marital standard in Florida

2005We rejected the First District's decision, which "held that the husband's entitlement to retirement benefits could not properly be considered marital property subject to equitable distribution, and limited consideration of the benefits to a source of maintenance and support obligations." Id. at 265 ; see also id. at 266-67 ("We ... join[] the vast majority of jurisdictions which have found it necessary to consider entitlement to [retirement] benefits in order to achieve an equitable distribution."); id. at 267 ("To the extent that [a pension right] result[s] from employment time [during the ma

2005We rejected the First District's decision, which "held that the husband's entitlement to retirement benefits could not properly be considered marital property subject to equitable distribution, and limited consideration of the benefits to a source of maintenance and support obligations." Id. at 265 ; see also id. at 266-67 ("We ... join[] the vast majority of jurisdictions which have found it necessary to consider entitlement to [retirement] benefits in order to achieve an equitable distribution."); id. at 267 ("To the extent that [a pension right] result[s] from employment time [during the ma

2005We rejected the First District's decision, which "held that the husband's entitlement to retirement benefits could not properly be considered marital property subject to equitable distribution, and limited consideration of the benefits to a source of maintenance and support obligations." Id. at 265 ; see also id. at 266-67 ("We ... join[] the vast majority of jurisdictions which have found it necessary to consider entitlement to [retirement] benefits in order to achieve an equitable distribution."); id. at 267 ("To the extent that [a pension right] result[s] from employment time [during the ma

2005We rejected the First District's decision, which "held that the husband's entitlement to retirement benefits could not properly be considered marital property subject to equitable distribution, and limited consideration of the benefits to a source of maintenance and support obligations." Id. at 265 ; see also id. at 266-67 ("We ... join[] the vast majority of jurisdictions which have found it necessary to consider entitlement to [retirement] benefits in order to achieve an equitable distribution."); id. at 267 ("To the extent that [a pension right] result[s] from employment time [during the ma

2009See, e.g., Proffitt v. State, 315 So.2d 461, 465 (Fla.1975), aff'd, 428 U.S. 242 , 96 S.Ct. 2960 , 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976); Johnson v. State, 730 So.2d 368, 370 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999).

1976In order for the marital privilege to apply, "the communication in question must have been made in confidence." Proffitt v. State, 315 So.2d 461, 464 (Fla. 1975) cert. granted, 423 U.S. 1082 , 96 S.Ct. 1090 , 47 L.Ed.2d 94 (1976). [3] See 5 Wigmore, Evidence, § 1476 nn. 5 & 8 (Chadbourn rev. 1974). [4] 11 Cl. & F. 85, 8 Eng.Rep. 1034 (1844).

2009The courts will not engage in an after-the-fact analysis of whether a statement is ‘incidental to' or 'because of' the marital relationship, because a married couple, and each of them, should be secure in the knowledge that their private communications are exactly that — private.” Jackson v. State, 603 So.2d 670, 671 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (citations omitted) (citing Smith v. State, 344 So.2d 915, 919 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)). .

2002Cf. Jackson v. State, 603 So.2d 670, 671 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) ("As the statute specifically delineates those exceptions to the marital privilege, we are loath to add additional exceptions.") (citations omitted).

2010See id. (reversing denial of permanent alimony in a 13-and-a-half-year marriage where there was nothing in the record to indicate the wife would ever be able to support herself in a manner commensurate with the marital standard of living and there was no serious contention concerning the husband’s inability to provide some level of permanent support); Burrill, 701 So.2d at 354 (finding denial of permanent alimony was an abuse of discretion in 16-year marriage where the wife was 40 years old with limited work experience and her earning capacity was much lower than that of the husband).

1996As in Zeigler , we remand for the trial court 1) to assess the appellant's prospects of approaching the marital standard of living, 2) to reconsider the denial of permanent alimony, and 3) to make the requisite findings of fact relative to the other statutory factors enumerated in section 61.08(2), Florida Statutes (1993). § 61.08(1); Collinsworth, 624 So.2d at 291 (award of rehabilitative alimony was legally deficient where final judgment lacked explicit findings to support the award); Zeigler, 635 So.2d at 53-55 .

2009The courts will not engage in an after-the-fact analysis of whether a statement is ‘incidental to' or 'because of' the marital relationship, because a married couple, and each of them, should be secure in the knowledge that their private communications are exactly that — private.” Jackson v. State, 603 So.2d 670, 671 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (citations omitted) (citing Smith v. State, 344 So.2d 915, 919 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)). .

1983I would recede from Smith, supra. The majority of the Smith panel refused to except from the marital privilege communications made in furtherance of crimes because of the harm it would inflict upon the strong policy underlying the privilege.

2011See Jaffy v. Jaffy, 965 So.2d 825, 827-28 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007); Nichols v. Nichols, 907 So.2d 620, 623 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).

2011See Nichols v. Nichols, 907 So.2d 620, 623 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (recognizing marital standard of living is not useful guide in awarding alimony where parties lived beyond their means).

2009See, e.g., Proffitt v. State, 315 So.2d 461, 465 (Fla.1975), aff'd, 428 U.S. 242 , 96 S.Ct. 2960 , 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976); Johnson v. State, 730 So.2d 368, 370 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999).

2009See, e.g., Proffitt v. State, 315 So.2d 461, 465 (Fla.1975), aff'd, 428 U.S. 242 , 96 S.Ct. 2960 , 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976); Johnson v. State, 730 So.2d 368, 370 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999).

2009See, e.g., Proffitt v. State, 315 So.2d 461, 465 (Fla.1975), aff'd, 428 U.S. 242 , 96 S.Ct. 2960 , 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976); Johnson v. State, 730 So.2d 368, 370 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999).

2003See, e.g., Proffitt v. State, 315 So.2d 461, 465 (Fla.1975), aff'd, 428 U.S. 242 , 96 S.Ct. 2960 , 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976); Johnson v. State, 730 So.2d 368, 370 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999).

1996As in Zeigler , we remand for the trial court 1) to assess the appellant's prospects of approaching the marital standard of living, 2) to reconsider the denial of permanent alimony, and 3) to make the requisite findings of fact relative to the other statutory factors enumerated in section 61.08(2), Florida Statutes (1993). § 61.08(1); Collinsworth, 624 So.2d at 291 (award of rehabilitative alimony was legally deficient where final judgment lacked explicit findings to support the award); Zeigler, 635 So.2d at 53-55 .

1996An award of rehabilitative alimony should be supported by explicit findings, which "address the rehabilitative plan, the objective of rehabilitation, the cost of the plan and the projected period necessary for the wife to complete her rehabilitation." Wetzel, 671 So.2d at 235-236 ; Collinsworth v. Collinsworth, 624 So.2d 287, 291 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).

1996Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla.1980); Crowley v. Crowley, 672 So.2d 597 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Zeigler v. Zeigler, 635 So.2d 50, 53 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).

1993This approach completely ignores other statutory factors such as the ages and physical conditions of the parties, and the contribution of each party to the marriage. [1] While Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla. 1980), allowed broad discretion to the trial judge in domestic matters, it specifically did not require the equalization of the financial position of the parties.

2017Lander v. Smith, 906 So.2d 1130, 1133 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (quoting Dep’t of Health & Rehab.

2017An example of when the application of the presumption of legitimacy outraged common sense and logic can be found in Lander v. Smith, 906 So.2d 1130 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).

1996See Lanier v. Lanier, 594 So.2d 809, 811 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).

1993Mrs. White's health and prospects for appropriate employment are factors in determining the nature or extent of a proper award of alimony, but they are not reasons to deny all alimony to this middle-aged woman whose needs, in light of the marital standard of living, could not be met by her employment opportunities at the time of the trial court's decision. § 61.08(2), Fla. Stat. (1991); Morrill v. Morrill, 578 So.2d 53 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Bowen v. Bowen, 543 So.2d 1284 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Lanier v. Lanier, 594 So.2d 809 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).

2013Taylor, 855 So.2d at 13-14, n. 11 .

2012See Kerlin, 352 So.2d at 53 (violation of the marital privilege subject to harmless error analysis).

2011See Jaffy v. Jaffy, 965 So.2d 825, 827-28 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007); Nichols v. Nichols, 907 So.2d 620, 623 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).

2010See Farrior v. Farrior, 712 So.2d 1154, 1156 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (observing that an asset may retain its separate identity even after the income derived from that asset is used to maintain or raise the marital standard of living), approved, 736 So.2d 1177 (Fla.1999).

2010See id. (reversing denial of permanent alimony in a 13-and-a-half-year marriage where there was nothing in the record to indicate the wife would ever be able to support herself in a manner commensurate with the marital standard of living and there was no serious contention concerning the husband’s inability to provide some level of permanent support); Burrill, 701 So.2d at 354 (finding denial of permanent alimony was an abuse of discretion in 16-year marriage where the wife was 40 years old with limited work experience and her earning capacity was much lower than that of the husband).

2010See Farrior v. Farrior, 712 So.2d 1154, 1156 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (observing that an asset may retain its separate identity even after the income derived from that asset is used to maintain or raise the marital standard of living), approved, 736 So.2d 1177 (Fla.1999).

2010See e.g., Salisbury v. Salisbury, 525 So.2d 427, 428 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).

2010See also Wolff v. Wolff, 576 So.2d 852 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (finding permanent, periodic alimony appropriate in 15-year marriage where the wife remained out of the workforce at the husband’s request and the husband earned four times more than the wife). *973 At the time of trial, the wife was 59 years old, approximately 11 years older than the husband, and earned considerably less than the husband.

2009See, e.g., Bolin v. State, 793 So.2d 894, 896 (Fla.2001) (“If ... the trial court determines from the circumstances in which the letter was sent and from the content of the letter itself that the letter constituted a voluntary consent to such disclosure, then the marital privilege would be waived pursuant to section 90.507- If the court determines, however, that the circumstances together with the content of the letter do not indicate that [the defendant] voluntarily consented to disclosure ..., then there was not a waiver.” (footnote omitted)) (quoting and reaffirming the totality-based test

2009If the court determines, however, that the circumstances together with the content of the letter do not indicate that [the defendant] voluntarily consented to disclosure ..., then there was not a waiver." (footnote omitted)) (quoting and reaffirming the totality-based test articulated in Bolin v. State, 650 So.2d 19, 21 (Fla.1995)).

2009See, e.g., Bolin v. State, 793 So.2d 894, 896 (Fla.2001) (“If ... the trial court determines from the circumstances in which the letter was sent and from the content of the letter itself that the letter constituted a voluntary consent to such disclosure, then the marital privilege would be waived pursuant to section 90.507- If the court determines, however, that the circumstances together with the content of the letter do not indicate that [the defendant] voluntarily consented to disclosure ..., then there was not a waiver.” (footnote omitted)) (quoting and reaffirming the totality-based test

2009See, e.g., Bolin v. State, 793 So.2d 894, 896 (Fla.2001) ("If... the trial court determines from the circumstances in which the letter was sent and from the content of the letter itself that the letter constituted a voluntary consent to such disclosure, then the marital privilege would be waived pursuant to section 90.507. ...