16 Kentucky opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2024 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Andersongreen2 sentences2024Under KRS 403.720(2)(a), “‘Domestic violence and abuse’ means (a) Physical injury, serious physical injury, stalking, sexual abuse, strangulation, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical injury, serious physical injury, sexual abuse, strangulation, or assault between family members or members of an unmarried couple[.]” (Emphasis added.) “Under the preponderance standard, the court must conclude from the evidence that the victim ‘was more likely than not to have been a victim of domestic violence.’” Buddenberg, 304 S.W.3d at 720 (quoting Commonwealth v. Anderson, 934 S.W.2d 276, 2024A court may grant a DVO, following a full hearing, “if it finds from a preponderance of the evidence that an act or acts of domestic violence and abuse have -4- occurred and may again occur[.]” KRS 403.750(1).[2] “‘Domestic violence and abuse’ means physical injury, serious physical injury, sexual abuse, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical injury, serious physical injury, sexual abuse, or assault between . . . members of an unmarried couple[.]” KRS 403.720(1).[3] To satisfy the preponderance standard, the evidence believed by the fact-finder must show that the victim “was m | 6 | 6 |
Buddenberg v. Buddenberggreen2 sentences2024Under KRS 403.720(2)(a), “‘Domestic violence and abuse’ means (a) Physical injury, serious physical injury, stalking, sexual abuse, strangulation, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical injury, serious physical injury, sexual abuse, strangulation, or assault between family members or members of an unmarried couple[.]” (Emphasis added.) “Under the preponderance standard, the court must conclude from the evidence that the victim ‘was more likely than not to have been a victim of domestic violence.’” Buddenberg, 304 S.W.3d at 720 (quoting Commonwealth v. Anderson, 934 S.W.2d 276, 2024“On appeal, we are mindful of the trial court’s opportunity to assess the credibility of the witnesses, and we will only disturb the lower court’s finding of domestic violence if it was clearly erroneous.” Buddenberg v. Buddenberg, 304 S.W.3d 717, 720 (Ky. App. 2010). | 4 | 5 |
Wright v. Wrightgreen2 sentences2017Wright v. Wright, 181 S.W.3d 49, 52 (Ky. App. 2005). 2008Wright v. Wright, 181 S.W.3d 49, 52 (Ky.App.2005). | 2 | 2 |
Hohman v. Derygreen1 sentence2024To satisfy the preponderance standard, the evidence believed by the fact-finder must show that the victim “was more likely than not to have been a victim of domestic violence.” Hohman v. Dery, 371 S.W.3d 780, 782 (Ky. App. 2012) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Staples v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1998Wigmore, Evidence § 2498 (Chadbourne rev. 1981) & Supp.1996 (Best rev.) (stating "The traditional standard of proof in a civil or administrative proceeding is the preponderance standard.") "[T]he mens rea requirement under a criminal statute," however, "is a question of law, to be determined by the court." Staples v. U.S., 511 U.S. 600 , 612 n. 6, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 1800 , 128 L.Ed.2d 608, 621 (1994). 1998Wigmore, Evidence § 2498 (Chadbourne rev. 1981) & Supp.1996 (Best rev.) (stating "The traditional standard of proof in a civil or administrative proceeding is the preponderance standard.") "[T]he mens rea requirement under a criminal statute," however, "is a question of law, to be determined by the court." Staples v. U.S., 511 U.S. 600 , 612 n. 6, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 1800 , 128 L.Ed.2d 608, 621 (1994). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Star v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2022Finally, as in Star, Hall’s trial counsel “was fully able to articulate this burden to the jury” and did so seemingly successfully. 313 S.W.3d at 37 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Commonwealth v. Andrews
green
1 sentence2022There was no discussion or proof that Mr. Grace had declined any kind of treatment.” We disagree. “[W]hile HB 463 reflects a new emphasis in imposing and managing [diversion], it does not upend the trial court’s discretion in matters of [diversion], provided that discretion is exercised consistent with statutory criteria.” McClure, 457 S.W.3d at 731 -32 (quoting Andrews, 448 S.W.3d at 780 ). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
McClure v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2022There was no discussion or proof that Mr. Grace had declined any kind of treatment.” We disagree. “[W]hile HB 463 reflects a new emphasis in imposing and managing [diversion], it does not upend the trial court’s discretion in matters of [diversion], provided that discretion is exercised consistent with statutory criteria.” McClure, 457 S.W.3d at 731 -32 (quoting Andrews, 448 S.W.3d at 780 ). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Manning v. Liberty Tire Servs. of Ohio, LLC
green
2 sentences2022The interplay between the proof necessary to establish an actual injury and the preponderance requirement for class certification was considered in Manning, 577 S.W.3d 102 . 2022Id. at 116-18 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Miller v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2019Miller v. Commonwealth , 329 S.W.3d 358 , 359 (Ky. App. 2010) (citation omitted). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Morrissey v. Brewer
green
2 sentences2019Notably, the Morrissey Court required something “more than” probable cause but never expressly invoked the preponderance standard. 408 U.S. at 488 . 2019The application of the preponderance standard facilitates the required “final evaluation of any contested relevant facts,” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 488 , and appropriately protects the interests of both the Commonwealth and the offender. 3. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Lego v. Twomey
green
2 sentences1992Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 , 92 S.Ct. 619 , 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972); United States v. Matlock, supra . 1992Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 , 92 S.Ct. 619 , 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972); United States v. Matlock, supra . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.