marital privilege in Illinois

2021People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 334-35 (2000). ¶ 89 Defendant concedes that her trial counsel did not invoke the marital privilege during Rick’s testimony, and thus, she has not preserved her challenge to the admissibility of the statements.

2020People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 334-35 (2000). ¶ 89 Defendant concedes that her trial counsel did not invoke the marital privilege during Rick’s testimony, and thus, she has not preserved her challenge to the admissibility of the statements.

2021Specific to third persons being children, our supreme court has expressly denied expanding the marital privilege to protect instances where spouses make statements in the presence of their children “unless they are too young to understand what is being said.” People v. Sanders, 99 Ill. 2d 262, 268-69 (1983).

2020Specific to third persons being children, our supreme court has expressly denied expanding the marital privilege to protect instances where spouses make statements in the presence of their children “unless they are too young to understand what is being said.” People v. Sanders, 99 Ill. 2d 262, 268-69 (1983).

2014But, after viewing Nilsen's videotaped statement to the police, the trial court held the jury would not be allowed to see it. ¶ 10 While the original opinion of this court did not address evidence of Trzeciak's prior domestic violence, the supreme court, after recognizing that Trzeciak's motion to exclude evidence of the prior domestic violence was not based on the marital privilege, nevertheless held that Trzeciak's conduct (which took place in April 2004) "need not have been barred by the marital privilege." People v. Trzeciak, 2013 IL 114491, ¶ 48 . ¶ 11 Later, the State moved to bar the de

2014But, after viewing Nilsen's videotaped statement to the police, the trial court held the jury would not be allowed to see it. ¶ 10 While the original opinion of this court did not address evidence of Trzeciak's prior domestic violence, the supreme court, after recognizing that Trzeciak's motion to exclude evidence of the prior domestic violence was not based on the marital privilege, nevertheless held that Trzeciak's conduct (which took place in April 2004) "need not have been barred by the marital privilege." People v. Trzeciak, 2013 IL 114491, ¶ 48 . ¶ 11 Later, the State moved to bar the de

2016See id. (“Once a spouse has committed an abusive act against a child, the damage to marital harmony has already been done.”).

2016See id. (“Once a spouse has committed an abusive act against a child, the damage to marital harmony has already been done.”).

2014This separate motion did not seek exclusion of this evidence based on the marital privilege but, rather, because such evidence constituted improper evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts (see People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 146 (1998); see also Ill.

2014This separate motion did not seek exclusion of this evidence based on the marital privilege but, rather, because such evidence constituted improper evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts (see People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 146 (1998); see also Ill.

2010The appellate court rejected the State's request to create a new exception to the marital privilege, finding that the exception had never been adopted in Illinois, that the marital privilege statute did not enunciate such an exception, and that the argument was explicitly rejected in People v. Krankel, 105 Ill.

2010The appellate court rejected the State’s request to create a new exception to the marital privilege, finding that the exception had never been adopted in Illinois, that the marital privilege statute did not enunciate such an exception, and that the argument was explicitly rejected in People v. Krankel, 105 Ill.

2021See Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 49 .

2020See Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 49 .

2020We also rejected the State’s - 16 - 2020 IL App (2d) 190412 arguments that (1) section 115-16 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/115-16 (West 2016)) bars spousal testimony, not communications themselves (Gliniewicz I, 2018 IL App (2d) 170490, ¶¶ 5, 33 ); (2) the text messages were admissible under the third-party exception (Gliniewicz I, 2018 IL App (2d) 170490, ¶ 37 , citing Simpson, 68 Ill. 2d at 280 ); (3) the marital communications between defendant and Joe were admissible under the joint-criminal-enterprise exception (id. ¶ 38); and (4) the “agency” exception to the marital privilege should be expan

2020We also rejected the State’s - 16 - 2020 IL App (2d) 190412 arguments that (1) section 115-16 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/115-16 (West 2016)) bars spousal testimony, not communications themselves (Gliniewicz I, 2018 IL App (2d) 170490, ¶¶ 5, 33 ); (2) the text messages were admissible under the third-party exception (Gliniewicz I, 2018 IL App (2d) 170490, ¶ 37 , citing Simpson, 68 Ill. 2d at 280 ); (3) the marital communications between defendant and Joe were admissible under the joint-criminal-enterprise exception (id. ¶ 38); and (4) the “agency” exception to the marital privilege should be expan

2016See Dhillon, 2014 IL App (3d) 130653, ¶ 25 (“because account 4863 was opened during the marriage, the marital presumption clearly applied to the account and to the funds therein”).

2016See Dhillon, 2014 IL App (3d) 130653, ¶ 25 (“because account 4863 was opened during the marriage, the marital presumption clearly applied to the account and to the funds therein”).

2014See In re Marriage of Hagshenas, 234 Ill.

2014See In re Marriage of Hagshenas, 234 Ill.

2014App. Div. 1995) (“It has long been held that it is not appropriate for a trial court [for purposes of applying the marital privilege] to have to determine whether a marital relationship is genuine or viable ***.”); Jackson v. State, 603 So. 2d 670, 671 (Fla. Dist.

2014App. Div. 1995) (“It has long been held that it is not appropriate for a trial court [for purposes of applying the marital privilege] to have to determine whether a marital relationship is genuine or viable ***.”); Jackson v. State, 603 So. 2d 670, 671 (Fla. Dist.

2014Ct. App. 1992) (per curiam) (“The courts will not engage in an after-the-fact analysis of whether a statement is ‘incidental to’ or ‘because of’ the marital relationship, because a married couple, and each of them, should be secure in the knowledge that their private communications are exactly that—private.”); United States v. Sims, 755 F.2d 1239 , 1243 n.3 (6th Cir. 1985) (“We do not believe that courts can or should assess the social worthiness of particular marriages or the need of particular marriages for the protection of the privilege.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)); United States

2014Ct. App. 1992) (per curiam) (“The courts will not engage in an after-the-fact analysis of whether a statement is ‘incidental to’ or ‘because of’ the marital relationship, because a married couple, and each of them, should be secure in the knowledge that their private communications are exactly that—private.”); United States v. Sims, 755 F.2d 1239 , 1243 n.3 (6th Cir. 1985) (“We do not believe that - 19 - courts can or should assess the social worthiness of particular marriages or the need of particular marriages for the protection of the privilege.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)); United

2014Ct. App. 1992) (per curiam) (“The courts will not engage in an after-the-fact analysis of whether a statement is ‘incidental to’ or ‘because of’ the marital relationship, because a married couple, and each of them, should be secure in the knowledge that their private communications are exactly that—private.”); United States v. Sims, 755 F.2d 1239 , 1243 n.3 (6th Cir. 1985) (“We do not believe that courts can or should assess the social worthiness of particular marriages or the need of particular marriages for the protection of the privilege.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)); United States

2014Ct. App. 1992) (per curiam) (“The courts will not engage in an after-the-fact analysis of whether a statement is ‘incidental to’ or ‘because of’ the marital relationship, because a married couple, and each of them, should be secure in the knowledge that their private communications are exactly that—private.”); United States v. Sims, 755 F.2d 1239 , 1243 n.3 (6th Cir. 1985) (“We do not believe that - 19 - courts can or should assess the social worthiness of particular marriages or the need of particular marriages for the protection of the privilege.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)); United

2014Ct. App. 1992) (per curiam) (“The courts will not engage in an after-the-fact analysis of whether a statement is ‘incidental to’ or ‘because of’ the marital relationship, because a married couple, and each of them, should be secure in the knowledge that their private communications are exactly that—private.”); United States v. Sims, 755 F.2d 1239 , 1243 n.3 (6th Cir. 1985) (“We do not believe that courts can or should assess the social worthiness of particular marriages or the need of particular marriages for the protection of the privilege.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)); United States

2014Ct. App. 1992) (per curiam) (“The courts will not engage in an after-the-fact analysis of whether a statement is ‘incidental to’ or ‘because of’ the marital relationship, because a married couple, and each of them, should be secure in the knowledge that their private communications are exactly that—private.”); United States v. Sims, 755 F.2d 1239 , 1243 n.3 (6th Cir. 1985) (“We do not believe that - 19 - courts can or should assess the social worthiness of particular marriages or the need of particular marriages for the protection of the privilege.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)); United

2010People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 178-79 (2005); see Hall, 194 Ill. 2d at 335 (admission of evidence in violation of the marital privilege does not affect the fundamental fairness of a defendant's trial).

2010People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 178-79 (2005); see Hall, 194 Ill. 2d at 335 (admission of evidence in violation of the marital privilege does not affect the fundamental fairness of a defendant’s trial).

2011J.S.A. v. M.H., 343 Ill.App.3d 217, 220 , 278 Ill.Dec. 110 , 797 N.E.2d 705, 708 (2003).

2011J.S.A. v. M.H., 343 Ill.App.3d 217, 220 , 278 Ill.Dec. 110 , 797 N.E.2d 705, 708 (2003).