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7 New Hampshire opinions name it 1 courts 1977–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Hampshire courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lego v. Twomeygreen2 sentences2010The United States Supreme Court has held that the preponderance standard satisfies the federal constitutional requirements, but that the states are free to adopt a stricter standard because “[t]hey may indeed differ as to the appropriate restriction of the values they find at stake.” Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972). 2010The United States Supreme Court has held that the preponderance standard satisfies the federal constitutional requirements, but that the states are free to adopt a stricter standard because "[t]hey may indeed differ as to the appropriate restriction of the values they find at stake." Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 , 92 S.Ct. 619 , 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972). | 2 | 2 |
New England Insurance v. Sylviagreen1 sentence2024Co. v. Sylvia, 783 F. Supp. 6, 10 (D.N.H. 1991) (“Civil actions . . . use a preponderance standard when making findings of fact.”) (citation omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen1 sentence2020“The Strickland prejudice standard is not stringent — it is, in fact, less demanding than the preponderance standard.” Williams v. Beard, 637 F.3d 195, 227 (3d Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted); see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693 ; see also Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 22 (2002) (explaining that Strickland “specifically rejected the proposition that the defendant had to prove it more likely than not that the outcome would have been altered”). | 1 | 1 |
Woodford v. Visciottigreen1 sentence2020“The Strickland prejudice standard is not stringent — it is, in fact, less demanding than the preponderance standard.” Williams v. Beard, 637 F.3d 195, 227 (3d Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted); see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693 ; see also Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 22 (2002) (explaining that Strickland “specifically rejected the proposition that the defendant had to prove it more likely than not that the outcome would have been altered”). | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Beardgreen1 sentence2020“The Strickland prejudice standard is not stringent — it is, in fact, less demanding than the preponderance standard.” Williams v. Beard, 637 F.3d 195, 227 (3d Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted); see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693 ; see also Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 22 (2002) (explaining that Strickland “specifically rejected the proposition that the defendant had to prove it more likely than not that the outcome would have been altered”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Phinneygreen2 sentences2010Phinney, 117 N.H. at 146-47 (citations omitted). 2010Phinney, 117 N.H. at 146-47 , 370 A.2d 1153 (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Leonardgreen1 sentence2007The court also noted that “[significantly, if [involuntary admission] proceedings are instituted pursuant to RSA 171-B, the standard of proof at that time would be clear and convincing evidence.” In matters of statutory interpretation, we are “the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole.” State v. Leonard, 151 N.H. 201, 203 (2004) (quotation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ke Tong Chengreen1 sentence2007The trial court reasoned that the preponderance standard was the same burden the State was required to meet regarding the defendant’s competency, see State v. Chen, 148 N.H. 565, 567 (2002), and was appropriate given that the result of a finding of dangerousness would do no more than keep the defendant in some form of custody for a reasonable period not longer than ninety days to evaluate the appropriateness of involuntary treatment. | 1 | 1 |
Dunlop v. Daiglegreen2 sentences2000See Dunlop v. Daigle, 122 N.H. 295, 298 , 444 A.2d 519, 520 (1982); cf. Scott & Fratcher, supra § 492.4, at 458. 2000See Dunlop v. Daigle, 122 N.H. 295, 298 , 444 A.2d 519, 520 (1982); cf. Scott & Fratcher, supra § 492.4, at 458. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Petersgreen2 sentences1977The adoption of the preponderance standard would amount to a determination that it is no more serious for an involuntary confession to be admitted than it is for a voluntary one to be excluded, See In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan J., concurring); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. at 494 (Brennan J., dissenting); Burton v. State, 260 Ind. 94 , 292 N.E.2d 790 (1973); State v. Peters, 315 So. 2d 678, 681 (La. 1975); State v. Bowden, 342 A.2d 281, 285 (Me. 1975). 1977See In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan J., concurring); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. at 494 (Brennan J., dissenting); Burton v. State, 260 Ind. 94 , 292 N.E.2d 790 (1973); State v. Peters, 315 So. 2d 678, 681 (La. 1975); State v. Bowden, 342 A.2d 281, 285 (Me. 1975). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bowdengreen2 sentences1977The adoption of the preponderance standard would amount to a determination that it is no more serious for an involuntary confession to be admitted than it is for a voluntary one to be excluded, See In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan J., concurring); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. at 494 (Brennan J., dissenting); Burton v. State, 260 Ind. 94 , 292 N.E.2d 790 (1973); State v. Peters, 315 So. 2d 678, 681 (La. 1975); State v. Bowden, 342 A.2d 281, 285 (Me. 1975). 1977See In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan J., concurring); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. at 494 (Brennan J., dissenting); Burton v. State, 260 Ind. 94 , 292 N.E.2d 790 (1973); State v. Peters, 315 So. 2d 678, 681 (La. 1975); State v. Bowden, 342 A.2d 281, 285 (Me. 1975). | 1 | 1 |
Burton v. Stategreen2 sentences1977The adoption of the preponderance standard would amount to a determination that it is no more serious for an involuntary confession to be admitted than it is for a voluntary one to be excluded, See In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan J., concurring); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. at 494 (Brennan J., dissenting); Burton v. State, 260 Ind. 94 , 292 N.E.2d 790 (1973); State v. Peters, 315 So. 2d 678, 681 (La. 1975); State v. Bowden, 342 A.2d 281, 285 (Me. 1975). 1977The adoption of the preponderance standard would amount to a determination that it is no more serious for an involuntary confession to be admitted than it is for a voluntary one to be excluded, See In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan J., concurring); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. at 494 (Brennan J., dissenting); Burton v. State, 260 Ind. 94 , 292 N.E.2d 790 (1973); State v. Peters, 315 So. 2d 678, 681 (La. 1975); State v. Bowden, 342 A.2d 281, 285 (Me. 1975). | 1 | 1 |
In Re WINSHIPgreen2 sentences1977The adoption of the preponderance standard would amount to a determination that it is no more serious for an involuntary confession to be admitted than it is for a voluntary one to be excluded, See In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan J., concurring); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. at 494 (Brennan J., dissenting); Burton v. State, 260 Ind. 94 , 292 N.E.2d 790 (1973); State v. Peters, 315 So. 2d 678, 681 (La. 1975); State v. Bowden, 342 A.2d 281, 285 (Me. 1975). 1977See In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan J., concurring); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. at 494 (Brennan J., dissenting); Burton v. State, 260 Ind. 94 , 292 N.E.2d 790 (1973); State v. Peters, 315 So. 2d 678, 681 (La. 1975); State v. Bowden, 342 A.2d 281, 285 (Me. 1975). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Hampshire. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Addington v. Texas
green
2 sentences2011The Court found the reasonable doubt standard “inappropriate in civil commitment proceedings because, given the uncertainties of psychiatric diagnosis, it may impose a burden the state cannot meet and thereby erect an unreasonable barrier to needed medical treatment.” Id. at 432 . 2011The Court stated that while “the preponderance standard falls short of meeting the demands of due process ... the reasonable-doubt standard is not required.” Id. at 431 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.