preponderance standard in Hawaii

10 Hawaii opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2026 4 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Hawaii courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (16)

Case	Followed	Cited
In re the Guardianship of Doegreen hawapp · 2004 · cited in 2 Hawaii opinions naming this issue, 2025–2026 2 sentences 2026It authorizes “any order that is in the best interest of the ward.” The court then turned to its earlier decision in In re Guardianship of Doe, 106 Hawaiʻi at 78, 101 P.3d at 687, which held that the preponderance standard governs parental fitness when appointing a guardian. 2026It authorizes “any order that is in the best interest of the ward.” The court then turned to its earlier decision in In re Guardianship of Doe, 106 Hawaiʻi at 78, 101 P.3d at 687 , which held that the preponderance standard governs parental fitness when appointing a guardian.	2	2
Masaki v. General Motors Corp.green haw · 1989 · cited in 2 Hawaii opinions naming this issue, 2005–2025 2 sentences 2025“The purpose of fixing a particular standard of proof is to ‘instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.’” Masaki v. General Motors Corp., 71 Haw. 1, 13-14, 780 P.2d 566, 574 (1989) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370, (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 2025“The purpose of fixing a particular standard of proof is to ‘instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.’” Masaki v. General Motors Corp., 71 Haw. 1, 13-14, 780 P.2d 566, 574 (1989) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370, (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).	2	2
Santosky v. Kramergreen scotus · 1982 · cited in 1 Hawaii opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026 2 sentences 2026State v. Bani, 97 Hawaiʻi 285, 297, 36 P.3d 1255, 1267 (2001) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758 (1982) (the Mathews balancing test 12 * FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER * demonstrated that using the preponderance standard in parental terminations is “inconsistent with due process”). 2026State v. Bani, 97 Hawaiʻi 285, 297, 36 P.3d 1255, 1267 (2001) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758 (1982) (the Mathews balancing test 12 * FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER * demonstrated that using the preponderance standard in parental terminations is “inconsistent with due process”).	1	1
State v. Banigreen haw · 2001 · cited in 1 Hawaii opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026 2 sentences 2026State v. Bani, 97 Hawaiʻi 285, 297, 36 P.3d 1255, 1267 (2001) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758 (1982) (the Mathews balancing test 12 * FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER * demonstrated that using the preponderance standard in parental terminations is “inconsistent with due process”). 2026State v. Bani, 97 Hawaiʻi 285, 297, 36 P.3d 1255, 1267 (2001) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758 (1982) (the Mathews balancing test 12 * FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER * demonstrated that using the preponderance standard in parental terminations is “inconsistent with due process”).	1	1
Mathews v. Eldridgegreen scotus · 1976 · cited in 1 Hawaii opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026 2 sentences 2026State v. Bani, 97 Hawaiʻi 285, 297, 36 P.3d 1255, 1267 (2001) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758 (1982) (the Mathews balancing test 12 * FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER * demonstrated that using the preponderance standard in parental terminations is “inconsistent with due process”). 2026State v. Bani, 97 Hawaiʻi 285, 297, 36 P.3d 1255, 1267 (2001) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758 (1982) (the Mathews balancing test 12 * FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER * demonstrated that using the preponderance standard in parental terminations is “inconsistent with due process”).	1	1
In Re WINSHIPgreen scotus · 1970 · cited in 1 Hawaii opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025 2 sentences 2025“The purpose of fixing a particular standard of proof is to ‘instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.’” Masaki v. General Motors Corp., 71 Haw. 1, 13-14, 780 P.2d 566, 574 (1989) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370, (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 2025“The purpose of fixing a particular standard of proof is to ‘instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.’” Masaki v. General Motors Corp., 71 Haw. 1, 13-14 , 780 P.2d 566, 574 (1989) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 , (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).	1	1
Iddings v. Mee-Leegreen haw · 1996 · cited in 1 Hawaii opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025 1 sentence 2025This court has explained that the party with the burden of proof under the preponderance standard needs to “tip the scale slightly,” while the other side need merely keep “the scale evenly balanced.” Iddings v. Mee-Lee, 82 Hawaiʻi 1, 13, 919 P.2d. 263, 275 (1996).	1	1
Kekona v. Abastillasgreen haw · 2006 · cited in 1 Hawaii opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007 2 sentences 2007(Emphases added.) "The preponderance standard directs the factfinder to decide whether `the existence of the contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence.'" Kekona v. Abastillas, 150 P.3d 823, 829 (Haw.2006) (quoting E. 2007(Emphases added.) “The preponderance standard directs the factfinder to decide whether ‘the existence of the contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence.’ ” Kekona v. Abastillas, 150 P.3d 823, 829 (Haw.2006) (quoting E.	1	1
Farrell v. Farrellgreen connappct · 1994 · cited in 1 Hawaii opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006 2 sentences 2006However, the Ayala Court’s reasoning is at odds with that of many other jurisdictions that have expressly required that a plaintiff prove a fraudulent transfer by “clear and convincing evidence.” See, e.g., Blood v. Nofzinger, 162 Ohio App.3d 545 , 834 N.E.2d 358, 367-68 (2005); Parker v. Parker, 268 Neb. 187 , 681 N.W.2d 735, 742 (2004); McCain Foods USA, Inc. v. Central Processors, Inc., 275 Kan. 1 , 61 P.3d 68, 77 (2002); Bradford v. Bradford, 993 P.2d 887, 891 (Utah Ct.App.1999); Gerow v. Covill, 192 Ariz. 9 , 960 P.2d 55 , 62 n. 8 (Ariz.Ct.App.1998); Farrell v. Farrell, 36 Conn.App. 305 , 2006However, the Ayala Court’s reasoning is at odds with that of many other jurisdictions that have expressly required that a plaintiff prove a fraudulent transfer by “clear and convincing evidence.” See, e.g., Blood v. Nofzinger, 162 Ohio App.3d 545 , 834 N.E.2d 358, 367-68 (2005); Parker v. Parker, 268 Neb. 187 , 681 N.W.2d 735, 742 (2004); McCain Foods USA, Inc. v. Central Processors, Inc., 275 Kan. 1 , 61 P.3d 68, 77 (2002); Bradford v. Bradford, 993 P.2d 887, 891 (Utah Ct.App.1999); Gerow v. Covill, 192 Ariz. 9 , 960 P.2d 55 , 62 n. 8 (Ariz.Ct.App.1998); Farrell v. Farrell, 36 Conn.App. 305 ,	1	1
Bradford v. Bradfordgreen utahctapp · 1999 · cited in 1 Hawaii opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006 1 sentence 2006However, the Ayala Court’s reasoning is at odds with that of many other jurisdictions that have expressly required that a plaintiff prove a fraudulent transfer by “clear and convincing evidence.” See, e.g., Blood v. Nofzinger, 162 Ohio App.3d 545 , 834 N.E.2d 358, 367-68 (2005); Parker v. Parker, 268 Neb. 187 , 681 N.W.2d 735, 742 (2004); McCain Foods USA, Inc. v. Central Processors, Inc., 275 Kan. 1 , 61 P.3d 68, 77 (2002); Bradford v. Bradford, 993 P.2d 887, 891 (Utah Ct.App.1999); Gerow v. Covill, 192 Ariz. 9 , 960 P.2d 55 , 62 n. 8 (Ariz.Ct.App.1998); Farrell v. Farrell, 36 Conn.App. 305 ,	1	1
Mohar v. McLelland Lumber Companygreen idaho · 1972 · cited in 1 Hawaii opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006 2 sentences 2006However, the Ayala Court’s reasoning is at odds with that of many other jurisdictions that have expressly required that a plaintiff prove a fraudulent transfer by “clear and convincing evidence.” See, e.g., Blood v. Nofzinger, 162 Ohio App.3d 545 , 834 N.E.2d 358, 367-68 (2005); Parker v. Parker, 268 Neb. 187 , 681 N.W.2d 735, 742 (2004); McCain Foods USA, Inc. v. Central Processors, Inc., 275 Kan. 1 , 61 P.3d 68, 77 (2002); Bradford v. Bradford, 993 P.2d 887, 891 (Utah Ct.App.1999); Gerow v. Covill, 192 Ariz. 9 , 960 P.2d 55 , 62 n. 8 (Ariz.Ct.App.1998); Farrell v. Farrell, 36 Conn.App. 305 , 2006However, the Ayala Court’s reasoning is at odds with that of many other jurisdictions that have expressly required that a plaintiff prove a fraudulent transfer by “clear and convincing evidence.” See, e.g., Blood v. Nofzinger, 162 Ohio App.3d 545 , 834 N.E.2d 358, 367-68 (2005); Parker v. Parker, 268 Neb. 187 , 681 N.W.2d 735, 742 (2004); McCain Foods USA, Inc. v. Central Processors, Inc., 275 Kan. 1 , 61 P.3d 68, 77 (2002); Bradford v. Bradford, 993 P.2d 887, 891 (Utah Ct.App.1999); Gerow v. Covill, 192 Ariz. 9 , 960 P.2d 55 , 62 n. 8 (Ariz.Ct.App.1998); Farrell v. Farrell, 36 Conn.App. 305 ,	1	1
Jensen v. Eamesgreen utah · 1974 · cited in 1 Hawaii opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006 2 sentences 2006However, the Ayala Court’s reasoning is at odds with that of many other jurisdictions that have expressly required that a plaintiff prove a fraudulent transfer by “clear and convincing evidence.” See, e.g., Blood v. Nofzinger, 162 Ohio App.3d 545 , 834 N.E.2d 358, 367-68 (2005); Parker v. Parker, 268 Neb. 187 , 681 N.W.2d 735, 742 (2004); McCain Foods USA, Inc. v. Central Processors, Inc., 275 Kan. 1 , 61 P.3d 68, 77 (2002); Bradford v. Bradford, 993 P.2d 887, 891 (Utah Ct.App.1999); Gerow v. Covill, 192 Ariz. 9 , 960 P.2d 55 , 62 n. 8 (Ariz.Ct.App.1998); Farrell v. Farrell, 36 Conn.App. 305 , 2006However, the Ayala Court’s reasoning is at odds with that of many other jurisdictions that have expressly required that a plaintiff prove a fraudulent transfer by “clear and convincing evidence.” See, e.g., Blood v. Nofzinger, 162 Ohio App.3d 545 , 834 N.E.2d 358, 367-68 (2005); Parker v. Parker, 268 Neb. 187 , 681 N.W.2d 735, 742 (2004); McCain Foods USA, Inc. v. Central Processors, Inc., 275 Kan. 1 , 61 P.3d 68, 77 (2002); Bradford v. Bradford, 993 P.2d 887, 891 (Utah Ct.App.1999); Gerow v. Covill, 192 Ariz. 9 , 960 P.2d 55 , 62 n. 8 (Ariz.Ct.App.1998); Farrell v. Farrell, 36 Conn.App. 305 ,	1	1
Parker v. Parkergreen neb · 2004 · cited in 1 Hawaii opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006 2 sentences 2006However, the Ayala Court’s reasoning is at odds with that of many other jurisdictions that have expressly required that a plaintiff prove a fraudulent transfer by “clear and convincing evidence.” See, e.g., Blood v. Nofzinger, 162 Ohio App.3d 545 , 834 N.E.2d 358, 367-68 (2005); Parker v. Parker, 268 Neb. 187 , 681 N.W.2d 735, 742 (2004); McCain Foods USA, Inc. v. Central Processors, Inc., 275 Kan. 1 , 61 P.3d 68, 77 (2002); Bradford v. Bradford, 993 P.2d 887, 891 (Utah Ct.App.1999); Gerow v. Covill, 192 Ariz. 9 , 960 P.2d 55 , 62 n. 8 (Ariz.Ct.App.1998); Farrell v. Farrell, 36 Conn.App. 305 , 2006However, the Ayala Court’s reasoning is at odds with that of many other jurisdictions that have expressly required that a plaintiff prove a fraudulent transfer by “clear and convincing evidence.” See, e.g., Blood v. Nofzinger, 162 Ohio App.3d 545 , 834 N.E.2d 358, 367-68 (2005); Parker v. Parker, 268 Neb. 187 , 681 N.W.2d 735, 742 (2004); McCain Foods USA, Inc. v. Central Processors, Inc., 275 Kan. 1 , 61 P.3d 68, 77 (2002); Bradford v. Bradford, 993 P.2d 887, 891 (Utah Ct.App.1999); Gerow v. Covill, 192 Ariz. 9 , 960 P.2d 55 , 62 n. 8 (Ariz.Ct.App.1998); Farrell v. Farrell, 36 Conn.App. 305 ,	1	1
McCain Foods USA, Inc. v. Central Processors, Inc.green kan · 2002 · cited in 1 Hawaii opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006 2 sentences 2006However, the Ayala Court’s reasoning is at odds with that of many other jurisdictions that have expressly required that a plaintiff prove a fraudulent transfer by “clear and convincing evidence.” See, e.g., Blood v. Nofzinger, 162 Ohio App.3d 545 , 834 N.E.2d 358, 367-68 (2005); Parker v. Parker, 268 Neb. 187 , 681 N.W.2d 735, 742 (2004); McCain Foods USA, Inc. v. Central Processors, Inc., 275 Kan. 1 , 61 P.3d 68, 77 (2002); Bradford v. Bradford, 993 P.2d 887, 891 (Utah Ct.App.1999); Gerow v. Covill, 192 Ariz. 9 , 960 P.2d 55 , 62 n. 8 (Ariz.Ct.App.1998); Farrell v. Farrell, 36 Conn.App. 305 , 2006However, the Ayala Court’s reasoning is at odds with that of many other jurisdictions that have expressly required that a plaintiff prove a fraudulent transfer by “clear and convincing evidence.” See, e.g., Blood v. Nofzinger, 162 Ohio App.3d 545 , 834 N.E.2d 358, 367-68 (2005); Parker v. Parker, 268 Neb. 187 , 681 N.W.2d 735, 742 (2004); McCain Foods USA, Inc. v. Central Processors, Inc., 275 Kan. 1 , 61 P.3d 68, 77 (2002); Bradford v. Bradford, 993 P.2d 887, 891 (Utah Ct.App.1999); Gerow v. Covill, 192 Ariz. 9 , 960 P.2d 55 , 62 n. 8 (Ariz.Ct.App.1998); Farrell v. Farrell, 36 Conn.App. 305 ,	1	1
Orsen Et Ux. v. Sieglegreen or · 1946 · cited in 1 Hawaii opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006 2 sentences 2006However, the Ayala Court’s reasoning is at odds with that of many other jurisdictions that have expressly required that a plaintiff prove a fraudulent transfer by “clear and convincing evidence.” See, e.g., Blood v. Nofzinger, 162 Ohio App.3d 545 , 834 N.E.2d 358, 367-68 (2005); Parker v. Parker, 268 Neb. 187 , 681 N.W.2d 735, 742 (2004); McCain Foods USA, Inc. v. Central Processors, Inc., 275 Kan. 1 , 61 P.3d 68, 77 (2002); Bradford v. Bradford, 993 P.2d 887, 891 (Utah Ct.App.1999); Gerow v. Covill, 192 Ariz. 9 , 960 P.2d 55 , 62 n. 8 (Ariz.Ct.App.1998); Farrell v. Farrell, 36 Conn.App. 305 , 2006However, the Ayala Court’s reasoning is at odds with that of many other jurisdictions that have expressly required that a plaintiff prove a fraudulent transfer by “clear and convincing evidence.” See, e.g., Blood v. Nofzinger, 162 Ohio App.3d 545 , 834 N.E.2d 358, 367-68 (2005); Parker v. Parker, 268 Neb. 187 , 681 N.W.2d 735, 742 (2004); McCain Foods USA, Inc. v. Central Processors, Inc., 275 Kan. 1 , 61 P.3d 68, 77 (2002); Bradford v. Bradford, 993 P.2d 887, 891 (Utah Ct.App.1999); Gerow v. Covill, 192 Ariz. 9 , 960 P.2d 55 , 62 n. 8 (Ariz.Ct.App.1998); Farrell v. Farrell, 36 Conn.App. 305 ,	1	1
Blood v. Nofzingergreen ohioctapp · 2005 · cited in 1 Hawaii opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006 2 sentences 2006However, the Ayala Court’s reasoning is at odds with that of many other jurisdictions that have expressly required that a plaintiff prove a fraudulent transfer by “clear and convincing evidence.” See, e.g., Blood v. Nofzinger, 162 Ohio App.3d 545 , 834 N.E.2d 358, 367-68 (2005); Parker v. Parker, 268 Neb. 187 , 681 N.W.2d 735, 742 (2004); McCain Foods USA, Inc. v. Central Processors, Inc., 275 Kan. 1 , 61 P.3d 68, 77 (2002); Bradford v. Bradford, 993 P.2d 887, 891 (Utah Ct.App.1999); Gerow v. Covill, 192 Ariz. 9 , 960 P.2d 55 , 62 n. 8 (Ariz.Ct.App.1998); Farrell v. Farrell, 36 Conn.App. 305 , 2006However, the Ayala Court’s reasoning is at odds with that of many other jurisdictions that have expressly required that a plaintiff prove a fraudulent transfer by “clear and convincing evidence.” See, e.g., Blood v. Nofzinger, 162 Ohio App.3d 545 , 834 N.E.2d 358, 367-68 (2005); Parker v. Parker, 268 Neb. 187 , 681 N.W.2d 735, 742 (2004); McCain Foods USA, Inc. v. Central Processors, Inc., 275 Kan. 1 , 61 P.3d 68, 77 (2002); Bradford v. Bradford, 993 P.2d 887, 891 (Utah Ct.App.1999); Gerow v. Covill, 192 Ariz. 9 , 960 P.2d 55 , 62 n. 8 (Ariz.Ct.App.1998); Farrell v. Farrell, 36 Conn.App. 305 ,	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Hawaii. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (3)

Case	Cited	Years
Addington v. Texas green scotus · 1979 2 sentences 2006Under the preponderance standard, the parties share the risks of an erroneous verdict in roughly equal fashion. [Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 ,] 423, 99 S.Ct. [1804,] 1808, 60 L.Ed.2d [323,] 329 [ (1979) ]. 1981The United States Supreme Court, in Addington v. State, 441 U.S. 418 (1979), explained the function of this standard, falling between the preponderance standard of typical civil cases and the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of criminal cases, as serving “to protect particularly important individual interests in various civil cases.” Id. at 424 .	4	1981–2006
Marriage of Gerow v. Covill green arizctapp · 1998 2 sentences 2006However, the Ayala Court’s reasoning is at odds with that of many other jurisdictions that have expressly required that a plaintiff prove a fraudulent transfer by “clear and convincing evidence.” See, e.g., Blood v. Nofzinger, 162 Ohio App.3d 545 , 834 N.E.2d 358, 367-68 (2005); Parker v. Parker, 268 Neb. 187 , 681 N.W.2d 735, 742 (2004); McCain Foods USA, Inc. v. Central Processors, Inc., 275 Kan. 1 , 61 P.3d 68, 77 (2002); Bradford v. Bradford, 993 P.2d 887, 891 (Utah Ct.App.1999); Gerow v. Covill, 192 Ariz. 9 , 960 P.2d 55 , 62 n. 8 (Ariz.Ct.App.1998); Farrell v. Farrell, 36 Conn.App. 305 , 2006However, the Ayala Court’s reasoning is at odds with that of many other jurisdictions that have expressly required that a plaintiff prove a fraudulent transfer by “clear and convincing evidence.” See, e.g., Blood v. Nofzinger, 162 Ohio App.3d 545 , 834 N.E.2d 358, 367-68 (2005); Parker v. Parker, 268 Neb. 187 , 681 N.W.2d 735, 742 (2004); McCain Foods USA, Inc. v. Central Processors, Inc., 275 Kan. 1 , 61 P.3d 68, 77 (2002); Bradford v. Bradford, 993 P.2d 887, 891 (Utah Ct.App.1999); Gerow v. Covill, 192 Ariz. 9 , 960 P.2d 55 , 62 n. 8 (Ariz.Ct.App.1998); Farrell v. Farrell, 36 Conn.App. 305 ,	1	2006–2006
United States v. Ayala (In Re Ayala) green caeb · 1989 1 sentence 2006The court reasoned that “the [Bankruptcy] Code [did] not state a level of proof necessary, [and] that in the face of this silence, [c]ourts may not imply a higher standard than the preponderance standard normally applied in civil proceedings.” Id.	1	2006–2006

Where else courts name it

TX 409 (1972–2026) CA 122 (1921–2026) IA 99 (1980–2025) WA 95 (1971–2026) IL 88 (1939–2026) PA 62 (1975–2024) LA 49 (1977–2024) DC 42 (1970–2025) MD 41 (1964–2025) NJ 39 (1982–2026) OR 38 (1960–2024) NY 37 (1975–2026) CO 37 (1961–2026) AZ 22 (1981–2025) MA 21 (1978–2026) VT 21 (1983–2023) OH 20 (1984–2026) FL 20 (1962–2023) VA 17 (1975–2025) MI 16 (1974–2026) KY 16 (1992–2024) IN 16 (1975–2024) CT 15 (1978–2019) GA 14 (1949–2025) AK 14 (1981–2025) NV 13 (1987–2025) UT 13 (1991–2025) WI 12 (1981–2025) ME 11 (1984–2024) MN 10 (1985–2024) DE 10 (1982–2024) TN 10 (2000–2025) HI 10 (1981–2026) ND 8 (1981–2020) KS 8 (1977–2022) WV 7 (1982–2022) NH 7 (1977–2024) ID 7 (1996–2026) SD 7 (1987–2015) OK 6 (1980–2005) MO 6 (2000–2023) MS 6 (1988–2013) AR 5 (1974–2017) NC 5 (1982–2024) WY 5 (1987–2004) MT 4 (1979–2010) SC 3 (1996–2023) NM 2 (2000–2021) VI 2 (2013–2013) NE 2 (1948–2016)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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