10 Virginia opinions name it 1 courts 1996–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Thomas v. Thomasgreen2 sentences2004See Thomas v. Thomas, 40 Va. App. 639, 644 , 580 S.E.2d 503, 505 (2003) (“The credibility of the witnesses and the weight accorded the evidence are matters solely for the fact finder who has the opportunity to see and hear that evidence as it is presented.”). 2004See Thomas v. Thomas, 40 Va. App. 639, 644 , 580 S.E.2d 503, 505 (2003) (“The credibility of the witnesses and the weight accorded the evidence are matters solely for the fact finder who has the opportunity to see and hear that evidence as it is presented.”). | 2 | 2 |
Servis v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2013See Servis v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 507, 525 , 371 S.E.2d 156, 165 (1988). 2013See Servis v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 507, 525 , 371 S.E.2d 156, 165 (1988). | 1 | 1 |
Sandoval v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2010“The credibility of the witnesses and the weight accorded the evidence are matters solely for the fact finder who has the opportunity to see and hear that evidence as it is presented.” Sandoval v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 133, 138 , 455 S.E.2d 730, 732 (1995). 2010“The credibility of the witnesses and the weight accorded the evidence are matters solely for the fact finder who has the opportunity to see and hear that evidence as it is presented.” Sandoval v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 133, 138 , 455 S.E.2d 730, 732 (1995). | 1 | 1 |
Cunningham v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2007Appellant’s position is also inconsistent with the principle that, “The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is a personal privilege of the testifying witness and not the defendant who is being tried but is not testifying.” Cunningham v. Commonwealth, 2 Va.App. 358, 367 , 344 S.E.2d 389, 394 (1986) (Benton, J., concurring) (citing Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 , 71 S.Ct. 438, 441 , 95 L.Ed. 344 (1951)). 2007Appellant’s position is also inconsistent with the principle that, “The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is a personal privilege of the testifying witness and not the defendant who is being tried but is not testifying.” Cunningham v. Commonwealth, 2 Va.App. 358, 367 , 344 S.E.2d 389, 394 (1986) (Benton, J., concurring) (citing Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 , 71 S.Ct. 438, 441 , 95 L.Ed. 344 (1951)). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Dolph-Hostettergreen1 sentence2007Id. at 255. | 1 | 1 |
Blackman v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2006Cf. Blackman v. Commonwealth, 45 Va.App. 633, 641 , 613 S.E.2d 460, 464-65 (2005) (applying principle to privilege against self-incrimination). . 2006Cf. Blackman v. Commonwealth, 45 Va.App. 633, 641 , 613 S.E.2d 460, 464-65 (2005) (applying principle to privilege against self-incrimination). . | 1 | 1 |
Cheng v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2006Cf. Blackman v. Commonwealth, 45 Va.App. 633, 641 , 613 S.E.2d 460, 464-65 (2005) (applying principle to privilege against self-incrimination). [6] Gary Pryor also challenges the manner in which the preliminary hearing testimony was read to the jury, which he characterizes as an impermissible "reenactment." Under Virginia law, however, the "manner of the introduction of evidence" involves a core aspect of the trial court's discretion, "`and in the absence of abuse of this discretion resulting in prejudice to [the] defendant's case,' the court's ruling will not be reversed on appeal." Cheng v. 2006Cf. Blackman v. Commonwealth, 45 Va.App. 633, 641 , 613 S.E.2d 460, 464-65 (2005) (applying principle to privilege against self-incrimination). [6] Gary Pryor also challenges the manner in which the preliminary hearing testimony was read to the jury, which he characterizes as an impermissible "reenactment." Under Virginia law, however, the "manner of the introduction of evidence" involves a core aspect of the trial court's discretion, "`and in the absence of abuse of this discretion resulting in prejudice to [the] defendant's case,' the court's ruling will not be reversed on appeal." Cheng v. | 1 | 1 |
Virginian Railway Co. v. Londongreen2 sentences2006Cf. Blackman v. Commonwealth, 45 Va.App. 633, 641 , 613 S.E.2d 460, 464-65 (2005) (applying principle to privilege against self-incrimination). [6] Gary Pryor also challenges the manner in which the preliminary hearing testimony was read to the jury, which he characterizes as an impermissible "reenactment." Under Virginia law, however, the "manner of the introduction of evidence" involves a core aspect of the trial court's discretion, "`and in the absence of abuse of this discretion resulting in prejudice to [the] defendant's case,' the court's ruling will not be reversed on appeal." Cheng v. 2006Cf. Blackman v. Commonwealth, 45 Va.App. 633, 641 , 613 S.E.2d 460, 464-65 (2005) (applying principle to privilege against self-incrimination). [6] Gary Pryor also challenges the manner in which the preliminary hearing testimony was read to the jury, which he characterizes as an impermissible "reenactment." Under Virginia law, however, the "manner of the introduction of evidence" involves a core aspect of the trial court's discretion, "`and in the absence of abuse of this discretion resulting in prejudice to [the] defendant's case,' the court's ruling will not be reversed on appeal." Cheng v. | 1 | 1 |
Dean v. Deangreen2 sentences1999See id. at 17-18 , 396 S.E.2d at 689 ; Dean v. Dean, 8 Va. App. 143, 146 , 379 S.E.2d 742, 744 (1989). "'Where the evidence for and against the presumption are equal the presumption will prevail.'" Lambert v. Lambert, 6 Va. App. 94, 101 , 367 S.E.2d 184, 188 (1988) (quoting Rowe v. Rowe, 144 - 5 - Va. 816, 822, 130 S.E. 771, 772 (1925)). 1999See id. at 17-18 , 396 S.E.2d at 689 ; Dean v. Dean, 8 Va. App. 143, 146 , 379 S.E.2d 742, 744 (1989). "'Where the evidence for and against the presumption are equal the presumption will prevail.'" Lambert v. Lambert, 6 Va. App. 94, 101 , 367 S.E.2d 184, 188 (1988) (quoting Rowe v. Rowe, 144 - 5 - Va. 816, 822, 130 S.E. 771, 772 (1925)). | 1 | 1 |
Lambert v. Lambertgreen2 sentences1999See id. at 17-18 , 396 S.E.2d at 689 ; Dean v. Dean, 8 Va. App. 143, 146 , 379 S.E.2d 742, 744 (1989). "'Where the evidence for and against the presumption are equal the presumption will prevail.'" Lambert v. Lambert, 6 Va. App. 94, 101 , 367 S.E.2d 184, 188 (1988) (quoting Rowe v. Rowe, 144 - 5 - Va. 816, 822, 130 S.E. 771, 772 (1925)). 1999See id. at 17-18 , 396 S.E.2d at 689 ; Dean v. Dean, 8 Va. App. 143, 146 , 379 S.E.2d 742, 744 (1989). "'Where the evidence for and against the presumption are equal the presumption will prevail.'" Lambert v. Lambert, 6 Va. App. 94, 101 , 367 S.E.2d 184, 188 (1988) (quoting Rowe v. Rowe, 144 - 5 - Va. 816, 822, 130 S.E. 771, 772 (1925)). | 1 | 1 |
Rowe v. Rowegreen1 sentence1999See id. at 17-18 , 396 S.E.2d at 689 ; Dean v. Dean, 8 Va. App. 143, 146 , 379 S.E.2d 742, 744 (1989). "'Where the evidence for and against the presumption are equal the presumption will prevail.'" Lambert v. Lambert, 6 Va. App. 94, 101 , 367 S.E.2d 184, 188 (1988) (quoting Rowe v. Rowe, 144 - 5 - Va. 816, 822, 130 S.E. 771, 772 (1925)). | 1 | 1 |
Stainback v. Stainbackgreen2 sentences1999See id. at 17-18 , 396 S.E.2d at 689 ; Dean v. Dean, 8 Va. App. 143, 146 , 379 S.E.2d 742, 744 (1989). "'Where the evidence for and against the presumption are equal the presumption will prevail.'" Lambert v. Lambert, 6 Va. App. 94, 101 , 367 S.E.2d 184, 188 (1988) (quoting Rowe v. Rowe, 144 - 5 - Va. 816, 822, 130 S.E. 771, 772 (1925)). 1999See id. at 17-18 , 396 S.E.2d at 689 ; Dean v. Dean, 8 Va. App. 143, 146 , 379 S.E.2d 742, 744 (1989). "'Where the evidence for and against the presumption are equal the presumption will prevail.'" Lambert v. Lambert, 6 Va. App. 94, 101 , 367 S.E.2d 184, 188 (1988) (quoting Rowe v. Rowe, 144 - 5 - Va. 816, 822, 130 S.E. 771, 772 (1925)). | 1 | 1 |
Grant v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1996In determining whether the marital privilege of Code § 19.2-271.2 applies to information provided in a police investigation, we must first determine the scope of the legislature’s directive that the privilege applies only in a “criminal case.” To do so, we must “view the entire body of legislation and the statutory scheme to determine the ‘true intention of each part.’ In construing statutes, courts should give the fullest possible effect to the legislative intent embodied in the entire statutory enactment.” Virginia Real Estate Bd. v. Clay, 9 Va.App. 152, 157 , 384 S.E.2d 622, 625 (1989) (cit 1996In determining whether the marital privilege of Code § 19.2-271.2 applies to information provided in a police investigation, we must first determine the scope of the legislature’s directive that the privilege applies only in a “criminal case.” To do so, we must “view the entire body of legislation and the statutory scheme to determine the ‘true intention of each part.’ In construing statutes, courts should give the fullest possible effect to the legislative intent embodied in the entire statutory enactment.” Virginia Real Estate Bd. v. Clay, 9 Va.App. 152, 157 , 384 S.E.2d 622, 625 (1989) (cit | 1 | 1 |
Creech v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1996See, e.g., Creech, 242 Va. at 386 , 410 S.E.2d at 651 (trial); Stewart, 219 Va. at 891 , 252 S.E.2d at 332 (trial); *628 Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 764, 767 , 250 S.E.2d 763, 765 (1979) (trial). 1996See, e.g., Creech, 242 Va. at 386 , 410 S.E.2d at 651 (trial); Stewart, 219 Va. at 891 , 252 S.E.2d at 332 (trial); *628 Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 764, 767 , 250 S.E.2d 763, 765 (1979) (trial). | 1 | 1 |
Jenkins v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1996See, e.g., Creech, 242 Va. at 386 , 410 S.E.2d at 651 (trial); Stewart, 219 Va. at 891 , 252 S.E.2d at 332 (trial); *628 Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 764, 767 , 250 S.E.2d 763, 765 (1979) (trial). 1996See, e.g., Creech, 242 Va. at 386 , 410 S.E.2d at 651 (trial); Stewart, 219 Va. at 891 , 252 S.E.2d at 332 (trial); *628 Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 764, 767 , 250 S.E.2d 763, 765 (1979) (trial). | 1 | 1 |
Virginia Real Estate Board v. Claygreen2 sentences1996In determining whether the marital privilege of Code § 19.2-271.2 applies to information provided in a police investigation, we must first determine the scope of the legislature’s directive that the privilege applies only in a “criminal case.” To do so, we must “view the entire body of legislation and the statutory scheme to determine the ‘true intention of each part.’ In construing statutes, courts should give the fullest possible effect to the legislative intent embodied in the entire statutory enactment.” Virginia Real Estate Bd. v. Clay, 9 Va.App. 152, 157 , 384 S.E.2d 622, 625 (1989) (cit 1996In determining whether the marital privilege of Code § 19.2-271.2 applies to information provided in a police investigation, we must first determine the scope of the legislature’s directive that the privilege applies only in a “criminal case.” To do so, we must “view the entire body of legislation and the statutory scheme to determine the ‘true intention of each part.’ In construing statutes, courts should give the fullest possible effect to the legislative intent embodied in the entire statutory enactment.” Virginia Real Estate Bd. v. Clay, 9 Va.App. 152, 157 , 384 S.E.2d 622, 625 (1989) (cit | 1 | 1 |
Stewart v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1996See, e.g., Creech, 242 Va. at 386 , 410 S.E.2d at 651 (trial); Stewart, 219 Va. at 891 , 252 S.E.2d at 332 (trial); *628 Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 764, 767 , 250 S.E.2d 763, 765 (1979) (trial). 1996See, e.g., Creech, 242 Va. at 386 , 410 S.E.2d at 651 (trial); Stewart, 219 Va. at 891 , 252 S.E.2d at 332 (trial); *628 Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 764, 767 , 250 S.E.2d 763, 765 (1979) (trial). | 1 | 1 |
Virginia Beach v. BOARD OF SUP'RSgreen1 sentence1996In determining whether the marital privilege of Code § 19.2-271.2 applies to information provided in a police investigation, we must first determine the scope of the legislature’s directive that the privilege applies only in a “criminal case.” To do so, we must “view the entire body of legislation and the statutory scheme to determine the ‘true intention of each part.’ In construing statutes, courts should give the fullest possible effect to the legislative intent embodied in the entire statutory enactment.” Virginia Real Estate Bd. v. Clay, 9 Va.App. 152, 157 , 384 S.E.2d 622, 625 (1989) (cit | 1 | 1 |
Arnold v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1996“On appeal, the burden is on appellant to show, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, that the denial of the motion to suppress constituted reversible error.” Arnold v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 313, 317 , 437 S.E.2d 235, 238 (1993). 1996“On appeal, the burden is on appellant to show, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, that the denial of the motion to suppress constituted reversible error.” Arnold v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 313, 317 , 437 S.E.2d 235, 238 (1993). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Crawford v. Washington
green
2 sentences2016Id. at 40-41 , 124 S.Ct. at 1357-58 . 2016Id. at 40-41 , 124 S.Ct. at 1357-58 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Dietz v. Dietz
green
2 sentences2013Furthermore this Court “will not search the record for errors in order to interpret the appellant’s 1 While wife argued husband never testified that the CDs were his separate property, it is clear from his testimony that he considered them as such. 2 While the exhibit indicates that CDs were acquired after the final separation, neither party argues that the marital presumption does not apply pursuant to Dietz v. Dietz, 17 Va. App. 203 , 436 S.E.2d 463 (1993), and we will not raise the issue sua sponte. 2013Furthermore this Court “will not search the record for errors in order to interpret the appellant’s 1 While wife argued husband never testified that the CDs were his separate property, it is clear from his testimony that he considered them as such. 2 While the exhibit indicates that CDs were acquired after the final separation, neither party argues that the marital presumption does not apply pursuant to Dietz v. Dietz, 17 Va. App. 203 , 436 S.E.2d 463 (1993), and we will not raise the issue sua sponte. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Fitzgerald v. Bass
green
2 sentences2013Nor is it this Court’s “function to comb through the record . . . in order to ferret-out for ourselves the validity of [appellant’s] claims.” Fitzgerald v. Bass, 6 Va. App. 38 , 56 n.7, 366 S.E.2d 615 , 625 n.7 (1988) (en banc). 2013Nor is it this Court’s “function to comb through the record . . . in order to ferret-out for ourselves the validity of [appellant’s] claims.” Fitzgerald v. Bass, 6 Va. App. 38 , 56 n.7, 366 S.E.2d 615 , 625 n.7 (1988) (en banc). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Taylor v. Taylor
green
2 sentences2009Husband further testified that his separate wealth was the parties’ primary source of income during their marriage. 6 Wife points to Taylor v. Taylor, 9 Va. App. 341 , 387 S.E.2d 797 (1990), in support of her contention that husband’s bare testimony is insufficient to rebut the marital presumption. 2009Husband further testified that his separate wealth was the parties’ primary source of income during their marriage. 6 Wife points to Taylor v. Taylor, 9 Va. App. 341 , 387 S.E.2d 797 (1990), in support of her contention that husband’s bare testimony is insufficient to rebut the marital presumption. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Calder v. Bull
green
1 sentence2007Calder, 3 U.S. at 390 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Rogers v. United States
green
2 sentences2007Appellant’s position is also inconsistent with the principle that, “The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is a personal privilege of the testifying witness and not the defendant who is being tried but is not testifying.” Cunningham v. Commonwealth, 2 Va.App. 358, 367 , 344 S.E.2d 389, 394 (1986) (Benton, J., concurring) (citing Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 , 71 S.Ct. 438, 441 , 95 L.Ed. 344 (1951)). 2007Appellant’s position is also inconsistent with the principle that, “The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is a personal privilege of the testifying witness and not the defendant who is being tried but is not testifying.” Cunningham v. Commonwealth, 2 Va.App. 358, 367 , 344 S.E.2d 389, 394 (1986) (Benton, J., concurring) (citing Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 , 71 S.Ct. 438, 441 , 95 L.Ed. 344 (1951)). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Trammel v. United States
green
2 sentences1996In determining whether the marital privilege of Code § 19.2-271.2 applies to information provided in a police investigation, we must first determine the scope of the legislature’s directive that the privilege applies only in a “criminal case.” To do so, we must “view the entire body of legislation and the statutory scheme to determine the ‘true intention of each part.’ In construing statutes, courts should give the fullest possible effect to the legislative intent embodied in the entire statutory enactment.” Virginia Real Estate Bd. v. Clay, 9 Va.App. 152, 157 , 384 S.E.2d 622, 625 (1989) (cit 1996In determining whether the marital privilege of Code § 19.2-271.2 applies to information provided in a police investigation, we must first determine the scope of the legislature’s directive that the privilege applies only in a “criminal case.” To do so, we must “view the entire body of legislation and the statutory scheme to determine the ‘true intention of each part.’ In construing statutes, courts should give the fullest possible effect to the legislative intent embodied in the entire statutory enactment.” Virginia Real Estate Bd. v. Clay, 9 Va.App. 152, 157 , 384 S.E.2d 622, 625 (1989) (cit | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Brown v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence1996In determining whether the marital privilege of Code § 19.2-271.2 applies to information provided in a police investigation, we must first determine the scope of the legislature’s directive that the privilege applies only in a “criminal case.” To do so, we must “view the entire body of legislation and the statutory scheme to determine the ‘true intention of each part.’ In construing statutes, courts should give the fullest possible effect to the legislative intent embodied in the entire statutory enactment.” Virginia Real Estate Bd. v. Clay, 9 Va.App. 152, 157 , 384 S.E.2d 622, 625 (1989) (cit | 1 | 1996–1996 |
City of Virginia Beach v. Board of Supervisors of Mecklenburg County
green
1 sentence1996In determining whether the marital privilege of Code § 19.2-271.2 applies to information provided in a police investigation, we must first determine the scope of the legislature’s directive that the privilege applies only in a “criminal case.” To do so, we must “view the entire body of legislation and the statutory scheme to determine the ‘true intention of each part.’ In construing statutes, courts should give the fullest possible effect to the legislative intent embodied in the entire statutory enactment.” Virginia Real Estate Bd. v. Clay, 9 Va.App. 152, 157 , 384 S.E.2d 622, 625 (1989) (cit | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.