preponderance standard in Vermont

2011Indeed, in Harrington we observed that the agency’s action was a clear “deviation from the preponderance of the evidence standard normally applied in administrative proceedings,” noting that the United States Supreme Court had upheld the preponderance standard even in “a securities fraud disciplinary case . . . despite the fact the proceeding could result in an order permanently barring the licensee from practicing his profession.” 152 Vt. at 448 -49 (citing Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 102 (1981)).

2009We relied, in this regard, on Steadman v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 450 U.S. 91, 102 (1981), where the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the preponderance standard satisfied due process in an administrative hearing before the SEC to determine whether violations of federal security laws warranted a disciplinary suspension.

2010Id.

2010See id. at 436 , 467 A.2d at 124 (“[T]he State’s interest in protecting a child from the risk of serious and potentially irrevocable harm counterbalances the parents’ interest in avoiding an erroneous curtailment of their rights.”) (quotations omitted). ¶ 8.

1983See, e.g., In re Sabrina M., 460 A.2d 1009, 1015-17 (Me. 1983).

1983See, e.g., In re Sabrina M., 460 A.2d 1009, 1015-17 (Me.1983).

2011Indeed, in Harrington we observed that the agency’s action was a clear “deviation from the preponderance of the evidence standard normally applied in administrative proceedings,” noting that the United States Supreme Court had upheld the preponderance standard even in “a securities fraud disciplinary case . . . despite the fact the proceeding could result in an order permanently barring the licensee from practicing his profession.” 152 Vt. at 448 -49 (citing Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 102 (1981)).

1993See Harrington v. Department of Employment & Training, 152 Vt. 446, 448-49 , 566 A.2d 988, 990 (1989).

2023See Harlow v. Miller, 147 Vt. 480 , 483–84 (1986) (“Where a family relationship between claimants is involved, proof of adverse possession must be established by stronger evidence than is required in other cases.”); see also Benson v. Lowe, No. 2020-021, 2020 WL 3045993 , at *3 (stating that the Vermont Supreme Court has not addressed whether the standard of proof for prescriptive easements is “clear and convincing.”).

2019See, e.g., Brady v. State , 575 N.E.2d 981 , 984-86 (Ind. 1991) (holding Indiana statute that allowed child to testify outside of court upon finding it was more likely than not that trauma would result from testifying in defendant's presence met requirements of Craig ); Taylor v. Wall , 821 A.2d 685 , 690 (R.I. 2003) (holding that court's finding that child "would suffer unreasonable and unnecessary mental and emotional harm if required to testify in defendant's presence" satisfied Craig requirements).

2011See In re Smith, 169 Vt. 162, 172 , 730 A.2d 605, 612-13 (1999) (“Where substantial interests exist on both sides, due process demands no more than an equal apportionment of the risk of error, which the preponderance standard accomplishes.”).

2011See In re Smith, 169 Vt. 162, 172 , 730 A.2d 605, 612-13 (1999) (“Where substantial interests exist on both sides, due process demands no more than an equal apportionment of the risk of error, which the preponderance standard accomplishes.”).

2011See TBH n Meyer, 168 Vt. 149, 152 , 716 A.2d 31, 33-34 (1998) (noting this Court “will not render a cramped definition of sexually abusive acts” and holding that abuse can properly be inferred from taking nude photographs of minor).

2011See TBH n Meyer, 168 Vt. 149, 152 , 716 A.2d 31, 33-34 (1998) (noting this Court “will not render a cramped definition of sexually abusive acts” and holding that abuse can properly be inferred from taking nude photographs of minor).

2010See Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 716 (concluding that properly designed and executed epidemiological studies may be part of the evidence supporting causation in a toxic tort case, and finding a rational basis for relating the requirement that there be more than a “doubling of the risk” to the “more likely than not” burden of proof) (citing cases where other courts have found that “the requirement of a more than 50% probability means that epidemiological evidence must show that the risk of an injury or condition in the exposed population was more than double the risk in the unexposed or control popula

2010Although the trial court is correct that some courts have adopted the 2.0 standard when determining whether to admit epidemiological studies, see, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 716 (Tex. 1997), those courts that have adopted the 2.0 standard have for the most part done so on the basis of the following passage from the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995) (Daubert II): For an epidemiological study to show causation under a preponderance standard, the relative risk of limb reduction defects arising fro

2010See Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 716 (concluding that properly designed and executed epidemiological studies may be part of the evidence supporting causation in a toxic tort case, and finding a rational basis for relating the requirement that there be more than a “doubling of the risk” to the “more likely than not” burden of proof) (citing cases where other courts have found that “the requirement of a more than 50% probability means that epidemiological evidence must show that the risk of an injury or condition in the exposed population was more than double the risk in the unexposed or control popula

2010Although the trial court is correct that some courts have adopted the 2.0 standard when determining whether to admit epidemiological studies, see, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 716 (Tex. 1997), those courts that have adopted the 2.0 standard have for the most part done so on the basis of the following passage from the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995) (Daubert II): For an epidemiological study to show causation under a preponderance standard, the relative risk of limb reduction defects arising fro

2010See Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 716 (concluding that properly designed and executed epidemiological studies may be part of the evidence supporting causation in a toxic tort case, and finding a rational basis for relating the requirement that there be more than a "doubling of the risk" to the "more likely than not" burden of proof) (citing cases where other courts have found that "the requirement of a more than 50% probability means that epidemiological evidence must show that the risk of an injury or condition in the exposed population was more than double the risk in the unexposed or control popula

2010See Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 716 (concluding that properly designed and executed epidemiological studies may be part of the evidence supporting causation in a toxic tort case, and finding a rational basis for relating the requirement that there be more than a "doubling of the risk" to the "more likely than not" burden of proof) (citing cases where other courts have found that "the requirement of a more than 50% probability means that epidemiological evidence must show that the risk of an injury or condition in the exposed population was more than double the risk in the unexposed or control popula

2010See Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 716 (concluding that properly designed and executed epidemiological studies may be part of the evidence supporting causation in a toxic tort case, and finding a rational basis for relating the requirement that there be more than a "doubling of the risk" to the "more likely than not" burden of proof) (citing cases where other courts have found that "the requirement of a more than 50% probability means that epidemiological evidence must show that the risk of an injury or condition in the exposed population was more than double the risk in the unexposed or control popula

2010Cal. 1996) (plaintiff must show more than that certain chemical increased somewhat the likelihood of particular injury; he or she must show that it more than doubled the risk — this would then offer support for an opinion that it was more likely than not the source of plaintiff’s injury); Magistrini, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 605 n.27 (“[M]any courts confronted with determining the reliability of expert testimony look at whether or not the studies relied upon by the expert are statistically significant.”) (citing Joiner, 522 U.S. at 145-46 (evaluating reliability of epidemiological data based on stat

2009Practice, 733 N.W.2d 778, 785 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that the preponderance standard satisfied due process in a proceeding involving the temporary suspension of a physician’s medical license); N.D.

2009No decision by the United States Supreme Court has since reconsidered Steadman or suggested that our holding in Smith is inconsistent with the dictates of due process, and while some states — as we recognized in Smith — have concluded that due process requires proof by clear and convincing evidence in medical disciplinary proceedings, see, e.g., Nguyen v. State, 29 P.3d 689, 697 (Wash. 2001), many others have reached conclusions identical to ours.

1999As explained above, the “burden of persuasion on factual issues before an administrative body is met by the usual civil case standard of a preponderance of evidence.” Muzzy, 141 Vt. at 472 , 449 A.2d at 974 (internal quotation omitted). “[I]f the conflicting evidence of the parties is of equal weight, or if the evidence of the [grievant] outweighs that of the [State], the evidence of the [State] does not preponderate.” Id. at 472-73 , 449 A.2d at 974 (citations omitted).

1999As explained above, the “burden of persuasion on factual issues before an administrative body is met by the usual civil case standard of a preponderance of evidence.” Muzzy, 141 Vt. at 472 , 449 A.2d at 974 (internal quotation omitted). “[I]f the conflicting evidence of the parties is of equal weight, or if the evidence of the [grievant] outweighs that of the [State], the evidence of the [State] does not preponderate.” Id. at 472-73 , 449 A.2d at 974 (citations omitted).

1999See In re Walton, 676 P.2d 1078, 1085 (Alaska 1983); see also Steadman v. Securities & Exch.

1995Olson v. Union Oil Co., 78 P.2d 446, 447 (Cal. 1938) (words “clearly proved” are understood to mean proved by a preponderance of the evidence).

1994Since the custody proceeding entails an adversary contest involving the parents and the children, “the relevant question is whether a preponderance standard fairly allocates the risk of an erroneous factfinding.” Santosky, 455 U.S. at 761 (emphasis added).

1994Since the custody proceeding entails an adversary contest involving the parents and the children, "the relevant question is whether a preponderance standard fairly allocates the risk of an erroneous factfinding." Santosky, 455 U.S. at 761 , 102 S.Ct. at 1399 (emphasis added).

1990See, e.g., Light v. State, 547 N.E.2d 1073, 1079 (Ind. 1989); State v. Langill, 567 A.2d 440, 443 (Me. 1989).

1990See, e.g., Light v. State, 547 N.E.2d 1073, 1079 (Ind. 1989); State v. Langill, 567 A.2d 440, 443 (Me. 1989).