7 Maine opinions name it 1 courts 1971–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kaye v. Kayegreen2 sentences2022Id. (examining the predecessor statute to 19-A M.R.S. § 953). 2001See 19-A M.R.S.A. § 953(2)(C); see also Kaye v. Kaye, 538 A.2d 288, 289 (Me.1988) ("In the absence of a judicially sanctioned separation, the parties’ agreement to a de facto separation does not prevent the marital presumption from attaching to subsequently acquired property.”). 11 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Bennergreen2 sentences1990Further, the privilege can be invoked only when the communication was made while acting “in reliance upon an expectancy, reasonable under all the circumstances” that the communication “will be transmitted only to the spouse and to no other person...." State v. Benner, 284 A.2d 91, 109 (Me.1971) (emphasis in original). 1990Further, the privilege can be invoked only when the communication was made while acting "in reliance upon an expectancy, reasonable under all the circumstances" that the communication "will be transmitted only to the spouse and to no other person...." State v. Benner, 284 A.2d 91, 109 (Me.1971) (emphasis in original). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Dechainegreen1 sentence1994See State v. Dechaine, 572 A.2d 130, 133 (Me.1990) (explaining abuse of discretion standard as applied to the admissibility of evidence). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Ahmed
green
1 sentence2010P. 52(a); State v. Rega, 2005 ME 5, ¶ 19 , 863 A.2d 917, 928 ; and, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the court could rationally have found each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, see Ahmed, 2006 ME 138, ¶ 21 , 909 A.2d at 1019 ; 17-A M.R.S. § 703(1)(A). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Estate of Silsby
neutral
1 sentence2010P. 52(a); State v. Rega, 2005 ME 5, ¶ 19 , 863 A.2d 917, 928 ; and, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the court could rationally have found each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, see Ahmed, 2006 ME 138, ¶ 21 , 909 A.2d at 1019 ; 17-A M.R.S. § 703(1)(A). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Rega
green
2 sentences2010P. 52(a); State v. Rega, 2005 ME 5, ¶ 19 , 863 A.2d 917, 928 ; and, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the court could rationally have found each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, see Ahmed, 2006 ME 138, ¶ 21 , 909 A.2d at 1019 ; 17-A M.R.S. § 703(1)(A). 2010P. 52(a); State v. Rega, 2005 ME 5, ¶ 19 , 863 A.2d 917, 928 ; and, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the court could rationally have found each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, see Ahmed, 2006 ME 138, ¶ 21 , 909 A.2d at 1019 ; 17-A M.R.S. § 703(1)(A). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Cummings v. Cummings
green
1 sentence2001Cummings, 540 A.2d at 780 . 10 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Holyoke v. Estate of Holyoke
green
2 sentences1990We have previously stated that the marital privilege “is based upon the necessity of preserving the confidence which must exist in order to create and maintain mutual happy relations...” and does not apply to couples who are separated with “the one making the communication [being] actively hostile to the other, and ... known to be so.” Holyoke v. Estate of Holyoke, 110 Me. 469, 474 , 87 A. 40 (1913). 1990We have previously stated that the marital privilege “is based upon the necessity of preserving the confidence which must exist in order to create and maintain mutual happy relations...” and does not apply to couples who are separated with “the one making the communication [being] actively hostile to the other, and ... known to be so.” Holyoke v. Estate of Holyoke, 110 Me. 469, 474 , 87 A. 40 (1913). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Wolfle v. United States
green
2 sentences1978As with other privileges, the marital privilege “suppresses relevant testimony, and should be allowed only when it is plain that marital confidence cannot otherwise reasonably be preserved.” Wolfle v. United States, supra, 291 U.S. at 17 , 54 S.Ct. at 281 . 1978As with other privileges, the marital privilege “suppresses relevant testimony, and should be allowed only when it is plain that marital confidence cannot otherwise reasonably be preserved.” Wolfle v. United States, supra, 291 U.S. at 17 , 54 S.Ct. at 281 . | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Walker v. Sanborn
green
2 sentences1971In any event, (1) the omission of the Court in its analysis to suggest the existence, in relation to criminal proceedings, of a privilege arising from the marital relationship (such as fifteen years previously, the Court, in Walker v. Sanborn, supra, had taken pains to mention as to civil proceedings) and (2) the express focus upon the nature of criminal proceedings as requiring “all possible constitutional means to ferret out and punish crime” — (language which has so strong a tendency to import a conclusion that any protection afforded by a marital privilege created by the common law but not 1971It was this factor of confidentiality in the marriage relationship, and the need to foster and preserve it, to which the Court made reference in Walker v. Sanborn, supra, when it spoke of “confidential communications, and whatever has come to the knowledge of either by means of the confidence which the relation inspires,” (p. 472) (emphasis supplied) ; and upon which the Court in Holyoke v. Estate of Holyoke, supra, premised the privilege as being “based upon the necessity of preserving the confidence which must exist in order to *108 * * * fulfill the purposes of marriage, * * * ” (110 Me. p. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
State v. Black
green
1 sentence1971It was this factor of confidentiality in the marriage relationship, and the need to foster and preserve it, to which the Court made reference in Walker v. Sanborn, supra, when it spoke of “confidential communications, and whatever has come to the knowledge of either by means of the confidence which the relation inspires,” (p. 472) (emphasis supplied) ; and upon which the Court in Holyoke v. Estate of Holyoke, supra, premised the privilege as being “based upon the necessity of preserving the confidence which must exist in order to *108 * * * fulfill the purposes of marriage, * * * ” (110 Me. p. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Bond v. Bond
green
2 sentences1971The issue seems to have been finally settled as to civil proceedings when this Court decided Bond v. Bond, 127 Me. 117 , 141 A. 833 (1928). 1971The issue seems to have been finally settled as to civil proceedings when this Court decided Bond v. Bond, 127 Me. 117 , 141 A. 833 (1928). | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.