marital privilege in Michigan

2014Id. at 123 .

2003Accordingly, the prosecutor’s interpretation of the amendment is *602 consistent with the Legislature’s plainly expressed intent. 7 See, generally, Washington v Clevenger, 69 Wash 2d 136, 143; 417 P2d 626 (1966) (emphasizing that a marital privilege is invoked only “when the testimony of the spouse is offered at a trial or hearing” and not, for example, when the marital communication occurs).

2001The Supreme Court, in People v Hamacher, 432 Mich 157, 161-162 ; 438 NW2d 43 (1989), succinctly outlined the difference between these privileges: Section 2162 of the rja provides two distinct privileges.

2001The Supreme Court, in People v Hamacher, 432 Mich 157, 161-162 ; 438 NW2d 43 (1989), succinctly outlined the difference between these privileges: Section 2162 of the rja provides two distinct privileges.

1993In an earlier decision of the Kansas Supreme Court, State v Holt, 223 Kan 34; 574 P2d 152 (1977), the court held that it was error, albeit harmless error, to have admitted a note [20] from the defendant to his wife, left by him in the kitchen of their home and delivered by her to the authorities.

1993In an earlier decision of the Kansas Supreme Court, State v Holt, 223 Kan 34; 574 P2d 152 (1977), the court held that it was error, albeit harmless error, to have admitted a note 20 from the defendant to his wife, left by him in the kitchen of their home and delivered by her to the authorities.

1993On the other hand, a police detective, who interviewed Mary Fisher at the crime scene and obtained her statements, testified for the prosecution regarding the accuracy of the statements contained in the report. [4] The Court of Appeals did not consider the applicability of the marital privilege statute to the second statement, having found that defendant conceded it was made in the presence of a third party, the son of Mary Fisher. 190 Mich 601 .

1993The Court of Appeals did not consider the applicability of the marital privilege statute to the second statement, having found that defendant conceded it was made in the presence of a third party, the son of Mary Fisher. 190 Mich 601 .

1989People v DeWitt, 173 Mich App 261, 265-266 ; 433 NW2d 325 (1988).

1989People v DeWitt, 173 Mich App 261, 265-266 ; 433 NW2d 325 (1988).

1987Affirmed. 1 We note that an early Michigan case, People v Dunnigan, 163 Mich 349 ; 128 NW 180 (1910), found a waiver of the marital privilege where a police informant, entrusted by the defendant to deliver a letter containing a potential confession to the defendant’s wife, instead turned the letter over to the authorities for whom he was secretly working.

1987Affirmed. 1 We note that an early Michigan case, People v Dunnigan, 163 Mich 349 ; 128 NW 180 (1910), found a waiver of the marital privilege where a police informant, entrusted by the defendant to deliver a letter containing a potential confession to the defendant’s wife, instead turned the letter over to the authorities for whom he was secretly working.

1987In People v Garcia, 398 Mich 250, 264-266 ; 247 NW2d 547 (1976), reh den 399 Mich 1041 (1977), the Supreme Court established a bifurcated test for ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

1987In People v Garcia, 398 Mich 250, 264-266 ; 247 NW2d 547 (1976), reh den 399 Mich 1041 (1977), the Supreme Court established a bifurcated test for ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

1985It looks like something fabricated." Robinson, supra, 119-120. [5] In a similar vein, defendants urge that a parallel be drawn between the alleged infringement on the right to be present at trial in their cases and impermissibly intrusions on other rights — e.g., prosecutorial comment on a defendant's exercise of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel held improper, Bruno v Rushen, 721 F2d 1193 (CA 9, 1983), cert den 469 US 920 (1984); People v Meredith, 84 Ill App 3d 1065; 405 NE2d 1306 (1980), testimony that the defendant's refusal to consent to a search held violative of his Fourth Amendment

1985It looks like something fabricated." Robinson, supra, 119-120. [5] In a similar vein, defendants urge that a parallel be drawn between the alleged infringement on the right to be present at trial in their cases and impermissibly intrusions on other rights — e.g., prosecutorial comment on a defendant's exercise of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel held improper, Bruno v Rushen, 721 F2d 1193 (CA 9, 1983), cert den 469 US 920 (1984); People v Meredith, 84 Ill App 3d 1065; 405 NE2d 1306 (1980), testimony that the defendant's refusal to consent to a search held violative of his Fourth Amendment

1985In a similar vein, defendants urge that a parallel be drawn between the alleged infringement on the right to be present at trial in their cases and impermissible intrusions on other rights — e.g., prosecutorial comment on a defendant’s exercise of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel held improper, Bruno v Rushen, 721 F2d 1193 (CA 9, 1983), cert den 469 US 920 (1984); People v Meredith, 84 Ill App 3d 1065; 405 NE2d 1306 (1980), testimony that the defendant’s refusal to consent to a search held violative of his Fourth Amendment rights, People v Stephens, 133 Mich App 294 ; 349 NW2d 162 (1984),

1985In a similar vein, defendants urge that a parallel be drawn between the alleged infringement on the right to be present at trial in their cases and impermissible intrusions on other rights — e.g., prosecutorial comment on a defendant’s exercise of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel held improper, Bruno v Rushen, 721 F2d 1193 (CA 9, 1983), cert den 469 US 920 (1984); People v Meredith, 84 Ill App 3d 1065; 405 NE2d 1306 (1980), testimony that the defendant’s refusal to consent to a search held violative of his Fourth Amendment rights, People v Stephens, 133 Mich App 294 ; 349 NW2d 162 (1984),

1985It looks like something fabricated." Robinson, supra, 119-120. [5] In a similar vein, defendants urge that a parallel be drawn between the alleged infringement on the right to be present at trial in their cases and impermissibly intrusions on other rights — e.g., prosecutorial comment on a defendant's exercise of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel held improper, Bruno v Rushen, 721 F2d 1193 (CA 9, 1983), cert den 469 US 920 (1984); People v Meredith, 84 Ill App 3d 1065; 405 NE2d 1306 (1980), testimony that the defendant's refusal to consent to a search held violative of his Fourth Amendment

1985It looks like something fabricated." Robinson, supra, 119-120. [5] In a similar vein, defendants urge that a parallel be drawn between the alleged infringement on the right to be present at trial in their cases and impermissibly intrusions on other rights — e.g., prosecutorial comment on a defendant's exercise of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel held improper, Bruno v Rushen, 721 F2d 1193 (CA 9, 1983), cert den 469 US 920 (1984); People v Meredith, 84 Ill App 3d 1065; 405 NE2d 1306 (1980), testimony that the defendant's refusal to consent to a search held violative of his Fourth Amendment

1985In a similar vein, defendants urge that a parallel be drawn between the alleged infringement on the right to be present at trial in their cases and impermissible intrusions on other rights — e.g., prosecutorial comment on a defendant’s exercise of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel held improper, Bruno v Rushen, 721 F2d 1193 (CA 9, 1983), cert den 469 US 920 (1984); People v Meredith, 84 Ill App 3d 1065; 405 NE2d 1306 (1980), testimony that the defendant’s refusal to consent to a search held violative of his Fourth Amendment rights, People v Stephens, 133 Mich App 294 ; 349 NW2d 162 (1984),

1985In a similar vein, defendants urge that a parallel be drawn between the alleged infringement on the right to be present at trial in their cases and impermissible intrusions on other rights — e.g., prosecutorial comment on a defendant’s exercise of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel held improper, Bruno v Rushen, 721 F2d 1193 (CA 9, 1983), cert den 469 US 920 (1984); People v Meredith, 84 Ill App 3d 1065; 405 NE2d 1306 (1980), testimony that the defendant’s refusal to consent to a search held violative of his Fourth Amendment rights, People v Stephens, 133 Mich App 294 ; 349 NW2d 162 (1984),

1985It looks like something fabricated." Robinson, supra, 119-120. [5] In a similar vein, defendants urge that a parallel be drawn between the alleged infringement on the right to be present at trial in their cases and impermissibly intrusions on other rights — e.g., prosecutorial comment on a defendant's exercise of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel held improper, Bruno v Rushen, 721 F2d 1193 (CA 9, 1983), cert den 469 US 920 (1984); People v Meredith, 84 Ill App 3d 1065; 405 NE2d 1306 (1980), testimony that the defendant's refusal to consent to a search held violative of his Fourth Amendment

1985In a similar vein, defendants urge that a parallel be drawn between the alleged infringement on the right to be present at trial in their cases and impermissible intrusions on other rights — e.g., prosecutorial comment on a defendant’s exercise of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel held improper, Bruno v Rushen, 721 F2d 1193 (CA 9, 1983), cert den 469 US 920 (1984); People v Meredith, 84 Ill App 3d 1065; 405 NE2d 1306 (1980), testimony that the defendant’s refusal to consent to a search held violative of his Fourth Amendment rights, People v Stephens, 133 Mich App 294 ; 349 NW2d 162 (1984),

1985In a similar vein, defendants urge that a parallel be drawn between the alleged infringement on the right to be present at trial in their cases and impermissible intrusions on other rights — e.g., prosecutorial comment on a defendant’s exercise of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel held improper, Bruno v Rushen, 721 F2d 1193 (CA 9, 1983), cert den 469 US 920 (1984); People v Meredith, 84 Ill App 3d 1065; 405 NE2d 1306 (1980), testimony that the defendant’s refusal to consent to a search held violative of his Fourth Amendment rights, People v Stephens, 133 Mich App 294 ; 349 NW2d 162 (1984),

1985It looks like something fabricated." Robinson, supra, 119-120. [5] In a similar vein, defendants urge that a parallel be drawn between the alleged infringement on the right to be present at trial in their cases and impermissibly intrusions on other rights — e.g., prosecutorial comment on a defendant's exercise of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel held improper, Bruno v Rushen, 721 F2d 1193 (CA 9, 1983), cert den 469 US 920 (1984); People v Meredith, 84 Ill App 3d 1065; 405 NE2d 1306 (1980), testimony that the defendant's refusal to consent to a search held violative of his Fourth Amendment

1985In a similar vein, defendants urge that a parallel be drawn between the alleged infringement on the right to be present at trial in their cases and impermissible intrusions on other rights — e.g., prosecutorial comment on a defendant’s exercise of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel held improper, Bruno v Rushen, 721 F2d 1193 (CA 9, 1983), cert den 469 US 920 (1984); People v Meredith, 84 Ill App 3d 1065; 405 NE2d 1306 (1980), testimony that the defendant’s refusal to consent to a search held violative of his Fourth Amendment rights, People v Stephens, 133 Mich App 294 ; 349 NW2d 162 (1984),

1985It looks like something fabricated." Robinson, supra, 119-120. [5] In a similar vein, defendants urge that a parallel be drawn between the alleged infringement on the right to be present at trial in their cases and impermissibly intrusions on other rights — e.g., prosecutorial comment on a defendant's exercise of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel held improper, Bruno v Rushen, 721 F2d 1193 (CA 9, 1983), cert den 469 US 920 (1984); People v Meredith, 84 Ill App 3d 1065; 405 NE2d 1306 (1980), testimony that the defendant's refusal to consent to a search held violative of his Fourth Amendment

1985In a similar vein, defendants urge that a parallel be drawn between the alleged infringement on the right to be present at trial in their cases and impermissible intrusions on other rights — e.g., prosecutorial comment on a defendant’s exercise of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel held improper, Bruno v Rushen, 721 F2d 1193 (CA 9, 1983), cert den 469 US 920 (1984); People v Meredith, 84 Ill App 3d 1065; 405 NE2d 1306 (1980), testimony that the defendant’s refusal to consent to a search held violative of his Fourth Amendment rights, People v Stephens, 133 Mich App 294 ; 349 NW2d 162 (1984),

1985It looks like something fabricated." Robinson, supra, 119-120. [5] In a similar vein, defendants urge that a parallel be drawn between the alleged infringement on the right to be present at trial in their cases and impermissibly intrusions on other rights — e.g., prosecutorial comment on a defendant's exercise of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel held improper, Bruno v Rushen, 721 F2d 1193 (CA 9, 1983), cert den 469 US 920 (1984); People v Meredith, 84 Ill App 3d 1065; 405 NE2d 1306 (1980), testimony that the defendant's refusal to consent to a search held violative of his Fourth Amendment

1985It looks like something fabricated." Robinson, supra, 119-120. [5] In a similar vein, defendants urge that a parallel be drawn between the alleged infringement on the right to be present at trial in their cases and impermissibly intrusions on other rights — e.g., prosecutorial comment on a defendant's exercise of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel held improper, Bruno v Rushen, 721 F2d 1193 (CA 9, 1983), cert den 469 US 920 (1984); People v Meredith, 84 Ill App 3d 1065; 405 NE2d 1306 (1980), testimony that the defendant's refusal to consent to a search held violative of his Fourth Amendment

1983As the Court ruled in People v Werner, supra, and as appears from the language of the statute, the prosecutor is charged with a duty not to violate the privilege in the absence of defendant’s express consent: "The exclusion of a husband from being a witness against his wife, in this kind of a case, stands as a complete bar, unless she consents, and it constitutes error to compel the defendant in the presence of the jury to assume the attitude of keeping out testimony, only admissible by virtue of her consent.

1983As the Court ruled in People v Werner, supra , and as appears from the language of the statute, the prosecutor is charged with a duty not to violate the privilege in the absence of defendant's express consent: "The exclusion of a husband from being a witness against his wife, in this kind of a case, stands as a complete bar, unless she consents, and it constitutes error to compel the defendant in the presence of the jury to assume the attitude of keeping out testimony, only admissible by virtue of her consent.

1982The marital privilege statute, MCL 600.2162; MSA 27A.2162, provides in pertinent part: "A husband shall not be examined as a witness for or against his wife without her consent; nor a wife for or against her husband without his consent, except * * * where the cause of action grows out of a personal wrong or injury done by one to the other, * * * nor shall either, during the marriage or afterwards, without the *122 consent of both, be examined as to any communication made by one to the other during the marriage * * *.” As noted by this Court in People v Wadkins, 101 Mich App 272 ; 300 NW2d 542

1982The marital privilege statute, MCL 600.2162; MSA 27A.2162, provides in pertinent part: "A husband shall not be examined as a witness for or against his wife without her consent; nor a wife for or against her husband without his consent, except * * * where the cause of action grows out of a personal wrong or injury done by one to the other, * * * nor shall either, during the marriage or afterwards, without the *122 consent of both, be examined as to any communication made by one to the other during the marriage * * *.” As noted by this Court in People v Wadkins, 101 Mich App 272 ; 300 NW2d 542

1981In People v Gessinger, 238 Mich 625 ; 214 NW 184 (1927), the Court held that it was error to admit testimony of the defendant’s ex-wife as to her observations of stolen property while she was married to the defendant.

1981In People v Gessinger, 238 Mich 625 ; 214 NW 184 (1927), the Court held that it was error to admit testimony of the defendant’s ex-wife as to her observations of stolen property while she was married to the defendant.

1975If the prosecution knows when it puts the question that he will claim the privilege, it is charged with notice of the probable effect of his refusal upon the jury’s mind. ” (Emphasis supplied.) McDuff v Detroit Evening Journal Co, 84 Mich 1 ; 47 NW 671 (1890) (improper conduct for counsel to state in the jury’s presence that if his opponent would withdraw his objection to a question counsel could then prove the matter in question); Laird v Laird’s Estate, 127 Mich 24, 27-28 ; 86 NW 436 (1901) (reversible error for plaintiff to call decedent’s wife and challenge defendant to waive the marital p

1975If the prosecution knows when it puts the question that he will claim the privilege, it is charged with notice of the probable effect of his refusal upon the jury’s mind. ” (Emphasis supplied.) McDuff v Detroit Evening Journal Co, 84 Mich 1 ; 47 NW 671 (1890) (improper conduct for counsel to state in the jury’s presence that if his opponent would withdraw his objection to a question counsel could then prove the matter in question); Laird v Laird’s Estate, 127 Mich 24, 27-28 ; 86 NW 436 (1901) (reversible error for plaintiff to call decedent’s wife and challenge defendant to waive the marital p

1975If the prosecution knows when it puts the question that he will claim the privilege, it is charged with notice of the probable effect of his refusal upon the jury’s mind. ” (Emphasis supplied.) McDuff v Detroit Evening Journal Co, 84 Mich 1 ; 47 NW 671 (1890) (improper conduct for counsel to state in the jury’s presence that if his opponent would withdraw his objection to a question counsel could then prove the matter in question); Laird v Laird’s Estate, 127 Mich 24, 27-28 ; 86 NW 436 (1901) (reversible error for plaintiff to call decedent’s wife and challenge defendant to waive the marital p

1975If the prosecution knows when it puts the question that he will claim the privilege, it is charged with notice of the probable effect of his refusal upon the jury’s mind. ” (Emphasis supplied.) McDuff v Detroit Evening Journal Co, 84 Mich 1 ; 47 NW 671 (1890) (improper conduct for counsel to state in the jury’s presence that if his opponent would withdraw his objection to a question counsel could then prove the matter in question); Laird v Laird’s Estate, 127 Mich 24, 27-28 ; 86 NW 436 (1901) (reversible error for plaintiff to call decedent’s wife and challenge defendant to waive the marital p

1975If the prosecution knows when it puts the question that he will claim the privilege, it is charged with notice of the probable effect of his refusal upon the jury’s mind. ” (Emphasis supplied.) McDuff v Detroit Evening Journal Co, 84 Mich 1 ; 47 NW 671 (1890) (improper conduct for counsel to state in the jury’s presence that if his opponent would withdraw his objection to a question counsel could then prove the matter in question); Laird v Laird’s Estate, 127 Mich 24, 27-28 ; 86 NW 436 (1901) (reversible error for plaintiff to call decedent’s wife and challenge defendant to waive the marital p

1975If the prosecution knows when it puts the question that he will claim the privilege, it is charged with notice of the probable effect of his refusal upon the jury’s mind. ” (Emphasis supplied.) McDuff v Detroit Evening Journal Co, 84 Mich 1 ; 47 NW 671 (1890) (improper conduct for counsel to state in the jury’s presence that if his opponent would withdraw his objection to a question counsel could then prove the matter in question); Laird v Laird’s Estate, 127 Mich 24, 27-28 ; 86 NW 436 (1901) (reversible error for plaintiff to call decedent’s wife and challenge defendant to waive the marital p

1965In concluding that the language of the Minnesota wrongful death act giving an action “if the decedent might have maintained an action, had he lived” did not bar plaintiff’s action, the Minnesota court relied upon and quoted from its earlier decision in Shumway v. Nelson (1961), 259 Minn 319, 322, 323 ( 107 NW2d 531 ): “ ‘This clause refers to the facts and circumstances giving rise to the cause of action, as well as any facts or circumstances pertaining to any permissible defenses such as contributory negligence, rather than to the person by whom the action could be maintained. “ ‘This conclus

1965In concluding that the language of the Minnesota wrongful death act giving an action "if the decedent might have maintained an action, had he lived" did not bar plaintiff's action, the Minnesota court relied upon and quoted from its earlier decision in Shumway v. Nelson (1961), 259 Minn 319, 322, 323 ( 107 NW2d 531 ): "`This clause refers to the facts and circumstances giving rise to the cause of action, as well as any facts or circumstances pertaining to any permissible defenses such as contributory negligence, rather than to the person by whom the action could be maintained. "`This conclusio