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22 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Santosky v. Kramergreen2 sentences2025Such consideration as part of a best-interests determination, with a preponderance standard of proof, therefore does not pass “constitutional muster.” Sandra R., 248 Ariz. 224 , ¶¶ 12, 24 (citing Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769-70 ). ¶29 In sum, the juvenile court erred in failing to consider Maria’s participation in and benefit from services—which were offered by DCS as part of the related dependency proceeding with a case plan goal of family reunification—in its finding of parental unfitness under § 8-533(B)(2). 2025Such consideration as part of a best-interests determination, with a preponderance standard of proof, therefore does not pass “constitutional muster.” Sandra R., 248 Ariz. 224 , ¶¶ 12, 24 (citing Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769-70 ). ¶29 In sum, the juvenile court erred in failing to consider Maria’s participation in and benefit from services—which were offered by DCS as part of the related dependency proceeding with a case plan goal of family reunification—in its finding of parental unfitness under § 8-533(B)(2). | 2 | 5 |
Hi-Ho Tower, Inc. v. Com-Tronics, Inc.green2 sentences2002Hi-Ho Tower, Inc. v. Com-Tronics, Inc., 255 Conn. 20 , 761 A.2d 1268, 1273-75 (2000) (Com Tronics must prove claim of tortious interference with contractual relations by a preponderance of the evidence); Examination Mgmt. 2002Hi-Ho Tower, Inc. v. Com-Tronics, Inc., 255 Conn. 20 , 761 A.2d 1268, 1273-75 (2000) (Com Tronics must prove claim of tortious interference with contractual relations by a preponderance of the evidence); Examination Mgmt. | 2 | 2 |
Ingraham v. Meindlgreen2 sentences1996For instance, both Oregon and Michigan apply a preponderance test to testamentary capacity; see Lacey v. Meindl, 216 Or. 373 , 339 P.2d 447, 448 (1959); Gardnier v. Smith, 198 Mich. 203 , 164 N.W. 382, 383 (1917); yet both recognize that a will should be upheld unless it is clearly the product of the testator’s insane delusion. 1996For instance, both Oregon and Michigan apply a preponderance test to testamentary capacity; see Lacey v. Meindl, 216 Or. 373 , 339 P.2d 447, 448 (1959); Gardnier v. Smith, 198 Mich. 203 , 164 N.W. 382, 383 (1917); yet both recognize that a will should be upheld unless it is clearly the product of the testator’s insane delusion. | 2 | 2 |
Gardnier v. Smithgreen2 sentences1996For instance, both Oregon and Michigan apply a preponderance test to testamentary capacity; see Lacey v. Meindl, 216 Or. 373 , 339 P.2d 447, 448 (1959); Gardnier v. Smith, 198 Mich. 203 , 164 N.W. 382, 383 (1917); yet both recognize that a will should be upheld unless it is clearly the product of the testator’s insane delusion. 1996For instance, both Oregon and Michigan apply a preponderance test to testamentary capacity; see Lacey v. Meindl, 216 Or. 373 , 339 P.2d 447, 448 (1959); Gardnier v. Smith, 198 Mich. 203 , 164 N.W. 382, 383 (1917); yet both recognize that a will should be upheld unless it is clearly the product of the testator’s insane delusion. | 2 | 2 |
In Re WINSHIPgreen2 sentences2005See Winship, 397 U.S. at 364 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 . 2005See Winship, 397 U.S. at 364 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 . | 1 | 2 |
Dillon v. Phillipsgreen2 sentences1996In Oregon, an insane delusion must have “absolutely no foundation in fact, and even slight evidence which provides a basis for the [testator’s] belief negates the existence of a delusion.” Dillon v. Phillips, 92 Or.App. 65 , 756 P.2d 1278, 1279 (1988). 1996In Oregon, an insane delusion must have “absolutely no foundation in fact, and even slight evidence which provides a basis for the [testator’s] belief negates the existence of a delusion.” Dillon v. Phillips, 92 Or.App. 65 , 756 P.2d 1278, 1279 (1988). | 1 | 2 |
Nix v. Williamsgreen1 sentence2024See Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 n.5. | 1 | 1 |
Kent K. v. Bobby M.green1 sentence2024See Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284, ¶ 25 (2005) (explaining that the preponderance standard “essentially allocates the risk 4 LAZORCAK v. LAZORCAK Decision of the Court of error equally between the parties involved”). | 1 | 1 |
Abrams Airborne Manufacturing, Inc. v. State Department of Revenuegreen1 sentence2022See id. at 288, ¶ 41 (holding "because the best interests inquiry requires a delicate balancing of the child's interests, along with the parens patriae interest of the state, against the interests of an unfit parent, we hold that the preponderance of the evidence standard adequately allocates the risk of error between these competing interests"); see also Jennifer B., 189 Ariz. at 557 (applying best interest analysis from termination proceedings in a guardianship revocation). ¶13 Similarly, the phrase "by clear and convincing evidence" in A.R.S. § 8-873(C) modifies only the preceding phrase "c | 1 | 1 |
Jennifer B. v. Arizona Department of Economic Securitygreen1 sentence2022See id. at 288, ¶ 41 (holding "because the best interests inquiry requires a delicate balancing of the child's interests, along with the parens patriae interest of the state, against the interests of an unfit parent, we hold that the preponderance of the evidence standard adequately allocates the risk of error between these competing interests"); see also Jennifer B., 189 Ariz. at 557 (applying best interest analysis from termination proceedings in a guardianship revocation). ¶13 Similarly, the phrase "by clear and convincing evidence" in A.R.S. § 8-873(C) modifies only the preceding phrase "c | 1 | 1 |
Mata v. Stategreen1 sentence2014Id. at 908, 917 . | 1 | 1 |
Atkins v. Virginiagreen2 sentences2006See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314 -15 & nn. 12-15, 122 S.Ct. 2242 . . 2006See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314 -15 & nn. 12-15, 122 S.Ct. 2242 . . | 1 | 1 |
Wicks v. City of Tucsongreen2 sentences2005See, e.g., Wicks v. City of Tucson, 112 Ariz. 487, 488 , 543 P.2d 1116, 1117 (1975) (stating that the Tucson Civil Service Commission requires an employer to bear the burden of proving facts by a preponderance of the evidence); Woerth v. City of Flagstaff, 167 Ariz. 412, 415 , 808 P.2d 297, 300 (App. 1990) (stating that the Flagstaff Personnel Board requires that the employer establish facts by a preponderance of the evidence). ¶ 20 Therefore, although such a standard may not be required by the language of Pima County LEMSC Rule XIII-4(I), in applying the preponderance standard for proving the 2005See, e.g., Wicks v. City of Tucson, 112 Ariz. 487, 488 , 543 P.2d 1116, 1117 (1975) (stating that the Tucson Civil Service Commission requires an employer to bear the burden of proving facts by a preponderance of the evidence); Woerth v. City of Flagstaff, 167 Ariz. 412, 415 , 808 P.2d 297, 300 (App. 1990) (stating that the Flagstaff Personnel Board requires that the employer establish facts by a preponderance of the evidence). ¶ 20 Therefore, although such a standard may not be required by the language of Pima County LEMSC Rule XIII-4(I), in applying the preponderance standard for proving the | 1 | 1 |
Woerth v. City of Flagstaffgreen2 sentences2005See, e.g., Wicks v. City of Tucson, 112 Ariz. 487, 488 , 543 P.2d 1116, 1117 (1975) (stating that the Tucson Civil Service Commission requires an employer to bear the burden of proving facts by a preponderance of the evidence); Woerth v. City of Flagstaff, 167 Ariz. 412, 415 , 808 P.2d 297, 300 (App. 1990) (stating that the Flagstaff Personnel Board requires that the employer establish facts by a preponderance of the evidence). ¶ 20 Therefore, although such a standard may not be required by the language of Pima County LEMSC Rule XIII-4(I), in applying the preponderance standard for proving the 2005See, e.g., Wicks v. City of Tucson, 112 Ariz. 487, 488 , 543 P.2d 1116, 1117 (1975) (stating that the Tucson Civil Service Commission requires an employer to bear the burden of proving facts by a preponderance of the evidence); Woerth v. City of Flagstaff, 167 Ariz. 412, 415 , 808 P.2d 297, 300 (App. 1990) (stating that the Flagstaff Personnel Board requires that the employer establish facts by a preponderance of the evidence). ¶ 20 Therefore, although such a standard may not be required by the language of Pima County LEMSC Rule XIII-4(I), in applying the preponderance standard for proving the | 1 | 1 |
Molever v. Roushgreen2 sentences2002Molever v. Roush, 152 Ariz. 367, 374 , 732 P.2d 1105, 1112 (App. 1986) (citing Harmon v. Szrama, 102 Ariz. 343 , 429 P.2d 662 (1967)). [21] Intentional interference with contract requires the preponderance standard. 2002Molever v. Roush, 152 Ariz. 367, 374 , 732 P.2d 1105, 1112 (App. 1986) (citing Harmon v. Szrama, 102 Ariz. 343 , 429 P.2d 662 (1967)). [21] Intentional interference with contract requires the preponderance standard. | 1 | 1 |
Halberstam v. Welchgreen2 sentences2002Because there is a difference between proving an agreement to participate in a tortious line of conduct (civil conspiracy) and proving knowing action that substantially aids tortious conduct (aiding and abetting), Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 478 (D.C.Cir.1983), we deem the preponderance standard more appropriate for an aiding and abetting claim. . 2002Because there is a difference between proving an agreement to participate in a tortious line of conduct (civil conspiracy) and proving knowing action that substantially aids tortious conduct (aiding and abetting), Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 478 (D.C.Cir.1983), we deem the preponderance standard more appropriate for an aiding and abetting claim. [17] Triparty Agreement § 3.9: ... | 1 | 1 |
Enyart v. Transamerica Insurancegreen1 sentence2002Cir. 1983), we deem the preponderance standard more appropriate for an aiding and abetting claim. -33- Ariz. 71, 985 P.2d 556, ¶14 (1998) (citing Rawlings v. Apodaca, 151 Ariz. 149 , 726 P.2d 565 (1986)); see also Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 383 , 710 P.2d 1025, 1038 (1985)). | 1 | 1 |
Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospitalgreen2 sentences2002Cir. 1983), we deem the preponderance standard more appropriate for an aiding and abetting claim. -33- Ariz. 71, 985 P.2d 556, ¶14 (1998) (citing Rawlings v. Apodaca, 151 Ariz. 149 , 726 P.2d 565 (1986)); see also Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 383 , 710 P.2d 1025, 1038 (1985)). 2002Cir. 1983), we deem the preponderance standard more appropriate for an aiding and abetting claim. -33- Ariz. 71, 985 P.2d 556, ¶14 (1998) (citing Rawlings v. Apodaca, 151 Ariz. 149 , 726 P.2d 565 (1986)); see also Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 383 , 710 P.2d 1025, 1038 (1985)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Medranogreen2 sentences1999See State v. Stokley, 182 Ariz. 505, 520 , 898 P.2d 454, 469 (1995) (intoxication); State v. Medrano, 185 Ariz. 192, 194-95 , 914 P.2d 225, 227-28 (1996) (substance abuse). 1999See State v. Stokley, 182 Ariz. 505, 520 , 898 P.2d 454, 469 (1995) (intoxication); State v. Medrano, 185 Ariz. 192, 194-95 , 914 P.2d 225, 227-28 (1996) (substance abuse). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jonesgreen2 sentences1999See State v. Henry, 189 Ariz. 542, 552-53 , 944 P.2d 57, 67-68 (1997); State v. Jones, 185 Ariz. 471, 492 , 917 P.2d 200, 221 (1996); Apelt, 176 Ariz. at 377 , 861 P.2d at 662 . 1999See State v. Henry, 189 Ariz. 542, 552-53 , 944 P.2d 57, 67-68 (1997); State v. Jones, 185 Ariz. 471, 492 , 917 P.2d 200, 221 (1996); Apelt, 176 Ariz. at 377 , 861 P.2d at 662 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Stokleygreen2 sentences1999See State v. Stokley, 182 Ariz. 505, 520 , 898 P.2d 454, 469 (1995) (intoxication); State v. Medrano, 185 Ariz. 192, 194-95 , 914 P.2d 225, 227-28 (1996) (substance abuse). 1999See State v. Stokley, 182 Ariz. 505, 520 , 898 P.2d 454, 469 (1995) (intoxication); State v. Medrano, 185 Ariz. 192, 194-95 , 914 P.2d 225, 227-28 (1996) (substance abuse). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Henrygreen2 sentences1999See State v. Henry, 189 Ariz. 542, 552-53 , 944 P.2d 57, 67-68 (1997); State v. Jones, 185 Ariz. 471, 492 , 917 P.2d 200, 221 (1996); Apelt, 176 Ariz. at 377 , 861 P.2d at 662 . 1999See State v. Henry, 189 Ariz. 542, 552-53 , 944 P.2d 57, 67-68 (1997); State v. Jones, 185 Ariz. 471, 492 , 917 P.2d 200, 221 (1996); Apelt, 176 Ariz. at 377 , 861 P.2d at 662 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Schurzgreen2 sentences1997When we last identified the issue, we declined to decide it. *1197 See State v. Schurz, 176 Ariz. 46, 51-52 , 859 P.2d 156, 161-62 (1993). 1997When we last identified the issue, we declined to decide it. *1197 See State v. Schurz, 176 Ariz. 46, 51-52 , 859 P.2d 156, 161-62 (1993). | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Cavanaughgreen | 1 | 1 |
| March v. New Yorkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Henderson
green
2 sentences2016This is “a fact-intensive inquiry,” and “[t]he showing a defendant must make varies, depending upon the type of error that occurred and the facts of a particular case.” Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 568 ¶ 26, 115 P.3d at 608 . ¶ 14 The error in Henderson “exist[ed] on two levels”—“[f]irst, the aggravating facts used to enhance Henderson’s sentence were found by a judge instead of a jury, violating Henderson’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial,” and second, “the trial judge applied a preponderance standard, not the constitutionally required standard of beyond a reasonable doubt, violating Henders 2016This is “a fact-intensive inquiry,” and “[t]he showing a defendant must make varies, depending upon the type of error that occurred and the facts of a particular case.” Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 568 ¶ 26, 115 P.3d at 608 . ¶ 14 The error in Henderson “exist[ed] on two levels”—“[f]irst, the aggravating facts used to enhance Henderson’s sentence were found by a judge instead of a jury, violating Henderson’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial,” and second, “the trial judge applied a preponderance standard, not the constitutionally required standard of beyond a reasonable doubt, violating Henders | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Cooper v. Oklahoma
green
2 sentences2006Id. at 368-69 , 116 S.Ct. 1373 . ¶ 32 As was the Court in Cooper , we have been asked to assess the statutory imposition of a clear and convincing evidence standard in a situation in which a preponderance standard would be permissible. 2006Id. at 368-69 , 116 S.Ct. 1373 . ¶ 32 As was the Court in Cooper , we have been asked to assess the statutory imposition of a clear and convincing evidence standard in a situation in which a preponderance standard would be permissible. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Rawlings v. Apodaca
green
2 sentences2002Cir. 1983), we deem the preponderance standard more appropriate for an aiding and abetting claim. -33- Ariz. 71, 985 P.2d 556, ¶14 (1998) (citing Rawlings v. Apodaca, 151 Ariz. 149 , 726 P.2d 565 (1986)); see also Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 383 , 710 P.2d 1025, 1038 (1985)). 2002Cir. 1983), we deem the preponderance standard more appropriate for an aiding and abetting claim. -33- Ariz. 71, 985 P.2d 556, ¶14 (1998) (citing Rawlings v. Apodaca, 151 Ariz. 149 , 726 P.2d 565 (1986)); see also Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 383 , 710 P.2d 1025, 1038 (1985)). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Harmon v. Szrama
green
2 sentences2002Molever v. Roush, 152 Ariz. 367, 374 , 732 P.2d 1105, 1112 (App. 1986) (citing Harmon v. Szrama, 102 Ariz. 343 , 429 P.2d 662 (1967)). [21] Intentional interference with contract requires the preponderance standard. 2002Molever v. Roush, 152 Ariz. 367, 374 , 732 P.2d 1105, 1112 (App. 1986) (citing Harmon v. Szrama, 102 Ariz. 343 , 429 P.2d 662 (1967)). [21] Intentional interference with contract requires the preponderance standard. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Rudi Apelt
green
2 sentences1999See State v. Henry, 189 Ariz. 542, 552-53 , 944 P.2d 57, 67-68 (1997); State v. Jones, 185 Ariz. 471, 492 , 917 P.2d 200, 221 (1996); Apelt, 176 Ariz. at 377 , 861 P.2d at 662 . 1999See State v. Henry, 189 Ariz. 542, 552-53 , 944 P.2d 57, 67-68 (1997); State v. Jones, 185 Ariz. 471, 492 , 917 P.2d 200, 221 (1996); Apelt, 176 Ariz. at 377 , 861 P.2d at 662 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State v. Terrazas
green
2 sentences1997The trial judge in the present case applied a standard "closer to the preponderance standard." Ante, at 581, 944 P.2d at 1195 . 1997The defendant argued that the Hughes standard requires only "enough evidence of the prior bad act or wrong to survive a directed verdict." Id. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Huddleston v. United States
green
2 sentences1997The defense stated that "there needs to be enough evidence of the prior bad act or wrong to survive a directed verdict." The trial judge, on the other hand, applied a standard closer to the preponderance standard enunciated in Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 , 108 S.Ct. 1496 , 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988). 1997The defense stated that "there needs to be enough evidence of the prior bad act or wrong to survive a directed verdict." The trial judge, on the other hand, applied a standard closer to the preponderance standard enunciated in Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 , 108 S.Ct. 1496 , 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Gerstein v. Pugh green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Addington v. Texas green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.