lesser standard in Nebraska

1993Therein, relying on United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 , 101 S. Ct. 690 , 66 L.

1993Therein, relying on United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 , 101 S. Ct. 690 , 66 L.

1993This lesser standard for investigative stops was recently articulated by this court in State v. Ebberson, 209 Neb. 41 , 305 N.W.2d 904 (1981), and reiterated in State v. Nowicki, 209 Neb. 640 , 309 N.W.2d 89 (1981).

1993This lesser standard for investigative stops was recently articulated by this court in State v. Ebberson, 209 Neb. 41 , 305 N.W.2d 904 (1981), and reiterated in State v. Nowicki, 209 Neb. 640 , 309 N.W.2d 89 (1981).

1993This lesser standard for investigative stops was recently articulated by this court in State v. Ebberson, 209 Neb. 41 , 305 N.W.2d 904 (1981), and reiterated in State v. Nowicki, 209 Neb. 640 , 309 N.W.2d 89 (1981).

1993This lesser standard for investigative stops was recently articulated by this court in State v. Ebberson, 209 Neb. 41 , 305 N.W.2d 904 (1981), and reiterated in State v. Nowicki, 209 Neb. 640 , 309 N.W.2d 89 (1981).

2015The court stated that although pedestrian access alone might be sufficient to negate a claim of easement by “strict necessity,” the theory of easement implied from prior use under - 468 - Nebraska A dvance Sheets 291 Nebraska R eports NAMN, LLC v. MORELLO Cite as 291 Neb. 462 consideration required the lesser standard of “reasonable neces- sity” and that the evidence showed the easement across Lot 10 was “reasonably necessary” for the convenient and comfortable use and enjoyment of Lot 9.

2006The dissent contends that we have extended our decision in Goff-Hamel v. Obstetricians & Gyns., P.C., 256 Neb. 19 , 588 N.W.2d 798 (1999), by concluding that there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to Blinn's promissory estoppel claim.

2006The dissent contends that we have extended our decision in Goff-Hamel v. Obstetricians & Gyns., P.C., 256 Neb. 19 , 588 N.W.2d 798 (1999), by concluding that there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to Blinn's promissory estoppel claim.

2003The Court set forth the rationale for treating prior convictions differently than elements of the offense when it noted in Apprendi that recidivism “does not relate to the commission of the offense” itself .... [Tjhere is a vast difference between accepting the validity of a prior judgment of conviction entered in a proceeding in which the defendant had the right to a jury trial and the right to require the prosecutor to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and allowing the judge to find the required fact under a lesser standard of proof. 530 U.S. at 496 .

1992This is because the standard of proof in a criminal case is beyond a reasonable doubt, State v. Morley, 239 Neb. 141 , 474 N.W.2d 660 (1991), while the lesser standard of proof for acquiring jurisdiction of a child in a juvenile case is by a preponderance of the evidence, In re Interest of D.A., 239 Neb. 264 , 475 N.W.2d 511 (1991).

1992This is because the standard of proof in a criminal case is beyond a reasonable doubt, State v. Morley, 239 Neb. 141 , 474 N.W.2d 660 (1991), while the lesser standard of proof for acquiring jurisdiction of a child in a juvenile case is by a preponderance of the evidence, In re Interest of D.A., 239 Neb. 264 , 475 N.W.2d 511 (1991).

1992This is because the standard of proof in a criminal case is beyond a reasonable doubt, State v. Morley, 239 Neb. 141 , 474 N.W.2d 660 (1991), while the lesser standard of proof for acquiring jurisdiction of a child in a juvenile case is by a preponderance of the evidence, In re Interest of D.A., 239 Neb. 264 , 475 N.W.2d 511 (1991).

1992This is because the standard of proof in a criminal case is beyond a reasonable doubt, State v. Morley, 239 Neb. 141 , 474 N.W.2d 660 (1991), while the lesser standard of proof for acquiring jurisdiction of a child in a juvenile case is by a preponderance of the evidence, In re Interest of D.A., 239 Neb. 264 , 475 N.W.2d 511 (1991).

1985Neither do we decide the issue in this case, for we conclude from our independent review of the record, In re Interest of Spradlin, 210 Neb. 734 , 317 N.W.2d 59 (1982), that the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that the parents, by reason of their fault or habits, failed to provide proper parental care and thus placed the child in a situation injurious to her health. *917 The question raised by the parents as to visitation for Christmas past is moot and therefore is not discussed.

1985Neither do we decide the issue in this case, for we conclude from our independent review of the record, In re Interest of Spradlin, 210 Neb. 734 , 317 N.W.2d 59 (1982), that the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that the parents, by reason of their fault or habits, failed to provide proper parental care and thus placed the child in a situation injurious to her health. *917 The question raised by the parents as to visitation for Christmas past is moot and therefore is not discussed.

1983This lesser standard for investigative stops was recently articulated by this court in State v. Longa, 211 Neb. 356 , 318 N.W.2d 733 (1982), and previously stated in State v. Nowicki, 209 Neb. 640 , 309 N.W.2d 89 (1981).

1983This lesser standard for investigative stops was recently articulated by this court in State v. Longa, 211 Neb. 356 , 318 N.W.2d 733 (1982), and previously stated in State v. Nowicki, 209 Neb. 640 , 309 N.W.2d 89 (1981).

1982See, State v. Jefferson, 196 Neb. 340 , 242 N.W.2d 881 (1976); State v. Micek, 193 Neb. 379 , 227 N.W.2d 409 (1975). *364 This lesser standard for investigative stops was recently articulated by this court in State v. Ebberson, 209 Neb. 41 , 305 N.W.2d 904 (1981), and reiterated in State v. Nowicki, 209 Neb. 640 , 309 N.W.2d 89 (1981).

1982See, State v. Jefferson, 196 Neb. 340 , 242 N.W.2d 881 (1976); State v. Micek, 193 Neb. 379 , 227 N.W.2d 409 (1975). *364 This lesser standard for investigative stops was recently articulated by this court in State v. Ebberson, 209 Neb. 41 , 305 N.W.2d 904 (1981), and reiterated in State v. Nowicki, 209 Neb. 640 , 309 N.W.2d 89 (1981).

1982“The reasonableness of seizures that are less intrusive than a traditional arrest [citations omitted] depends ‘on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.’ ” Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50 , 99 S. Ct. 2637 , 61 L.

1982“The reasonableness of seizures that are less intrusive than a traditional arrest [citations omitted] depends ‘on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.’ ” Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50 , 99 S. Ct. 2637 , 61 L.