14 Nebraska opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Nebraska courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Interest of Bird Headgreen2 sentences2015See In re Interest of Mischa S., supra. The Tribe asserts that this case is akin to In re Interest of Bird Head, 213 Neb. 741 , 331 N.W.2d 785 (1983). 2015See In re Interest of Mischa S., supra. The Tribe asserts that this case is akin to In re Interest of Bird Head, 213 Neb. 741 , 331 N.W.2d 785 (1983). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Douglasgreen1 sentence2006Addington, supra. Our inquiry is limited to whether Hergert violated his duties to the public as a constitutional officer of this state, that is, whether he has committed a “misdemeanor in office.” Whether Hergert should be impeached does not depend upon whether he could be convicted of violating a criminal statute, but upon whether his alleged conduct is “ ‘ “in its nature or consequences subversive of some fundamental or essential principle of government or highly prejudicial to the public interest....”’” State v. Douglas, 217 Neb. 199, 202 , 349 N.W.2d 870, 875 (1984), quoting Hastings, sup | 1 | 1 |
State v. Yelligreen2 sentences2004See, also, State v. Yelli, 247 Neb. 785 , 530 N.W.2d 250 (1995) (because civil judgments have lower burden of proof than criminal trials, doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are not applicable as bases for admission of prior civil judgments in subsequent criminal trial; but judgment in civil paternity adjudication is res judicata as between same parties in subsequent civil action such as support modification proceeding because burdens of proof for two actions are same). *581 In light of the standard of review for evaluating termination of parental rights cases, set forth in § 43- 2004See, also, State v. Yelli, 247 Neb. 785 , 530 N.W.2d 250 (1995) (because civil judgments have lower burden of proof than criminal trials, doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are not applicable as bases for admission of prior civil judgments in subsequent criminal trial; but judgment in civil paternity adjudication is res judicata as between same parties in subsequent civil action such as support modification proceeding because burdens of proof for two actions are same). *581 In light of the standard of review for evaluating termination of parental rights cases, set forth in § 43- | 1 | 1 |
New Jersey Div. v. ARGgreen1 sentence2003See New Jersey Div. v. A.R.G., 361 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
In Interest of Wagnergreen2 sentences2000In In re Interest of Wagner and Russell, 209 Neb. 33, 37 , 305 N.W.2d 900, 902 (1981), the Nebraska Supreme Court found that “[t]he evidence presented at the various hearings, if believed by the [trial] court, would permit it to find, by clear and convincing evidence, the following facts.” The Supreme Court then summarized the facts which it believed supported the trial court’s decision to sever the parents’ rights to their children. 2000In In re Interest of Wagner and Russell, 209 Neb. 33, 37 , 305 N.W.2d 900, 902 (1981), the Nebraska Supreme Court found that “[t]he evidence presented at the various hearings, if believed by the [trial] court, would permit it to find, by clear and convincing evidence, the following facts.” The Supreme Court then summarized the facts which it believed supported the trial court’s decision to sever the parents’ rights to their children. | 1 | 1 |
Drew v. Walkupgreen2 sentences2000See Drew v. Walkup, 240 Neb. 946 , 486 N.W.2d 187 (1992). 2000See Drew v. Walkup, 240 Neb. 946 , 486 N.W.2d 187 (1992). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Nebraska. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Palmtag v. Republican Party of Neb.
green
1 sentence2024Cite as 315 Neb. 679 specific facts showing a genuine issue and may not rest only upon mere allegations or denials. 37 Still, the Court in Anderson reiterated that a higher under- lying burden of proof at trial does not change the fact that “[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge . . . .” 38 Furthermore, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” 39 [10] The Court emphasized in Anderson that its “holding th | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Warner
green
1 sentence2022Id. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Hayden
green
2 sentences2017So too, in State v. Hayden, 233 Neb. 211 , 444 N.W.2d, 317 (1989), a defendant acquitted on grounds of insanity claimed the State offered insufficient evidence to support a finding by the clear and convincing standard. 2017So too, in State v. Hayden, 233 Neb. 211 , 444 N.W.2d, 317 (1989), a defendant acquitted on grounds of insanity claimed the State offered insufficient evidence to support a finding by the clear and convincing standard. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Double K, Inc. v. Scottsdale Insurance
green
2 sentences2014Co., 245 Neb. 712 , 515 N.W.2d 416 (1994); Commerce Sav. 2014Co., 245 Neb. 712 , 515 N.W.2d 416 (1994); Commerce Sav. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Douglas
green
1 sentence2006Addington, supra. Our inquiry is limited to whether Hergert violated his duties to the public as a constitutional officer of this state, that is, whether he has committed a “misdemeanor in office.” Whether Hergert should be impeached does not depend upon whether he could be convicted of violating a criminal statute, but upon whether his alleged conduct is “ ‘ “in its nature or consequences subversive of some fundamental or essential principle of government or highly prejudicial to the public interest....”’” State v. Douglas, 217 Neb. 199, 202 , 349 N.W.2d 870, 875 (1984), quoting Hastings, sup | 1 | 2006–2006 |
In Re Interest of DMB
green
2 sentences2004In In re Interest of D.M.B., 240 Neb. 349 , 481 N.W.2d 905 (1992), the Nebraska Supreme Court acknowledged that differing standards of proof apply to criminal and juvenile cases and determined that a parent’s conduct may be grounds for a juvenile court to acquire jurisdiction under the clear and convincing standard, notwithstanding that the parent was acquitted of a criminal charge for conduct detrimental to the child under the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. 2004In In re Interest of D.M.B., 240 Neb. 349 , 481 N.W.2d 905 (1992), the Nebraska Supreme Court acknowledged that differing standards of proof apply to criminal and juvenile cases and determined that a parent’s conduct may be grounds for a juvenile court to acquire jurisdiction under the clear and convincing standard, notwithstanding that the parent was acquitted of a criminal charge for conduct detrimental to the child under the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Shepherd
neutral
2 sentences2004See, e.g., § 43-279.01(3); In re Interest of Kantril P. & Chenelle P., 257 Neb. 450 , 598 N.W.2d 729 (1999); In re Interest of Shepherd, 211 Neb. 313, 318 N.W.2d 288 (1982). 2004See, e.g., § 43-279.01(3); In re Interest of Kantril P. & Chenelle P., 257 Neb. 450 , 598 N.W.2d 729 (1999); In re Interest of Shepherd, 211 Neb. 313, 318 N.W.2d 288 (1982). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Carlotta P. v. State
green
2 sentences2004See, e.g., § 43-279.01(3); In re Interest of Kantril P. & Chenelle P., 257 Neb. 450 , 598 N.W.2d 729 (1999); In re Interest of Shepherd, 211 Neb. 313, 318 N.W.2d 288 (1982). 2004See, e.g., § 43-279.01(3); In re Interest of Kantril P. & Chenelle P., 257 Neb. 450 , 598 N.W.2d 729 (1999); In re Interest of Shepherd, 211 Neb. 313, 318 N.W.2d 288 (1982). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Reid v. Flournoy
green
1 sentence2000Like in Reid, supra, Melissa and the objectors each presented evidence which, if believed, supported their argument. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health
green
2 sentences1997We find the clear and convincing standard used in [the statute] acceptable." (Emphasis in original.) Id., 497 U.S. at 516, 110 S.Ct. at 2981. 1997We find the clear and convincing standard used in [the statute] acceptable.” (Emphasis in original.) Id., 497 U.S. at 516. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Lake
neutral
2 sentences1994In State v. Lake, 33 Ohio App. 3d 275 , 515 N.E.2d 960 (1986), the same court held that the least restrictive alternative requirement applied only to transfers between facilities and not between wards of the same facility. 1994In State v. Lake, 33 Ohio App. 3d 275 , 515 N.E.2d 960 (1986), the same court held that the least restrictive alternative requirement applied only to transfers between facilities and not between wards of the same facility. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
State v. Shepard
green
2 sentences1994The Ohio Court of Appeals held that the clear and convincing standard applied to hearings for the determination of confinement of an insanity acquittee, “even when the only issue consists in ascertaining which controlled environment, among the available alternatives, is most appropriate to the patient’s mental health.” Id. at 392 , 469 N.E.2d at 1044 . 1994The Ohio Court of Appeals held that the clear and convincing standard applied to hearings for the determination of confinement of an insanity acquittee, “even when the only issue consists in ascertaining which controlled environment, among the available alternatives, is most appropriate to the patient’s mental health.” Id. at 392 , 469 N.E.2d at 1044 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
State v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1994After recognizing that the clear and convincing standard of proof is mandated in both the initial determination of commitment and any determination that the commitment should be continued, the court held that when the sole question is whether the appellant should be transferred from one facility to a less restrictive one, “any determination made by the trial court in such cases will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of discretion.” Id. at 113 , 512 N.E.2d at 656 . 1994After recognizing that the clear and convincing standard of proof is mandated in both the initial determination of commitment and any determination that the commitment should be continued, the court held that when the sole question is whether the appellant should be transferred from one facility to a less restrictive one, “any determination made by the trial court in such cases will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of discretion.” Id. at 113 , 512 N.E.2d at 656 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
State v. Bruton
neutral
2 sentences1994In State v. Bruton, 27 Ohio App. 3d 362 , 501 N.E.2d 651 (1985), the clear and convincing standard was applied by the trial court when it refused a less restrictive environment, and the appellate court affirmed the judgment. 1994In State v. Bruton, 27 Ohio App. 3d 362 , 501 N.E.2d 651 (1985), the clear and convincing standard was applied by the trial court when it refused a less restrictive environment, and the appellate court affirmed the judgment. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Vitek v. Jones
green
2 sentences1990The court, *792 therefore, met the federal due process clause burden of proof required by Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 , 100 S. Ct. 1254 , 63 L. 1990The court, *792 therefore, met the federal due process clause burden of proof required by Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 , 100 S. Ct. 1254 , 63 L. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Castellano v. Bitkower
green
2 sentences1988(For *489 another application of the clear and convincing standard of proof in a law action, see Castellano v. Bitkower, 216 Neb. 806 , 346 N.W.2d 249 (1984), which required such quantum of proof in a suit to recover on lost promissory notes.) Thus, the district court held the plaintiff to the correct standard of proof, and the record provides no basis for concluding that the district court’s finding of no undue influence under that standard is clearly wrong. 1988(For *489 another application of the clear and convincing standard of proof in a law action, see Castellano v. Bitkower, 216 Neb. 806 , 346 N.W.2d 249 (1984), which required such quantum of proof in a suit to recover on lost promissory notes.) Thus, the district court held the plaintiff to the correct standard of proof, and the record provides no basis for concluding that the district court’s finding of no undue influence under that standard is clearly wrong. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Wells v. Tietge
neutral
2 sentences1981To the extent that Foos v. Reuter, 180 Neb. 301 , 142 N.W.2d 552 (1966), and Wells v. Tietge, 143 Neb. 230 , 9 N.W.2d 180 (1943), establish a clear and convincing standard, they are overruled. 1981To the extent that Foos v. Reuter, 180 Neb. 301 , 142 N.W.2d 552 (1966), and Wells v. Tietge, 143 Neb. 230 , 9 N.W.2d 180 (1943), establish a clear and convincing standard, they are overruled. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Foos v. Reuter
green
2 sentences1981To the extent that Foos v. Reuter, 180 Neb. 301 , 142 N.W.2d 552 (1966), and Wells v. Tietge, 143 Neb. 230 , 9 N.W.2d 180 (1943), establish a clear and convincing standard, they are overruled. 1981To the extent that Foos v. Reuter, 180 Neb. 301 , 142 N.W.2d 552 (1966), and Wells v. Tietge, 143 Neb. 230 , 9 N.W.2d 180 (1943), establish a clear and convincing standard, they are overruled. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.