marital privilege in Arizona

1994Just as our courts have construed the marital privilege strictly against non-married couples, see State v. Watkins, 126 Ariz. 293, 298 , 614 P.2d 835, 840 (1980) (marital privileges do not apply to “de facto” or “quasi” marriages), Arizona’s public policy justifies extending the full benefit of the privilege to validly married couples, including couples who are separated.

1994Just as our courts have construed the marital privilege strictly against non-married couples, see State v. Watkins, 126 Ariz. 293, 298 , 614 P.2d 835, 840 (1980) (marital privileges do not apply to “de facto” or “quasi” marriages), Arizona’s public policy justifies extending the full benefit of the privilege to validly married couples, including couples who are separated.

2002Blazek v. Superior Court, 177 Ariz. 535, 537 , 869 P.2d 509, 511 (App.1994); see also State ex rel.

2002Blazek v. Superior Court, 177 Ariz. 535, 537 , 869 P.2d 509, 511 (App.1994); see also State ex rel.

2002Udall v. Superior Court, 183 Ariz. 462, 466 , 904 P.2d 1286, 1290 (App.1995) (abrogation of privileges has “not been narrowly interpreted”). ¶ 13 Nothing in the language of § 13-3620(G), which creates an exception to the marital privilege in cases involving child abuse, expressly limits the meaning of “abuse,” as used in that section, to the definition of abuse in § 8-201(2).

2002Udall v. Superior Court, 183 Ariz. 462, 466 , 904 P.2d 1286, 1290 (App.1995) (abrogation of privileges has “not been narrowly interpreted”). ¶ 13 Nothing in the language of § 13-3620(G), which creates an exception to the marital privilege in cases involving child abuse, expressly limits the meaning of “abuse,” as used in that section, to the definition of abuse in § 8-201(2).

2002State v. Wilson, 200 Ariz. 390, ¶ 4 , 26 P.3d 1161, ¶ 4 (App.2001).

2002State v. Wilson, 200 Ariz. 390, ¶ 4 , 26 P.3d 1161, ¶ 4 (App.2001).

2000In my view, we should not allow a litigant "to use as a sword the protection which *1178 the Legislature awarded them as a shield." Hancock, 186 Ariz. at 419, 924 P.2d at 109 (Martone, J., dissenting from order vacating review as improvidently granted) (quoting Pappas v. Holloway, 114 Wash.2d 198 , 787 P.2d 30, 36 (1990), which followed Hearn ) (other citations omitted).

2000In my view, we should not allow a litigant "to use as a sword the protection which *1178 the Legislature awarded them as a shield." Hancock, 186 Ariz. at 419, 924 P.2d at 109 (Martone, J., dissenting from order vacating review as improvidently granted) (quoting Pappas v. Holloway, 114 Wash.2d 198 , 787 P.2d 30, 36 (1990), which followed Hearn ) (other citations omitted).

2016See Ban v. Quigley, 168 Ariz. 196, 199 , 812 P.2d 1014, 1017 (App. 1990); see also Partanen v. Gallagher, 475 Mass. 632 , 59 N.E.3d 1133, 1141 (2016) (finding that presumptions of paternity “ ‘are driven, not by biological paternity, but by the [Sjtate’s interest in the welfare of the child and the integrity of the family”’), quoting In re Guardianship of Madelyn B., 166 N.H. 453 , 98 A.3d 494 , 500 (2014)( alteration in Partanen); CW v. LV, 788 A.2d 1002, 1005 (Pa. Super.

2016See Ban v. Quigley, 168 Ariz. 196, 199 , 812 P.2d 1014, 1017 (App. 1990); see also Partanen v. Gallagher, 475 Mass. 632 , 59 N.E.3d 1133, 1141 (2016) (finding that presumptions of paternity “ ‘are driven, not by biological paternity, but by the [Sjtate’s interest in the welfare of the child and the integrity of the family”’), quoting In re Guardianship of Madelyn B., 166 N.H. 453 , 98 A.3d 494 , 500 (2014)( alteration in Partanen); CW v. LV, 788 A.2d 1002, 1005 (Pa. Super.

1991See State v. Hunt, 8 Ariz.App. 514 , 447 P.2d 896 (1968).

1991See State v. Hunt, 8 Ariz.App. 514 , 447 P.2d 896 (1968).

2018As our supreme court has recognized, the Arizona Legislature has "made it clear that it places paramount importance on the marital relationship and believes the privilege is necessary to protect that relationship from the strain which would be placed upon it if spouses were allowed to testify against each other." Williams , 133 Ariz. at 232 , 650 P.2d at 1214 ; see also State v. Watkins , 126 Ariz. 293 , 298, 614 P.2d 835 , 840 (1980) ("The anti-marital fact privilege exists by virtue of legislative fiat, as a matter of policy to protect certain interests" involved in the marital relationship.

2018As our supreme court has recognized, the Arizona Legislature has "made it clear that it places paramount importance on the marital relationship and believes the privilege is necessary to protect that relationship from the strain which would be placed upon it if spouses were allowed to testify against each other." Williams , 133 Ariz. at 232 , 650 P.2d at 1214 ; see also State v. Watkins , 126 Ariz. 293 , 298, 614 P.2d 835 , 840 (1980) ("The anti-marital fact privilege exists by virtue of legislative fiat, as a matter of policy to protect certain interests" involved in the marital relationship.

2018As our supreme court has recognized, the Arizona Legislature has "made it clear that it places paramount importance on the marital relationship and believes the privilege is necessary to protect that relationship from the strain which would be placed upon it if spouses were allowed to testify against each other." Williams , 133 Ariz. at 232 , 650 P.2d at 1214 ; see also State v. Watkins , 126 Ariz. 293 , 298, 614 P.2d 835 , 840 (1980) ("The anti-marital fact privilege exists by virtue of legislative fiat, as a matter of policy to protect certain interests" involved in the marital relationship.

2018As our supreme court has recognized, the Arizona Legislature has "made it clear that it places paramount importance on the marital relationship and believes the privilege is necessary to protect that relationship from the strain which would be placed upon it if spouses were allowed to testify against each other." Williams , 133 Ariz. at 232 , 650 P.2d at 1214 ; see also State v. Watkins , 126 Ariz. 293 , 298, 614 P.2d 835 , 840 (1980) ("The anti-marital fact privilege exists by virtue of legislative fiat, as a matter of policy to protect certain interests" involved in the marital relationship.

2017He also asserted violations of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966), and the marital privilege rule.

2016Id. at 634. ¶ 24 The Wisconsin court identified the issue as “whether the actions and inactions of [the mother] and [the putative father] were so unfair as to preclude them from overcoming the public’s interest in the marital presumption” under the Wisconsin statute, which is similar to § 25-814(A)(l).

2016Cf. Soos v. Superior Court, 182 Ariz. 470, 474-75 , 897 P.2d 1356, 1360-61 (App. 1994) (finding A.R.S. § 25-218, which prohibits surrogate parentage contracts, violated equal protection principles insofar as it allowed men to rebut presumption of paternity but did not permit a woman, whose egg had been implanted in the surrogate, to rebut the presumption of maternity). ¶ 20 Here, however, we need not decide how the rebuttal provision in § 25-814(C) applies in a same-sex marriage because we determine Kimberly is estopped from rebutting the presumption.

2016Cf. Soos v. Superior Court, 182 Ariz. 470, 474-75 , 897 P.2d 1356, 1360-61 (App. 1994) (finding A.R.S. § 25-218, which prohibits surrogate parentage contracts, violated equal protection principles insofar as it allowed men to rebut presumption of paternity but did not permit a woman, whose egg had been implanted in the surrogate, to rebut the presumption of maternity). ¶ 20 Here, however, we need not decide how the rebuttal provision in § 25-814(C) applies in a same-sex marriage because we determine Kimberly is estopped from rebutting the presumption.

2016See Ban v. Quigley, 168 Ariz. 196, 199 , 812 P.2d 1014, 1017 (App. 1990); see also Partanen v. Gallagher, 475 Mass. 632 , 59 N.E.3d 1133, 1141 (2016) (finding that presumptions of paternity “ ‘are driven, not by biological paternity, but by the [Sjtate’s interest in the welfare of the child and the integrity of the family”’), quoting In re Guardianship of Madelyn B., 166 N.H. 453 , 98 A.3d 494 , 500 (2014)( alteration in Partanen); CW v. LV, 788 A.2d 1002, 1005 (Pa. Super.

2016See Ban v. Quigley, 168 Ariz. 196, 199 , 812 P.2d 1014, 1017 (App. 1990); see also Partanen v. Gallagher, 475 Mass. 632 , 59 N.E.3d 1133, 1141 (2016) (finding that presumptions of paternity “ ‘are driven, not by biological paternity, but by the [Sjtate’s interest in the welfare of the child and the integrity of the family”’), quoting In re Guardianship of Madelyn B., 166 N.H. 453 , 98 A.3d 494 , 500 (2014)( alteration in Partanen); CW v. LV, 788 A.2d 1002, 1005 (Pa. Super.

2016See Ban v. Quigley, 168 Ariz. 196, 199 , 812 P.2d 1014, 1017 (App. 1990); see also Partanen v. Gallagher, 475 Mass. 632 , 59 N.E.3d 1133, 1141 (2016) (finding that presumptions of paternity “ ‘are driven, not by biological paternity, but by the [Sjtate’s interest in the welfare of the child and the integrity of the family”’), quoting In re Guardianship of Madelyn B., 166 N.H. 453 , 98 A.3d 494 , 500 (2014)( alteration in Partanen); CW v. LV, 788 A.2d 1002, 1005 (Pa. Super.

2016See Ban v. Quigley, 168 Ariz. 196, 199 , 812 P.2d 1014, 1017 (App. 1990); see also Partanen v. Gallagher, 475 Mass. 632 , 59 N.E.3d 1133, 1141 (2016) (finding that presumptions of paternity “ ‘are driven, not by biological paternity, but by the [Sjtate’s interest in the welfare of the child and the integrity of the family”’), quoting In re Guardianship of Madelyn B., 166 N.H. 453 , 98 A.3d 494 , 500 (2014)( alteration in Partanen); CW v. LV, 788 A.2d 1002, 1005 (Pa. Super.

2000In my view, we should not allow a litigant "to use as a sword the protection which *1178 the Legislature awarded them as a shield." Hancock, 186 Ariz. at 419, 924 P.2d at 109 (Martone, J., dissenting from order vacating review as improvidently granted) (quoting Pappas v. Holloway, 114 Wash.2d 198 , 787 P.2d 30, 36 (1990), which followed Hearn ) (other citations omitted).

2000In my view, we should not allow a litigant "to use as a sword the protection which *1178 the Legislature awarded them as a shield." Hancock, 186 Ariz. at 419, 924 P.2d at 109 (Martone, J., dissenting from order vacating review as improvidently granted) (quoting Pappas v. Holloway, 114 Wash.2d 198 , 787 P.2d 30, 36 (1990), which followed Hearn ) (other citations omitted).

1996Compare this case with Rainwater , in which a permanent spousal maintenance award was affirmed, in part, because the parties’ elevated standard of living in the years just prior to divorce was “a product of their sustained common efforts for 23 years.” *54 177 Ariz. at 504 , 869 P.2d at 180 .

1996Compare this case with Rainwater , in which a permanent spousal maintenance award was affirmed, in part, because the parties’ elevated standard of living in the years just prior to divorce was “a product of their sustained common efforts for 23 years.” *54 177 Ariz. at 504 , 869 P.2d at 180 .

1995Delk v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 285 S.W.2d 169, 171 (Ct.App. 1955); In re Vanderbilt, 57 N.Y.2d 66 , 453 N.Y.S.2d 662, 666 , 439 N.E.2d 378, 382 (1982); see Shepherd v. Indiana, 257 Ind. 229 , 277 N.E.2d 165, 167 (1971).

1995Delk v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 285 S.W.2d 169, 171 (Ct.App. 1955); In re Vanderbilt, 57 N.Y.2d 66 , 453 N.Y.S.2d 662, 666 , 439 N.E.2d 378, 382 (1982); see Shepherd v. Indiana, 257 Ind. 229 , 277 N.E.2d 165, 167 (1971).

1995Delk v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 285 S.W.2d 169, 171 (Ct.App. 1955); In re Vanderbilt, 57 N.Y.2d 66 , 453 N.Y.S.2d 662, 666 , 439 N.E.2d 378, 382 (1982); see Shepherd v. Indiana, 257 Ind. 229 , 277 N.E.2d 165, 167 (1971).

1995Delk v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 285 S.W.2d 169, 171 (Ct.App. 1955); In re Vanderbilt, 57 N.Y.2d 66 , 453 N.Y.S.2d 662, 666 , 439 N.E.2d 378, 382 (1982); see Shepherd v. Indiana, 257 Ind. 229 , 277 N.E.2d 165, 167 (1971).

1995See State v. Salzman, 139 Ariz. 521 , 679 P.2d 544 (App. 1984) (holding that the statute was clear and that it applied to the marital privilege broadly and without limitation).

1995See State v. Salzman, 139 Ariz. 521 , 679 P.2d 544 (App. 1984) (holding that the statute was clear and that it applied to the marital privilege broadly and without limitation).

1995Delk v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 285 S.W.2d 169, 171 (Ct.App. 1955); In re Vanderbilt, 57 N.Y.2d 66 , 453 N.Y.S.2d 662, 666 , 439 N.E.2d 378, 382 (1982); see Shepherd v. Indiana, 257 Ind. 229 , 277 N.E.2d 165, 167 (1971).

1995Delk v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 285 S.W.2d 169, 171 (Ct.App. 1955); In re Vanderbilt, 57 N.Y.2d 66 , 453 N.Y.S.2d 662, 666 , 439 N.E.2d 378, 382 (1982); see Shepherd v. Indiana, 257 Ind. 229 , 277 N.E.2d 165, 167 (1971).

1995Finding that the lawsuit placed decedent's mental health in issue, the court ruled that he could not have hidden behind the marital privilege had he lived, so neither could his widow. 422 N.Y.S.2d at 916 , 398 N.E.2d at 522 .

1995Finding that the lawsuit placed decedent's mental health in issue, the court ruled that he could not have hidden behind the marital privilege had he lived, so neither could his widow. 422 N.Y.S.2d at 916 , 398 N.E.2d at 522 .

1982In Arizona, our legislature has chosen to retain the marital privilege despite this court's strong disapproval of the privilege in State v. Whitaker, 112 Ariz. 537, 540 , 544 P.2d 219, 222 (1975).

1982In Arizona, our legislature has chosen to retain the marital privilege despite this court's strong disapproval of the privilege in State v. Whitaker, 112 Ariz. 537, 540 , 544 P.2d 219, 222 (1975).