preponderance standard in Louisiana

2020Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 , 95 S.Ct. 854 , 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975); State v. Rodrigue, 437 So.2d 830 (La.1983).

2020Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 , 95 S.Ct. 854 , 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975); State v. Rodrigue, 437 So.2d 830 (La.1983).

2020Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 , 95 S.Ct. 854 , 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975); State v. Rodrigue, 437 So.2d 830 (La.1983).

2011Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 , 95 S.Ct. 854 , 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975); State v. Rodrigue, 437 So.2d 830 (La.1983).

2009State v. Green, 98-1021, p. 9 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/22/99), 750 So.2d 343 .

2003State v. Green, 98-1021 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/22/99) , 750 So.2d 343 , writ denied, 96-2610 (La.6/20/97), 695 So.2d 1348 .

2003State v. Green, 98-1021 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/22/99) , 750 So.2d 343 , writ denied, 96-2610 (La.6/20/97), 695 So.2d 1348 .

2002State v. Green, 98-1021 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/22/99) , 750 So.2d 343 , writ denied, 96-2610 (La.6/20/97), 695 So.2d 1348 .

2015“The determination of probable cause, unlike the determination of guilt at trial, does not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable doubt or near a preponderance standard demands.” State v. Lawrence, 02-0363, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/8/02); 817 So.2d 1216, 1220 .

2014“The determination of probable cause, unlike the determination of guilt at trial, does not require the fine resolu tion of conflicting evidence that a reasonable doubt or near a preponderance standard demands.” State v. Lawrence, 02-0363, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/8/02); 817 So.2d 1216, 1220 .

2016We have noted that the Supreme Court, in discussing the standard for admissibility of other crimes evidence in Huddleston v. U.S., 485 U.S. 681, 690 , 108 S.Ct. 1496, 1501 , 99 L.Ed.2d 771 , (1988) (emphasis added), stated that the court should decide “whether the jury could reasonably find the conditional fact .... by a preponderance of the evidence.” This language suggests the Huddle-ston court contemplated that juries would employ the preponderance standard in their assessments of other crimes evidence.

2016We have noted that the Supreme Court, in discussing the standard for admissibility of other crimes evidence in Huddleston v. U.S., 485 U.S. 681, 690 , 108 S.Ct. 1496, 1501 , 99 L.Ed.2d 771 , (1988) (emphasis added), stated that the court should decide “whether the jury could reasonably find the conditional fact .... by a preponderance of the evidence.” This language suggests the Huddle-ston court contemplated that juries would employ the preponderance standard in their assessments of other crimes evidence.

2024Id. at 969-70 .

2015Id., 831 So.2d at 969-70 .

2016Further, the Supreme Court’s language in Dowling v. U.S., 493 U.S. 342 , 110 S.Ct. 668 , 107 L.Ed.2d 708 (1990), a collateral estoppel case, appears to take the same view.

2016Further, the Supreme Court’s language in Dowling v. U.S., 493 U.S. 342 , 110 S.Ct. 668 , 107 L.Ed.2d 708 (1990), a collateral estoppel case, appears to take the same view.

2002State v. Green, 98-1021 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/22/99) , 750 So.2d 343 , unit denied, 96-2610 (La.6/20/97), 695 So.2d 1348 ; State v. Short, 96-1069 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/7/97) , 694 So.2d 549 .

2002Id. |fiThe determination of probable cause, unlike the determination of guilt at trial, does not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable doubt or a preponderance standard demands.

1998In State v. Silva, 96-0407 (La.App. 4th Cir. 9/3/97), 699 So.2d 487 , the defendant made the same assignment as in LeBlanc : that the trial court had considered the evidence of his competency under the impermissibly high standard of clear and convincing evidence.

1998If the trial court determines that the defendant was competent to proceed on September 27, 1994 under the preponderance standard, the defendant’s right to appeal is reserved. ' State v. LeBlanc, pp. 3-4, 702 So.2d at 378 .

1997In State v. Crawford, 95-1352 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/3/96) ; 672 So.2d 197 , writ denied, 96-1126 (La. 10/4/96); 679 So.2d 1379 , this circuit, relying on Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 , 108 S.Ct. 1496 , 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988), held that the state's burden of proof of "other crimes" is the preponderance standard rather than the clear-and-convincing standard. [3] Regardless of whether clear-and-convincing proof or a preponderance of proof is required, under the facts of this case, we find no error in the trial court's ruling.

1997In State v. Crawford, 95-1352 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/3/96) ; 672 So.2d 197 , writ denied, 96-1126 (La. 10/4/96); 679 So.2d 1379 , this circuit, relying on Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 , 108 S.Ct. 1496 , 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988), held that the state's burden of proof of "other crimes" is the preponderance standard rather than the clear-and-convincing standard. [3] Regardless of whether clear-and-convincing proof or a preponderance of proof is required, under the facts of this case, we find no error in the trial court's ruling.

1997In State v. Crawford, 95-1352 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/3/96) ; 672 So.2d 197 , writ denied, 96-1126 (La. 10/4/96); 679 So.2d 1379 , this circuit, relying on Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 , 108 S.Ct. 1496 , 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988), held that the state's burden of proof of "other crimes" is the preponderance standard rather than the clear-and-convincing standard. [3] Regardless of whether clear-and-convincing proof or a preponderance of proof is required, under the facts of this case, we find no error in the trial court's ruling.

1997However, in the present case of Sudwischer, 589 So.2d at 475 , when it was before us on writs, the supreme court stated in dictum: “Alana’s statutory burden of proof is ‘clear and convincing evidence.’ This standard of proof is more stringent than the preponderance standard which generally 1 mapplies in civil eases.” We hold that the 1982 amendment to Article 209 applies retroactively, and, hence, Alana’s burden is “clear and convincing evidence.” Alana argues that, if the more stringent burden of proof does apply, this statutory provision is violative of the equal protection clause and, thus,

1996App. 2nd Cir.1984), writs denied, 466 So.2d 465 , 466 (1985); self-defense, State in the Interest of D.W., 528 So.2d 1071, 1073 (La.

1996Cooper v. Oklahoma, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 1373 , 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996).

1996Cooper v. Oklahoma, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 1373 , 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996).

1996State v. Gwinn, 373 So.2d 1304 (La.1979); State v. Bennett, supra. Since the amendment, this and another appellate court have still referred to the preponderance standard. [2] The United States Supreme Court has recently held that States may not require defendants to prove their capacity to proceed by any standard greater than a preponderance of evidence.

1996State v. Gwinn, 373 So.2d 1304 (La.1979); State v. Bennett, supra. Since the amendment, this and another appellate court have still referred to the preponderance standard. [2] The United States Supreme Court has recently held that States may not require defendants to prove their capacity to proceed by any standard greater than a preponderance of evidence.

1994In Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), the Supreme Court, in analyzing the factors enunciated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), observed that in parental rights termination proceedings, the private interest affected is commanding; the risk of error from using a preponderance standard is substantial; and the countervailing governmental interest favoring that standard is comparatively slight.

1994In Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), the Supreme Court, in analyzing the factors enunciated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), observed that in parental rights termination proceedings, the private interest affected is commanding; the risk of error from using a preponderance standard is substantial; and the countervailing governmental interest favoring that standard is comparatively slight.

1994Yet the function of a standard of proof is to "instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual *749 conclusions for a particular type of adjudication." Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 , 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1808 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979), quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 , 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1076 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).

1994Yet the function of a standard of proof is to "instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual *749 conclusions for a particular type of adjudication." Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 , 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1808 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979), quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 , 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1076 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).

1994Yet the function of a standard of proof is to "instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual *749 conclusions for a particular type of adjudication." Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 , 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1808 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979), quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 , 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1076 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).

1994Yet the function of a standard of proof is to "instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual *749 conclusions for a particular type of adjudication." Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 , 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1808 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979), quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 , 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1076 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).

1994In Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), the Supreme Court, in analyzing the factors enunciated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), observed that in parental rights termination proceedings, the private interest affected is commanding; the risk of error from using a preponderance standard is substantial; and the countervailing governmental interest favoring that standard is comparatively slight.

1994In Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), the Supreme Court, in analyzing the factors enunciated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), observed that in parental rights termination proceedings, the private interest affected is commanding; the risk of error from using a preponderance standard is substantial; and the countervailing governmental interest favoring that standard is comparatively slight.