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12 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kuehn v. Kuehngreen2 sentences2021See Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 299 , 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980) (citing Kuehn v. Kuehn, 11 Wis. 2d 15, 26 , 104 N.W.2d 138 (1960)). 26 regarding what constitutes a material, intentional misrepresentation.12 Because a material, intentional misrepresentation of any kind by RSM would suffice to sustain the fraud verdict against it, we need not address the commission issue involving RSM. 2021See Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 299 , 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980) (citing Kuehn v. Kuehn, 11 Wis. 2d 15, 26 , 104 N.W.2d 138 (1960)). 26 regarding what constitutes a material, intentional misrepresentation.12 Because a material, intentional misrepresentation of any kind by RSM would suffice to sustain the fraud verdict against it, we need not address the commission issue involving RSM. | 1 | 1 |
Wangen v. Ford Motor Co.green2 sentences2021See Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 299 , 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980) (citing Kuehn v. Kuehn, 11 Wis. 2d 15, 26 , 104 N.W.2d 138 (1960)). 26 regarding what constitutes a material, intentional misrepresentation.12 Because a material, intentional misrepresentation of any kind by RSM would suffice to sustain the fraud verdict against it, we need not address the commission issue involving RSM. 2021See Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 299 , 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980) (citing Kuehn v. Kuehn, 11 Wis. 2d 15, 26 , 104 N.W.2d 138 (1960)). 26 regarding what constitutes a material, intentional misrepresentation.12 Because a material, intentional misrepresentation of any kind by RSM would suffice to sustain the fraud verdict against it, we need not address the commission issue involving RSM. | 1 | 1 |
Stone v. City of Chicagogreen1 sentence2005See also Stone v. City of Chicago, 738 F.2d 896, 900-01 (7th Cir. 1984) (analyzing jury instruction that utilized the preponderance of the evidence standard in an excessive force case arising under § 1983). 7 Indeed, even looking beyond the Seventh Circuit, we have found many federal appellate decisions that utilize an ordinary civil burden of proof in § 1983 excessive force cases. 8 *395 ¶ 30. | 1 | 1 |
Victor R. McNair and Tr K. McNair v. Sean Coffeygreen1 sentence2005In McNair v. Coffey, for example, the Seventh Circuit recognized that "a § 1983 case is not a criminal prosecution, and the preponderance standard applies to civil claims of all sorts." McNair v. Coffey, 234 F.3d 352, 355 (7th Cir. 2000), vacated on other grounds by 533 U.S. 925 (2001), overruled on remand McNair v. Coffey, 279 F.3d 463 (7th Cir. 2002). | 1 | 1 |
Colorado v. Connellygreen2 sentences1999Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168 (1986); State v. Santiago, 206 Wis. 2d 3, 29 , 556 N.W.2d 687 (1996). 1999Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168 (1986); State v. Santiago, 206 Wis. 2d 3, 29 , 556 N.W.2d 687 (1996). | 1 | 1 |
Malloy v. Hogangreen1 sentence1999Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
City of Milwaukee v. Wilsongreen2 sentences1995See City of Milwaukee v. Wilson, 96 Wis. 2d 11, 21-23 , 291 N.W.2d 452, 458-59 (1980). 1995See City of Milwaukee v. Wilson, 96 Wis. 2d 11, 21-23 , 291 N.W.2d 452, 458-59 (1980). | 1 | 1 |
Steadman v. Securities & Exchange Commissiongreen1 sentence1992See id. at 100-01 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Walberg
green
2 sentences2025The preponderance standard “applies in ordinary civil actions,” while the clear and convincing standard applies in cases where public policy demands a higher standard of proof than that applied in the ordinary civil action.2 Walberg, 109 Wis. 2d at 102 . ¶38 The part the majority gets wrong is its declaration that there is no burden of proof. 2025The preponderance standard “applies in ordinary civil actions,” while the clear and convincing standard applies in cases where public policy demands a higher standard of proof than that applied in the ordinary civil action.2 Walberg, 109 Wis. 2d at 102 . ¶38 The part the majority gets wrong is its declaration that there is no burden of proof. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
McMillan v. Pennsylvania
red
2 sentences2018In *765 McMillan v. Pennsylvania , the Court had "little difficulty concluding that in this case the preponderance standard satisfies due process" after determining "that States may treat 'visible possession of a firearm' as a sentencing consideration rather than an element of a particular offense." 477 U.S. 79 , 91, 106 S.Ct. 2411 , 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986). ¶ 38 In line with the United States Supreme Court, numerous federal circuits have consistently applied a preponderance of the evidence standard at sentencing. 2018In *765 McMillan v. Pennsylvania , the Court had "little difficulty concluding that in this case the preponderance standard satisfies due process" after determining "that States may treat 'visible possession of a firearm' as a sentencing consideration rather than an element of a particular offense." 477 U.S. 79 , 91, 106 S.Ct. 2411 , 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986). ¶ 38 In line with the United States Supreme Court, numerous federal circuits have consistently applied a preponderance of the evidence standard at sentencing. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
United States v. Watts
green
2 sentences2018The Supreme Court has "held that application of the preponderance standard at sentencing generally satisfies due process." United States v. Watts , 519 U.S. 148 , 156, 117 S.Ct. 633 , 136 L.Ed.2d 554 (1997). 2018The Supreme Court has "held that application of the preponderance standard at sentencing generally satisfies due process." United States v. Watts , 519 U.S. 148 , 156, 117 S.Ct. 633 , 136 L.Ed.2d 554 (1997). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
VICTOR R. MCNAIR AND TRÉ K. MCNAIR v. SEAN COFFEY
green
1 sentence2005In McNair v. Coffey, for example, the Seventh Circuit recognized that "a § 1983 case is not a criminal prosecution, and the preponderance standard applies to civil claims of all sorts." McNair v. Coffey, 234 F.3d 352, 355 (7th Cir. 2000), vacated on other grounds by 533 U.S. 925 (2001), overruled on remand McNair v. Coffey, 279 F.3d 463 (7th Cir. 2002). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Coffey v. McNair
green
1 sentence2005In McNair v. Coffey, for example, the Seventh Circuit recognized that "a § 1983 case is not a criminal prosecution, and the preponderance standard applies to civil claims of all sorts." McNair v. Coffey, 234 F.3d 352, 355 (7th Cir. 2000), vacated on other grounds by 533 U.S. 925 (2001), overruled on remand McNair v. Coffey, 279 F.3d 463 (7th Cir. 2002). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Tompkins
green
2 sentences2002Id. at 181-82 . ¶ 41. 2002Id. at 181-82 . ¶ 41. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Santiago
green
2 sentences1999Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168 (1986); State v. Santiago, 206 Wis. 2d 3, 29 , 556 N.W.2d 687 (1996). 1999Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168 (1986); State v. Santiago, 206 Wis. 2d 3, 29 , 556 N.W.2d 687 (1996). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State v. Rewolinski
green
2 sentences1999Albrecht incorrectly relied on State v. Rewolinski, 159 Wis. 2d 1 , 16 n.7, 464 N.W.2d 401 (1990), a case which set forth a preponderance standard as the burden of proof in a Fourth Amendment search and seizure suppression hearing. 1999Albrecht incorrectly relied on State v. Rewolinski, 159 Wis. 2d 1 , 16 n.7, 464 N.W.2d 401 (1990), a case which set forth a preponderance standard as the burden of proof in a Fourth Amendment search and seizure suppression hearing. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Santosky v. Kramer
green
2 sentences1984The Court analyzed the question according to the standards set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) and determined that: “In parental rights termination proceedings, the private interest affected is commanding; the risk of error from using a preponderance standard is substantial; and the countervailing governmental interest favoring that standard is comparatively slight.” 455 U.S. at 758 . 1984The Court analyzed the question according to the standards set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) and determined that: "In parental rights termination proceedings, the private interest affected is commanding; the risk of error from using a preponderance standard is substantial; and the countervailing governmental interest favoring that standard is comparatively slight." 455 U.S. at 758 . | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Mathews v. Eldridge
green
2 sentences1984The Court analyzed the question according to the standards set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) and determined that: “In parental rights termination proceedings, the private interest affected is commanding; the risk of error from using a preponderance standard is substantial; and the countervailing governmental interest favoring that standard is comparatively slight.” 455 U.S. at 758 . 1984The Court analyzed the question according to the standards set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) and determined that: "In parental rights termination proceedings, the private interest affected is commanding; the risk of error from using a preponderance standard is substantial; and the countervailing governmental interest favoring that standard is comparatively slight." 455 U.S. at 758 . | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Hills v. State
green
2 sentences1981Hills, 93 Wis. 2d at 145-48 , 286 N.W.2d at 358-59 . 1981Hills, 93 Wis. 2d at 145-48 , 286 N.W.2d at 358-59 . | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Hernandez v. ST. EX REL. ARIZ. DEPT. OF ECON. SEC.
green
2 sentences1981Arizona Department of Economic Security, 23 Ariz. App. 32 , 530 P.2d 389 (1975). 1981Arizona Department of Economic Security, 23 Ariz. App. 32 , 530 P.2d 389 (1975). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.