marital standard in New Jersey

2026Plaintiff argues she "has relied on the agreed-upon support in planning her post-divorce financial stability, and a change would cause undue hardship." The trial court erred in concluding plaintiff's increased income was not a changed circumstance warranting a modification without first considering the marital standard of living, which "is an essential component in the changed - A-3896-23 10 circumstances analysis when reviewing an application for modification of alimony." Crews v. Crews, 164 N.J. 11, 25 (2000).

2026Crews established after the court makes a finding on the parties' marital standard of living, it "should review the adequacy and reasonableness of the support award against this finding." 164 N.J. at 26 .

2026A-1567-24 10 A. Marital Lifestyle Defendant argues the second judge did not follow our remand instructions because he did not adequately consider and quantify the financial contributions plaintiff's parents made to support the marital lifestyle and failed to evaluate "whether there are sufficient presently available funds to sustain the marital standard," citing Weishaus, 180 N.J. at 145 .

2025"In the determination of the marital standard, the court establishes the amount the parties needed during the marriage to maintain their lifestyle. " Weishaus v. Weishaus, 180 N.J. 131, 145 (2004); accord S.W. v. G.M., 462 N.J.

2010"The standard of living during the marriage is the way the couple actually lived, whether they resorted to borrowing and parental support, or if they limited themselves to their earned income." ( Hughes v. Hughes, 311 N.J.Super. 15, 34 [ 709 A. 2d 261 ] (App.Div.1998)). [ Glass v. Glass, 366 N.J.Super. 357, 370-71 , 841 A. 2d 451 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 180 N.J. 354 , 851 A. 2d 648 (2004) (internal quotations omitted).] "In the determination of the marital standard, the court establishes the amount the parties needed during the marriage to maintain their lifestyle.

2010"The standard of living during the marriage is the way the couple actually lived, whether they resorted to borrowing and parental support, or if they limited themselves to their earned income." ( Hughes v. Hughes, 311 N.J.Super. 15, 34 [ 709 A. 2d 261 ] (App.Div.1998)). [ Glass v. Glass, 366 N.J.Super. 357, 370-71 , 841 A. 2d 451 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 180 N.J. 354 , 851 A. 2d 648 (2004) (internal quotations omitted).] "In the determination of the marital standard, the court establishes the amount the parties needed during the marriage to maintain their lifestyle.

2010"The standard of living during the marriage is the way the couple actually lived, whether they resorted to borrowing and parental support, or if they limited themselves to their earned income." ( Hughes v. Hughes, 311 N.J.Super. 15, 34 [ 709 A. 2d 261 ] (App.Div.1998)). [ Glass v. Glass, 366 N.J.Super. 357, 370-71 , 841 A. 2d 451 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 180 N.J. 354 , 851 A. 2d 648 (2004) (internal quotations omitted).] "In the determination of the marital standard, the court establishes the amount the parties needed during the marriage to maintain their lifestyle.

2010"The standard of living during the marriage is the way the couple actually lived, whether they resorted to borrowing and parental support, or if they limited themselves to their earned income." ( Hughes v. Hughes, 311 N.J.Super. 15, 34 [ 709 A. 2d 261 ] (App.Div.1998)). [ Glass v. Glass, 366 N.J.Super. 357, 370-71 , 841 A. 2d 451 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 180 N.J. 354 , 851 A. 2d 648 (2004) (internal quotations omitted).] "In the determination of the marital standard, the court establishes the amount the parties needed during the marriage to maintain their lifestyle.

1986As was noted in the context of the marital privilege in State v. Briley, 53 N.J. 498, 506 (1969): Since rigid adherence to the letter of the privileges promotes the suppression of truth, they should be construed and applied in sensible accommodation to the aim of a just result.

1986But the principles and methodology, were foreshadowed in State v. Briley, 53 N.J. 498, 506 (1969), discussing the marital privilege, and in State v. Boiardo, 82 N.J. 446, 467 (1980); and In re Myron Farber, supra, 78 N.J. at 277 . [7] This point has not been raised in the appellate briefs, but our review of the record indicates that the objection was made below and, since there may be a retrial, we have considered the point on our own motion.

1976See Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 379-382 , 54 S.Ct. 212 , 78 L.Ed. 369 (1933); Shores v. United States, 174 F.2d 838 , 11 A.L.R. 2d 635 (8th Cir.1949); Wyatt v. United States, supra; Note, 38 V.L.

1976See Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 379-382 , 54 S.Ct. 212 , 78 L.Ed. 369 (1933); Shores v. United States, 174 F.2d 838 , 11 A.L.R. 2d 635 (8th Cir.1949); Wyatt v. United States, supra; Note, 38 V.L.

2000The needs of the dependent spouse and children contemplate their continued maintenance at the standard of living they had become accustomed to prior to the separation. [Ibid, (citations omitted).] A three-part examination was articulated in Lepis : When support of an economically dependent spouse is at issue, the general considerations are the dependent spouse’s needs, that spouse’s ability to contribute to the fulfillment of those needs, and the supporting spouse’s ability to maintain the dependent spouse at the former standard. [Id. at 152, 416 A.2d 45 .] *25 Identifying the marital standard

2000Only after the movant has made this prima facie showing should the respondent’s ability to pay become a factor for the court to consider. [83 N.J. at 157, 416 A.2d 45 .] In this case, Mrs. Crews must carry the burden of showing that changed circumstances have impaired her ability to maintain a standard of living reasonably comparable to the Crews-es’ marital standard of living.

1998See, e.g., Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535 , 388 A. 2d 951 (1978) (abrogating interspousal immunity; also observing that it is hard to "monitor marital morality" and stating: "The threat to domestic harmony posed by a legal action between spouses is an imponderable; the cohesiveness of a marriage may be jeopardized as much by barring a cause of action as by allowing it.").

1998See, e.g., Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535 , 388 A. 2d 951 (1978) (abrogating interspousal immunity; also observing that it is hard to "monitor marital morality" and stating: "The threat to domestic harmony posed by a legal action between spouses is an imponderable; the cohesiveness of a marriage may be jeopardized as much by barring a cause of action as by allowing it.").

2026See Lombardi v. Lombardi, 447 N.J.

2026See Lombardi v. Lombardi, 447 N.J.

2021See Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 429 (2015).

2020See Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 429 (2015).

2016See id. at 379; see also Capodanno v. Capodanno, 58 N.J. 113, 120 (1971).

2016See id. at 379; see also Capodanno v. Capodanno, 58 N.J. 113, 120 (1971).

2018In determining the marital standard of living or lifestyle, the A-4518-16T3 12 trial court looks at various elements including "the marital residence, vacation home, cars owned or leased, typical travel and vacations each year, schools, special lessons, and camps for [the] children, entertainment (such as theater, concerts, dining out), household help, and other personal services." Weishaus v. Weishaus, 360 N.J.

2004The Appellate Division concluded that when the trial *145 court determined the marital standard, “[it] improperly excluded the contributions made by defendant’s mother as well as the funds generated by the liquidation and leveraging of marital assets.” Weishaus, supra, 360 N.J.Super. at 289 , 822 A2d 656 .

2001Neither is any other intentional tort by which one spouse victimizes the other.” Tevis v. Tevis, 155 N.J.Super. 273, 278 , 382 A.2d 697 (App.Div. 1978), rev’d on other grounds 79 N.J. 422 , 400 A.2d 1189 (1979).

2001Neither is any other intentional tort by which one spouse victimizes the other.” Tevis v. Tevis, 155 N.J.Super. 273, 278 , 382 A.2d 697 (App.Div. 1978), rev’d on other grounds 79 N.J. 422 , 400 A.2d 1189 (1979).

1988For example, the Court in B.N. v. K.K., 312 Md. 135, 152 , 538 A.2d 1175, 1184 (Ct.App.1988) stated that it was “not about to decide that only a marital relationship would impose a duty to disclose a contagious disease transmitted by sexual relations.” (Emphasis added.) This Court holds that the marital privilege of sexual relations does not include immunity to personal injury suits between spouses based upon the transmittal of a sexual disease.

1988For example, the Court in B.N. v. K.K., 312 Md. 135, 152 , 538 A.2d 1175, 1184 (Ct.App.1988) stated that it was “not about to decide that only a marital relationship would impose a duty to disclose a contagious disease transmitted by sexual relations.” (Emphasis added.) This Court holds that the marital privilege of sexual relations does not include immunity to personal injury suits between spouses based upon the transmittal of a sexual disease.

2026Super. 49 (App. Div. 2011), was "affirmed by an equally divided [Supreme] Court," In re T.J.S., 212 N.J. 334, 335 (2012), therefore, the Court's "concurring and dissenting opinions are not precedential." Mt.

2022See, e.g., Tannen v. Tannen, 416 N.J.

2019See Gordon, 380 N.J.

2019The marital standard of living "serves as the touchstone for the initial alimony award and for adjudicating later motions for modification of the alimony award when 'changed circumstances' are asserted." Crews v. Crews, 164 N.J. 11, 16 (2000); see Beck, 239 N.J.

2019The marital standard of living "serves as the touchstone for the initial alimony award and for adjudicating later motions for modification of the alimony award when 'changed circumstances' are asserted." Crews v. Crews, 164 N.J. 11, 16 (2000); see Beck, 239 N.J.

2015Nevertheless, we do not hesitate to declare a fifteen-year marriage is not short-term, a conclusion which precludes consideration of an award of limited duration alimony. [ Zd. at 153, 74 A.3d 58 (emphasis added).] The panel rejected Elizabeth’s assertions that the trial judge abused his discretion when considering the marital standard of living.

2015Id. at 156 , 74 A.3d 58 .