11 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. LaForgegreen2 sentences2024See State v. LaForge, 2012 ME 65, ¶ 10 , 43 A.3d 961 . 2024See State v. LaForge, 2012 ME 65, ¶ 10 , 43 A.3d 961 . | 1 | 1 |
In re Caleb M.green1 sentence2018See In re Caleb M. , 2017 ME 66 , ¶¶ 24-26, 159 A.3d 345 . 4 In fact, the protections afforded a parent are greater in a termination proceeding than in the jeopardy phase of a child protection case, because the clear and convincing standard of proof necessary for termination is greater than the preponderance standard applicable at a jeopardy hearing. | 1 | 1 |
In re Caleb M.green1 sentence2018See In re Caleb M. , 2017 ME 66 , ¶¶ 24-26, 159 A.3d 345 . 4 In fact, the protections afforded a parent are greater in a termination proceeding than in the jeopardy phase of a child protection case, because the clear and convincing standard of proof necessary for termination is greater than the preponderance standard applicable at a jeopardy hearing. | 1 | 1 |
E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. State Tax Assessorgreen2 sentences2017DuPont de Nemours & Co., 675 A.2d at 90 ('TWlhen the taxpayer, as here, contends that the [alternative apportionmentJ formula 6 ultimately adopted by the tax assessor is arbitrary and reaches unreasonable results, the burden is on the taxpayer to establish such facts by clear and convincing evidence,'') The Court concludes that a preponderance standard appJies here. 2017In E.I.DuPont de Nemours & Co., the Assessor applied an alternative apportionment factor pursuant to section 5211 (17) and the taxpayer was advocating the application of the statutory apportionment factor, Id. | 1 | 1 |
Harmon v. Harmongreen1 sentence1996The language in Harmon v. Harmon, 404 A.2d 1020, 1026 (Me.1979), cited by the Court to support a preponderance standard is dictum; we have never cited it for that proposition. . | 1 | 1 |
Eldridge v. Maygreen2 sentences1996See Eldridge v. May, 150 A. 378, 379 , 129 Me. 112, 115 (1930) (“Fraud in equity includes all willful or intentional acts, omissions, and con-cealments which involve a breach of either legal or equitable duty, a trust or confidence, and are injurious to another, or by which an undue or unconscientious advantage is taken over another.") (citation omitted); Great Northern Mfg. 1996See Eldridge v. May, 150 A. 378, 379 , 129 Me. 112, 115 (1930) (“Fraud in equity includes all willful or intentional acts, omissions, and con-cealments which involve a breach of either legal or equitable duty, a trust or confidence, and are injurious to another, or by which an undue or unconscientious advantage is taken over another.") (citation omitted); Great Northern Mfg. | 1 | 1 |
Taylor v. Commissioner of Mental Health & Mental Retardationgreen1 sentence1991The standard to which an applicant for reinstatement must prove the additional elements required by Rule 7(o) is a high one. “[Although the preponderance standard normally prevails in a civil case, appellate courts in a large number of categories of litigation have found compelling reasons for requiring a higher standard of proof.” Taylor v. Commissioner of Mental Health, 481 A.2d 139, 150 (Me.1984) (clear and convincing proof of no danger to the public is required for release of a person committed to mental hospital following his acquittal by reason of insanity). | 1 | 1 |
In Re WINSHIPgreen2 sentences1984The purpose of fixing a standard of proof for the trial courts is to “instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 370 , 90 S.Ct. at 1076 (Harlan, J., concurring). 1984The purpose of fixing a standard of proof for the trial courts is to “instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 370 , 90 S.Ct. at 1076 (Harlan, J., concurring). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Dean
green
1 sentence2018Indeed, we relied on Huddleston in discussing the admissibility of the evidence at issue in State v. Dean , but not in relation to double jeopardy collateral estoppel; we instead cited to Huddleston in our discussion of the admissibility of the evidence for purposes of establishing the defendant's motive and opportunity after we had already concluded that no double jeopardy collateral estoppel violation had occurred. 589 A.2d 929 , 933 n.5 (Me. 1991). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Huddleston v. United States
green
2 sentences2018The second means by which a preponderance standard is triggered in a subsequent criminal trial is based on the rule of Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 , 690, 108 S.Ct. 1496 , 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988). 2018The second means by which a preponderance standard is triggered in a subsequent criminal trial is based on the rule of Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 , 690, 108 S.Ct. 1496 , 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
In Re Christmas C.
green
2 sentences2017Unlike a termination order, for example, which can “end” the parent’s liberty interest because the order terminates the underlying par *951 ent-child relationship itself, jeopardy orders are “neither final nor irrevocable ... [and] may be, and frequently are, modified.” In re Christmas C., 1998 ME 258, ¶ 12 , 721 A.2d 629 (quotation marks omitted) (holding that a preponderance standard of proof is constitutionally adequate in a jeopardy proceeding, while a standard of clear and convincing evidence is required for the court to terminate parental rights). [¶ 20] Balanced against the parent’s int 2017Unlike a termination order, for example, which can “end” the parent’s liberty interest because the order terminates the underlying par *951 ent-child relationship itself, jeopardy orders are “neither final nor irrevocable ... [and] may be, and frequently are, modified.” In re Christmas C., 1998 ME 258, ¶ 12 , 721 A.2d 629 (quotation marks omitted) (holding that a preponderance standard of proof is constitutionally adequate in a jeopardy proceeding, while a standard of clear and convincing evidence is required for the court to terminate parental rights). [¶ 20] Balanced against the parent’s int | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Beverly A. Gravison v. Calvert M. Fisher
green
2 sentences2017Id. <JI 9, n.4 ("Our notation in Gravison, 2016 J\.1E 35, <JI 52, 134 A.3d 857 , that extinguishment by abandonment and by adverse possession are both subject to a clear and convincing standard of proof is a misstatement of our prior decisions."). 2017Id. <JI 9, n.4 ("Our notation in Gravison, 2016 J\.1E 35, <JI 52, 134 A.3d 857 , that extinguishment by abandonment and by adverse possession are both subject to a clear and convincing standard of proof is a misstatement of our prior decisions."). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Guardianship of Sebastien Chamberlain
green
2 sentences2017Unlike a termination order, for example, which can “end” the parent’s liberty interest because the order terminates the underlying par *951 ent-child relationship itself, jeopardy orders are “neither final nor irrevocable ... [and] may be, and frequently are, modified.” In re Christmas C., 1998 ME 258, ¶ 12 , 721 A.2d 629 (quotation marks omitted) (holding that a preponderance standard of proof is constitutionally adequate in a jeopardy proceeding, while a standard of clear and convincing evidence is required for the court to terminate parental rights). [¶ 20] Balanced against the parent’s int 2017Unlike a termination order, for example, which can “end” the parent’s liberty interest because the order terminates the underlying par *951 ent-child relationship itself, jeopardy orders are “neither final nor irrevocable ... [and] may be, and frequently are, modified.” In re Christmas C., 1998 ME 258, ¶ 12 , 721 A.2d 629 (quotation marks omitted) (holding that a preponderance standard of proof is constitutionally adequate in a jeopardy proceeding, while a standard of clear and convincing evidence is required for the court to terminate parental rights). [¶ 20] Balanced against the parent’s int | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Jacques v. Brown
green
1 sentence2014Jacques v. Brown, 609 A.2d 290 , 292 n.3 (Me. 1992). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Application of Hughes
green
2 sentences1991There being no compelling reason for requiring a higher standard of proof, as in In re Hughes, 594 A.2d at 1101 , the preponderance standard that normally prevails in a civil case is applicable to the instant case. 1991Id. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.