marital standard in Connecticut

2021In addition to the marital standard of living, the trial court must also consider factors in . . . § 46b-82 when awarding alimony. . . . ‘‘[Section] 46b-82 (a) provides in relevant part that [i]n determining whether alimony shall be awarded, and the duration and amount of the award, the court shall consider the evidence presented by each party and shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the . . . dissolution of the marriage . . . the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, earning capacity, vocation skills, education employabil- ity, estate and needs o

2021In addition to the marital standard of living, the trial court must also consider factors in . . . § 46b-82 when awarding alimony. . . . ‘‘[Section] 46b-82 (a) provides in relevant part that [i]n determining whether alimony shall be awarded, and the duration and amount of the award, the court shall consider the evidence presented by each party and shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the . . . dissolution of the marriage . . . the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, earning capacity, vocation skills, education employabil- ity, estate and needs o

2016Cf. Matza v. Matza, 226 Conn. 166, 185 , 627 A.2d 414 (1993) (trial court explicitly stated that ‘‘parties did not during their marriage years enjoy a high standard of living as claimed by the [wife]’’). 23 The plaintiff, however, estimated the fair market value of the marital home to be $10 million. 24 The record reflects that the defendant earned $1,249,989 in 2004, $902,025 in 2005, $1,687,677 in 2006, $1,253,766 in 2007, and $575,262 in 2008. 25 We look to the standard of living of the marriage and the equitable factors in § 46b-82 to help us determine whether the lump sum alimony award is

2016Cf. Matza v. Matza, 226 Conn. 166, 185 , 627 A.2d 414 (1993) (trial court explicitly stated that ‘‘parties did not during their marriage years enjoy a high standard of living as claimed by the [wife]’’). 23 The plaintiff, however, estimated the fair market value of the marital home to be $10 million. 24 The record reflects that the defendant earned $1,249,989 in 2004, $902,025 in 2005, $1,687,677 in 2006, $1,253,766 in 2007, and $575,262 in 2008. 25 We look to the standard of living of the marriage and the equitable factors in § 46b-82 to help us determine whether the lump sum alimony award is

2023In addition to the marital standard of living, the trial court must also consider the factors in . . . § 46b-82 when awarding alimony.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Reinke v. Sing, 186 Conn. App. 665, 689 , 201 A.3d 404 (2018).

2023In addition to the marital standard of living, the trial court must also consider the factors in . . . § 46b-82 when awarding alimony.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Reinke v. Sing, 186 Conn. App. 665, 689 , 201 A.3d 404 (2018).

2020We conclude that the defendant’s particular challenge in State v. Williams, supra, 206 Conn. 203—i.e., to the postinvocation grant of immunity pursuant to § 54-47a to a witness who testified against him—is substantially similar to the sole claim raised in the present appeal— i.e., that Washington should not have been permitted to testify after he initially invoked his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

2017"In addition to the marital standard of living, the trial court must also consider the factors in [General Statutes] § 46b-82 when awarding alimony." Hornung v. Hornung , 323 Conn. 144 , 163, 146 A.3d 912 (2016).

2017"In addition to the marital standard of living, the trial court must also consider the factors in [General Statutes] § 46b-82 when awarding alimony." Hornung v. Hornung , 323 Conn. 144 , 163, 146 A.3d 912 (2016).

2016The application of the privilege presents a mixed question of law and fact.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Mark R., 300 Conn. 590, 597 , 17 A.3d 1 (2011).

2016The application of the privilege presents a mixed question of law and fact.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Mark R., 300 Conn. 590, 597 , 17 A.3d 1 (2011).

2013The defendant, now conceding that the issue had not been raised before the trial court, asks this court for review of his unpreserved claim under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989). 9 The defendant claims that the record is sufficient in this case to review his alleged claim of error because the five page document was marked for identification and the relevant facts were addressed when discussing the marital communications privilege before the trial court.

2013The defendant, now conceding that the issue had not been raised before the trial court, asks this court for review of his unpreserved claim under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989). 9 The defendant claims that the record is sufficient in this case to review his alleged claim of error because the five page document was marked for identification and the relevant facts were addressed when discussing the marital communications privilege before the trial court.

2009The day after Ramsey testified, the defendant moved to strike her testimony about the defendant’s plan to bum down their trailer for insurance money, as well as his claims to have burned property for money, as subject to the marital privilege under State v. Christian, supra, 267 Conn. 710 , and State v. Littlejohn, 199 Conn. 631 , 508 A.2d 1376 (1986).

2009The day after Ramsey testified, the defendant moved to strike her testimony about the defendant’s plan to bum down their trailer for insurance money, as well as his claims to have burned property for money, as subject to the marital privilege under State v. Christian, supra, 267 Conn. 710 , and State v. Littlejohn, 199 Conn. 631 , 508 A.2d 1376 (1986).

2009The day after Ramsey testified, the defendant moved to strike her testimony about the defendant’s plan to bum down their trailer for insurance money, as well as his claims to have burned property for money, as subject to the marital privilege under State v. Christian, supra, 267 Conn. 710 , and State v. Littlejohn, 199 Conn. 631 , 508 A.2d 1376 (1986).

1996The defendant further emphasizes that the Connecticut Supreme Court has neither reversed nor overturned the decision in Spitz's Appeal, 56 Conn. 184 (1888), which recognized the marital privilege against adverse spousal testimony.

1996The defendant further emphasizes that the Connecticut Supreme Court has neither reversed nor overturned the decision in Spitz's Appeal, 56 Conn. 184 (1888), which recognized the marital privilege against adverse spousal testimony.