marital presumption in North Carolina

2021App. 369, 372 , 536 S.E.2d 642, 645 (2000) (holding the trial court considered the parties’ marital standard of living when it “made explicit findings as to the parties’ respective incomes during the marriage, the type of home in which they lived, and the types of family vacations they enjoyed”); see also Adams v. Adams, 92 N.C.

2021App. 369, 372 , 536 S.E.2d 642, 645 (2000) (holding the trial court considered the parties’ marital standard of living when it “made explicit findings as to the parties’ respective incomes during the marriage, the type of home in which they lived, and the types of family vacations they enjoyed”); see also Adams v. Adams, 92 N.C.

2021App. 369, 372 , 536 S.E.2d 642, 645 (2000) (holding the trial court considered the parties’ marital standard of living when it “made explicit findings as to the parties’ respective incomes during the marriage, the type of home in which they lived, and the types of family vacations they enjoyed”); see also Adams v. Adams, 92 N.C.

2021App. 369, 372 , 536 S.E.2d 642, 645 (2000) (holding the trial court considered the parties’ marital standard of living when it “made explicit findings as to the parties’ respective incomes during the marriage, the type of home in which they lived, and the types of family vacations they enjoyed”); see also Adams v. Adams, 92 N.C.

2021App. 495, 506 , 715 S.E.2d 308, 316 (2011) (“Yet, arguably the only evidence which could potentially support findings of fact to rebut the marital presumption is plaintiff’s testimony as to her intent.

2021App. 495, 506 , 715 S.E.2d 308, 316 (2011) (“Yet, arguably the only evidence which could potentially support findings of fact to rebut the marital presumption is plaintiff’s testimony as to her intent.

2000Noting the marital presumption regarding children born during a marriage, the Court said, “North Carolina courts have long recognized that children bom during a marriage, as here, are presumed to be the product of the marriage.” Id. at 439 , 466 S.E.2d at 723 (citations omitted).

2000While recognizing that this marital presumption is “ordinarily” rebuttable by evidence of a blood test, the Court stated, “in the context of a custody dispute between the mother, and her husband or former spouse, concerning a child bom during their lawful marriage, the marital presumption is rebut-table only upon a showing that another man has formally acknowledged paternity . ...” Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

2008Id. at 552-53 , 608 S.E.2d at 96 .

2008Id. at 552-53 , 608 S.E.2d at 96 .

2023See Atkins, 102 N.C.

2016The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant's conviction for third-degree sodomy, stating that the trial court did not err in applying KRS 620.050(2) (Kentucky's statute abrogating both the professional-client/patient privilege and the marital privilege in cases of dependent, neglected, or abused children) in a criminal prosecution, stating the statute "declares that the husband and wife privilege is inapplicable in a criminal proceeding regarding a dependent, neglected or abused child." Id. (emphasis added).

2016Furthermore, the North Carolina Juvenile Code: Practice and Procedure 's interpretation of North Carolina's statute abrogating the marital privilege in cases of child abuse, N.C.G.S. § 8-57.1, seems to support a similar policy to the one enunciated in Mullins , namely that "[t]he marital privilege is subordinate or inferior to the right of a child to be free from sexual abuses." 956 S.W.2d at 212 .

2016Id. at 212 (internal citations omitted); see Kays v. Commonwealth , 505 S.W.3d 260 , ----, NO. 2014-CA-001924-MR, 2016 WL 5956995 , at *8 (Ky. Oct. 14, 2016) (citing Mullins , 956 S.W.2d at 211 ) (involving third-degree rape and sodomy of a fifteen-year-old-girl where the defendant confided in his then-wife "[w]hen details of how he preyed upon his former student began unraveling" and the defendant sought to invoke spousal privilege) (" Mullins remains the law in Kentucky.").

2016Id. at 212 (internal citations omitted); see Kays v. Commonwealth , 505 S.W.3d 260 , ----, NO. 2014-CA-001924-MR, 2016 WL 5956995 , at *8 (Ky. Oct. 14, 2016) (citing Mullins , 956 S.W.2d at 211 ) (involving third-degree rape and sodomy of a fifteen-year-old-girl where the defendant confided in his then-wife "[w]hen details of how he preyed upon his former student began unraveling" and the defendant sought to invoke spousal privilege) (" Mullins remains the law in Kentucky.").

2015This Court also held, "[t]he statute does not require a specifically articulated finding on the subject [of accustomed standard of living]." iD. at 280, 374 s.E.2D at 453 (citing bEaman v. bEaman, 77 n.C.APp. 717, 721-22, 336 S.E.2d 129 , 131-32 (1985) (holding the trial court's failure to make a categorical finding about the parties' accustomed standard of living was not fatal to the validity of the judgment)).

2008See, e.g., Proffitt v. State, 315 So.2d 461, 465 (Fla. 1975), aff’d, 428 U.S. 242 , ... 49 L.

2008App. 367, 372 , 653 S.E.2d 174, 178 (2007).

2008Our Court recently recognized that “[b]ecause of the requirement of confidentiality, it is well established that the marital privilege does not apply to communications made within the known hearing of a third party.” State v. Kirby, 187 N.C.

2008See id.; see also McCoy v. Justice, 199 N.C. 602 , 155 S.E. 452 (1930) (holding that one *257 spouse cannot defeat the other spouse’s privilege to exclude evidence by disclosing a confidential marital communication to a third party).

2008See id.; see also McCoy v. Justice, 199 N.C. 602 , 155 S.E. 452 (1930) (holding that one *257 spouse cannot defeat the other spouse’s privilege to exclude evidence by disclosing a confidential marital communication to a third party).

2008See, e.g., Proffitt v. State, 315 So.2d 461, 465 (Fla. 1975), aff’d, 428 U.S. 242 , ... 49 L.

2008See, e.g., Proffitt v. State, 315 So.2d 461, 465 (Fla. 1975), aff’d, 428 U.S. 242 , ... 49 L.

2004A letter, also, written confidentially by husband to wife is admissible against the husband, when brought into court by a third party.” 162 N.C. 623, 630 , 78 S.E. 1, 12 (1913) (quoting Whar.

2004A letter, also, written confidentially by husband to wife is admissible against the husband, when brought into court by a third party.” 162 N.C. 623, 630 , 78 S.E. 1, 12 (1913) (quoting Whar.

1996See Settle v. Beasley, 309 N.C. 616, 621 , 308 S.E.2d 288, 291 (1983) (child’s “right[] to support, inheritance, and custody” and “mental health, outlook, attitude, and personality” may be directly affected by illegitimation); 1 Ann M.

1996See Settle v. Beasley, 309 N.C. 616, 621 , 308 S.E.2d 288, 291 (1983) (child’s “right[] to support, inheritance, and custody” and “mental health, outlook, attitude, and personality” may be directly affected by illegitimation); 1 Ann M.

1996The marital presumption reflects the force of public policy which seeks to prevent “parent[s] from bastardizing [their] own issue.” State v. Rogers, 260 N.C. 406, 408 , 133 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1963).

1996The marital presumption reflects the force of public policy which seeks to prevent “parent[s] from bastardizing [their] own issue.” State v. Rogers, 260 N.C. 406, 408 , 133 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1963).

1995The court noted that Mr. Presse was clearly entitled to the marital presumption codified in subsection (a)(1), id., and held that Dr. Koenemann's attempt to assert his paternity under the presumption in (a)(4) failed for lack of standing under the rationale of Michael H., id. at 414, concluding: In this case, as in Michael H., the legal question is whether a man has standing to bring an action seeking to declare a child illegitimate and to have himself declared the father of that child.

1995The court noted that Mr. Presse was clearly entitled to the marital presumption codified in subsection (a)(1), id., and held that Dr. Koenemann's attempt to assert his paternity under the presumption in (a)(4) failed for lack of standing under the rationale of Michael H., id. at 414, concluding: In this case, as in Michael H., the legal question is whether a man has standing to bring an action seeking to declare a child illegitimate and to have himself declared the father of that child.

1995Eubanks v. Eubanks, 273 N.C. 189, 197 , 159 S.E.2d 562, 568 (1968) (citations omitted); see also In re Legitimation of Locklear, 314 N.C. 412, 419 , 334 S.E.2d 46, 51 (1985).

1995Eubanks v. Eubanks, 273 N.C. 189, 197 , 159 S.E.2d 562, 568 (1968) (citations omitted); see also In re Legitimation of Locklear, 314 N.C. 412, 419 , 334 S.E.2d 46, 51 (1985).

1995Eubanks v. Eubanks, 273 N.C. 189, 197 , 159 S.E.2d 562, 568 (1968) (citations omitted); see also In re Legitimation of Locklear, 314 N.C. 412, 419 , 334 S.E.2d 46, 51 (1985).

1995Eubanks v. Eubanks, 273 N.C. 189, 197 , 159 S.E.2d 562, 568 (1968) (citations omitted); see also In re Legitimation of Locklear, 314 N.C. 412, 419 , 334 S.E.2d 46, 51 (1985).