marital standard in Massachusetts

2025Rather, "[t]he judge must consider all the statutory factors and reach a fair balance of sacrifice between the former spouses when financial resources are inadequate to maintain the marital standard of living." Pierce v. Pierce, 455 Mass. 286, 296 (2009).

2022In such cases, "[t]he judge must consider all the statutory factors and reach a fair balance of sacrifice between the former spouses when financial resources are inadequate to maintain the marital standard of living." Pierce, supra. Here, the judge made the following relevant findings.

2016However, our cases hold that where a spouse’s testimony is obtained in the absence of a valid waiver of the privilege, use of that testimony at trial “offends fundamental fairness.” See Commonwealth v. Rosa, 412 Mass. 147, 162 (1992). *72 The judge’s explanation of the marital privilege was inaccurate.

1993See Commonwealth v. Rosa, 412 Mass. 147, 161 (1992). 5 See also Commonwealth v. Maillet, 400 Mass. 572, 576 (1987).

2007The ineluctable conclusion to be drawn from these facts, as well as from evidence of the value of Frederic’s other assets, is that Frederic has sufficient financial resources to meet his alimony obligations in the amount of $1,050 per week, as well as his own needs. 9 See Pagar v. Pagar, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 7 (1980), quoting from Kay v. Kay, 37 N.Y.2d 632, 636 (1975) (“[A]s to alimony . . . , if it were necessary for the husband here to utilize his capital or other assets, they would not be exempt from the requirement that he maintain the marital standard of living simply because he voluntaril

1980In Krokyn , 378 Mass, at 210, the court cited with approval Kay v. Kay, 37 N.Y. 2d 632, 636 (1975), where that court stated, “[A]s to alimony and child support both, if it were necessary for the husband here to utilize his capital or other assets, they would not be exempt from the requirement that he maintain the marital standard of living simply because he voluntarily maintains his finances in a form that limits the income they produce.” Notwithstanding the husband’s failure to describe this asset in his financial statement, the judge did consider it but concluded that it was not in the parti

2024App. at 473 (trial judge should have considered "savings made in accordance with a pre-existing pattern in determining defendant's accustomed standard of living"); LaVoi v. LaVoi, 505 N.W.2d 384, 387 (N.D. 1993) (upholding lower court's spousal support award, which afforded wife "a modest opportunity to plan some retirement savings"); Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357, ¶ 16 ("The critical question is whether funds for post-divorce savings, investment, and retirement accounts are necessary because contributing to such accounts was standard practice during the marriage and helped to form the couple's

2024App. 467, 473 (2000) ("the trial court can properly consider the parties' custom of making regular additions to savings plans as a part of their standard of living in determining the amount and duration of an alimony award" where "[e]vidence was presented that established an historical pattern of such contributions" [citation omitted]); Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357, ¶ 16 (inclusion of saving as part of needs analysis permissible where contribution to savings accounts "was standard practice during the marriage and helped to form the couple's marital standard of living").

2024App. at 473 (trial judge should have considered "savings made in accordance with a pre-existing pattern in determining defendant's accustomed standard of living"); LaVoi v. LaVoi, 505 N.W.2d 384, 387 (N.D. 1993) (upholding lower court's spousal support award, which afforded wife "a modest opportunity to plan some retirement savings"); Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357, ¶ 16 ("The critical question is whether funds for post-divorce savings, investment, and retirement accounts are necessary because contributing to such accounts was standard practice during the marriage and helped to form the couple's

2024App. at 473 (trial judge should have considered "savings made in accordance with a pre-existing pattern in determining defendant's accustomed standard of living"); LaVoi v. LaVoi, 505 N.W.2d 384, 387 (N.D. 1993) (upholding lower court's spousal support award, which afforded wife "a modest opportunity to plan some retirement savings"); Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357, ¶ 16 ("The critical question is whether funds for post-divorce savings, investment, and retirement accounts are necessary because contributing to such accounts was standard practice during the marriage and helped to form the couple's

2024See also Rainwater v. Rainwater, 177 Ariz. 500, 505 (Ct. App. 1993) ("[H]usband objects that wife's expenses were overstated by the amount of $337.60 for monthly savings and retirement contributions.

2024App. at 473 (trial judge should have considered "savings made in accordance with a pre-existing pattern in determining defendant's accustomed standard of living"); LaVoi v. LaVoi, 505 N.W.2d 384, 387 (N.D. 1993) (upholding lower court's spousal support award, which afforded wife "a modest opportunity to plan some retirement savings"); Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357, ¶ 16 ("The critical question is whether funds for post-divorce savings, investment, and retirement accounts are necessary because contributing to such accounts was standard practice during the marriage and helped to form the couple's

2016See Commonwealth v. Stokes, 374 Mass. 583, 595 (1978).

2015“If a supporting spouse has the ability to pay, the recipient spouse’s need for support is generally the amount needed to allow that spouse to maintain the lifestyle he or she enjoyed prior to termination of the marriage. ‘The standard of need is measured by the “station” of the parties — by what is required to maintain a standard of living comparable to the one enjoyed during the marriage.’ ” Pierce v. Pierce, supra at 296 , quoting Grubert v. Grubert, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 811, 819 (1985).

2007The ineluctable conclusion to be drawn from these facts, as well as from evidence of the value of Frederic’s other assets, is that Frederic has sufficient financial resources to meet his alimony obligations in the amount of $1,050 per week, as well as his own needs. 9 See Pagar v. Pagar, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 7 (1980), quoting from Kay v. Kay, 37 N.Y.2d 632, 636 (1975) (“[A]s to alimony . . . , if it were necessary for the husband here to utilize his capital or other assets, they would not be exempt from the requirement that he maintain the marital standard of living simply because he voluntaril

2007See also Binder v. Binder, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 751, 755 (1979) (no changed circumstances where wife’s needs and husband’s income unchanged, taking into account direct and indirect compensation as well as increased net worth); Wolfe v. Wolfe, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 254, 257 (1985) (“probate judge need not undertake to direct specifically what the source of the ordered payments shall be”). 2.

2007See also Binder v. Binder, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 751, 755 (1979) (no changed circumstances where wife’s needs and husband’s income unchanged, taking into account direct and indirect compensation as well as increased net worth); Wolfe v. Wolfe, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 254, 257 (1985) (“probate judge need not undertake to direct specifically what the source of the ordered payments shall be”). 2.

2000See ibid.

1999See e.g., In re Gary Snoonian, 502 F.2d 110, 112 (1st Cir. 1974) (holding that the husband-wife privilege applies to grand juiy proceedings); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 603 F.2d 786, 789 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that a witness before a grand jury should not be compelled to choose among perjury, contempt or disloyalty to his spouse); In Matter of Grand Jury, 633 F.2d 276, 277 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that privilege against adverse spousal testimony applies to grand jury proceedings); In re Grand Jury Matter, 673 F.2d 688, 693 (3rd Cir. 1982) (same); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 664 F.2d

1999See e.g., In re Gary Snoonian, 502 F.2d 110, 112 (1st Cir. 1974) (holding that the husband-wife privilege applies to grand juiy proceedings); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 603 F.2d 786, 789 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that a witness before a grand jury should not be compelled to choose among perjury, contempt or disloyalty to his spouse); In Matter of Grand Jury, 633 F.2d 276, 277 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that privilege against adverse spousal testimony applies to grand jury proceedings); In re Grand Jury Matter, 673 F.2d 688, 693 (3rd Cir. 1982) (same); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 664 F.2d

1999See e.g., In re Gary Snoonian, 502 F.2d 110, 112 (1st Cir. 1974) (holding that the husband-wife privilege applies to grand juiy proceedings); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 603 F.2d 786, 789 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that a witness before a grand jury should not be compelled to choose among perjury, contempt or disloyalty to his spouse); In Matter of Grand Jury, 633 F.2d 276, 277 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that privilege against adverse spousal testimony applies to grand jury proceedings); In re Grand Jury Matter, 673 F.2d 688, 693 (3rd Cir. 1982) (same); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 664 F.2d

1999See e.g., In re Gary Snoonian, 502 F.2d 110, 112 (1st Cir. 1974) (holding that the husband-wife privilege applies to grand juiy proceedings); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 603 F.2d 786, 789 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that a witness before a grand jury should not be compelled to choose among perjury, contempt or disloyalty to his spouse); In Matter of Grand Jury, 633 F.2d 276, 277 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that privilege against adverse spousal testimony applies to grand jury proceedings); In re Grand Jury Matter, 673 F.2d 688, 693 (3rd Cir. 1982) (same); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 664 F.2d

1999See e.g., In re Gary Snoonian, 502 F.2d 110, 112 (1st Cir. 1974) (holding that the husband-wife privilege applies to grand juiy proceedings); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 603 F.2d 786, 789 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that a witness before a grand jury should not be compelled to choose among perjury, contempt or disloyalty to his spouse); In Matter of Grand Jury, 633 F.2d 276, 277 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that privilege against adverse spousal testimony applies to grand jury proceedings); In re Grand Jury Matter, 673 F.2d 688, 693 (3rd Cir. 1982) (same); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 664 F.2d

1993See Commonwealth v. Rosa, 412 Mass. 147, 161 (1992). 5 See also Commonwealth v. Maillet, 400 Mass. 572, 576 (1987).