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20 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1962–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gerstein v. Pughgreen2 sentences2023See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 120 (1975). “[Probable cause] does not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a preponderance standard demands”; instead, it is found through informal modes of proof, such as written testimony and hearsay. 2012Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). “[T]he nature of the [probable cause] determination itself ... does not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a preponderance standard demands....” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 121 , 95 S.Ct. 854 , 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975). | 1 | 3 |
McMillan v. Pennsylvaniared2 sentences2022United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156 (1997) (“[W]e have held that application of the preponderance standard at sentencing generally satisfies due process.” (citing McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91-92 (1986) (“Like the court below, we have little difficulty concluding that in this case the preponderance standard satisfies due - 10 - it, in addition to the evidence that is the subject of this appeal, Garcia’s previous conviction for aggravated battery and adjudication of guilt for driving with a suspended license. 2005The absence of a burden of proof comports with the United States Supreme Court's observation in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91 , 106 S.Ct. 2411 , 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986), that "[s]entencing courts have traditionally heard evidence and found facts without any prescribed burden of proof at all." The burden of proof for these sentence-enhancing factual determinations is certainly no greater than the preponderance standard governing departure sentences. | 1 | 2 |
Bourjaily v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1997The preponderance standard ensures that before admitting evidence, the court will have found it more likely than not that the technical issues and policy concerns addressed by the Federal Rules of Evidence have been afforded due consideration. 483 U.S. at 175 , 107 S.Ct. at 2778-79 (citations omitted). 1997The preponderance standard ensures that before admitting evidence, the court will have found it more likely than not that the technical issues and policy concerns addressed by the Federal Rules of Evidence have been afforded due consideration. 483 U.S. at 175 , 107 S.Ct. at 2778-79 (citations omitted). | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Wattsgreen1 sentence2022United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156 (1997) (“[W]e have held that application of the preponderance standard at sentencing generally satisfies due process.” (citing McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91-92 (1986) (“Like the court below, we have little difficulty concluding that in this case the preponderance standard satisfies due - 10 - it, in addition to the evidence that is the subject of this appeal, Garcia’s previous conviction for aggravated battery and adjudication of guilt for driving with a suspended license. | 1 | 1 |
Lopez v. Stategreen2 sentences2010Compare Lopez v. State, 711 So.2d 563 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (holding that evidence of drugs found in the defendant's and his wife's jointly occupied closet was insufficient to prove constructive possession beyond a reasonable doubt) with Ubiles v. State, 23 So.3d 1288, 1291 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (holding evidence was sufficient under the preponderance standard because "it can . . . be inferred that [the probationer] had dominion and control of the marijuana cigarettes in the ashtray" within his reach even though another individual also had access). 2010Compare Lopez v. State, 711 So.2d 563 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (holding that evidence of drugs found in the defendant’s and his wife’s jointly occupied closet was insufficient to prove constructive possession beyond a reasonable doubt) with Ubiles v. State, 23 So.3d 1288, 1291 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (holding evidence was sufficient under the preponderance standard because “it can ... be inferred that [the probationer] had dominion and control of the marijuana cigarettes in the ashtray” within his reach even though another individual also had access). | 1 | 1 |
Ubiles v. Stategreen2 sentences2010Compare Lopez v. State, 711 So.2d 563 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (holding that evidence of drugs found in the defendant's and his wife's jointly occupied closet was insufficient to prove constructive possession beyond a reasonable doubt) with Ubiles v. State, 23 So.3d 1288, 1291 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (holding evidence was sufficient under the preponderance standard because "it can . . . be inferred that [the probationer] had dominion and control of the marijuana cigarettes in the ashtray" within his reach even though another individual also had access). 2010Compare Lopez v. State, 711 So.2d 563 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (holding that evidence of drugs found in the defendant’s and his wife’s jointly occupied closet was insufficient to prove constructive possession beyond a reasonable doubt) with Ubiles v. State, 23 So.3d 1288, 1291 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (holding evidence was sufficient under the preponderance standard because “it can ... be inferred that [the probationer] had dominion and control of the marijuana cigarettes in the ashtray” within his reach even though another individual also had access). | 1 | 1 |
Van Wagner v. Stategreen2 sentences2010"To establish a violation of probation, the prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a probationer willfully violated a substantial condition of probation." Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 316 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (citing Salzano v. State, 664 So.2d 23 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)). 2010“To establish a violation of probation, the prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a probationer willfully violated a substantial condition of probation.” Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 316 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (citing Salzano v. State, 664 So.2d 23 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)). | 1 | 1 |
Amador v. Stategreen1 sentence2000See Amador v. State, 713 So.2d 1121, 1122 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). | 1 | 1 |
In re Grimmgreen2 sentences1994See Petition of Grimm, 138 N.H. 42 , 635 A.2d 456 (1993); Gandhi v. State Medical Examining Bd., 168 Wis.2d 299 , 483 N.W.2d 295 (Wis. Ct. App.), review denied, 490 N.W.2d 23 (Wis. 1992); Boswell v. Iowa Bd. of Veterinary Medicine, 477 N.W.2d 366 (Iowa 1991); Matter of Insurance Agents' Licenses of Kane, 473 N.W.2d 869 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); Commonwealth, Dep't of Health v. Brownsville Golden Age Nursing Home, Inc., 103 Pa. Commw. 449 , 520 A.2d 926 (Pa. Commw. 1994See Petition of Grimm, 138 N.H. 42 , 635 A.2d 456 (1993); Gandhi v. State Medical Examining Bd., 168 Wis.2d 299 , 483 N.W.2d 295 (Wis. Ct. App.), review denied, 490 N.W.2d 23 (Wis. 1992); Boswell v. Iowa Bd. of Veterinary Medicine, 477 N.W.2d 366 (Iowa 1991); Matter of Insurance Agents' Licenses of Kane, 473 N.W.2d 869 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); Commonwealth, Dep't of Health v. Brownsville Golden Age Nursing Home, Inc., 103 Pa. Commw. 449 , 520 A.2d 926 (Pa. Commw. | 1 | 1 |
Burke v. Stategreen1 sentence1985See, e.g., Burke v. State, 465 So.2d 1337 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). | 1 | 1 |
| Hoffman v. Jonesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| Tamer v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Spinelli v. United States
red
2 sentences2012Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). “[T]he nature of the [probable cause] determination itself ... does not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a preponderance standard demands....” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 121 , 95 S.Ct. 854 , 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975). 2012Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). “[T]he nature of the [probable cause] determination itself ... does not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a preponderance standard demands....” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 121 , 95 S.Ct. 854 , 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975). | 2 | 2005–2012 |
Lego v. Twomey
green
2 sentences2001As in Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 488 , 92 S.Ct. 619, 626 , 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972), we find "nothing to suggest that admissibility rulings have been unreliable or otherwise wanting in quality because not based on some higher standard." We think that our previous decisions in this area resolve the matter. 2001As in Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 488 , 92 S.Ct. 619, 626 , 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972), we find "nothing to suggest that admissibility rulings have been unreliable or otherwise wanting in quality because not based on some higher standard." We think that our previous decisions in this area resolve the matter. | 2 | 1988–2001 |
Hughes v. State
green
1 sentence2013Id. at 491 . . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Salzano v. State
green
2 sentences2010"To establish a violation of probation, the prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a probationer willfully violated a substantial condition of probation." Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 316 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (citing Salzano v. State, 664 So.2d 23 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)). 2010“To establish a violation of probation, the prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a probationer willfully violated a substantial condition of probation.” Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314, 316 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (citing Salzano v. State, 664 So.2d 23 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Sepulveda v. United States
green
1 sentence2005Further, "even in the post- Apprendi era, findings of fact made by the sentencing judge, under a preponderance standard, remain an important part of the sentencing regimen." Sepulveda, 330 F.3d at 60 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Beck v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2005The "standard of probable cause" is "only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity." Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969) (citing Beck, 379 U.S. at 96 , 85 S.Ct. 223 ). "[T]he nature of the [probable cause] determination itself ... does not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a preponderance standard demands." Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 121 , 95 S.Ct. 854 , 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975). 2005The "standard of probable cause" is "only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity." Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969) (citing Beck, 379 U.S. at 96 , 85 S.Ct. 223 ). "[T]he nature of the [probable cause] determination itself ... does not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a preponderance standard demands." Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 121 , 95 S.Ct. 854 , 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Louis v. State
green
1 sentence2002In Louis v. State, 647 So.2d 324 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), this court reversed a habitual violent felony sentence because the State failed to introduce sufficient evidence to connect the defendant to the predicate offenses. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Addington v. Texas
green
2 sentences2002While "the preponderance standard falls short of meeting the demands of due process[,] ... the reasonable-doubt standard is not required." Id. at 431 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 . 2002While "the preponderance standard falls short of meeting the demands of due process[,] ... the reasonable-doubt standard is not required." Id. at 431 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
In Re the Insurance Agents' Licenses of Kane
green
1 sentence1994See Petition of Grimm, 138 N.H. 42 , 635 A.2d 456 (1993); Gandhi v. State Medical Examining Bd., 168 Wis.2d 299 , 483 N.W.2d 295 (Wis. Ct. App.), review denied, 490 N.W.2d 23 (Wis. 1992); Boswell v. Iowa Bd. of Veterinary Medicine, 477 N.W.2d 366 (Iowa 1991); Matter of Insurance Agents' Licenses of Kane, 473 N.W.2d 869 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); Commonwealth, Dep't of Health v. Brownsville Golden Age Nursing Home, Inc., 103 Pa. Commw. 449 , 520 A.2d 926 (Pa. Commw. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Gandhi v. State Medical Examining Board
green
2 sentences1994See Petition of Grimm, 138 N.H. 42 , 635 A.2d 456 (1993); Gandhi v. State Medical Examining Bd., 168 Wis.2d 299 , 483 N.W.2d 295 (Wis. Ct. App.), review denied, 490 N.W.2d 23 (Wis. 1992); Boswell v. Iowa Bd. of Veterinary Medicine, 477 N.W.2d 366 (Iowa 1991); Matter of Insurance Agents' Licenses of Kane, 473 N.W.2d 869 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); Commonwealth, Dep't of Health v. Brownsville Golden Age Nursing Home, Inc., 103 Pa. Commw. 449 , 520 A.2d 926 (Pa. Commw. 1994See Petition of Grimm, 138 N.H. 42 , 635 A.2d 456 (1993); Gandhi v. State Medical Examining Bd., 168 Wis.2d 299 , 483 N.W.2d 295 (Wis. Ct. App.), review denied, 490 N.W.2d 23 (Wis. 1992); Boswell v. Iowa Bd. of Veterinary Medicine, 477 N.W.2d 366 (Iowa 1991); Matter of Insurance Agents' Licenses of Kane, 473 N.W.2d 869 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); Commonwealth, Dep't of Health v. Brownsville Golden Age Nursing Home, Inc., 103 Pa. Commw. 449 , 520 A.2d 926 (Pa. Commw. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Commonwealth v. Brownsville Golden Age Nursing Home Inc.
green
2 sentences1994See Petition of Grimm, 138 N.H. 42 , 635 A.2d 456 (1993); Gandhi v. State Medical Examining Bd., 168 Wis.2d 299 , 483 N.W.2d 295 (Wis. Ct. App.), review denied, 490 N.W.2d 23 (Wis. 1992); Boswell v. Iowa Bd. of Veterinary Medicine, 477 N.W.2d 366 (Iowa 1991); Matter of Insurance Agents' Licenses of Kane, 473 N.W.2d 869 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); Commonwealth, Dep't of Health v. Brownsville Golden Age Nursing Home, Inc., 103 Pa. Commw. 449 , 520 A.2d 926 (Pa. Commw. 1994See Petition of Grimm, 138 N.H. 42 , 635 A.2d 456 (1993); Gandhi v. State Medical Examining Bd., 168 Wis.2d 299 , 483 N.W.2d 295 (Wis. Ct. App.), review denied, 490 N.W.2d 23 (Wis. 1992); Boswell v. Iowa Bd. of Veterinary Medicine, 477 N.W.2d 366 (Iowa 1991); Matter of Insurance Agents' Licenses of Kane, 473 N.W.2d 869 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); Commonwealth, Dep't of Health v. Brownsville Golden Age Nursing Home, Inc., 103 Pa. Commw. 449 , 520 A.2d 926 (Pa. Commw. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Boswell v. Iowa Board of Veterinary Medicine
green
1 sentence1994See Petition of Grimm, 138 N.H. 42 , 635 A.2d 456 (1993); Gandhi v. State Medical Examining Bd., 168 Wis.2d 299 , 483 N.W.2d 295 (Wis. Ct. App.), review denied, 490 N.W.2d 23 (Wis. 1992); Boswell v. Iowa Bd. of Veterinary Medicine, 477 N.W.2d 366 (Iowa 1991); Matter of Insurance Agents' Licenses of Kane, 473 N.W.2d 869 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); Commonwealth, Dep't of Health v. Brownsville Golden Age Nursing Home, Inc., 103 Pa. Commw. 449 , 520 A.2d 926 (Pa. Commw. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Romani v. State
green
1 sentence1988Morales has been called into question by the Third District's recent decision in Romani v. State, 528 So.2d 15 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
United States v. Matlock
green
2 sentences1988In Romani , the Third District, in referring to Bourjaily 's modification of the quantum of proof required in the preliminary stage from "substantial" to "preponderance," stated: Relying on prior decisions which addressed the admissibility of other preliminary factual questions, such as United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 , 94 S.Ct. 988 , 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974) (voluntariness of consent to search must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence) and Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 , 92 S.Ct. 619 , 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972) (voluntariness of confession must be demonstrated by a preponderance of the 1988In Romani , the Third District, in referring to Bourjaily 's modification of the quantum of proof required in the preliminary stage from "substantial" to "preponderance," stated: Relying on prior decisions which addressed the admissibility of other preliminary factual questions, such as United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 , 94 S.Ct. 988 , 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974) (voluntariness of consent to search must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence) and Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 , 92 S.Ct. 619 , 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972) (voluntariness of confession must be demonstrated by a preponderance of the | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Leonard v. State
yellow
1 sentence1985While the overwhelming number of Florida decisions, including post- Deneby cases, contain statements that voluntariness must be shown by clear and convincing evidence, Bailey ; State v. Santamaria, 464 So.2d 197 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); State v. Spencer, 432 So.2d 718 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Leonard v. State, 431 So.2d 614 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), and while it is unusual for the court to so casually overrule prior case law, we will not, and cannot under Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431, 433-34 (Fla. 1973), assume that the supreme *1069 court's pronouncement was mistaken or unintended. [2] , [3] Having decid | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| State v. Price green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Palacios v. State green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| McDole v. State green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| State v. Santamaria green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Saavedra v. State
green
1 sentence1985Subsequently, we further stated, the trial court, in accordance with our approval of the Fourth District's view expressed in Saavedra v. State, 421 So.2d 725 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), may undertake a second assessment of the evidence at trial to ascertain its sufficiency by a preponderance test. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Younger v. State green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Denehy v. State
green
2 sentences1985Denehy v. State, 400 So.2d 1216 (Fla. 1980). 1985In my view, neither Denehy v. State, 400 So.2d 1216 (Fla. 1980), nor any binding United States Supreme Court decision has established a preponderance standard for all consent cases without regard to whether the consent is given after an initial illegal stop or other coercive action. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Luxenburg v. State
green
1 sentence1985Compare Carney; Major v. State, 389 So.2d 1203 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), review denied, 408 So.2d 1095 (Fla. 1981); Luxenburg v. State, 384 So.2d 742 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Raleigh v. State, 365 So.2d 1048 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (finding no consent) with Martin; Bannister v. State, 434 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); State v. Price, 363 So.2d 1102 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 372 So.2d 470 (Fla. 1979) (finding consent). [7] Contrary to the coexisting rules of Denehy and Norman , there are cases which use the clear and convincing burden where there has been no initial illegality, see, e.g., Younger v. S | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Major v. State green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Nix v. Williams
green
2 sentences1985Nix v. Williams, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984). 1985Nix v. Williams, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Raleigh v. State green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Neff v. State
green
1 sentence1985While the overwhelming number of Florida decisions, including post- Deneby cases, contain statements that voluntariness must be shown by clear and convincing evidence, Bailey ; State v. Santamaria, 464 So.2d 197 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); State v. Spencer, 432 So.2d 718 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Leonard v. State, 431 So.2d 614 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), and while it is unusual for the court to so casually overrule prior case law, we will not, and cannot under Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431, 433-34 (Fla. 1973), assume that the supreme *1069 court's pronouncement was mistaken or unintended. [2] , [3] Having decid | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Bannister v. State neutral | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| United States v. Dante Angelo Grassi and Jack Louis Gail green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| United States v. Donald James and David Anthony Butler, United States of America v. Henry Smith and Kenneth Wayne Whitmore green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| United States v. Nixon green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Farkas v. United States green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Grassi v. United States green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Tucker v. Hartford National Bank & Trust Co. green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Hi-Acres Groves, Inc. v. Bassett green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Transammonia Export Corporation, Cross v. Conserv, Inc., Cross green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Shell's City, Inc. v. Westerman green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Carraway v. Armour and Company green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Feinberg v. St. Francis Hospital neutral | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Johnson v. Dicks green | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.