preponderance standard in Texas

2026It is “an intermediate standard, falling between the preponderance standard of ordinary civil proceedings and the reasonable doubt standard of criminal proceedings.” In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1980). 15 C.

2014“Clear and convincing” proof is an intermediate standard “falling between the preponderance standard of civil proceedings and the reasonable doubt standard of criminal proceedings.” Vardilos v. Vardilos, 219 S.W.3d 920, 922 (Tex.App.Dallas 2007, no pet.) (citing In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex.1980)); see also In re M.L.S., No. 01-97-00886-CV, 1998 WL 414701 , at *2 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Jul. 16, 1998, no pet.) (holding that, due to lower standard of proof than criminal cases, evidence was sufficient to support involuntary termination of mother’s parental rights based upon a prior

1987The difference is material, for a clear and convincing standard is an intermediate one falling between the preponderance standard of ordinary civil proceedings and the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of criminal proceedings, and is defined as “that measure or degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” See State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex.1979).

1981We recognize that, in State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex.1979), our Supreme Court acknowledged and adopted a clear and convincing evidence standard “in those civil proceedings brought under state law to commit an individual for an indefinite period to a state mental hospital.” The court explained that the clear and convincing standard is an intermediate standard, falling between the preponderance standard of ordinary civil proceedings and the reasonable doubt standard of criminal proceedings.

2021In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d 625 , 630 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied).

2021In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d 625 , 630 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied).

2014“This intermediate standard falls between the preponderance standard of civil proceedings and the reasonable doubt standard of criminal proceedings.” In re C.S., 208 S.W.3d 77, 83 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied).

2013“This intermediate standard falls between the preponderance standard of civil proceedings and the reasonable doubt standard of criminal proceedings.” In re C.S., 208 S.W.3d 77, 83 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied).

2009“This intermediate standard falls between the preponderance standard of ordinary civil proceedings and the reasonable doubt standard of criminal proceedings.” In re D.M.F., 283 S.W.2d at 129 (citing In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1980); In re K.W., 138 S.W.3d 420, 425 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied)).

2009"This intermediate standard falls between the preponderance standard of ordinary civil proceedings and the reasonable doubt standard of criminal proceedings." In re D.M.F. , 283 S.W.2d at 129 (citing In re G.M. , 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1980); In re K.W. , 138 S.W.3d 420, 425 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied)).

2012See Cherry v. State , 215 S.W.3d 917, 919 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. ref’d).

2012See Cherry v. State, 215 S.W.3d 917, 919 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. ref‘d).

2010In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex.1980); State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex.1979); see Strange, 256 S.W.3d at 775 .

2010In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex.1980); State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex.1979); see Strange, 256 S.W.3d at 775 .

2024Id.

2014Under the applicable preponderance standard and viewing the evidence in favor of the trial court’s 12 finding, this evidence was sufficient to create a reasonable belief that Appellant did not avoid the injurious habit of cocaine use. 8 See generally Hacker, 389 S.W.3d at 865 (explaining preponderance-of-evidence standard).

2006Trimble, 981 S.W.2d at 217.

2006Trimble , 981 S.W.2d at 217.

2002In the Interest of B.R., 950 S.W.2d at 117 .

2002In the Interest of B.R., 950 S.W.2d at 117 .

2022Ex parte Buck, 418 S.W.3d 96 , 110 n.11 (Tex.Crim.App. 2013)(citing Gonzales, Ex Parte, 204 S.W.3d 391, 394 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006))(“A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”); see also Bouchillon v. Collins, 907 F.2d 589, 595 (5th Cir. 1990)(“sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome” is “a lower burden of proof than the preponderance standard”).

2015The Supreme Court reiterated this point in Williams v. Taylor, expressly noting that a state court’s use of a preponderance of the evidence standard rather than the lesser reasonable probability standard would result in a decision that was contrary to federal law as determined by that Court. 529 U.S. at 405-06 . 1 In Bouchillon, 907 F.2d 589 , the Fifth Circuit recognized that the prejudice prong imposes “a lower burden of proof than the preponderance standard.” Id. at 595 .

2009Code Ann. § 105.005 (Vernon 2008) (stating that findings in family law cases must generally be proved by the preponderance standard). 42: Lewelling , 796 S.W.2d at 167 . 43: Id. at 168. 44: Id. 45: May v. May , 829 S.W.2d 373, 377 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied) (op. on reh’g); see S.W.H. , 72 S.W.3d at 777–78 (holding that the mother’s past severe drug addiction and past incarcerations related to drug use did not create a present likelihood of significant impairment to her child). 46: At trial, Shelley testified that she visited Ryder’s school two days a week and that she went to

2009Lewelling v. Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d 164, 167 (Tex.1990); Whitworth v. Whitworth, 222 S.W.3d 616, 623 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (stating that the "link between the parent’s conduct and harm to the child may not be based on evidence which merely raises a surmise or speculation”); see Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 105.005 (Vernon 2008) (stating that findings in family law cases must generally be proved by the preponderance standard). .

2022Ex parte Buck, 418 S.W.3d 96 , 110 n.11 (Tex.Crim.App. 2013)(citing Gonzales, Ex Parte, 204 S.W.3d 391, 394 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006))(“A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”); see also Bouchillon v. Collins, 907 F.2d 589, 595 (5th Cir. 1990)(“sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome” is “a lower burden of proof than the preponderance standard”).

2022Ex parte Buck, 418 S.W.3d 96 , 110 n.11 (Tex.Crim.App. 2013)(citing Gonzales, Ex Parte, 204 S.W.3d 391, 394 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006))(“A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”); see also Bouchillon v. Collins, 907 F.2d 589, 595 (5th Cir. 1990)(“sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome” is “a lower burden of proof than the preponderance standard”).

2015See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 , 658–62 (1984); Nero v. Blackburn, 597 F.2d 991, 994 (5th Cir. 1979).

2015See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 , 658–62 (1984); Nero v. Blackburn, 597 F.2d 991, 994 (5th Cir. 1979).

2015Even when “the evidence arguably supports a different result under a preponderance standard,” a reviewing court still can be “confident that it meets the ‘reasonable probability’ standard.” Id.; see also Buckner v. Polk, 453 F.3d 195, 203 (4th Cir. 2006) (reciting Strickland prejudice standard of “reasonable probability” as “somewhat less than a preponderance of the evidence”); Hodge v. Hurley, 426 F.3d 368 , 376 n.18 (6th Cir. 2005) (Strickland standard “is a lesser standard than preponderance of the evidence”). 19 While courts hesitate to designate any error as ineffective assistance per se,

2015Even when “the evidence arguably supports a different result under a preponderance standard,” a reviewing court still can be “confident that it meets the ‘reasonable probability’ standard.” Id.; see also Buckner v. Polk, 453 F.3d 195, 203 (4th Cir. 2006) (reciting Strickland prejudice standard of “reasonable probability” as “somewhat less than a preponderance of the evidence”); Hodge v. Hurley, 426 F.3d 368 , 376 n.18 (6th Cir. 2005) (Strickland standard “is a lesser standard than preponderance of the evidence”). 19 While courts hesitate to designate any error as ineffective assistance per se,

2015See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 , 658–62 (1984); Nero v. Blackburn, 597 F.2d 991, 994 (5th Cir. 1979).

2015See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 , 658–62 (1984); Nero v. Blackburn, 597 F.2d 991, 994 (5th Cir. 1979).

2011"This intermediate standard falls between the preponderance standard of civil proceedings and the reasonable doubt standard of criminal proceedings." Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Allen Rae Invs., 142 S.W.3d 459, 483 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.). "`To give appropriate deference to the factfinder's conclusions and the role of a court conducting a legal sufficiency review, looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment means that a reviewing court must assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so.'" In re J

2011“This intermediate standard falls between the preponderance standard of civil proceedings and the reasonable doubt standard of criminal proceedings.” Citizens Nat’l Bank v. Allen Rae Invs., 142 S.W.3d 459, 483 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 2004, no pet.). “ ‘To give appropriate deference to the factfinder’s conclusions and the role of a court conducting a legal sufficiency review, looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment means that a reviewing court must assume that the fact-finder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so.’” In re

2011"Disregarding undisputed facts that do not support the finding could skew the analysis of whether there is clear and convincing evidence." Id.; see also City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 817 ("[W]e have held that a legal sufficiency review must consider all the evidence (not just that favoring the verdict) in reviewing cases of . . . punitive damages.

2011“Disregarding undisputed facts that do not support the finding could skew the analysis of whether there is clear and convincing evidence.” Id.; see also City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 817 (“[W]e have held that a legal sufficiency review must consider all the evidence (not just that favoring the verdict) in reviewing cases of ... punitive damages.

2011"This intermediate standard falls between the preponderance standard of civil proceedings and the reasonable doubt standard of criminal proceedings." Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Allen Rae Invs., 142 S.W.3d 459, 483 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.). "`To give appropriate deference to the factfinder's conclusions and the role of a court conducting a legal sufficiency review, looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment means that a reviewing court must assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so.'" In re J

2011“This intermediate standard falls between the preponderance standard of civil proceedings and the reasonable doubt standard of criminal proceedings.” Citizens Nat’l Bank v. Allen Rae Invs., 142 S.W.3d 459, 483 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 2004, no pet.). “ ‘To give appropriate deference to the factfinder’s conclusions and the role of a court conducting a legal sufficiency review, looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment means that a reviewing court must assume that the fact-finder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so.’” In re

2008In re G.M. , 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1980); S.B., 207 S.W.3d at 884 ; In re K.W. , 138 S.W.3d 420 , 425 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied).

2008“This intermediate standard falls between the preponderance standard of ordinary civil proceedings and the reasonable doubt standard of criminal proceedings.” In re S.B., 207 S.W.3d 877, 884 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.).

2012The Supreme Court describes the preponderance standard of proof as ―more likely than not.‖ In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 265 .

2011"This intermediate standard falls between the preponderance standard of civil proceedings and the reasonable doubt standard of criminal proceedings." Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Allen Rae Invs., 142 S.W.3d 459, 483 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.). "`To give appropriate deference to the factfinder's conclusions and the role of a court conducting a legal sufficiency review, looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment means that a reviewing court must assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so.'" In re J

2002“In parental termination proceedings, the private interest affected is commanding; the risk of error from using a preponderance standard is substantial; and the countervailing governmental interest favoring that standard is comparatively slight.” Id., 455 U.S. at 758 , 102 S.Ct. at 1397 , 71 L.Ed.2d at 609 .

2002“In parental termination proceedings, the private interest affected is commanding; the risk of error from using a preponderance standard is substantial; and the countervailing governmental interest favoring that standard is comparatively slight.” Id., 455 U.S. at 758 , 102 S.Ct. at 1397 , 71 L.Ed.2d at 609 .