16 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Stewart v. Stewartgreen2 sentences2010For these reasons, and until either our legislature or our supreme court determines otherwise, we conclude that the preponderance standard is the appropriate burden of proof in this situation. 7 See Stewart, 521 N.E.2d at 963 (holding that preponderance standard applied to party seeking to terminate visitation rights in dissolution proceeding "[blecause the private interest at stake, although great, is not permanently terminated and the state is not the initiator of the termination"). 8 Father acknowledges that the proper remedy "would be to remand the matter for judgment consistent with the p 2010For these reasons, and until either our legislature or our supreme court determines otherwise, we conclude that the preponderance standard is the appropriate burden of proof in this situation. [7] See Stewart, 521 N.E.2d at 963 (holding that preponderance standard applied to party seeking to terminate visitation rights in dissolution proceeding "[b]ecause the private interest at stake, although great, is not permanently terminated and the state is not the initiator of the termination"). [8] *721 Father acknowledges that the proper remedy "would be to remand the matter for judgment consistent w | 2 | 2 |
Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express & Station Employesgreen2 sentences1992As stated in Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks (1984), 466 U.S. 435, 457, n. 15 , 104 S.Ct. 1883, 1897, n. 15 , 80 L.Ed.2d 428 : “The fact that petitioners invoke the First Amendment is insufficient reason to impose the heightened standard on their opponents, and we perceive no need to abandon the preponderance standard normally applicable in civil suit for damages.” In summary, we hold a union cannot meet its burden of proving a nonunion member’s fair share fee by a formula that subtracts nonehargeable expenses from the union’s total expenses. 1992As stated in Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks (1984), 466 U.S. 435, 457, n. 15 , 104 S.Ct. 1883, 1897, n. 15 , 80 L.Ed.2d 428 : “The fact that petitioners invoke the First Amendment is insufficient reason to impose the heightened standard on their opponents, and we perceive no need to abandon the preponderance standard normally applicable in civil suit for damages.” In summary, we hold a union cannot meet its burden of proving a nonunion member’s fair share fee by a formula that subtracts nonehargeable expenses from the union’s total expenses. | 2 | 2 |
Pruitt v. Stategreen1 sentence2024Such a defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he “manifests,” before age twenty- two, “significantly subaverage intellectual functioning” and “substantial impairment of adaptive behavior.” I.C. § 35-36-9-2; Pruitt v. State, 834 N.E.2d 90, 103 (Ind. 2005) (imposing the preponderance standard). 1 Here, the parties dispute only whether Russell proved the adaptive-behavior element. | 1 | 1 |
Teague v. Stategreen1 sentence2016Teague v. State, 891 N.E.2d 1121, 1128 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (reasonable suspicion is less than probable cause and considerably less than the preponderance standard). | 1 | 1 |
Kathy L. Siner, and John T. Siner, prior Enduring Power of Attorney and Medical Representative of the v. Kindred Hospital Limited Partnershipgreen2 sentences2016P’ship, 33 N.E.3d 377, 383 (Ind.Ct.App.2015), tram, pending. ■■ “Expert opinions offered with reasonable medical certainty (in terms of their scientific/methodological reliability) which opine that a given injury was ‘probable’ or ‘more likely than not’ caused by defendant’s actions, fulfill the plaintiffs burden to meet the preponderance standard, and may support a verdict standing alone.” Id. 2016P’ship, 33 N.E.3d 377, 383 (Ind.Ct.App.2015), tram, pending. ■■ “Expert opinions offered with reasonable medical certainty (in terms of their scientific/methodological reliability) which opine that a given injury was ‘probable’ or ‘more likely than not’ caused by defendant’s actions, fulfill the plaintiffs burden to meet the preponderance standard, and may support a verdict standing alone.” Id. | 1 | 1 |
Hwk v. Maggreen1 sentence2013See H.W.K. v. M.A.G., 426 N.E.2d 129, 133 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (“Paternity actions are civil proceedings and the alleged father must be proved to be such by a preponderance of the evidence.”). | 1 | 1 |
Prewitt v. Stategreen1 sentence2012Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Wardship of RBgreen1 sentence1994See In re Wardship of R.B. (1993), Ind.App., 615 N.E.2d 494, 497 , trans. denied (proof by clear and convincing evidence assures the court that a high degree of probability exists that conditions would not be remedied-standard considerably above the more likely than not implications of the preponderance requirement). | 1 | 1 |
Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc. v. Trainagreen2 sentences1984See Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Traina, (1984) Ind.App., 461 N.E.2d 693 . 1984See Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Traina, (1984) Ind. App., 461 N.E.2d 693 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
E.S. v. Bartholomew County Department of Public Welfare
green
2 sentences1993Id. 1993Id. | 2 | 1993–1993 |
Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Armstrong
green
1 sentence1984NOTES [1] In so holding, the court noted that the evidence might "conceivably" have been sufficient "under a less stringent standard" to support the punitive damages award. 442 N.E.2d at 363 . [2] Likewise, where the evidence is "clear and convincing" as a matter of law, an award of punitive damages may be upheld on appeal even though the trial court applied the preponderance standard. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Morris v. State
green
1 sentence1982We hold the State must prove venue by a preponderance of the evidence.” We followed Sizemore in Morris v. State, (1980) Ind., 409 N.E.2d 608, 610 , where this Court stated: “At trial assurance must be provided that the offense charged occurred in the county of this State in which the trial is then taking place or from which it was removed at the instance of the accused. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Sizemore v. State
green
1 sentence1982The standard of review for the proof of venue in criminal eases was set forth by this Court in Sizemore v. State, (1979) Ind., 395 N.E.2d 783, 787 , as follows: “After careful consideration, we believe a preponderance standard is more appropriate and compatible with Indiana case law. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Ramirez v. State
green
2 sentences1978Moreno v. State (1975), 166 Ind.App. 441 , 336 N.E.2d 675 ; Watson v. State (1975), 165 Ind.App. 111 , 330 N.E.2d 781 ; State v. Cooley (1974), 162 Ind.App. 482 , 319 N.E.2d 868 ; Ramirez v. State (1972), 153 Ind.App. 142 , 286 N.E.2d 219 . 1978Moreno v. State (1975), 166 Ind.App. 441 , 336 N.E.2d 675 ; Watson v. State (1975), 165 Ind.App. 111 , 330 N.E.2d 781 ; State v. Cooley (1974), 162 Ind.App. 482 , 319 N.E.2d 868 ; Ramirez v. State (1972), 153 Ind.App. 142 , 286 N.E.2d 219 . | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Moreno v. State
green
2 sentences1978Moreno v. State (1975), 166 Ind.App. 441 , 336 N.E.2d 675 ; Watson v. State (1975), 165 Ind.App. 111 , 330 N.E.2d 781 ; State v. Cooley (1974), 162 Ind.App. 482 , 319 N.E.2d 868 ; Ramirez v. State (1972), 153 Ind.App. 142 , 286 N.E.2d 219 . 1978Moreno v. State (1975), 166 Ind.App. 441 , 336 N.E.2d 675 ; Watson v. State (1975), 165 Ind.App. 111 , 330 N.E.2d 781 ; State v. Cooley (1974), 162 Ind.App. 482 , 319 N.E.2d 868 ; Ramirez v. State (1972), 153 Ind.App. 142 , 286 N.E.2d 219 . | 1 | 1978–1978 |
State v. Cooley
neutral
2 sentences1978Moreno v. State (1975), 166 Ind.App. 441 , 336 N.E.2d 675 ; Watson v. State (1975), 165 Ind.App. 111 , 330 N.E.2d 781 ; State v. Cooley (1974), 162 Ind.App. 482 , 319 N.E.2d 868 ; Ramirez v. State (1972), 153 Ind.App. 142 , 286 N.E.2d 219 . 1978Moreno v. State (1975), 166 Ind.App. 441 , 336 N.E.2d 675 ; Watson v. State (1975), 165 Ind.App. 111 , 330 N.E.2d 781 ; State v. Cooley (1974), 162 Ind.App. 482 , 319 N.E.2d 868 ; Ramirez v. State (1972), 153 Ind.App. 142 , 286 N.E.2d 219 . | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Watson v. State
neutral
2 sentences1978Moreno v. State (1975), 166 Ind.App. 441 , 336 N.E.2d 675 ; Watson v. State (1975), 165 Ind.App. 111 , 330 N.E.2d 781 ; State v. Cooley (1974), 162 Ind.App. 482 , 319 N.E.2d 868 ; Ramirez v. State (1972), 153 Ind.App. 142 , 286 N.E.2d 219 . 1978Moreno v. State (1975), 166 Ind.App. 441 , 336 N.E.2d 675 ; Watson v. State (1975), 165 Ind.App. 111 , 330 N.E.2d 781 ; State v. Cooley (1974), 162 Ind.App. 482 , 319 N.E.2d 868 ; Ramirez v. State (1972), 153 Ind.App. 142 , 286 N.E.2d 219 . | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1975Lego v. Twomey, (1972) 404 U.S. 477 , 92 S.Ct. 619 , 30 L.Ed.2d 618 .) The record of the pre-trial hearing discloses that an adequate advisement of rights was given appellant as required by Miranda v. Arizona, (1966) 384 U.S. 436 , 88 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , and that he signed a written waiver at 9:10 a.m., November 11th. 1975Lego v. Twomey, (1972) 404 U.S. 477 , 92 S.Ct. 619 , 30 L.Ed.2d 618 .) The record of the pre-trial hearing discloses that an adequate advisement of rights was given appellant as required by Miranda v. Arizona, (1966) 384 U.S. 436 , 88 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , and that he signed a written waiver at 9:10 a.m., November 11th. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Lego v. Twomey
green
2 sentences1975Lego v. Twomey, (1972) 404 U.S. 477 , 92 S.Ct. 619 , 30 L.Ed.2d 618 .) The record of the pre-trial hearing discloses that an adequate advisement of rights was given appellant as required by Miranda v. Arizona, (1966) 384 U.S. 436 , 88 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , and that he signed a written waiver at 9:10 a.m., November 11th. 1975Lego v. Twomey, (1972) 404 U.S. 477 , 92 S.Ct. 619 , 30 L.Ed.2d 618 .) The record of the pre-trial hearing discloses that an adequate advisement of rights was given appellant as required by Miranda v. Arizona, (1966) 384 U.S. 436 , 88 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , and that he signed a written waiver at 9:10 a.m., November 11th. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.