marital privilege in Texas

2022As the majority observes, Treto found that applying the marital presumption to spouses in same-sex marriages not only satisfies Pavan’s requirement of placing such spouses on equal footing with spouses in opposite- sex marriages, but it also satisfies the policies of this state in promoting family stability and in 6 protecting the interests of children through the enforcement of child support obligations.3 Id. at 401 (citing In re J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189, 195 (Tex. 1994)(discussing the history of the marital presumption)); Williams v. Patton, 821 S.W.2d 141, 145 (Tex. 1991)(recognizing that it

2020See e.g., LC v. MG, 430 P.3d 400, 409 (Haw. 2018) (holding that wife of a child’s mother was presumed to be a legal parent of a child born during same-sex marriage pursuant to marital presumption under the UPA); Partanen v. Gallagher, 59 N.E.3d 1133, 1137 (Mass. 2016); In re Guardianship of Madelyn B., 98 A.3d 494 , 499 (N.H. 2014); Frazier v. Goudschaal, 295 P.3d 542, 547 (Kan. 2013) (holding the Kansas UPA allowed presumed parent status on same terms as presumed father); Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 665 (Cal. 2005) (holding that a woman was a presumed mother under the UPA provis

2007In Ludwig , the court construed the old Texas Rule of *615 Criminal Evidence 504’s suspension of the marital privilege when “an accused is charged with a crime against the person of any minor child or any member of the household of either spouse.” Id. at 240 n. 4; see also Tex.R.CRIm.

2004Id.

1996See Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186 , 107 S.Ct. 1714 , 95 L.Ed.2d 162 (1987); Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 , 107 S.Ct. 1702 , 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 , 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968).

1996See Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186 , 107 S.Ct. 1714 , 95 L.Ed.2d 162 (1987); Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 , 107 S.Ct. 1702 , 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 , 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968).

1996The court of appeals wrote: "We understand the exception contained in Rule 504(1)(d)(2) to expand the number of cases involving crimes against children in which an accused will not be permitted to invoke a marital privilege and prevent the jury from hearing otherwise relevant testimony." Ludwig v. State, 872 S.W.2d at 775 .

1996The court of appeals wrote: “We understand the exception contained in Rule 504(l)(d)(2) to expand the number of cases involving crimes against children in which an accused will not be permitted to invoke a marital privilege and prevent the jury from hearing otherwise relevant testimony.” Ludwig v. State, 872 S.W.2d at 775 .

1996See Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186 , 107 S.Ct. 1714 , 95 L.Ed.2d 162 (1987); Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 , 107 S.Ct. 1702 , 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 , 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968).

1996See Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186 , 107 S.Ct. 1714 , 95 L.Ed.2d 162 (1987); Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 , 107 S.Ct. 1702 , 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 , 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968).

1994See Clark v. Clark, 643 S.W.2d 795 (Tex.App.— Fort Worth 1982, no writ); Magana v. Magana, 576 S.W.2d 131 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1978, no writ).

1994See Clark v. Clark, 643 S.W.2d 795 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1982, no writ); Magana v. Magana, 576 S.W.2d 131 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1978, no writ).

1994Ludwig's pro-se brief states that Johnson v. State, 803 S.W.2d 272 (Tex.Crim.App. *775 1990), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2914 , 115 L.Ed.2d 1078 (1991), "upholds every aspect and nuance of this privilege." [3] However, Johnson holds that the state may not ordinarily call a spouse to testify when it knows that the spouse will invoke the marital privilege and that the state should not be permitted to cross-examine a spouse on irrelevant matters at a suppression hearing.

1994Ludwig’s pro-se brief states that Johnson v. State, 803 S.W.2d 272 (Tex.Crim.App.1990), ce rt. denied, — U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2914 , 115 L.Ed.2d 1078 (1991), “upholds every aspect and nuance of this privilege.” 3 However, Johnson holds that the state may not ordinarily call a spouse to testify when it knows that the spouse will invoke the marital privilege and that the state should not be permitted to cross-examine a spouse on irrelevant matters at a suppression hearing.

1988For other cases holding that the marital privilege does not apply to written communication in the hands of third parties see Dickerson v. United States, 65 F.2d 824 (D.C.Cir.1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 665 , 54 S.Ct. 89 , 78 L.Ed. 575 (1933) (Letter normally considered a privileged confidential communication between a husband and wife lost its privileged character and was admissible as evidence after coming into the hands of the prosecution through a third party.); People v. Peak, 66 Cal.App.2d 894, 153 P.2d 464 (1944) (Third person who obtained a letter without the connivance of a spouse co

1988For other cases holding that the marital privilege does not apply to written communication in the hands of third parties see Dickerson v. United States, 65 F.2d 824 (D.C.Cir.1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 665 , 54 S.Ct. 89 , 78 L.Ed. 575 (1933) (Letter normally considered a privileged confidential communication between a husband and wife lost its privileged character and was admissible as evidence after coming into the hands of the prosecution through a third party.); People v. Peak, 66 Cal.App.2d 894, 153 P.2d 464 (1944) (Third person who obtained a letter without the connivance of a spouse co

1988It was concluded that “the marital privilege is to protect the confidential relationship between husband and wife.” Myers, supra, 640 P.2d at 1249 .

1988Court analogized a written communication between husband and wife falling into the hands of a third party as being similar *201 to a conversation between spouses being overheard by a third party.); State v. Wilkins, 72 Or. 77 , 142 P. 589 (1914) (Court stated that the statutes directed against the examination of either spouse as a witness were distinguishable from die admission of communications between the spouses as derived from independent sources.

1988Court analogized a written communication between husband and wife falling into the hands of a third party as being similar *201 to a conversation between spouses being overheard by a third party.); State v. Wilkins, 72 Or. 77 , 142 P. 589 (1914) (Court stated that the statutes directed against the examination of either spouse as a witness were distinguishable from die admission of communications between the spouses as derived from independent sources.

1988For other cases holding that the marital privilege does not apply to written communication in the hands of third parties see Dickerson v. United States, 65 F.2d 824 (D.C.Cir.1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 665 , 54 S.Ct. 89 , 78 L.Ed. 575 (1933) (Letter normally considered a privileged confidential communication between a husband and wife lost its privileged character and was admissible as evidence after coming into the hands of the prosecution through a third party.); People v. Peak, 66 Cal.App.2d 894, 153 P.2d 464 (1944) (Third person who obtained a letter without the connivance of a spouse co

1988For other cases holding that the marital privilege does not apply to written communication in the hands of third parties see Dickerson v. United States, 65 F.2d 824 (D.C.Cir.1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 665 , 54 S.Ct. 89 , 78 L.Ed. 575 (1933) (Letter normally considered a privileged confidential communication between a husband and wife lost its privileged character and was admissible as evidence after coming into the hands of the prosecution through a third party.); People v. Peak, 66 Cal.App.2d 894, 153 P.2d 464 (1944) (Third person who obtained a letter without the connivance of a spouse co

1988For other cases holding that the marital privilege does not apply to written communication in the hands of third parties see Dickerson v. United States, 65 F.2d 824 (D.C.Cir.1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 665 , 54 S.Ct. 89 , 78 L.Ed. 575 (1933) (Letter normally considered a privileged confidential communication between a husband and wife lost its privileged character and was admissible as evidence after coming into the hands of the prosecution through a third party.); People v. Peak, 66 Cal.App.2d 894, 153 P.2d 464 (1944) (Third person who obtained a letter without the connivance of a spouse co

1985Robinson v. State, 487 S.W.2d 757 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Bear v. State, 612 S.W.2d 931 (Tex.Cr.App.1981).

1972Mat-lock v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 373 S.W.2d 237 ; Morris v. State, 150 Tex.Cr.R. 58 , 198 S.W.2d 901 .

1972Mat-lock v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 373 S.W.2d 237 ; Morris v. State, 150 Tex.Cr.R. 58 , 198 S.W.2d 901 .