preponderance standard in California

2004Nevertheless, we may "construe" the statute to preserve its constitutionality "by requiring clear and convincing evidence" to rebut the presumption that visitation by a petitioning grandparent over a custodial parent's objection is not in the child's best interest. [5] ( Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519, 543 , 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 412 , 28 P.3d 151 ( Wendland ).) Section 3104 is silent regarding the standard of proof, so construing it to require clear and convincing evidence "does not entail a deviation from the language of the statute. . . ." ( Wendland, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 54

2004Nevertheless, we may "construe" the statute to preserve its constitutionality "by requiring clear and convincing evidence" to rebut the presumption that visitation by a petitioning grandparent over a custodial parent's objection is not in the child's best interest. [5] ( Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519, 543 , 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 412 , 28 P.3d 151 ( Wendland ).) Section 3104 is silent regarding the standard of proof, so construing it to require clear and convincing evidence "does not entail a deviation from the language of the statute. . . ." ( Wendland, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 54

2023Bill No. 777 (2003–2004 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 29, 2003; Lawson, supra, 12 Cal. 5th at p. 712 .) Under Labor Code section 1102.6, the defendants must identify clear and convincing evidence to show that no reasonable jury could find that the District would not have given Andersson 31 a negative performance review for legitimate, independent reasons. “ ‘Clear and convincing’ evidence requires a finding of high probability.” (In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal. 3d 908, 919 , superseded by statute on another ground as stated in In re Cody W. (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 221 , 229–230.) Although this stan

2004Nevertheless, we may "construe" the statute to preserve its constitutionality "by requiring clear and convincing evidence" to rebut the presumption that visitation by a petitioning grandparent over a custodial parent's objection is not in the child's best interest. [5] ( Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519, 543 , 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 412 , 28 P.3d 151 ( Wendland ).) Section 3104 is silent regarding the standard of proof, so construing it to require clear and convincing evidence "does not entail a deviation from the language of the statute. . . ." ( Wendland, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 54

2017Code, § 115.) The Legislature's decision to apply the default standard of proof to other domestic violence offenses is consistent with the well-settled principle that " 'evidentiary facts' " are governed by the preponderance standard, while the reasonable doubt standard applies to the ultimate determination of guilt. ( People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694 , 763, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165 , 906 P.2d 2 ; People v. Lisenba (1939) 14 Cal.2d 403 , 430, 94 P.2d 569 .) A defendant's propensity to commit a crime is such an evidentiary fact. ( *997 People v. Anderson (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 851 , 896-897, 14

2017Code, § 115.) The Legislature's decision to apply the default standard of proof to other domestic violence offenses is consistent with the well-settled principle that " 'evidentiary facts' " are governed by the preponderance standard, while the reasonable doubt standard applies to the ultimate determination of guilt. ( People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694 , 763, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165 , 906 P.2d 2 ; People v. Lisenba (1939) 14 Cal.2d 403 , 430, 94 P.2d 569 .) A defendant's propensity to commit a crime is such an evidentiary fact. ( *997 People v. Anderson (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 851 , 896-897, 14

2017Code, § 115.) The Legislature's decision to apply the default standard of proof to other domestic violence offenses is consistent with the well-settled principle that " 'evidentiary facts' " are governed by the preponderance standard, while the reasonable doubt standard applies to the ultimate determination of guilt. ( People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694 , 763, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165 , 906 P.2d 2 ; People v. Lisenba (1939) 14 Cal.2d 403 , 430, 94 P.2d 569 .) A defendant's propensity to commit a crime is such an evidentiary fact. ( *997 People v. Anderson (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 851 , 896-897, 14

2017Code, § 115.) The Legislature's decision to apply the default standard of proof to other domestic violence offenses is consistent with the well-settled principle that " 'evidentiary facts' " are governed by the preponderance standard, while the reasonable doubt standard applies to the ultimate determination of guilt. ( People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694 , 763, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165 , 906 P.2d 2 ; People v. Lisenba (1939) 14 Cal.2d 403 , 430, 94 P.2d 569 .) A defendant's propensity to commit a crime is such an evidentiary fact. ( *997 People v. Anderson (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 851 , 896-897, 14

2012(People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 382 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 935 P.2d 708 ], superseded by statute on another point as noted in Verdin v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1096, 1106 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 287 , 183 P.3d 1250 ], which in turn was superseded by statute on another point as noted in Maldonado v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1112, 1119, fn. 5 [ 140 Cal.Rptr.3d 113 , 274 P.3d 1110 ].) As noted in People v. Carpenter, supra, at page 382, the United States Supreme Court, interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence, also has adopted the preponderance standard for proof of uncharge

2012(People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 382 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 935 P.2d 708 ], superseded by statute on another point as noted in Verdin v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1096, 1106 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 287 , 183 P.3d 1250 ], which in turn was superseded by statute on another point as noted in Maldonado v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1112, 1119, fn. 5 [ 140 Cal.Rptr.3d 113 , 274 P.3d 1110 ].) As noted in People v. Carpenter, supra, at page 382, the United States Supreme Court, interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence, also has adopted the preponderance standard for proof of uncharge

2004Nevertheless, we may "construe" the statute to preserve its constitutionality "by requiring clear and convincing evidence" to rebut the presumption that visitation by a petitioning grandparent over a custodial parent's objection is not in the child's best interest. [5] ( Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519, 543 , 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 412 , 28 P.3d 151 ( Wendland ).) Section 3104 is silent regarding the standard of proof, so construing it to require clear and convincing evidence "does not entail a deviation from the language of the statute. . . ." ( Wendland, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 54

2004Nevertheless, we may "construe" the statute to preserve its constitutionality "by requiring clear and convincing evidence" to rebut the presumption that visitation by a petitioning grandparent over a custodial parent's objection is not in the child's best interest. [5] ( Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519, 543 , 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 412 , 28 P.3d 151 ( Wendland ).) Section 3104 is silent regarding the standard of proof, so construing it to require clear and convincing evidence "does not entail a deviation from the language of the statute. . . ." ( Wendland, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 54

2018When evidence of uncharged misconduct is admitted for the purpose of establishing identity or intent, we have explained that the crimes are mere 'evidentiary facts.' [Citation.] The jury cannot consider them at all unless they find them proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 'If the jury finds by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant committed the other crimes, the evidence is clearly relevant and may therefore be considered. [Citations.]' [Citation.] If the jury finds the facts sufficiently proven for consideration, it must still decide whether the facts are sufficient, taken wit

2018When evidence of uncharged misconduct is admitted for the purpose of establishing identity or intent, we have explained that the crimes are mere 'evidentiary facts.' [Citation.] The jury cannot consider them at all unless they find them proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 'If the jury finds by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant committed the other crimes, the evidence is clearly relevant and may therefore be considered. [Citations.]' [Citation.] If the jury finds the facts sufficiently proven for consideration, it must still decide whether the facts are sufficient, taken wit

2008Code, §§ 1203.2, subd. (c), 1203.1, subd. (a); People v. Howard (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1081, 1087-1088 [ 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 870 , 946 P.2d 828 ].) By this measure, section 777 makes no unfavorable penal change, and the preponderance standard can apply." ( Eddie M., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 506 .) *60 (5) In sum, "Proposition 21 transformed section 777(a)(2) into a probation violation procedure in which no criminal offense can be alleged." ( Eddie M., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 508 .) "Even if criminal in fact, new misconduct may be treated, under section 777(a)(2), only as a probation violation.

2008Code, §§ 1203.2, subd. (c), 1203.1, subd. (a); People v. Howard (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1081, 1087-1088 [ 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 870 , 946 P.2d 828 ].) By this measure, section 777 makes no unfavorable penal change, and the preponderance standard can apply." ( Eddie M., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 506 .) *60 (5) In sum, "Proposition 21 transformed section 777(a)(2) into a probation violation procedure in which no criminal offense can be alleged." ( Eddie M., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 508 .) "Even if criminal in fact, new misconduct may be treated, under section 777(a)(2), only as a probation violation.

2004Nevertheless, we may "construe" the statute to preserve its constitutionality "by requiring clear and convincing evidence" to rebut the presumption that visitation by a petitioning grandparent over a custodial parent's objection is not in the child's best interest. [5] ( Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519, 543 , 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 412 , 28 P.3d 151 ( Wendland ).) Section 3104 is silent regarding the standard of proof, so construing it to require clear and convincing evidence "does not entail a deviation from the language of the statute. . . ." ( Wendland, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 54

2004Nevertheless, we may "construe" the statute to preserve its constitutionality "by requiring clear and convincing evidence" to rebut the presumption that visitation by a petitioning grandparent over a custodial parent's objection is not in the child's best interest. [5] ( Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519, 543 , 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 412 , 28 P.3d 151 ( Wendland ).) Section 3104 is silent regarding the standard of proof, so construing it to require clear and convincing evidence "does not entail a deviation from the language of the statute. . . ." ( Wendland, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 54

2000(People v. Simon, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d at p. 132 , citing People v. Albertson (1944) 23 Cal.2d 550, 581 [ 145 P.2d 7 ] (cone. opn. of Traynor, J.).) In Simon , the court held that the function of the trial court is to determine whether the evidence of the preliminary fact is “sufficient to allow the jury to determine by a preponderance standard” that the preliminary fact exists.

2000(People v. Simon, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d at p. 132 , citing People v. Albertson (1944) 23 Cal.2d 550, 581 [ 145 P.2d 7 ] (cone. opn. of Traynor, J.).) In Simon , the court held that the function of the trial court is to determine whether the evidence of the preliminary fact is “sufficient to allow the jury to determine by a preponderance standard” that the preliminary fact exists.

1997(People v. Durham (1969) 70 Cal.2d 171, 187, fn. 15 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 262 , 449 P.2d 198 ]; People v. Cavanaugh (1968) 69 Cal.2d 262, 273-274, fn. 9 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 438 , 444 P.2d 110 ]; People v. Haston (1968) 69 Cal.2d 233, 253 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 419 , 444 P.2d 91 ]; People v. Polk (1965) 63 Cal.2d 443, 451 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 406 P.2d 641 ].) In People v. Medina, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pages 762-764, we reiterated the preponderance standard against an argument that the reasonable doubt standard should apply, although the defendant did not specifically urge the clear and convincing evidence standard.

1997(People v. Durham (1969) 70 Cal.2d 171, 187, fn. 15 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 262 , 449 P.2d 198 ]; People v. Cavanaugh (1968) 69 Cal.2d 262, 273-274, fn. 9 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 438 , 444 P.2d 110 ]; People v. Haston (1968) 69 Cal.2d 233, 253 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 419 , 444 P.2d 91 ]; People v. Polk (1965) 63 Cal.2d 443, 451 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 406 P.2d 641 ].) In People v. Medina, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pages 762-764, we reiterated the preponderance standard against an argument that the reasonable doubt standard should apply, although the defendant did not specifically urge the clear and convincing evidence standard.

2026Our Supreme Court upheld an instruction that applied the preponderance standard to an uncharged offense in People v. Reliford (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1007 .

2024(People v. Loy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 46 , 71–77; People v. Reliford (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1007 , 1012–1016.) The court reasoned that such a limiting instruction only authorizes the jury to use the preponderance standard in making the preliminary determination whether the defendant committed a prior uncharged offense, and it is not reasonably likely the jury would interpret such an instruction to authorize conviction of the charged offense based on a lowered standard of proof.

2024The majority in Villatoro implicitly recognized that giving such an instruction would “impermissibly lower the standard of proof or otherwise interfere with defendant’s presumption of innocence.” (Villatoro, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1168 .) Justice Corrigan’s separate opinion (joined by Justice Werdegar) similarly noted: “If the same preponderance standard is applied to charged offenses . . . , there is a serious risk of confusion.

2023(Quintanilla, at pp. 575, 582–583.) Among the court’s reasons for so concluding was its belief that the Legislature did not mean “for juries to weigh the evidence supporting domestic violence charges under two different standards of proof—beyond a reasonable doubt on each charged offense, but preponderance of the evidence for purposes of assessing a defendant’s propensity.” (Id. at p. 583.) Because the trial court had “told the jury to consider charged offenses under the preponderance standard for purposes of drawing a propensity inference, while also weighing the same evidence under the reaso

2026People v. Cruz (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1178 , and People v. Holliday (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 536 , 546, upon which Ray relies, are inapposite because the juries there were instructed to apply the preponderance standard to charged offenses.

2024We believe that, for practical purposes, the instruction lowered the standard of proof for the determination of guilt.” (Id. at p. 1186.) Although the Cruz court acknowledged that the trial court had also given a proper jury instruction on the reasonable doubt standard, and that 37 “[o]ther instructions reiterated that the reasonable-doubt standard applied to the ultimate question of guilt” (Cruz, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 1184 ), it nevertheless found that “the combination of that instruction with the preponderance instruction for charged offenses produced a hopeless muddle.” (Id. at p. 1186

2012(People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 382 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 935 P.2d 708 ], superseded by statute on another point as noted in Verdin v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1096, 1106 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 287 , 183 P.3d 1250 ], which in turn was superseded by statute on another point as noted in Maldonado v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1112, 1119, fn. 5 [ 140 Cal.Rptr.3d 113 , 274 P.3d 1110 ].) As noted in People v. Carpenter, supra, at page 382, the United States Supreme Court, interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence, also has adopted the preponderance standard for proof of uncharge

2012(People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 382 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 935 P.2d 708 ], superseded by statute on another point as noted in Verdin v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1096, 1106 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 287 , 183 P.3d 1250 ], which in turn was superseded by statute on another point as noted in Maldonado v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1112, 1119, fn. 5 [ 140 Cal.Rptr.3d 113 , 274 P.3d 1110 ].) As noted in People v. Carpenter, supra, at page 382, the United States Supreme Court, interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence, also has adopted the preponderance standard for proof of uncharge

2024(People v. Gregerson (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 306, 316 (Gregerson).) “Thus, to obtain outpatient treatment, the patient must raise a 2 It is unnecessary to summarize the facts of the underlying offenses to resolve the present appeal. 2 strong suspicion in a person of ordinary prudence that outpatient treatment would be safe and effective.” (Id. at p. 319.) The patient “need not meet ‘the higher burden’ [citation] set by the preponderance standard of showing it is more likely than not that outpatient treatment would be safe and effective.” (Ibid.) “If the [trial] court denies outpatient treatment

2013(People v. Gregerson (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 306 , 315- 316.) To meet this burden, the MDO need not satisfy "the preponderance standard of . . . more likely than not"; rather, the statutory " 'reasonable cause' " standard merely requires "a strong suspicion in a person of ordinary prudence that outpatient treatment would be safe and effective." (Id. at p. 319.) Because the court is authorized to order outpatient treatment at the time of an MDO recommitment trial, the MDO may properly present evidence on the outpatient issue, including, for example, relevant testimony or 8 Section 2792, subdivis

2023(See Hicks, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at p. 512 [indicating that prior to Senate Bill No. 567, “ ‘ “[t]he circumstances utilized by the trial court to support its sentencing choice need only be established by a preponderance of the evidence” ’ ”]; see also People v. Superior Court (Kaulick) (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1305, fn. 28 [noting that “the preponderance standard” is synonymous with “ ‘more likely than not’ ”].) For that reason, we also conclude that Senate Bill No. 567 did not invalidate the trial court’s determination that lack of provocation was not a mitigating factor in this case. 18

2017The trial has been held or a plea has been taken, and the defendant is serving his or her sentence." ( People v. Bradford (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1322 , 1337, 174 Cal.Rptr.3d 499 ; see People v. White (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 512 , 527, 167 Cal.Rptr.3d 328 [acknowledging the prospective and retroactive parts of the Reform Act]; People v. Superior Court (Kaulick) (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1279 , 1292, 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 856 ( Kaulick ) [same].) The People urge that because the current offense has been fully litigated, the preponderance standard is appropriate: "[I]mposing a beyond a reasonable doubt sta

2013We simply note, however, that the use of such language in the prospective part of the Act, and its absence from the retrospective part of the Act, support the conclusion that dangerousness in the retrospective part of the Act is not, in fact, a sentencing factor. 27 Evidence Code section 115 “expressly contemplates exceptions to the preponderance standard developed by the common law.” (In re Marriage of Peters (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1490 [ 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 493 ].) 28 Kaulick suggests that the California Supreme Court, in a case involving the Sexually Violent Predator Act, held that the prep

2013We simply note, however, that the use of such language in the prospective part of the Act, and its absence from the retrospective part of the Act, support the conclusion that dangerousness in the retrospective part of the Act is not, in fact, a sentencing factor. 27 Evidence Code section 115 “expressly contemplates exceptions to the preponderance standard developed by the common law.” (In re Marriage of Peters (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1490 [ 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 493 ].) 28 Kaulick suggests that the California Supreme Court, in a case involving the Sexually Violent Predator Act, held that the prep

2012(People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 382 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 935 P.2d 708 ], superseded by statute on another point as noted in Verdin v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1096, 1106 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 287 , 183 P.3d 1250 ], which in turn was superseded by statute on another point as noted in Maldonado v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1112, 1119, fn. 5 [ 140 Cal.Rptr.3d 113 , 274 P.3d 1110 ].) As noted in People v. Carpenter, supra, at page 382, the United States Supreme Court, interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence, also has adopted the preponderance standard for proof of uncharge

2012(People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 382 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 935 P.2d 708 ], superseded by statute on another point as noted in Verdin v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1096, 1106 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 287 , 183 P.3d 1250 ], which in turn was superseded by statute on another point as noted in Maldonado v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1112, 1119, fn. 5 [ 140 Cal.Rptr.3d 113 , 274 P.3d 1110 ].) As noted in People v. Carpenter, supra, at page 382, the United States Supreme Court, interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence, also has adopted the preponderance standard for proof of uncharge

2004Nevertheless, we may "construe" the statute to preserve its constitutionality "by requiring clear and convincing evidence" to rebut the presumption that visitation by a petitioning grandparent over a custodial parent's objection is not in the child's best interest. [5] ( Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519, 543 , 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 412 , 28 P.3d 151 ( Wendland ).) Section 3104 is silent regarding the standard of proof, so construing it to require clear and convincing evidence "does not entail a deviation from the language of the statute. . . ." ( Wendland, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 54

2004Nevertheless, we may "construe" the statute to preserve its constitutionality "by requiring clear and convincing evidence" to rebut the presumption that visitation by a petitioning grandparent over a custodial parent's objection is not in the child's best interest. [5] ( Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519, 543 , 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 412 , 28 P.3d 151 ( Wendland ).) Section 3104 is silent regarding the standard of proof, so construing it to require clear and convincing evidence "does not entail a deviation from the language of the statute. . . ." ( Wendland, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 54