marital standard in California

2025As the court noted, at the evidentiary hearing, Steven “wanted to testify that the court was incorrect, and that the marital standard of living was much higher.” The court considered his argument to be “an impermissible collateral attack on the court’s prior ruling.” (See, e.g., In re Marriage of Hoffmeister (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 351, 364 [“Unless respondent can establish by credible evidence that she had a standard of living at the time of separation of the parties that was higher than that provided by the prior award, her motion for modification is no more than an attempt to collaterally att

2024The family court should make findings regarding the marital standard of living. (§ 4332; see Smith, supra, 225 Cal.App.3d at pp. 475, 484; Kerr, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 94, fn. 7 .) 10 explained, insufficient evidence supports the family court’s finding that Timothy had nontaxable income of $1,464 per month, we will remand for the family court to reweigh the relevant section 4320 circumstances for purposes of calculating spousal support.

2025(Ibid.) The first circumstance, the marital standard of living, “is relevant as a reference point against which the other statutory factors are to be weighed.” (In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 303 (Cheriton).) Marital standard of living has no strict statutory definition but can be described as a measure of “‘reasonable needs commensurate with the parties’ general station in life. . . .’” (In re Marriage of Ackerman (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 191, 207 ; see also In re Marriage of Nelson (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1546, 1560 .) In ordering spousal support, “‘the trial court posses

2025Under that provision, “the trial court must consider and weigh all of the circumstances enumerated in the statute, to the extent they are relevant to the case before it.” (In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 302 (Cheriton).) “The first of the enumerated circumstances, the marital standard of living, is relevant as a reference point against which the other statutory factors are to be weighed.” (Ibid.) “The other statutory factors include: contributions to the supporting spouse’s education, training, or career; the supporting spouse’s ability to pay; the needs of each party, ba

2025Rather, courts have stated the opposite: “[A] court may properly consider both income and expenses in determining the marital standard of living [citation], it may also base it on the family’s average income, rather than expenses.” (In re Marriage of Ackerman (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 191, 208 .) Next, Keith argues the court erred by adopting Hunt’s calculation that Robin needed $48,000 in post-tax income to maintain the marital standard of living.

2025Rather, courts have stated the opposite: “[A] court may properly consider both income and expenses in determining the marital standard of living [citation], it may also base it on the family’s average income, rather than expenses.” (In re Marriage of Ackerman (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 191, 208 .) Next, Keith argues the court erred by adopting Hunt’s calculation that Robin needed $48,000 in post-tax income to maintain the marital standard of living.

2025Section 4330 authorizes the trial court to order a party to pay spousal support in an amount, and for a period of time, that the court determines is 12. just and reasonable, based on the standard of living established during the marriage, taking into consideration the circumstances set forth in section 4320.’ ” (In re Marriage of Blazer (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1442 (Blazer).) Those factors include the extent to which each party’s earning capacity is sufficient to maintain the marital standard of living, the supporting spouse’s ability to pay, the parties’ obligations and assets, the durat

2023(See §§ 4300– 4360.) “[T]he court may order a party to pay for the support of the other party an amount, for a period of time, that the court determines is just and reasonable, based on the standard of living established during the marriage, taking into consideration the circumstances as provided in [section 4320].”5 (§ 4330; In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 302 .) The marital standard of living, which describes the “station in life that the parties had achieved by the date of separation,” “is neither a floor nor a ceiling for a spousal support award.” (In re Marriage of N

2024The family court should make findings regarding the marital standard of living. (§ 4332; see Smith, supra, 225 Cal.App.3d at pp. 475, 484; Kerr, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 94, fn. 7 .) 10 explained, insufficient evidence supports the family court’s finding that Timothy had nontaxable income of $1,464 per month, we will remand for the family court to reweigh the relevant section 4320 circumstances for purposes of calculating spousal support.

2024The family court should make findings regarding the marital standard of living. (§ 4332; see Smith, supra, 225 Cal.App.3d at pp. 475, 484; Kerr, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 94, fn. 7 .) 10 explained, insufficient evidence supports the family court’s finding that Timothy had nontaxable income of $1,464 per month, we will remand for the family court to reweigh the relevant section 4320 circumstances for purposes of calculating spousal support.

2025(Ibid.) The first circumstance, the marital standard of living, “is relevant as a reference point against which the other statutory factors are to be weighed.” (In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 303 (Cheriton).) Marital standard of living has no strict statutory definition but can be described as a measure of “‘reasonable needs commensurate with the parties’ general station in life. . . .’” (In re Marriage of Ackerman (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 191, 207 ; see also In re Marriage of Nelson (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1546, 1560 .) In ordering spousal support, “‘the trial court posses

2025(Ibid.) The first circumstance, the marital standard of living, “is relevant as a reference point against which the other statutory factors are to be weighed.” (In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 303 (Cheriton).) Marital standard of living has no strict statutory definition but can be described as a measure of “‘reasonable needs commensurate with the parties’ general station in life. . . .’” (In re Marriage of Ackerman (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 191, 207 ; see also In re Marriage of Nelson (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1546, 1560 .) In ordering spousal support, “‘the trial court posses

2025(Ibid.) The first circumstance, the marital standard of living, “is relevant as a reference point against which the other statutory factors are to be weighed.” (In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 303 (Cheriton).) Marital standard of living has no strict statutory definition but can be described as a measure of “‘reasonable needs commensurate with the parties’ general station in life. . . .’” (In re Marriage of Ackerman (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 191, 207 ; see also In re Marriage of Nelson (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1546, 1560 .) In ordering spousal support, “‘the trial court posses

2025(In re Marriage of Williamson (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1315-1316 [court may “ ‘fix spousal support at an amount greater than, equal to[,] or less than what the supported spouse may require to maintain the marital standard of living’ ” so long as it considers factors set forth in § 4320].) Alternatively, Alvianna contends the reduction of spousal support was not justified by a material change in circumstances.

2025This would still leave Robin at least $29,931 per month short of the $70,000 to $75,000 needed to maintain the marital standard of living. “[I]t would be an abuse of discretion to order support which leaves the supported spouse at a standard of living significantly lower than that enjoyed during marriage while allowing the supporting spouse a significantly higher one.” (In re Marriage of Weinstein (1991) 4 Cal.App.4th 555, 568 ; In re Marriage of Beust (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 24, 30 [“It is inequitable after a long marriage to supply the husband with a continued standard of living much higher th

2025This would still leave Robin at least $29,931 per month short of the $70,000 to $75,000 needed to maintain the marital standard of living. “[I]t would be an abuse of discretion to order support which leaves the supported spouse at a standard of living significantly lower than that enjoyed during marriage while allowing the supporting spouse a significantly higher one.” (In re Marriage of Weinstein (1991) 4 Cal.App.4th 555, 568 ; In re Marriage of Beust (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 24, 30 [“It is inequitable after a long marriage to supply the husband with a continued standard of living much higher th

2024(In re Marriage of Dennis (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 279, 284 ; In re Marriage of Rosan (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 885, 897 .) 2 [“appellate courts must act with cautious judicial restraint in reviewing these orders”].) Family Code section 43203 governs spousal support orders and identifies factors the trial court must consider in making them, including whether each party’s earning capacity suffices to maintain the marital standard of living; the needs of each party based on the marital standard of living; the duration of the marriage; the extent to which the supported party contributed to the attainment

2024(In re Marriage of Dennis (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 279, 284 ; In re Marriage of Rosan (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 885, 897 .) 2 [“appellate courts must act with cautious judicial restraint in reviewing these orders”].) Family Code section 43203 governs spousal support orders and identifies factors the trial court must consider in making them, including whether each party’s earning capacity suffices to maintain the marital standard of living; the needs of each party based on the marital standard of living; the duration of the marriage; the extent to which the supported party contributed to the attainment

2025Further, courts have held that the goal of achieving the marital 17 standard of living may decrease in relative importance over time. [Citation.] Finally, although the marital standard of living is an important factor in determining spousal support, it is not the only factor, and its importance in determining whether it is ‘just and reasonable’ (§ 4330) to award spousal support will vary based on the court’s evaluation of the section 4320 factors.” (Shaughnessy, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 1247 .) We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Jerome’s spousal support

2024(See Shaughnessy, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 1247 [importance of the marital standard of living “will vary based on the court’s evaluation of the section 4320 factors”].) Jay appears to contend the marital standard of living was entitled to less weight because Heather had been given adequate time to find full-time work and become self-sufficient.

2020Permanent spousal support “is constrained by numerous statutory factors set out in section 4320.” (In re Marriage of Murray (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 581, 594 , disapproved on other grounds by Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989 , 995.) One factor identifies the “goal that the supported party shall be self-supporting within a reasonable period of time,” and that except in marriages of long duration, a “ ‘reasonable period of time’ . . . generally shall be one-half the length of the marriage.” (§ 4320, subd. (l).) Other factors include each party’s ability to maintain the marital standard

2014Section 4330 authorizes the trial court to order a party to pay spousal support in an amount, and for a period of time, that the court determines is just and reasonable, based on the standard of living established during the marriage, taking into consideration the circumstances set forth in section 4320.’ [Citations.]” (In re Marriage of Blazer (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1442 ; see In re Marriage of Murray (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 581, 594-595 .) These circumstances “include the supporting spouse’s ability to pay; the needs of each spouse based on the marital standard of living; the obligation

2025(In re Marriage of Smith, supra, 225 Cal.App.3d at p. 495 , second italics added; In re Marriage of Hoffmeister (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 1163, 1172, fn. 7 (Hoffmeister I) [[“T]here may also be situations in which the change in circumstances arises out of economic facts that may relate to both the need of one spouse and the ability to pay of the other—such as significant inflation of the currency”].) As to Hunt’s use of weighting, Keith contends this approach is inappropriate where the supporting spouse’s income fluctuates.

2024(In re Marriage of Davis (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 71, 73, fn. 2 [judicial notice of the impact of inflation appropriate when supported spouse lived on a fixed income]; In re Marriage of Hoffmeister (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 1163, 1172, fn. 7 [inflation “[c]onceivably” a change in circumstance justifying modification of spousal support].) Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Marcia’s asserted inflation adjustment to the marital standard of living.

2024(In re Marriage of Schmir (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 43 , 52–53 [court may consider the supported spouse’s investment income]; In re Marriage of Ackerman, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 211 [court may impute a reasonable return on assets]; Ciprari, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at pp. 93–94 [reasonable inferences are to be drawn in support of the trial court’s decision].) Moreover, the marital standard of living “ ‘is neither a floor nor a ceiling for a spousal support award.’ ” (Ciprari, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 110 .) “After weighing the marital standard of living against the other statutory factors, ‘

2006We turn to these now. i. Marital Standard of Living One of the factors the court must consider in awarding spousal support is “[t]he needs of each party based on the standard of living established during the marriage.” (Fam Code, § 4320, subd. (d); all further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise indicated.) The marital standard of living has been described as “reasonable needs commensurate with the parties’ general station in life. [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Smith (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 469, 491 [ 274 Cal.Rptr. 911 ] (Smith).) The actual marital standard of living is not

2017(Cf. Diepenbrock, supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 749 [“while the court may properly have rejected plaintiff’s contention concerning the scope of the exception to the marital privilege, the conflicting legal authority on an unsettled issue provided substantial justification for appellants’ position, negating the basis for the sanction order”]; Bruno v. Superior Court (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1359, 1365 [ 269 Cal.Rptr. 142 ] [“Although we agree with respondent court that discovery is not available in a small claims appeal, we find that the court abused its discretion in sanctioning petitioner’s attor

2017(Cf. Diepenbrock, supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 749 [“while the court may properly have rejected plaintiff’s contention concerning the scope of the exception to the marital privilege, the conflicting legal authority on an unsettled issue provided substantial justification for appellants’ position, negating the basis for the sanction order”]; Bruno v. Superior Court (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1359, 1365 [“Although we agree with respondent court that discovery is not available in a small claims appeal, we find that the court abused its discretion in sanctioning petitioner's attorney for raising this i

2025(Ibid.) The first circumstance, the marital standard of living, “is relevant as a reference point against which the other statutory factors are to be weighed.” (In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 303 (Cheriton).) Marital standard of living has no strict statutory definition but can be described as a measure of “‘reasonable needs commensurate with the parties’ general station in life. . . .’” (In re Marriage of Ackerman (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 191, 207 ; see also In re Marriage of Nelson (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1546, 1560 .) In ordering spousal support, “‘the trial court posses

2025If the trial court conforms to these requirements its order will be upheld whether or not the appellate court agrees with it or would make the same order if it were a trial court.’ ” (In re Marriage of West, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 246 .) “ ‘ “Because trial courts have such broad discretion, appellate courts must act with cautious judicial restraint in reviewing these orders.” ’ ” (In re Marriage of McLain (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 262, 269 .) As stated, section 4320, subdivision (a) requires that in awarding spousal support, the court consider the extent to which the supported party possesses

2025Section 4330 authorizes the trial court to order a party to pay spousal support in an amount, and for a period of time, that the court determines is just and reasonable, based on the standard of living established during the marriage, taking into consideration the circumstances set forth in section 4320.” [Citations.] The statutory factors include the supporting spouse’s ability to pay; the needs of each spouse based on the marital standard of living; the obligations and assets of each spouse, including separate property; and any other factors pertinent to a just and equitable award.’” (In re

2024(In re Marriage of Schmir (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 43 , 52–53 [court may consider the supported spouse’s investment income]; In re Marriage of Ackerman, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 211 [court may impute a reasonable return on assets]; Ciprari, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at pp. 93–94 [reasonable inferences are to be drawn in support of the trial court’s decision].) Moreover, the marital standard of living “ ‘is neither a floor nor a ceiling for a spousal support award.’ ” (Ciprari, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 110 .) “After weighing the marital standard of living against the other statutory factors, ‘

2025As the court noted, at the evidentiary hearing, Steven “wanted to testify that the court was incorrect, and that the marital standard of living was much higher.” The court considered his argument to be “an impermissible collateral attack on the court’s prior ruling.” (See, e.g., In re Marriage of Hoffmeister (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 351, 364 [“Unless respondent can establish by credible evidence that she had a standard of living at the time of separation of the parties that was higher than that provided by the prior award, her motion for modification is no more than an attempt to collaterally att

2025(Hoffmeister II, supra, 191 Cal.App.3d at p. 364 .) Given Keith’s increased income and the failure of the initial support order to meet Robin’s needs, the court could modify spousal support to an amount that would permit Robin to live at the marital standard.

2025This would still leave Robin at least $29,931 per month short of the $70,000 to $75,000 needed to maintain the marital standard of living. “[I]t would be an abuse of discretion to order support which leaves the supported spouse at a standard of living significantly lower than that enjoyed during marriage while allowing the supporting spouse a significantly higher one.” (In re Marriage of Weinstein (1991) 4 Cal.App.4th 555, 568 ; In re Marriage of Beust (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 24, 30 [“It is inequitable after a long marriage to supply the husband with a continued standard of living much higher th

2025This would still leave Robin at least $29,931 per month short of the $70,000 to $75,000 needed to maintain the marital standard of living. “[I]t would be an abuse of discretion to order support which leaves the supported spouse at a standard of living significantly lower than that enjoyed during marriage while allowing the supporting spouse a significantly higher one.” (In re Marriage of Weinstein (1991) 4 Cal.App.4th 555, 568 ; In re Marriage of Beust (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 24, 30 [“It is inequitable after a long marriage to supply the husband with a continued standard of living much higher th

2025(In re Marriage of Khera & Sameer (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1467 , 1483–1484.) “‘The Legislature has never specified that spousal support must always meet the needs of the supported spouse as measured by the marital standard of living.’ . . . ‘[T]he trial court 5 Hub’s calculation appears to be inflated.

2021(Marriage of Smith, at p. 475.) 11 of the date of the Judgment.”12 The significance of this distinction, Johnnie’s argument continues, is that, at the time of the Judgment when the community had monthly income of $11,574, the parties agreed that monthly spousal support of $2,303—in addition to Johnnie’s monthly self-employment income of $1,578, for a total monthly income of $3,881—“was sufficient to provide her the marital standard of living.” Johnnie’s presentation then concludes: “The court, per [Marriage of] Khera, [supra, 206 Cal.App.4th 1467 ,] is obligated to measure those recited facts

2016Cheryl argues that spousal support should be commensurate with the upper middle class standard of living that she enjoyed during the marriage. (§ 4320, subd. (d).) In 2011, the trial court described the parties' marital standard of living as "middle class" at time of separation. "[A]lthough the marital standard of living is an important factor in determining spousal support, it is not the only factor, and its importance in determining whether it is 'just and reasonable' (§ 4330) to award spousal support will vary based on the court's evaluation of the section 4320 factors." (In re Shaughnessy,

2014(In re Marriage of Schulze (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 519, 525-528 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 488 ].) “Because dissolution of marriage is, in the mathematical sense, a negative-sum game where each party will not have the same access to the whole of the marital property he or she had during the marriage, permanent support orders will usually be lower than temporary orders.” (Id. at p. 525.) “In ordering [permanent] spousal support, the trial court must consider and weigh all of the circumstances enumerated in [section 4320], to the extent they are relevant to the case before it. [Citations.] The first of the

2024(In re Marriage of Dennis (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 279, 284 ; In re Marriage of Rosan (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 885, 897 .) 2 [“appellate courts must act with cautious judicial restraint in reviewing these orders”].) Family Code section 43203 governs spousal support orders and identifies factors the trial court must consider in making them, including whether each party’s earning capacity suffices to maintain the marital standard of living; the needs of each party based on the marital standard of living; the duration of the marriage; the extent to which the supported party contributed to the attainment

2016(In re Marriage of Williamson (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1316 .) The marital standard of living “‘is relevant as a reference point against which the other statutory factors [of section 4320] are to be weighed. . . .’ [Citation.]” (Namikas v. Miller (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1574, 1585 .) Other relevant statutory factors include the supporting spouse’s ability to pay (§ 4320, subd. (c)); the needs of each party, based on the marital standard of living (§ 4320, subds. (a), (d)); the obligations and assets of each party (§ 4320, subd. (e)); the ability of the supported spouse to engage in gainful

2025We are unpersuaded by Keith’s citation to In re Marriage of Mosley (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1375 .

2015(See Mosley, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1390 [when support provided by father was insufficient to allow mother and children to live according to the marital standard of living, imputation of additional income to mother could increase level of support from her and promote children’s best interests].) C.

2024(In re Marriage of Schmir (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 43 , 52–53 [court may consider the supported spouse’s investment income]; In re Marriage of Ackerman, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 211 [court may impute a reasonable return on assets]; Ciprari, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at pp. 93–94 [reasonable inferences are to be drawn in support of the trial court’s decision].) Moreover, the marital standard of living “ ‘is neither a floor nor a ceiling for a spousal support award.’ ” (Ciprari, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 110 .) “After weighing the marital standard of living against the other statutory factors, ‘

2017For these same reasons, this Court will also not be issuing a Gavron warning to [Wife].” “[A] ‘Gavron *271 warning’ is a fair warning to the supported spouse [that] he or she is expected to become self-supporting.” (In re Marriage of Schmir (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 43, 55 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 716 ].) The court’s reasoning reflects it weighed the goal of the supported party becoming self-supporting against the marital standard of living, and recognized that the goal of self-support would conflict with maintaining the marital standard of living because the marital standard of living included being ret

2023The trial court was obliged to consider the marital history of saving as part of the parties’ marital standard of living (In re Marriage of Drapeau (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1086, 1098 (Drapeau)), and the record shows that it did so.

2023As one authority has noted: “[T]he trial court should consider the parties’ practice of saving income as an element of the marital standard of living; and, after 12 considering and weighing all of the applicable § 4320 factors, it may be appropriate to award spousal support in an amount sufficient to continue to save as they did during the marriage. . . . [¶] This does not mean, of course, that a supported spouse is necessarily ‘entitled’ to support at a level that will allow for savings at a particular rate.” (Hogoboom et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter Group 2023 update) ¶¶

2016(In re Marriage of Williamson (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1316 .) The marital standard of living “‘is relevant as a reference point against which the other statutory factors [of section 4320] are to be weighed. . . .’ [Citation.]” (Namikas v. Miller (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1574, 1585 .) Other relevant statutory factors include the supporting spouse’s ability to pay (§ 4320, subd. (c)); the needs of each party, based on the marital standard of living (§ 4320, subds. (a), (d)); the obligations and assets of each party (§ 4320, subd. (e)); the ability of the supported spouse to engage in gainful

2014Section 4330 authorizes the trial court to order a party to pay spousal support in an amount, and for a period of time, that the court determines is just and reasonable, based on the standard of living established during the marriage, taking into consideration the circumstances set forth in section 4320.’ [Citations.]” (In re Marriage of Blazer (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1442 ; see In re Marriage of Murray (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 581, 594-595 .) These circumstances “include the supporting spouse’s ability to pay; the needs of each spouse based on the marital standard of living; the obligation