marital privilege in Maryland

2021At his trial, the witness/wife was unavailable to testify as a result of Washington’s marital privilege, which generally bars a spouse from testifying without the other spouse’s consent. 541 U.S. at 40 .

2012Concluding quite easily that a formal statement to police at the station house is testimonial in nature, the Supreme Court left “for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’ ” Id. at 68 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 (footnote omitted).

2019In doing so, the Peters court stated that it was following the prevailing rule throughout the country: "Allegations that a marriage was contracted solely for the purpose of barring testimony have been considered by a number of state courts, and they have overwhelmingly declined to create such a judicial exception to the marital privilege." Id.

2019Coleman v. State , 281 Md. 538 , 541, 380 A.2d 49 (1977) (citing 8 Wigmore, Evidence , § 2332 (McNaughton rev. 1961) ).

2019Coleman v. State , 281 Md. 538 , 541, 380 A.2d 49 (1977) (citing 8 Wigmore, Evidence , § 2332 (McNaughton rev. 1961) ).

2019Id.

2018The State suggests that the party asserting the privilege with respect to text messages could generate evidence that the recipient secured the phone by a passcode or set up the phone to ensure text messages would not appear on the screen if the phone was locked. 6 The statute has been interpreted by the Court of Appeals in such a manner that the section "does not render a spouse 'incompetent' in any manner, but simply provides a privilege, exercisable and waivable by the person who made the confidential communication, to preclude the person's spouse from disclosing that communication through t

2018The State suggests that the party asserting the privilege with respect to text messages could generate evidence that the recipient secured the phone by a passcode or set up the phone to ensure text messages would not appear on the screen if the phone was locked. 6 The statute has been interpreted by the Court of Appeals in such a manner that the section "does not render a spouse 'incompetent' in any manner, but simply provides a privilege, exercisable and waivable by the person who made the confidential communication, to preclude the person's spouse from disclosing that communication through t

2018App. 1 , 65, 807 A.2d 732 , 769 (2002), emphasized that testimonial privileges such as the marital privilege are disfavored, and explained the significance of that status as follows: "Keeping in the forefront of the mind the appreciation that testimonial privileges are disfavored, rather than favored, and are to be strictly construed, rather than liberally construed, is important because that decided 'tilt' may well be *111 dispositive in close or ambiguous cases.

2009These judicial decisions concerning whether genetic test results are sufficient to rebut the marital presumption of paternity appear to be based on assumptions about fatherhood." (footnotes omitted). [12] In Mattingly v. Shifflett, 327 Md. 337 , 609 A.2d 329 (1992), the issue with which this Court was presented was the proper procedure for rebutting the presumption of legitimacy prescribed by the predecessor to § 5-1027(c), § 5-1028(c).

2009These judicial decisions concerning whether genetic test results are sufficient to rebut the marital presumption of paternity appear to be based on assumptions about fatherhood." (footnotes omitted). [12] In Mattingly v. Shifflett, 327 Md. 337 , 609 A.2d 329 (1992), the issue with which this Court was presented was the proper procedure for rebutting the presumption of legitimacy prescribed by the predecessor to § 5-1027(c), § 5-1028(c).

2003Appellant relies on Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 , 88 S.Ct. 2008 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1047 (1968).

2003Appellant relies on Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 , 88 S.Ct. 2008 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1047 (1968).

2001In Walker, supra, the Court of Appeals held that it is not unanticipated that witnesses will invoke the marital privilege, and noted the existence of statutes that address that issue. 345 Md. at 327-329 , 691 A.2d 1341 .

2000Trammel led the way for some of the federal circuits to define "spousal incompetency" issues as "privileges." In a case involving allegations of drug smuggling, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted in United States v. Ramirez, 145 F.3d 345, 355 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1046 , 119 S.Ct. 602 , 142 L.Ed.2d 543 (1998), that: "The marital privilege is divided into two distinct privileges by the federal courts.

2000Trammel led the way for some of the federal circuits to define “spousal incompetency” issues as “privileges.” In a case involving allegations of drug smuggling, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted in United States v. Ramirez, 145 F.3d 345, 355 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1046 , 119 S.Ct. 602 , 142 L.Ed.2d 543 (1998), that: “The marital privilege is divided into two distinct privileges by the federal courts.

2000Trammel led the way for some of the federal circuits to define "spousal incompetency" issues as "privileges." In a case involving allegations of drug smuggling, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted in United States v. Ramirez, 145 F.3d 345, 355 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1046 , 119 S.Ct. 602 , 142 L.Ed.2d 543 (1998), that: "The marital privilege is divided into two distinct privileges by the federal courts.

2000Trammel led the way for some of the federal circuits to define “spousal incompetency” issues as “privileges.” In a case involving allegations of drug smuggling, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted in United States v. Ramirez, 145 F.3d 345, 355 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1046 , 119 S.Ct. 602 , 142 L.Ed.2d 543 (1998), that: “The marital privilege is divided into two distinct privileges by the federal courts.

2000The defendant asserted that "the marital privilege would prevent it from being admitted in his trial." Id. at 890 .

2000The defendant asserted that “the marital privilege would prevent it from being admitted in his trial.” Id. at 890 .

1998For example, in State v. Farber, 314 N.W.2d 365 (Iowa 1982), the applicable statute applied the marital privilege, somewhat ambiguously, to a “case”; it read, in relevant part: “Neither the husband nor the wife shall in any case be a witness against the other.... ” The court noted that the statute had been applied in grand jury proceedings, but then distinguished grand jury proceedings from search warrant proceedings: The issue in a grand jury inquiry is much different than in a search warrant proceeding.