preponderance standard in Pennsylvania

2018Along these lines, the Court clarified that, although the child and his foster parents may be "deeply interested in the outcome of the contest," at the fact-finding phase "the focus emphatically is not on them." Id. ; see also id. at 761 , 102 S.Ct. at 1399 ("Since the factfinding phase of a permanent neglect proceeding is an adversary contest between the State and the natural parents, the relevant question is whether a preponderance standard fairly allocates the risk of an erroneous factfinding between these two parties. " (emphasis added) ).

2018Along these lines, the Court clarified that, although the child and his foster parents may be "deeply interested in the outcome of the contest," at the fact-finding phase "the focus emphatically is not on them." Id. ; see also id. at 761 , 102 S.Ct. at 1399 ("Since the factfinding phase of a permanent neglect proceeding is an adversary contest between the State and the natural parents, the relevant question is whether a preponderance standard fairly allocates the risk of an erroneous factfinding between these two parties. " (emphasis added) ).

2022However, this rule is unavailing in this case because it appears that the written instructions provided to the jury in Schmocker’s trial have been irretrievably lost. -8- J-A29032-21 The reasonable probability “test is not a stringent one,” as it is “less demanding than the preponderance standard.” Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d 136, 141 (Pa. Super. 2002).

2021This reasonable probability “test is not a stringent one,” as it is “less demanding than the preponderance standard.” Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d 136, 141 (Pa. Super. 2012). 1.

1985While the unavailability of a witness may be a relevant factor in determining whether an extension should be granted, see Commonwealth v. Brown, 252 Pa.Super. 365 , 381 A.2d 961 (1977), "[m]ere assertions of due diligence and unproven facts, do not establish cause for an extension under Rule 1100(c)." *207 Commonwealth v. Antonuccio, 257 Pa.Super. 535, 537 , 390 A.2d 1366, 1367 (1978).

1979See Commonwealth v. Mitchell, supra. Instantly, while the Commonwealth may initially have been diligent in its attempt to commence Ehredt’s trial on July 1, 1975, it has not met its burden of establishing “due diligence” in attempting to commence the trial subsequent to that date and prior to the expiration of the term mandated by the Rule. *195 At the extension “hearing,” 5 the assistant district attorney stated “good cause” for the grant of an extension existed because “[s]everal Commonwealth witnesses indicated that although they were available on July 1, 1975, they would not be available o

2007In other words, the Commission is to evaluate the entire body of evidence under the preponderance standard to "decide which party's explanation of the employer's motivation it believes.” Allegheny Housing, 516 Pa. at 131 , 532 A.2d at 319 . 16 .

2007In other words, the Commission is to evaluate the entire body of evidence under the preponderance standard to "decide which party's explanation of the employer's motivation it believes.” Allegheny Housing, 516 Pa. at 131 , 532 A.2d at 319 . 16 .

2023“This reasonable probability test is not a stringent one, as it is less demanding than the preponderance standard.” Commonwealth v. Little, 246 A.3d 312, 326 (Pa.Super. 2021).

2022The “reasonable probability” test is “less demanding than the preponderance standard.” Commonwealth v. Little, 246 A.3d 312, 326 (Pa. Super. 2021) (quotations omitted).

2021See, e.g., Ehredt, 401 A.2d at 360-61 (“Although the preponderance standard is the least burdensome standard of proof known to the law, . . . a bare statement by the Commonwealth’s attorney that several witnesses are ‘unavailable,’ without more, does not establish ‘due diligence’ within that standard.” (internal citation omitted)). [J-102-2020] - 33 discovery obligations through the date of trial in November 2016 — more than 365 days after the Commonwealth filed the complaint in January 2015 — it is evident that the Commonwealth was not prepared to proceed to trial prior to that time, and that

1980In Commonwealth v. Ehredt, supra 485 Pa. at 195 , 401 A.2d at 360-61 , the Supreme Court stated: “Although the preponderance standard is the least burdensome standard of proof known to the law, Commonwealth v. Mitchell, supra, a bare statement by the Commonwealth’s attorney that several witnesses are ‘unavailable’, without more, does not establish ‘due diligence’ within that standard.

1989That this was in fact the intent of our Supreme Court is most evident in Brown, in which it is acknowledged that as persuasive a tribunal as the United States Supreme Court has held that "after [a criminal trial] acquittal collateral estoppel does not bar a subsequent civil action using a preponderance standard of proof." 503 Pa. at 520 , 469 A.2d at 1374 (referring to One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 [ 93 S.Ct. 489 , 34 L.Ed.2d 438 ] (1972)).

1989That this was in fact the intent of our Supreme Court is most evident in Brown, in which it is acknowledged that as persuasive a tribunal as the United States Supreme Court has held that "after [a criminal trial] acquittal collateral estoppel does not bar a subsequent civil action using a preponderance standard of proof." 503 Pa. at 520 , 469 A.2d at 1374 (referring to One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 [ 93 S.Ct. 489 , 34 L.Ed.2d 438 ] (1972)).

1979See Commonwealth v. Mitchell, supra. Instantly, while the Commonwealth may initially have been diligent in its attempt to commence Ehredt’s trial on July 1, 1975, it has not met its burden of establishing “due diligence” in attempting to commence the trial subsequent to that date and prior to the expiration of the term mandated by the Rule. *195 At the extension “hearing,” 5 the assistant district attorney stated “good cause” for the grant of an extension existed because “[s]everal Commonwealth witnesses indicated that although they were available on July 1, 1975, they would not be available o

1979See Commonwealth v. Mitchell, supra. Instantly, while the Commonwealth may initially have been diligent in its attempt to commence Ehredt’s trial on July 1, 1975, it has not met its burden of establishing “due diligence” in attempting to commence the trial subsequent to that date and prior to the expiration of the term mandated by the Rule. *195 At the extension “hearing,” 5 the assistant district attorney stated “good cause” for the grant of an extension existed because “[s]everal Commonwealth witnesses indicated that although they were available on July 1, 1975, they would not be available o

2021See, e.g., In re Vencil, 152 A.3d 235, 246 (Pa. 2017) (“preponderance of the evidence standard . . . is generally applicable to civil matters and has been classified as ‘a more likely than not inquiry,’ supported by the greater weight of the evidence; something a reasonable person would accept as sufficient to support a decision.”).

2018It is the "highest standard of proof utilized in civil proceedings, requiring evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the [trier of fact] to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts [in] issue." In Re Vencil , 638 Pa. 1 , 152 A.3d 235 , 237 n.1 (2017).

2000If the offender can rebut the presumption the mandatory minimum sentence is lowered to five years. § 9714(a)(1). ¶ 13 In Commonwealth v. Allen, 508 Pa. 114 , 494 A.2d 1067 (1985), our Supreme Court already determined the preponderance standard for proving the requisite prior record under the former version of § 9714, which allowed no possibility of rebuttal of the mandatory minimum term, satisfied the minimum requisites of due process.

2000If the offender can rebut the presumption the mandatory minimum sentence is lowered to five years. § 9714(a)(1). ¶ 13 In Commonwealth v. Allen, 508 Pa. 114 , 494 A.2d 1067 (1985), our Supreme Court already determined the preponderance standard for proving the requisite prior record under the former version of § 9714, which allowed no possibility of rebuttal of the mandatory minimum term, satisfied the minimum requisites of due process.

2022Commonwealth v. Johnson, 838 A.2d 663, 675 (Pa. 2003) (“In a number of circumstances, however, where … the inculpatory statements are narrative declarations of past activity made to a non-participant in the asserted conspiracy, courts have found the essential in-furtherance-of attribute absent.”).

2022Where a jury has received incorrect instructions due to counsel’s ineffectiveness, a court must assess PCRA prejudice by weighing the error “against the overwhelming strength of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 317 (Pa. 2014).

2020Indeed, the term "burden of proof," standing alone, implicitly means "by the preponderance of the evidence." In re Navana, 185 A.3d 342,354 (Pa. Super. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 25 Rosl)¡n Swim Club,2l3 A.2d at 748, quoting Hostetter v. Commonwealth, 80 A.2d 719 (Pa. 19sl). o'As a general rule, where there is a conflict between course and distances or quantity of land and natural or artificial monuments, the monuments prevail.

2020Attorney of Phila. v. Bagwell, 155 A.3d 1119, 1130 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017).

2020See Nix, 475 U.S. at 175 .

2019See 18 Pa.C.S. § 5721.1(c)(4). ____________________________________________ home beyond even that of an overnight guest); State v. Anonymous, 480 A.2d 600 , 608-09 (Conn. Sup. Ct. 1984) (reasoning that “[a]s the caretaker of the child, [the babysitter] undoubtedly had a socially acceptable expectation of privacy [in the home].”); see also State v. Elrod, 395 S.W.3d 869, 878 (Tex. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that a babysitter had an expectation of privacy because she “had dominion and control over the residence and had the right, perhaps even the duty, to exclude others from the home”). - 10 - J-S0

2018A parole revocation hearing is not a formal procedure that must comport with the "entire gamut of evidentiary and procedural rules necessary in a criminal trial." Commonwealth v. Maye, 411 A.2d 783, 785 (Pa. Super. 1979).

2018The preponderance standard reflects the policy that, in a revocation hearing, the court is concerned with whether parole "is an effective tool to promote rehabilitation and 'deter future antisocial conduct."' Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Kates, 305 A.2d 701, 708 (Pa. 1973)).

2018See Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc. , 628 Pa. 296 , 104 A.3d 328 , 408 (2014) (citations omitted).

2018See Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc. , 628 Pa. 296 , 104 A.3d 328 , 408 (2014) (citations omitted).

2017Accord McBride, 528 Pa. at 157-58 , 595 A.2d at 591 (emphasizing the preliminary hearings are not to be converted into guilt-based mini-trials).

2017Accord McBride, 528 Pa. at 157-58 , 595 A.2d at 591 (emphasizing the preliminary hearings are not to be converted into guilt-based mini-trials).