 statutory change from penalizing driving by someone who “becomes or is intoxicated” to penalizing driving by someone who is “under the influence of intoxicating liquor” evidenced the Legislature’s decision that “many persons who ha[ve] not yet arrived at [the point of actual intoxication]” should nevertheless be prohibited from driving); see also State v. Noble, 119 Or. 674 , 250 P. 833, 834 (1926) (concluding that the “under the influence of intoxicating liquor” standard under Oregon law was a lesser standa 2014See Hasten v. State, 35 Ariz. 427, 430-31 , 280 P. 670, 671 (1929) (noting that a 1927 statutory change from penalizing driving by someone who “becomes or is intoxicated” to penalizing driving by someone who is “under the influence of intoxicating liquor” evidenced the Legislature’s decision that “many persons who ha[ve] not yet arrived at [the point of actual intoxication]” should nevertheless be prohibited from driving); see also State v. Noble, 119 Or. 674 , 250 P. 833, 834 (1926) (concluding that the “under the influence of intoxicating liquor” standard under Oregon law was a lesser standa | 1 | 1 |
State v. Noblegreen2 sentences2014See Hasten v. State, 35 Ariz. 427, 430-31 , 280 P. 670, 671 (1929) (noting that a 1927 statutory change from penalizing driving by someone who “becomes or is intoxicated” to penalizing driving by someone who is “under the influence of intoxicating liquor” evidenced the Legislature’s decision that “many persons who ha[ve] not yet arrived at [the point of actual intoxication]” should nevertheless be prohibited from driving); see also State v. Noble, 119 Or. 674 , 250 P. 833, 834 (1926) (concluding that the “under the influence of intoxicating liquor” standard under Oregon law was a lesser standa 2014See Hasten v. State, 35 Ariz. 427, 430-31 , 280 P. 670, 671 (1929) (noting that a 1927 statutory change from penalizing driving by someone who “becomes or is intoxicated” to penalizing driving by someone who is “under the influence of intoxicating liquor” evidenced the Legislature’s decision that “many persons who ha[ve] not yet arrived at [the point of actual intoxication]” should nevertheless be prohibited from driving); see also State v. Noble, 119 Or. 674 , 250 P. 833, 834 (1926) (concluding that the “under the influence of intoxicating liquor” standard under Oregon law was a lesser standa | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sierra-Cervantesgreen2 sentences2008State v. Sierra-Cervantes, 201 Ariz. 459, 464, ¶ 29 , 37 P.3d 432, 437 (App.2001). 2008State v. Sierra-Cervantes, 201 Ariz. 459, 464, ¶ 29 , 37 P.3d 432, 437 (App.2001). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. $191,910.00 in U.S. Currency, Bruce R. Morgan, Claimant-Appelleegreen1 sentence1994See, e.g., United States v. $191,910 in United States Currency, 16 F.3d 1051, 1069 (9th Cir.1994) (disparity between government’s and claimant’s burdens “involves a serious risk that an innocent person will be deprived of his property”). | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Decellogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hunt Building Corp. v. Industrial Commissiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Valerie M. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security
green
2 sentences2009Id. at 159 ¶ 14, 195 P.3d at 196 . 2009Id. at 159 ¶ 14, 195 P.3d at 196 . | 2 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Snelling
green
1 sentence2026Cf. State v. Snelling, 225 Ariz. 182, 186 ¶ 12 (2010) (stating that “a conviction precludes review of the finding of probable cause made by a grand jury” (quoting State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 440 n.3 ¶ 31 (2004))); A.R.S. § 13-202(C) (providing that proof of a greater culpable mental state establishes proof of a lesser culpable mental state). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Harris v. Coleman
green
1 sentence2024Their fraudulent assignment therefore can support a conversion claim, Harris v. Coleman, 863 F.Supp. 2d 336 , 344–45 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), and, logically, the lesser claim of trespass to chattel. ¶41 We hold that in the modern digitized world, electronic touching may suffice. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Terrazas
green
2 sentences2013In accord with those cases, we conclude an acquittal does not bar the introduction of other-act evidence under Rule 404, because such evidence involves a lesser standard of proof, and “the earlier acquittal could be based upon the failure of the state to have proved the prior bad acts beyond a reasonable doubt.” Terrazas, 189 Ariz. at 584 n. 3, 944 P.2d at 1198 n. 3. ¶ 16 As noted, Yonkman does not challenge the admission of the evidence on the ground the trial court incorrectly applied Rule 404(b) and (c). 2013In accord with those cases, we conclude an acquittal does not bar the introduction of other-act evidence under Rule 404, because such evidence involves a lesser standard of proof, and “the earlier acquittal could be based upon the failure of the state to have proved the prior bad acts beyond a reasonable doubt.” Terrazas, 189 Ariz. at 584 n. 3, 944 P.2d at 1198 n. 3. ¶ 16 As noted, Yonkman does not challenge the admission of the evidence on the ground the trial court incorrectly applied Rule 404(b) and (c). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah
green
1 sentence2009Such laws are subject to strict scrutiny and survive such searching review “only in rare eases.” Id. ¶ 16 In contrast to the targeted law at issue in Dukumi Babalu Aye, laws of general applicability are judged under the First Amendment by a lesser standard. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Wisconsin v. Yoder
green
2 sentences2009In Yoder , the Court acknowledged that religiously based conduct is “often subject to regulation by the States in the exercise of their undoubted power to promote the health, safety, and general welfare, or the Federal Government in the exercise of its delegated powers.” 406 U.S. at 220 , 92 S.Ct. 1526 . 2009In Yoder , the Court acknowledged that religiously based conduct is “often subject to regulation by the States in the exercise of their undoubted power to promote the health, safety, and general welfare, or the Federal Government in the exercise of its delegated powers.” 406 U.S. at 220 , 92 S.Ct. 1526 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
People v. Ray
green
2 sentences2007The court noted that "the appropriate standard under the community caretaker exception is one of reasonableness: Given the known facts, would a prudent and reasonable officer have perceived a need to act in the proper discharge of his or her community caretaking functions?" Id. at 476-77 , 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 981 P.2d at 937 . ¶ 53 On the facts in the case at hand, my view is that the standard from Fisher for emergency aid has been met. 2007The court noted that "the appropriate standard under the community caretaker exception is one of reasonableness: Given the known facts, would a prudent and reasonable officer have perceived a need to act in the proper discharge of his or her community caretaking functions?" Id. at 476-77 , 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 981 P.2d at 937 . ¶ 53 On the facts in the case at hand, my view is that the standard from Fisher for emergency aid has been met. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Apprendi v. New Jersey
green
1 sentence2004The Cou rt reasoned in Apprendi that “there is a vast difference between accepting the validity of a prior judgment of convictio n entered in a proceed ing in which the defendan t had the righ t to a jury 3 In Blakely v. Washington, No. 02-1632, 2004 WL 1402697 (U.S. June 24, 2004), the Supreme Court’s most recent decision dealing with the Apprendi doctrine, the Court left unchanged that portion of Apprendi excepting the fact of a prior conviction from the rule that a jury must find certain facts that affect the length of a sentence. 9 trial and the right to require the prosecutor to prove gui | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Claude Cauley v. United States
green
2 sentences1995A lesser standard has been allowed in cases in which the question of territorial jurisdiction is identified with the issue of venue. 7 See, e.g., Cauley v. United States, 355 F.2d 175 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 951 , 86 S.Ct. 1572 , 16 L.Ed.2d 548 (1966). 1995A lesser standard has been allowed in cases in which the question of territorial jurisdiction is identified with the issue of venue. [7] See, e.g., Cauley v. United States, *538 355 F.2d 175 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 951 , 86 S.Ct. 1572 , 16 L.Ed.2d 548 (1966). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Theodore v. Alaska
green
2 sentences1995A lesser standard has been allowed in cases in which the question of territorial jurisdiction is identified with the issue of venue. 7 See, e.g., Cauley v. United States, 355 F.2d 175 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 951 , 86 S.Ct. 1572 , 16 L.Ed.2d 548 (1966). 1995A lesser standard has been allowed in cases in which the question of territorial jurisdiction is identified with the issue of venue. [7] See, e.g., Cauley v. United States, *538 355 F.2d 175 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 951 , 86 S.Ct. 1572 , 16 L.Ed.2d 548 (1966). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Hexagon Laboratories, Inc. v. United States
green
2 sentences1995A lesser standard has been allowed in cases in which the question of territorial jurisdiction is identified with the issue of venue. 7 See, e.g., Cauley v. United States, 355 F.2d 175 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 951 , 86 S.Ct. 1572 , 16 L.Ed.2d 548 (1966). 1995A lesser standard has been allowed in cases in which the question of territorial jurisdiction is identified with the issue of venue. [7] See, e.g., Cauley v. United States, *538 355 F.2d 175 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 951 , 86 S.Ct. 1572 , 16 L.Ed.2d 548 (1966). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Cook Electric Co. v. Frank Horton & Co.
green
2 sentences1995A lesser standard has been allowed in cases in which the question of territorial jurisdiction is identified with the issue of venue. 7 See, e.g., Cauley v. United States, 355 F.2d 175 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 951 , 86 S.Ct. 1572 , 16 L.Ed.2d 548 (1966). 1995A lesser standard has been allowed in cases in which the question of territorial jurisdiction is identified with the issue of venue. [7] See, e.g., Cauley v. United States, *538 355 F.2d 175 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 951 , 86 S.Ct. 1572 , 16 L.Ed.2d 548 (1966). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Matter of Hendrix
green
2 sentences1994Despite the fact that the judge in that case had *114 used her office to obtain special privileges and favors for her clerk, the court agreed that her actions did not constitute "willful conduct in office," but only "violated the lesser standard of `conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute.'" Id. at 348-49 , 701 P.2d at 844-45 . 1994Despite the fact that the judge in that case had *114 used her office to obtain special privileges and favors for her clerk, the court agreed that her actions did not constitute "willful conduct in office," but only "violated the lesser standard of `conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute.'" Id. at 348-49 , 701 P.2d at 844-45 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| State v. Callahan green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| State v. Marchesano green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Quadrini v. Sikorsky Aircraft Division green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp. green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| State v. Young green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Holloway v. Florida green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Brower's Moving & Storage, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| State v. Schantz green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.