22 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Lucerogreen2 sentences2021People v. Lucero ¶33 We set forth the prevailing test for establishing a common law marriage in Colorado more than three decades ago in People v. Lucero , a criminal case in which the defendant objected to the admission of testimony from his alleged common law wife on grounds that it violated the marital privilege codified at section 13-90-107 (1) (a) , C.R.S. ( 1973 ) . 747 P.2d at 661–62 . 2021People v. Lucero ¶33 We set forth the prevailing test for establishing a common law marriage in Colorado more than three decades ago in People v. Lucero, a criminal case in which the defendant objected to the admission of testimony from his alleged common law wife on grounds that it violated the marital privilege codified at section 13-90-107(1)(a), C.R.S. (1973). 747 P.2d at 661–62. | 1 | 4 |
In Re the Marriage of Bartologreen2 sentences2013In reaching this conclusion, the Balanson court relied on In re Marriage of Bartolo, 971 P.2d 699, 700 (Colo.App.1998) in which a division of this court held that the trial court properly concluded that the marital presumption established in section 14-10-118(8), C.R.S.2012, had been overcome by clear and convincing evidence. 2013In reaching this conclusion, the Balanson court relied on In re Marriage of Bartolo, 971 P.2d 699, 700 (Colo.App.1998) in which a division of this court held that the trial court properly concluded that the marital presumption established in section 14-10-118(8), C.R.S.2012, had been overcome by clear and convincing evidence. | 1 | 2 |
Petro-Lewis Corp. v. District Court, Fourth Judicial District, El Paso Countygreen2 sentences2006Court, 727 P.2d 41, 43 (Colo.1986)(“The testimonial provisions of the marital privilege are designed to protect the sanctity and tranquility of the marital relationship from the disruption attendant to adverse spousal testimony.”). 1991Citing Petro-Lewis Corp. v. District Court, 727 P.2d 41 (Colo.1986), defendant argues that the validity and scope of the marital privilege has been seriously questioned. | 1 | 2 |
Clark v. District Court, Second Judicial District, City & County of Denvergreen2 sentences1990In Clark v. District Court, 668 P.2d 3 (Colo.1983), we discussed the circumstances under which the physician-patient privilege and the psychologist-client privilege may be waived. 1987Nothing in the record reflects that Everett learned of his wife’s age through a spousal communication, and the trial court was correct in concluding that the communication was not privileged under section 13-90-107. 3 See People v. Marquez, 692 P.2d 1089, 1095 (Colo.1984) (“the burden of establishing the applicability of the privilege rests upon the claimant of that privilege”); Clark v. District Court, 668 P.2d 3, 8 (Colo.1983) (same). | 1 | 2 |
Loving v. Virginiagreen1 sentence2021The right to marry has been recognized as fundamental, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967), and marriage has been the wellspring of other constitutionally protected rights, see, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. | 1 | 1 |
In Re the Marriage of Dalegreen1 sentence2016The district court’s findings are insufficient for us to resolve this argument. ¶ 34 The marital presumption can be overcome by showing that the property was acquired by gift. § 14-10-113(2)(a); In re Marriage of Dale , 87 P.3d 219, 227 (Colo. App. 2003). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Marriage of Moncriefgreen1 sentence2013However, neither the Balanson nor the Bartolo court explained the derivation of the clear and convincing standard applied to overcome the marital presumption. 139 The Balanson court also discussed In re Marriage of Stumpf, 932 P.2d 845, 848 (Colo.App.1996), and In re Marriage of Moncrief, 36 Colo.App. 140 , 141, 535 P.2d 1137, 1138 (1975), regarding the marital presumption. | 1 | 1 |
In Re the Marriage of Balansongreen1 sentence2013Judge TAUBMAN specially concurs. 1387 I agree with the majority's analysis and conclusion, but I write separately to suggest that the marital presumption should be that a third-party donor intended a gift to the marriage, and that such a gift is presumed marital absent a preponderance of evidence to the contrary. 138 As the majority notes, in In re Marriage of Balanson, 25 P.3d 28, 37 (Colo.2001), the supreme court held that when a spouse places separate property in joint ownership during the marriage, a presumption that the donor spouse intended a gift to the marriage arises, and such gifted | 1 | 1 |
Page v. Clarkgreen2 sentences2013Similarly in Page, 197 Colo. at 317 n. 3, 592 P.2d at 799 n. 3, the supreme court noted that the burden of proof in actions in equity had been cited as "clear, strong, satisfactory, and convineing" (citing and abrogating Tourtelotte v. Brown, 4 Colo.App. 377 , 36 P. 73 (1894)), and similar formulations, all of which were tantamount to a clear and convincing standard. 483 Thus, the marital presumption as it had been applied in Balanson and earlier cases implicitly relied on the above-cited resulting and constructive trust cases which set forth a standard of proof equivalent to clear and convinc 2013Similarly in Page, 197 Colo. at 317 n. 3, 592 P.2d at 799 n. 3, the supreme court noted that the burden of proof in actions in equity had been cited as "clear, strong, satisfactory, and convineing" (citing and abrogating Tourtelotte v. Brown, 4 Colo.App. 377 , 36 P. 73 (1894)), and similar formulations, all of which were tantamount to a clear and convincing standard. 483 Thus, the marital presumption as it had been applied in Balanson and earlier cases implicitly relied on the above-cited resulting and constructive trust cases which set forth a standard of proof equivalent to clear and convinc | 1 | 1 |
In Re Marriage of Altmangreen2 sentences2013However, neither the Stumpf nor the Moncrief division discussed the clear and convincing standard to overcome the marital presumption. {40 The Moncrief division cited In re Marriage of Altman, 35 Colo.App. 183, 185 , 530 P.2d 1012, 1013 (1974), for the proposition that under the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act, when one spouse causes title to be placed jointly with the other spouse, a gift is presumed and the burden to show otherwise is upon the donor. 2013However, neither the Stumpf nor the Moncrief division discussed the clear and convincing standard to overcome the marital presumption. {40 The Moncrief division cited In re Marriage of Altman, 35 Colo.App. 183, 185 , 530 P.2d 1012, 1013 (1974), for the proposition that under the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act, when one spouse causes title to be placed jointly with the other spouse, a gift is presumed and the burden to show otherwise is upon the donor. | 1 | 1 |
In Re the Marriage of Stumpfgreen1 sentence2013However, neither the Balanson nor the Bartolo court explained the derivation of the clear and convincing standard applied to overcome the marital presumption. 139 The Balanson court also discussed In re Marriage of Stumpf, 932 P.2d 845, 848 (Colo.App.1996), and In re Marriage of Moncrief, 36 Colo.App. 140 , 141, 535 P.2d 1137, 1138 (1975), regarding the marital presumption. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Garciagreen1 sentence2004Cf. People v. Garcia, 940 P.2d 357, 358 (Colo.1997)(for “the purpose of due process notice, the distinction between a sen-' tence enhancement factor and a statutory element of an offense is irrelevant when the factor is specifically alleged in the charging document”). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Marriage of Bozarthgreen2 sentences2001See In re Marriage of Bozarth, 779 P.2d 1346, 1348 (Colo.1989)(stating that the marital privilege is a "statutory privilege"); see also People v. Thompson, 950 P.2d 608 (Colo.App.1997)(stating that the marital privilege developed from the common law without reference to any constitutional rights). 2001See In re Marriage of Bozarth, 779 P.2d 1346, 1348 (Colo.1989)(stating that the marital privilege is a "statutory privilege"); see also People v. Thompson, 950 P.2d 608 (Colo.App.1997)(stating that the marital privilege developed from the common law without reference to any constitutional rights). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Thompsongreen2 sentences2001See In re Marriage of Bozarth, 779 P.2d 1346, 1348 (Colo.1989)(stating that the marital privilege is a "statutory privilege"); see also People v. Thompson, 950 P.2d 608 (Colo.App.1997)(stating that the marital privilege developed from the common law without reference to any constitutional rights). 2001See In re Marriage of Bozarth, 779 P.2d 1346, 1348 (Colo.1989)(stating that the marital privilege is a "statutory privilege"); see also People v. Thompson, 950 P.2d 608 (Colo.App.1997)(stating that the marital privilege developed from the common law without reference to any constitutional rights). | 1 | 1 |
Cummings v. Peoplegreen1 sentence1990See Cummings v. People, 785 P.2d 920, 926 (Colo.1990). | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Donald J. Dien, Sanford S. Gendler, and Michael E. Dakotagreen | 1 | 1 |
Simms v. Stategreen2 sentences1990App.1984) (counsel waived privilege by asking spouse about defendant's criminal activity occurring after marriage); People v. Odmann, 160 Cal.App.2d 693 , 325 P.2d 495 (1958) (failure to object to spouse being called as a witness constituted a waiver of *927 the marital privilege); Simms v. State, 492 P.2d 516, 521 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 886 , 93 S.Ct. 104 , 34 L.Ed.2d 142 (1972) (statement made by counsel at pretrial conference constituted an express waiver of the marital privilege). 1990See United States v. Dien, 609 F.2d 1038, 1044 (2d Cir.1979) (failure to invoke marital privilege at suppression hearing constituted a waiver of the privilege); United States v. Burkhart, 501 F.2d 993, 995 (6th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 946 , 95 S.Ct. 1326 , 43 L.Ed.2d 424 (1975) (“Any marital privilege that may have existed was waived when appellant introduced his wife’s statements during cross-examination of the government witnesses.”); United States v. Figueroa-Paz, 468 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir.1972) (failure to make timely objection waived marital privilege); Canaday v. United States, 35 | 1 | 1 |
William Merle Canaday v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1990See United States v. Dien, 609 F.2d 1038, 1044 (2d Cir.1979) (failure to invoke marital privilege at suppression hearing constituted a waiver of the privilege); United States v. Burkhart, 501 F.2d 993, 995 (6th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 946 , 95 S.Ct. 1326 , 43 L.Ed.2d 424 (1975) ("Any marital privilege that may have existed was waived when appellant introduced his wife's statements during cross-examination of the government witnesses."); United States v. Figueroa-Paz, 468 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir.1972) (failure to make timely objection waived marital privilege); Canaday v. United States, 35 1990See United States v. Dien, 609 F.2d 1038, 1044 (2d Cir.1979) (failure to invoke marital privilege at suppression hearing constituted a waiver of the privilege); United States v. Burkhart, 501 F.2d 993, 995 (6th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 946 , 95 S.Ct. 1326 , 43 L.Ed.2d 424 (1975) (“Any marital privilege that may have existed was waived when appellant introduced his wife’s statements during cross-examination of the government witnesses.”); United States v. Figueroa-Paz, 468 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir.1972) (failure to make timely objection waived marital privilege); Canaday v. United States, 35 | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Floyd E. Burkhartgreen2 sentences1990See United States v. Dien, 609 F.2d 1038, 1044 (2d Cir.1979) (failure to invoke marital privilege at suppression hearing constituted a waiver of the privilege); United States v. Burkhart, 501 F.2d 993, 995 (6th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 946 , 95 S.Ct. 1326 , 43 L.Ed.2d 424 (1975) ("Any marital privilege that may have existed was waived when appellant introduced his wife's statements during cross-examination of the government witnesses."); United States v. Figueroa-Paz, 468 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir.1972) (failure to make timely objection waived marital privilege); Canaday v. United States, 35 1990See United States v. Dien, 609 F.2d 1038, 1044 (2d Cir.1979) (failure to invoke marital privilege at suppression hearing constituted a waiver of the privilege); United States v. Burkhart, 501 F.2d 993, 995 (6th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 946 , 95 S.Ct. 1326 , 43 L.Ed.2d 424 (1975) (“Any marital privilege that may have existed was waived when appellant introduced his wife’s statements during cross-examination of the government witnesses.”); United States v. Figueroa-Paz, 468 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir.1972) (failure to make timely objection waived marital privilege); Canaday v. United States, 35 | 1 | 1 |
Richards v. North Carolinagreen2 sentences1990See United States v. Dien, 609 F.2d 1038, 1044 (2d Cir.1979) (failure to invoke marital privilege at suppression hearing constituted a waiver of the privilege); United States v. Burkhart, 501 F.2d 993, 995 (6th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 946 , 95 S.Ct. 1326 , 43 L.Ed.2d 424 (1975) ("Any marital privilege that may have existed was waived when appellant introduced his wife's statements during cross-examination of the government witnesses."); United States v. Figueroa-Paz, 468 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir.1972) (failure to make timely objection waived marital privilege); Canaday v. United States, 35 1990See United States v. Dien, 609 F.2d 1038, 1044 (2d Cir.1979) (failure to invoke marital privilege at suppression hearing constituted a waiver of the privilege); United States v. Burkhart, 501 F.2d 993, 995 (6th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 946 , 95 S.Ct. 1326 , 43 L.Ed.2d 424 (1975) (“Any marital privilege that may have existed was waived when appellant introduced his wife’s statements during cross-examination of the government witnesses.”); United States v. Figueroa-Paz, 468 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir.1972) (failure to make timely objection waived marital privilege); Canaday v. United States, 35 | 1 | 1 |
Segura v. Immigration & Naturalization Servicegreen2 sentences1990See United States v. Dien, 609 F.2d 1038, 1044 (2d Cir.1979) (failure to invoke marital privilege at suppression hearing constituted a waiver of the privilege); United States v. Burkhart, 501 F.2d 993, 995 (6th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 946 , 95 S.Ct. 1326 , 43 L.Ed.2d 424 (1975) ("Any marital privilege that may have existed was waived when appellant introduced his wife's statements during cross-examination of the government witnesses."); United States v. Figueroa-Paz, 468 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir.1972) (failure to make timely objection waived marital privilege); Canaday v. United States, 35 1990See United States v. Dien, 609 F.2d 1038, 1044 (2d Cir.1979) (failure to invoke marital privilege at suppression hearing constituted a waiver of the privilege); United States v. Burkhart, 501 F.2d 993, 995 (6th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 946 , 95 S.Ct. 1326 , 43 L.Ed.2d 424 (1975) (“Any marital privilege that may have existed was waived when appellant introduced his wife’s statements during cross-examination of the government witnesses.”); United States v. Figueroa-Paz, 468 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir.1972) (failure to make timely objection waived marital privilege); Canaday v. United States, 35 | 1 | 1 |
Paulson v. Stategreen2 sentences1990See United States v. Dien, 609 F.2d 1038, 1044 (2d Cir.1979) (failure to invoke marital privilege at suppression hearing constituted a waiver of the privilege); United States v. Burkhart, 501 F.2d 993, 995 (6th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 946 , 95 S.Ct. 1326 , 43 L.Ed.2d 424 (1975) ("Any marital privilege that may have existed was waived when appellant introduced his wife's statements during cross-examination of the government witnesses."); United States v. Figueroa-Paz, 468 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir.1972) (failure to make timely objection waived marital privilege); Canaday v. United States, 35 1990See United States v. Dien, 609 F.2d 1038, 1044 (2d Cir.1979) (failure to invoke marital privilege at suppression hearing constituted a waiver of the privilege); United States v. Burkhart, 501 F.2d 993, 995 (6th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 946 , 95 S.Ct. 1326 , 43 L.Ed.2d 424 (1975) (“Any marital privilege that may have existed was waived when appellant introduced his wife’s statements during cross-examination of the government witnesses.”); United States v. Figueroa-Paz, 468 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir.1972) (failure to make timely objection waived marital privilege); Canaday v. United States, 35 | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Marquezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| McAllister v. McAllistergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Archina v. Peoplegreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Kahngreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Irving Kahn and Minnie Kahngreen | 1 | 1 |
| White v. District Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| White v. District Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Botkin v. Pylegreen2 sentences2013In Altman, the division relied on Botkin v. Pyle, 91 Colo. 221, 232 , 14 P.2d 187, 191 (1932), abrogated by Page v. Clark, 197 Colo. 306, 317-20 , 592 P.2d 792, 799-801 (1979), a case involving, among other things, the criteria for establishing a resulting trust, which is a trust that the court presumes to arise out of the transactions of parties, "as if one man pays the purchase[ Imoney for an estate, and the deed is taken in the name of another." Id. (quoting 1 Perry on Trusts and Trustees 17 (Tth ed.)). {41 The Botkin court held that "[where ... the husband acquires and pays for real proper 2013In Altman, the division relied on Botkin v. Pyle, 91 Colo. 221, 232 , 14 P.2d 187, 191 (1932), abrogated by Page v. Clark, 197 Colo. 306, 317-20 , 592 P.2d 792, 799-801 (1979), a case involving, among other things, the criteria for establishing a resulting trust, which is a trust that the court presumes to arise out of the transactions of parties, "as if one man pays the purchase[ Imoney for an estate, and the deed is taken in the name of another." Id. (quoting 1 Perry on Trusts and Trustees 17 (Tth ed.)). {41 The Botkin court held that "[where ... the husband acquires and pays for real proper | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Worthington
green
2 sentences1990For example, in People v. Worthington, 113 Cal.Rptr. 322 , 38 Cal.App.3d 359 (1974), the court held that the defendant impliedly waived the marital privilege when he testified that his wife had committed the murder for which he was charged. 1990For example, in People v. Worthington, 113 Cal.Rptr. 322 , 38 Cal.App.3d 359 (1974), the court held that the defendant impliedly waived the marital privilege when he testified that his wife had committed the murder for which he was charged. | 2 | 1988–1990 |
People v. Christian
green
2 sentences2026Id. 2026Id. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
United States v. Windsor
green
1 sentence2021A couple’s marital status has implications in civil, domestic, and probate cases, and even plays a role in some criminal offenses.4 4For just a few examples of the legal consequences of marriage, see 8 U.S.C. § 1154 (2018) (permitting married U.S. citizens to petition for immigration status for their foreign-born spouses); 26 U.S.C. § 6013 (2018) (allowing married couples to file federal taxes jointly); 42 U.S.C. § 416 (2018) (providing federal old-age, survivors, and disability insurance benefits to spouses); § 13-90-107(1)(a), C.R.S. (2020) (establishing scope of the marital privilege); § 14 | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Tourtelotte v. Brown
green
1 sentence2013Similarly in Page, 197 Colo. at 317 n. 3, 592 P.2d at 799 n. 3, the supreme court noted that the burden of proof in actions in equity had been cited as "clear, strong, satisfactory, and convineing" (citing and abrogating Tourtelotte v. Brown, 4 Colo.App. 377 , 36 P. 73 (1894)), and similar formulations, all of which were tantamount to a clear and convincing standard. 483 Thus, the marital presumption as it had been applied in Balanson and earlier cases implicitly relied on the above-cited resulting and constructive trust cases which set forth a standard of proof equivalent to clear and convinc | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Cummings
green
2 sentences1990The court of appeals in People v. Cummings, 768 P.2d 718 (Colo.App. 1988), rejected his arguments. 1990The court of appeals in People v. Cummings, 768 P.2d 718 (Colo.App.1988), rejected his arguments. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
People v. Odmann
green
2 sentences1990App.1984) (counsel waived privilege by asking spouse about defendant's criminal activity occurring after marriage); People v. Odmann, 160 Cal.App.2d 693 , 325 P.2d 495 (1958) (failure to object to spouse being called as a witness constituted a waiver of *927 the marital privilege); Simms v. State, 492 P.2d 516, 521 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 886 , 93 S.Ct. 104 , 34 L.Ed.2d 142 (1972) (statement made by counsel at pretrial conference constituted an express waiver of the marital privilege). 1990App.1984) (counsel waived privilege by asking spouse about defendant's criminal activity occurring after marriage); People v. Odmann, 160 Cal.App.2d 693 , 325 P.2d 495 (1958) (failure to object to spouse being called as a witness constituted a waiver of *927 the marital privilege); Simms v. State, 492 P.2d 516, 521 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 886 , 93 S.Ct. 104 , 34 L.Ed.2d 142 (1972) (statement made by counsel at pretrial conference constituted an express waiver of the marital privilege). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
United States v. Ramon Figueroa-Paz
green
2 sentences1990See United States v. Dien, 609 F.2d 1038, 1044 (2d Cir.1979) (failure to invoke marital privilege at suppression hearing constituted a waiver of the privilege); United States v. Burkhart, 501 F.2d 993, 995 (6th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 946 , 95 S.Ct. 1326 , 43 L.Ed.2d 424 (1975) ("Any marital privilege that may have existed was waived when appellant introduced his wife's statements during cross-examination of the government witnesses."); United States v. Figueroa-Paz, 468 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir.1972) (failure to make timely objection waived marital privilege); Canaday v. United States, 35 1990See United States v. Dien, 609 F.2d 1038, 1044 (2d Cir.1979) (failure to invoke marital privilege at suppression hearing constituted a waiver of the privilege); United States v. Burkhart, 501 F.2d 993, 995 (6th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 946 , 95 S.Ct. 1326 , 43 L.Ed.2d 424 (1975) (“Any marital privilege that may have existed was waived when appellant introduced his wife’s statements during cross-examination of the government witnesses.”); United States v. Figueroa-Paz, 468 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir.1972) (failure to make timely objection waived marital privilege); Canaday v. United States, 35 | 1 | 1990–1990 |
New Jersey v. Woodard
green
2 sentences1990App.1984) (counsel waived privilege by asking spouse about defendant's criminal activity occurring after marriage); People v. Odmann, 160 Cal.App.2d 693 , 325 P.2d 495 (1958) (failure to object to spouse being called as a witness constituted a waiver of *927 the marital privilege); Simms v. State, 492 P.2d 516, 521 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 886 , 93 S.Ct. 104 , 34 L.Ed.2d 142 (1972) (statement made by counsel at pretrial conference constituted an express waiver of the marital privilege). 1990See United States v. Dien, 609 F.2d 1038, 1044 (2d Cir.1979) (failure to invoke marital privilege at suppression hearing constituted a waiver of the privilege); United States v. Burkhart, 501 F.2d 993, 995 (6th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 946 , 95 S.Ct. 1326 , 43 L.Ed.2d 424 (1975) (“Any marital privilege that may have existed was waived when appellant introduced his wife’s statements during cross-examination of the government witnesses.”); United States v. Figueroa-Paz, 468 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir.1972) (failure to make timely objection waived marital privilege); Canaday v. United States, 35 | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Crismon v. United States neutral | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Rayer v. Rayer green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| State v. Pendergras green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Caldwell v. DIST. CT. IN AND FOR CITY, ETC. green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| United States v. Arnold J. Price, Charles R. Mitchell, William Pernar Mitchell, A/K/A Bill Mitchell, and Bobbi Mitchell green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| California v. Civil Aeronautics Board green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Todd v. Associated Credit Bureau Services, Inc. green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Mitchell v. United States green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| United States v. Doe green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Hawkins v. United States green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| People v. Corbett green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Trammel v. United States green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Deutscher v. State green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| People v. Brown green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| People v. Vinnola green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Stickler v. Tehan green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Columbia Bank for Cooperatives v. Lee green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Cutler v. American Federation of Musicians of the United States & Canada green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Jordan v. People green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.