preponderance standard in Georgia

2011See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 176 , 107 S.Ct. 2775 , 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987); State v. Rocco, 255 Ga.App. 565, 566 , 566 S.E.2d 365 (2002).

2011See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U. S. 171, 176 (107 SC 2775, 97 LE2d 144) (1987); State v. Rocco, 255 Ga. App. 565, 566 ( 566 SE2d 365 ) (2002).

2014See also Copelan v. Copelan, 294 Ga. 840, 841 ( 755 SE2d 739 ) (2014) (explaining that the collateral estoppel doctrine does not apply when the first proceeding required proof of the issue by clear and convincing evidence and the second proceeding required proof by the lower preponderance standard).

2014See also Copelan v. Copelan, 294 Ga. 840, 841 ( 755 SE2d 739 ) (2014) (explaining that the collateral estoppel doctrine does not apply when the first proceeding required proof of the issue by clear and convincing evidence and the second proceeding required proof by the lower preponderance standard).

2011See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U. S. 171, 176 (107 SC 2775, 97 LE2d 144) (1987); State v. Rocco, 255 Ga. App. 565, 566 ( 566 SE2d 365 ) (2002).

2011See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U. S. 171, 176 (107 SC 2775, 97 LE2d 144) (1987); State v. Rocco, 255 Ga. App. 565, 566 ( 566 SE2d 365 ) (2002).

2025I also recognize that, when we review the granting of an immunity motion on appeal, we are bound “to accept the trial court’s findings with regard to questions of fact and credibility if there is any evidence to support them.” Remy, 308 Ga. at 298 (3) (citation omitted; emphasis added).

2025I also recognize that, when we review the grant of an immunity motion on appeal, we are bound to “accept the trial court’s findings with regard to questions of fact and credibility if there is any evidence to support them.” Remy, 308 Ga. at 298 (3) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied).

2023S., 310 Ga. App. 70, 78 (2) n.14 ( 712 SE2d 99 ) (2011) (“Under the preponderance standard, to sustain a 5 an instruction almost identical to Georgia’s suggested pattern jury instruction on the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applicable in civil cases: The plaintiff has the burden of proof, which means the plaintiff must prove whatever it takes to make his case, except for any admissions in the pleadings by the defendant.

2023In Georgia, to show reversible error, there “must be harm as well as error.”29 And relevant here, the mere fact that an accident happened and the plaintiff may have sustained injuries or damages “affords no basis for recovery against a particular defendant unless the plaintiff carries the burden of proof and shows that such accident 28 See United States v. Watkins, 10 F4th 1179, 1184 (11th Cir. 2021) (“The preponderance standard of proof is one of widespread and longstanding use.

2020The United States Supreme Court has held that “application of the preponderance standard at sentencing generally satisfies due process.” United States v. Watts, 519 U. S. 148, 156 ( 117 SCt 633 , 136 LE2d 554) (1997).

2020The United States Supreme Court has held that “application of the preponderance standard at sentencing generally satisfies due process.” United States v. Watts, 519 U. S. 148, 156 ( 117 SCt 633 , 136 LE2d 554) (1997).

2020Delacruz v. State, 280 Ga. 392, 398 ( 627 SE2d 579 ) (2006) (citation omitted) (holding that the trial court’s isolated misstatement, “if you do not believe from the entire evidence that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, you may convict,” was not reversible 25 error given the jury charges as a whole (punctuation omitted; emphasis in original)).

2020Delacruz v. State, 280 Ga. 392, 398 ( 627 SE2d 579 ) (2006) (citation omitted) (holding that the trial court’s isolated misstatement, “if you do not believe from the entire evidence that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, you may convict,” was not reversible 25 error given the jury charges as a whole (punctuation omitted; emphasis in original)).

2012Dillard, J., concurs in judgment only. other individuals, when the police found cocaine inside his mother’s bedroom was insufficient to establish under the preponderance standard that the probationer was in possession of cocaine with intent to distribute); see also Boatner v. State, 312 Ga. App. 147, 148 (1) ( 717 SE2d 727 ) (2011) (reversing probation revocation for possession of rifle found leaning against the outside railing of porch on probationer’s trailer, where probationer testified that the rifle was not his, probation officer acknowledged that rifle could have belonged to a neighbor,

2012Dillard, J., concurs in judgment only. other individuals, when the police found cocaine inside his mother’s bedroom was insufficient to establish under the preponderance standard that the probationer was in possession of cocaine with intent to distribute); see also Boatner v. State, 312 Ga. App. 147, 148 (1) ( 717 SE2d 727 ) (2011) (reversing probation revocation for possession of rifle found leaning against the outside railing of porch on probationer’s trailer, where probationer testified that the rifle was not his, probation officer acknowledged that rifle could have belonged to a neighbor,

2012Dillard, J., concurs in judgment only. other individuals, when the police found cocaine inside his mother’s bedroom was insufficient to establish under the preponderance standard that the probationer was in possession of cocaine with intent to distribute); see also Boatner v. State, 312 Ga. App. 147, 148 (1) ( 717 SE2d 727 ) (2011) (reversing probation revocation for possession of rifle found leaning against the outside railing of porch on probationer’s trailer, where probationer testified that the rifle was not his, probation officer acknowledged that rifle could have belonged to a neighbor,

2012Dillard, J., concurs in judgment only. other individuals, when the police found cocaine inside his mother’s bedroom was insufficient to establish under the preponderance standard that the probationer was in possession of cocaine with intent to distribute); see also Boatner v. State, 312 Ga. App. 147, 148 (1) ( 717 SE2d 727 ) (2011) (reversing probation revocation for possession of rifle found leaning against the outside railing of porch on probationer’s trailer, where probationer testified that the rifle was not his, probation officer acknowledged that rifle could have belonged to a neighbor,

2012Dillard, J., concurs in judgment only. other individuals, when the police found cocaine inside his mother’s bedroom was insufficient to establish under the preponderance standard that the probationer was in possession of cocaine with intent to distribute); see also Boatner v. State, 312 Ga. App. 147, 148 (1) ( 717 SE2d 727 ) (2011) (reversing probation revocation for possession of rifle found leaning against the outside railing of porch on probationer’s trailer, where probationer testified that the rifle was not his, probation officer acknowledged that rifle could have belonged to a neighbor,

2011See Ward v. State, 271 Ga. 62, 64 ( 515 SE2d 392 ) (1999) (after concluding its charge on reasonable doubt, the *247 trial court explained that its reasonable doubt charge was better expressed as a simple, honestly held belief that defendants were guilty); see also Jones v. State, 252 Ga. App. 332, 334 (2) (a) ( 556 SE2d 238 ) (2001) (immediately after charging the jury on reasonable doubt, the trial court neutralized the same by instructing the jury that “reasonable doubt, ‘in other words,’ means honest belief”).

2011See Ward v. State, 271 Ga. 62, 64 ( 515 SE2d 392 ) (1999) (after concluding its charge on reasonable doubt, the *247 trial court explained that its reasonable doubt charge was better expressed as a simple, honestly held belief that defendants were guilty); see also Jones v. State, 252 Ga. App. 332, 334 (2) (a) ( 556 SE2d 238 ) (2001) (immediately after charging the jury on reasonable doubt, the trial court neutralized the same by instructing the jury that “reasonable doubt, ‘in other words,’ means honest belief”).

2011See Ward v. State, 271 Ga. 62, 64 ( 515 SE2d 392 ) (1999) (after concluding its charge on reasonable doubt, the *247 trial court explained that its reasonable doubt charge was better expressed as a simple, honestly held belief that defendants were guilty); see also Jones v. State, 252 Ga. App. 332, 334 (2) (a) ( 556 SE2d 238 ) (2001) (immediately after charging the jury on reasonable doubt, the trial court neutralized the same by instructing the jury that “reasonable doubt, ‘in other words,’ means honest belief”).

2011See Ward v. State, 271 Ga. 62, 64 ( 515 SE2d 392 ) (1999) (after concluding its charge on reasonable doubt, the *247 trial court explained that its reasonable doubt charge was better expressed as a simple, honestly held belief that defendants were guilty); see also Jones v. State, 252 Ga. App. 332, 334 (2) (a) ( 556 SE2d 238 ) (2001) (immediately after charging the jury on reasonable doubt, the trial court neutralized the same by instructing the jury that “reasonable doubt, ‘in other words,’ means honest belief”).

1997Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 74 (II), 112 S.Ct. 475, 483 , 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). "[W]e find `nothing to suggest that admissibility rulings have been unreliable or otherwise wanting in quality because not based on some higher standard.'" Bourjaily v. U.S., 483 U.S. 171, 175-176 , 107 S.Ct. 2775, 2779 , 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987) (cited with approval in Huddleston v. U.S., supra at 687, fn. 5, 108 S.Ct. at 1500, fn. 5 ).

1997Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 74 (II), 112 S.Ct. 475, 483 , 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). "[W]e find `nothing to suggest that admissibility rulings have been unreliable or otherwise wanting in quality because not based on some higher standard.'" Bourjaily v. U.S., 483 U.S. 171, 175-176 , 107 S.Ct. 2775, 2779 , 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987) (cited with approval in Huddleston v. U.S., supra at 687, fn. 5, 108 S.Ct. at 1500, fn. 5 ).

1997Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 74 (II), 112 S.Ct. 475, 483 , 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). "[W]e find `nothing to suggest that admissibility rulings have been unreliable or otherwise wanting in quality because not based on some higher standard.'" Bourjaily v. U.S., 483 U.S. 171, 175-176 , 107 S.Ct. 2775, 2779 , 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987) (cited with approval in Huddleston v. U.S., supra at 687, fn. 5, 108 S.Ct. at 1500, fn. 5 ).