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14 Alaska opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alaska courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Institution at Walpole v. Hillgreen1 sentence2025Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454, 456 (1985)). 4 7737 concluded that the preponderance standard is constitutional in light of our decision in Nordlund. | 1 | 1 |
Brent McCormick v. Chippewa, Inc. and Louis Olsongreen1 sentence2025McCormick v. Chippewa, Inc., 459 P.3d 1172, 1180 (Alaska 2020) (holding arguments waived for inadequate briefing when appellant attempted to incorporate by reference arguments made in other documents). 9 7737 demanding burden would also increase the risk that violations of prison disciplinary rules may go unpunished. 30 Third, we consider the State’s interest in using a preponderance standard for prison disciplinary proceedings. | 1 | 1 |
Nunez v. City Of San Diegogreen1 sentence2023Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 945 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that “minors’ rights are not coextensive with the rights of adults because the state has a greater range of interests that justify the infringement”). -23- 7660 We normally assume that the superior court has applied the correct standard and that it does not need to explicitly state the standard if there is no dispute.57 During the hearings at issue no party disputed the burden of proof. | 1 | 1 |
Caroline J. v. Theodore J.green2 sentences2019Everett does not directly address Sharon’s argument about the standard of proof for the sexual abuse allegations, but he suggests the evidence could not have established the timing and causes of their daughter’s injury even under a preponderance standard: he argues that Sharon presented “[n]o evidence . . . that could substantiate when the injury to [the girl] occurred, whether it occurred solely during [Everett’s custodial] time, or who was the perpetrator.” He asserts that his initial apparent disregard for the possibility of sexual abuse was because he was given only “inconclusive 24 (...co 2019Everett does not directly address Sharon’s argument about the standard of proof for the sexual abuse allegations, but he suggests the evidence could not have established the timing and causes of their daughter’s injury even under a preponderance standard: he argues that Sharon presented “[n]o evidence . . . that could substantiate when the injury to [the girl] occurred, whether it occurred solely during [Everett’s custodial] time, or who was the perpetrator.” He asserts that his initial apparent disregard for the possibility of sexual abuse was because he was given only “inconclusive 24 (...co | 1 | 1 |
Carter v. Novotnygreen1 sentence2004Both Carter v. Novotny, 779 P.2d 1195, 1197 (Alaska 1989) and C.R.B. v. C.C., 959 P.2d 375, 380 (Alaska 1998) use the phrase "clear evidence." These cases, however, were not addressing the question of burden of proof, but were most likely referring to the substantive standard. [4] 567 P.2d at 310 . [5] Buness v. Gillen, 781 P.2d 985 , 989 n. 7 (Alaska 1989). | 1 | 1 |
Crb v. Ccgreen1 sentence2004Both Carter v. Novotny, 779 P.2d 1195, 1197 (Alaska 1989) and C.R.B. v. C.C., 959 P.2d 375, 380 (Alaska 1998) use the phrase "clear evidence." These cases, however, were not addressing the question of burden of proof, but were most likely referring to the substantive standard. [4] 567 P.2d at 310 . [5] Buness v. Gillen, 781 P.2d 985 , 989 n. 7 (Alaska 1989). | 1 | 1 |
Todd v. Toddgreen1 sentence2004It simply announced that the preponderance standard applied, and did not explain that it was choosing that standard, or its rationale for citing that standard. 567 P.2d at 310 . [1] 540 P.2d 1051, 1055 (Alaska 1975). [2] Todd v. Todd, 989 P.2d 141, 143 (Alaska 1999); J.W. v. R.J., 951 P.2d 1206 , 1210 n. 3 (Alaska 1998); Buness v. Gillen, 781 P.2d 985 , 989 n. 7 (Alaska 1989); Britt v. Britt, 567 P.2d 308, 310 (Alaska 1977). [3] While "clearly shown" is in our early cases, these precede Turner. | 1 | 1 |
Britt v. Brittgreen2 sentences2004It simply announced that the preponderance standard applied, and did not explain that it was choosing that standard, or its rationale for citing that standard. 567 P.2d at 310 . [1] 540 P.2d 1051, 1055 (Alaska 1975). [2] Todd v. Todd, 989 P.2d 141, 143 (Alaska 1999); J.W. v. R.J., 951 P.2d 1206 , 1210 n. 3 (Alaska 1998); Buness v. Gillen, 781 P.2d 985 , 989 n. 7 (Alaska 1989); Britt v. Britt, 567 P.2d 308, 310 (Alaska 1977). [3] While "clearly shown" is in our early cases, these precede Turner. 2004It simply announced that the preponderance standard applied, and did not explain that it was choosing that standard, or its rationale for citing that standard. 567 P.2d at 310 . [1] 540 P.2d 1051, 1055 (Alaska 1975). [2] Todd v. Todd, 989 P.2d 141, 143 (Alaska 1999); J.W. v. R.J., 951 P.2d 1206 , 1210 n. 3 (Alaska 1998); Buness v. Gillen, 781 P.2d 985 , 989 n. 7 (Alaska 1989); Britt v. Britt, 567 P.2d 308, 310 (Alaska 1977). [3] While "clearly shown" is in our early cases, these precede Turner. | 1 | 1 |
Turner v. Pannickgreen1 sentence2004It simply announced that the preponderance standard applied, and did not explain that it was choosing that standard, or its rationale for citing that standard. 567 P.2d at 310 . [1] 540 P.2d 1051, 1055 (Alaska 1975). [2] Todd v. Todd, 989 P.2d 141, 143 (Alaska 1999); J.W. v. R.J., 951 P.2d 1206 , 1210 n. 3 (Alaska 1998); Buness v. Gillen, 781 P.2d 985 , 989 n. 7 (Alaska 1989); Britt v. Britt, 567 P.2d 308, 310 (Alaska 1977). [3] While "clearly shown" is in our early cases, these precede Turner. | 1 | 1 |
Shaw v. State, Department of Administrationgreen1 sentence2003See Kaiser v. Sakata, 40 P.3d 800 , 805 n. 16 (Alaska 2002); Shaw v. State, Dep't of Admin., 861 P.2d 566, 572 (Alaska 1993); and Dairy Queen of Fairbanks, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. | 1 | 1 |
Kaiser v. Sakatagreen1 sentence2003See Kaiser v. Sakata, 40 P.3d 800 , 805 n. 16 (Alaska 2002); Shaw v. State, Dep't of Admin., 861 P.2d 566, 572 (Alaska 1993); and Dairy Queen of Fairbanks, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. | 1 | 1 |
Matter of KLJgreen1 sentence1998See In re K.L.J., 813 P.2d 276, 279 (Alaska 1991) ("The right to the care, custody, companionship, and control of one's children `undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.'") (quoting Lassiter v. Department of Soc. | 1 | 1 |
Clark v. Board of Fire & Police Commissionersgreen2 sentences1996See Clark v. Board of Fire & Police Comm’rs, 245 Ill.App.3d 385 , 184 Ill.Dec. 509, 513 , 613 N.E.2d 826, 830 (1993) (termination of police officer accused of obstruction of justice, bribery, and conspiracy); Meyers v. Montgomery County Police Dept., 96 Md. 1996See Clark v. Board of Fire & Police Comm’rs, 245 Ill.App.3d 385 , 184 Ill.Dec. 509, 513 , 613 N.E.2d 826, 830 (1993) (termination of police officer accused of obstruction of justice, bribery, and conspiracy); Meyers v. Montgomery County Police Dept., 96 Md. | 1 | 1 |
Saxton v. Harrisgreen1 sentence1982If clear and convincing proof is required, there must be induced a belief that the truth of the asserted facts is highly probable.” Saxton v. Harris, 395 P.2d 71, 72 (Alaska 1964). 5 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alaska. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Care & Protection of Robert
green
2 sentences1998Cf. Care & Protection of Robert, 408 Mass. 52 , 556 N.E.2d 993 , 1001 n. 7 (1990) (observing that the preponderance standard required for review of emergency removal of child is “analogous to the hearing accorded a request for a preliminary injunction” in which the “task for the motion judge is to balance the risk of irreparable harm to the plaintiff and the defendant ‘in light of [each] party’s chance of success on the merits’ ” because both hearings serve “essentially the same function”) (citations omitted). 1998Cf. Care & Protection of Robert, 408 Mass. 52 , 556 N.E.2d 993 , 1001 n. 7 (1990) (observing that the preponderance standard required for review of emergency removal of child is “analogous to the hearing accorded a request for a preliminary injunction” in which the “task for the motion judge is to balance the risk of irreparable harm to the plaintiff and the defendant ‘in light of [each] party’s chance of success on the merits’ ” because both hearings serve “essentially the same function”) (citations omitted). | 2 | 1998–1998 |
Opinions of the Justices
green
2 sentences1998Supportive of this conclusion is Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 427 Mass. 1201 , 691 N.E.2d 911 , 916 (1998), in which the Massachusetts Supreme Court stated that “the preponderance standard was sufficient for purposes of restricting a parent’s right to custody, in part, because ‘further proceedings regarding the particular situation [would] be held’ ” (quoting Care & Protection of Robert, 556 N.E.2d at 999 ). 1998Supportive of this conclusion is Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 427 Mass. 1201 , 691 N.E.2d 911 , 916 (1998), in which the Massachusetts Supreme Court stated that "the preponderance standard was sufficient for purposes of restricting a parent's right to custody, in part, because `further proceedings regarding the particular situation [would] be held'" (quoting Care & Protection of Robert, 556 N.E.2d at 999 ). | 2 | 1998–1998 |
Matter of AB
green
2 sentences1998Since a preponderance standard is required merely to restrict the visitation rights of a parent who has already been deprived of custody, see A.B., 791 P.2d at 618 n. 3, it follows that a standard at least as demanding is necessary to deprive a parent of custody for an appreciable period of time. 1998Since a preponderance standard is required merely to restrict the visitation rights of a parent who has already been deprived of custody, see A.B., 791 P.2d at 618 n. 3, it follows that a standard at least as demanding is necessary to deprive a parent of custody for an appreciable period of time. | 2 | 1998–1998 |
Matter of JH
green
2 sentences1990Matter of J.H., 758 P.2d 1287 , 1291 (Alaska App. 1988). 1990Matter of J.H., 758 P.2d 1287 , 1291 (Alaska App.1988). | 2 | 1990–1990 |
Treacy v. Municipality of Anchorage
green
1 sentence2023We therefore reject the argument that the court’s use of the word “barely” indicated use of a preponderance standard. 56 See, e.g., Treacy v. Mun. of Anchorage, 91 P.3d 252 , 265 n.60 (Alaska 2004) (noting that United States Supreme Court has “held that the rights of minors are not always coextensive with those of adults”); Nunez ex rel. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Jw v. Rj
green
1 sentence2004It simply announced that the preponderance standard applied, and did not explain that it was choosing that standard, or its rationale for citing that standard. 567 P.2d at 310 . [1] 540 P.2d 1051, 1055 (Alaska 1975). [2] Todd v. Todd, 989 P.2d 141, 143 (Alaska 1999); J.W. v. R.J., 951 P.2d 1206 , 1210 n. 3 (Alaska 1998); Buness v. Gillen, 781 P.2d 985 , 989 n. 7 (Alaska 1989); Britt v. Britt, 567 P.2d 308, 310 (Alaska 1977). [3] While "clearly shown" is in our early cases, these precede Turner. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Buness v. Gillen
green
2 sentences2004In mentioning the preponderance standard, we simply cited to Britt. 781 P.2d at 989 n. 7. 2004It simply announced that the preponderance standard applied, and did not explain that it was choosing that standard, or its rationale for citing that standard. 567 P.2d at 310 . [1] 540 P.2d 1051, 1055 (Alaska 1975). [2] Todd v. Todd, 989 P.2d 141, 143 (Alaska 1999); J.W. v. R.J., 951 P.2d 1206 , 1210 n. 3 (Alaska 1998); Buness v. Gillen, 781 P.2d 985 , 989 n. 7 (Alaska 1989); Britt v. Britt, 567 P.2d 308, 310 (Alaska 1977). [3] While "clearly shown" is in our early cases, these precede Turner. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
VF v. State
green
1 sentence2000The record does not contain a copy of the case plan showing D.M.'s receipt, nor would it be appropriate for us to take judicial notice of that document. [22] She cites V.F. v. State, 666 P.2d 42 , 46-47 n. 5 (Alaska 1983). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Meyers v. Montgomery County Police Department
green
1 sentence1996See Clark v. Board of Fire & Police Comm’rs, 245 Ill.App.3d 385 , 184 Ill.Dec. 509, 513 , 613 N.E.2d 826, 830 (1993) (termination of police officer accused of obstruction of justice, bribery, and conspiracy); Meyers v. Montgomery County Police Dept., 96 Md. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance v. McBride
green
1 sentence1988Mutual of Enumclaw, 667 P.2d at 499 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Jonas v. Northeastern Mutual Fire Insurance
green
1 sentence1988Co., 44 Wis.2d 347 , 171 N.W.2’d 185, 187 (1969). 4 *1171 Travelers responds by pointing out that the majority rule favors the preponderance standard. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Neises v. Soloman State Bank
green
1 sentence1988Those jurisdictions that adopt the preponderance standard do so on the grounds that the cases present “a simple breach of contract,” Neises, 696 P.2d at 378 , and that “[t]he stakes are solely financial and aim at *1172 compensation rather than punishment. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Troyer v. State
green
2 sentences1981As recently noted in Troyer v. State, 614 P.2d 313 , 317 n. 9 (Alaska 1980), we have previously utilized the preponderance standard in determining voluntariness. 1981As recently noted in Troyer v. State, 614 P.2d 313 , 317 n.9 (Alaska 1980), we have previously utilized the preponderance standard in determining voluntariness. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.