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147 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1982–2026 19 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Santosky v. Kramergreen2 sentences2018Furthermore, in Fish , our Supreme Court determined that, contrary to Roth , the clear and convincing standard was not constitutionally required under the test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Santosky v. Kramer , supra, 455 U.S. at 753 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 . 2018Furthermore, in Fish , our Supreme Court determined that, contrary to Roth , the clear and convincing standard was not constitutionally required under the test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Santosky v. Kramer , supra, 455 U.S. at 753 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 . | 5 | 9 |
Goldstar Medical Services, Inc. v. Department of Social Servicesgreen2 sentences2011In Goldstar Medical Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Social Services, 288 Conn. 790, 821 , 955 A.2d 15 (2008), our Supreme Court held that “[i]nthe absence of state legislation prescribing an applicable standard of proof . . . the preponderance of the evidence standard is the appropriate standard of proof in administrative proceedings” under the UAPA. 11 In this appeal, we have neither been presented with nor found any statutory authority requiring the clear and convincing standard of proof to be applied in revocation proceedings before the defendant. *593 It is axiomatic that this court, as an inte 2011In Goldstar Medical Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Social Services, 288 Conn. 790, 821 , 955 A.2d 15 (2008), our Supreme Court held that “[i]nthe absence of state legislation prescribing an applicable standard of proof . . . the preponderance of the evidence standard is the appropriate standard of proof in administrative proceedings” under the UAPA. 11 In this appeal, we have neither been presented with nor found any statutory authority requiring the clear and convincing standard of proof to be applied in revocation proceedings before the defendant. *593 It is axiomatic that this court, as an inte | 3 | 5 |
Haven v. State Board of Educationgreen2 sentences2021See New Haven v. State Board of Education, 228 Conn. 699 , 714-20, 638 A.2d 589 (1994) (applying plenary review to challenge to allocation of burden of proof between parties in administrative appeal); Zabaneh v. Dan Beard Associates, LLC, 105 Conn. App. 134, 140 , 937 A.2d 706 (applying plenary review to plaintiff’s claim that the [trial] court improperly required that it, rather than the defendant, bear the burden of proof regarding the existence of permission), cert. denied, 286 Conn. 916 , 945 A.2d 979 (2008); Wieselman v. Hoeniger, 103 Conn. App. 591 , 596-97, 930 A.2d 768 (applying plenar 2021See New Haven v. State Board of Education, 228 Conn. 699 , 714-20, 638 A.2d 589 (1994) (applying plenary review to challenge to allocation of burden of proof between parties in administrative appeal); Zabaneh v. Dan Beard Associates, LLC, 105 Conn. App. 134, 140 , 937 A.2d 706 (applying plenary review to plaintiff’s claim that the [trial] court improperly required that it, rather than the defendant, bear the burden of proof regarding the existence of permission), cert. denied, 286 Conn. 916 , 945 A.2d 979 (2008); Wieselman v. Hoeniger, 103 Conn. App. 591 , 596-97, 930 A.2d 768 (applying plenar | 3 | 3 |
Black v. Goodwin, Loomis & Britton, Inc.green2 sentences2022See, e.g., Goldstar Medical Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Social Services, 288 Conn. 790, 819 , 955 A.2d 15 (2008) (clear and convincing standard is appropriate standard in common-law fraud cases); Notopoulos v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 277 Conn. 218, 226 , 890 A.2d 509 (clear and convincing standard is applicable when determining whether attorney violated Rules of Professional Conduct), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 823 , 127 S. Ct. 157 , 166 L. Ed. 2d 39 (2006); Black v. Goodwin, Loomis & Britton, Inc., 239 Conn. 144 , 163-64, 681 A.2d 293 (1996) (clear and convincing evidence standard of proof 2022See, e.g., Goldstar Medical Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Social Services, 288 Conn. 790, 819 , 955 A.2d 15 (2008) (clear and convincing standard is appropriate standard in common-law fraud cases); Notopoulos v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 277 Conn. 218, 226 , 890 A.2d 509 (clear and convincing standard is applicable when determining whether attorney violated Rules of Professional Conduct), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 823 , 127 S. Ct. 157 , 166 L. Ed. 2d 39 (2006); Black v. Goodwin, Loomis & Britton, Inc., 239 Conn. 144 , 163-64, 681 A.2d 293 (1996) (clear and convincing evidence standard of proof | 2 | 4 |
| Ross v. Commissioner of Correctiongreen | 2 | 2 |
| Roth v. Westonyellow | 2 | 2 |
Miller v. Commissioner of Correctiongreen2 sentences2021Id. ‘‘As to the first prong, we emphasized in Miller that the clear and convincing standard . . . is a very demanding standard and should be understood as such, particularly when applied to a habeas claim of actual innocence, where the stakes are so important for both the petitioner and the state. . . . [That standard] should operate as a weighty caution upon the minds of all judges, and it forbids relief whenever the evidence is loose, equivocal or contradictory. . . . [The standard requires] extraordinarily high and truly persuasive demonstration[s] of actual innocence. . . . ‘‘Moreover, act 2011Thus, the “heavy burden” that this very demanding standard of proof imposes has been reserved for matters “involving extremely significant questions of fact”; id., 796 ; and, consequently, this court employs a clear and convincing standard of proof with caution. | 1 | 8 |
State v. Bonellogreen2 sentences2000The clear and convincing standard is met only if "the evidence induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true, and that the probability that they are true or exist is substantially greater than the probability that they are false or do not exist." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Charlton v. Commissioner of Correction, 51 Conn. App. 87 , 90 , 719 A.2d 1205 (1998); see also State v. Bonello, 210 Conn. 51 , 66 , 554 A.2d 277 , cert. denied, 490 U.S. 108 , 109 S.Ct. 3268 , 106 L.Ed.2d 612 (1989); Wildwood Associates, 2000The clear and convincing standard is met only if "the evidence induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true, and that the probability that they are true or exist is substantially greater than the probability that they are false or do not exist." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Charlton v. Commissioner of Correction, 51 Conn. App. 87 , 90 , 719 A.2d 1205 (1998); see also State v. Bonello, 210 Conn. 51 , 66 , 554 A.2d 277 , cert. denied, 490 U.S. 108 , 109 S.Ct. 3268 , 106 L.Ed.2d 612 (1989); Wildwood Associates, | 1 | 7 |
Lopinto v. Hainesgreen2 sentences2019It is true that Connecticut cases often describe the clear and convincing standard in the following way: "The burden of persuasion, therefore, in those cases requiring a showing of clear and convincing proof is sustained if evidence induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true, that the probability that they are true or exist is substantially greater than the probability that they are false or do not exist." Dacey v. Connecticut Bar Assn. , 170 Conn. 520 , 537, 368 A.2d 125 (1976) ; see also Lopinto v. Haines , 185 Conn. 527 , 534, 441 A 2019It is true that Connecticut cases often describe the clear and convincing standard in the following way: "The burden of persuasion, therefore, in those cases requiring a showing of clear and convincing proof is sustained if evidence induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true, that the probability that they are true or exist is substantially greater than the probability that they are false or do not exist." Dacey v. Connecticut Bar Assn. , 170 Conn. 520 , 537, 368 A.2d 125 (1976) ; see also Lopinto v. Haines , 185 Conn. 527 , 534, 441 A | 1 | 3 |
Wildwood Associates, Ltd. v. Espositogreen2 sentences2002The grievance committee must prove the case by a clear and convincing standard of proof. “[C]lear and convincing proof denotes a degree of belief that lies between the belief that is required to find the truth or existence of the [fact in issue] in an ordinary civil action and the belief that is required to find guilt in a criminal prosecution. . . . [The burden] is sustained if evidence induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true, that the probability that they are true or exist is substantially greater than the probability that they a 2002The grievance committee must prove the case by a clear and convincing standard of proof. “[C]lear and convincing proof denotes a degree of belief that lies between the belief that is required to find the truth or existence of the [fact in issue] in an ordinary civil action and the belief that is required to find guilt in a criminal prosecution. . . . [The burden] is sustained if evidence induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true, that the probability that they are true or exist is substantially greater than the probability that they a | 1 | 3 |
Statewide Grievance Committee v. Presnickgreen2 sentences1995Statewide Grievance Committee v. Presnick , 215 Conn. 162 , 171-72 (1990). 1993See Statewide Grievance Committee v. Presnick, 215 Conn. 162 , 171-172 (1990). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Rizzogreen2 sentences2004The clear and convincing standard traditionally applies in civil cases “to protect particularly important individual interests . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rizzo, 266 Conn. 171 , 211 n.22, 833 A.2d 363 (2003), quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 , 99 S. Ct. 1804 , 60 L. 2004The clear and convincing standard traditionally applies in civil cases “to protect particularly important individual interests . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rizzo, 266 Conn. 171 , 211 n.22, 833 A.2d 363 (2003), quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 , 99 S. Ct. 1804 , 60 L. | 1 | 2 |
| Addington v. Texasgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Kaczynski v. Kaczynskigreen | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Jarzbekgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Somers v. Statewide Grievance Committeegreen | 1 | 2 |
| In re Tianna M.-M.green | 1 | 1 |
| Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue Servicesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Alexandre v. Commissioner of Revenue Servicesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Blumberg Associates Worldwide, Inc. v. Brown & Brown of Connecticut, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Guardianship of Barrosgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Guardianship of Llgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Davisgreen2 sentences2009See, e.g., Smith v. Muellner, 283 Conn. 510, 537 , 932 A.2d 382 (2007) (rejecting claim that trial court improperly held party to higher standard of proof on prescriptive easement claim); Rollar Construction & Demolition, Inc. v. Granite Rock Associates, LLC, 94 Conn. App. 125, 133-34 , 891 A.2d 133 (2006) (rejecting claim that trial court improperly held party to higher standard of proof as to validity of mechanic’s lien); but see State v. Davis, 229 Conn. 285, 303 , 641 A.2d 370 (1994) (declining to presume that preponderance of evidence standard had been applied where trial court “articulat 2009See, e.g., Smith v. Muellner, 283 Conn. 510, 537 , 932 A.2d 382 (2007) (rejecting claim that trial court improperly held party to higher standard of proof on prescriptive easement claim); Rollar Construction & Demolition, Inc. v. Granite Rock Associates, LLC, 94 Conn. App. 125, 133-34 , 891 A.2d 133 (2006) (rejecting claim that trial court improperly held party to higher standard of proof as to validity of mechanic’s lien); but see State v. Davis, 229 Conn. 285, 303 , 641 A.2d 370 (1994) (declining to presume that preponderance of evidence standard had been applied where trial court “articulat | 1 | 3 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In re Tabitha T.
green
2 sentences2010They were referred to services multiple times to encourage cooperation. [The respondent] has not been able to take full advantage of services, as he has been incarcerated for most of the current [department] involvement.” (Citation omitted.) Section 17a-112 (k) (2) requires the court to determine whether the department “has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended . . . .” “The word reasonable is the linchpin on which the department’s efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using 2010They were referred to services multiple times to encourage cooperation. [The respondent] has not been able to take full advantage of services, as he has been incarcerated for most of the current [department] involvement.” (Citation omitted.) Section 17a-112 (k) (2) requires the court to determine whether the department “has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended . . . .” “The word reasonable is the linchpin on which the department’s efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using | 10 | 1999–2014 |
In re Daniel C.
green
2 sentences2001The word reasonable is the linchpin on which the department's efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using the clear and convincing standard of proof . . . [R]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Daniel C., 63 Conn. App. 339 , 360-61 , 776 A.2d 487 (2001). 2001The word reasonable is the linchpin on which the department's efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using the clear and convincing standard of proof . . . [R]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Daniel C., 63 Conn. App. 339 , 360-61 , 776 A.2d 487 (2001). | 8 | 2001–2017 |
In re Ebony H.
green
2 sentences2002The word reasonable is the linchpin on which the department's efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using the clear and convincing standard of proof. . . . [R]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible. . . . [R]easonableness is an objective standard . . . and whether reasonable efforts have been proven depends on the careful consideration of the circumstances of each individual case." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Ebony H ., 68 Conn. App. 342 , 348-49 , 789 A.2d 1158 (2002). 2002The word reasonable is the linchpin on which the department's efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using the clear and convincing standard of proof. . . . [R]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible. . . . [R]easonableness is an objective standard . . . and whether reasonable efforts have been proven depends on the careful consideration of the circumstances of each individual case." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Ebony H ., 68 Conn. App. 342 , 348-49 , 789 A.2d 1158 (2002). | 7 | 2002–2017 |
In re Amber B.
green
2 sentences2001"General Statutes [Rev. 1999] § 17a-112 (c) provides in relevant part that `[t]he Superior Court . . . may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence (1) that the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts. . . .' `The word reasonable is the linchpin on which the department's efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using 2001"General Statutes [Rev. 1999] § 17a-112 (c) provides in relevant part that `[t]he Superior Court . . . may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence (1) that the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts. . . .' `The word reasonable is the linchpin on which the department's efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using | 7 | 2000–2001 |
Bonello v. Connecticut
green
2 sentences1998With respect to the first Miller prong, the clear and convincing standard is met only if “the evidence induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true, that the probability that they are true or exist is substantially greater than the probability that they are false or do not exist.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 794 ; State v. Bonello, 210 Conn. 51, 66 , 554 A.2d 277 , cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1082 , 109 S. Ct. 2103 , 104 L. 1998With respect to the first Miller prong, the clear and convincing standard is met only if “the evidence induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true, that the probability that they are true or exist is substantially greater than the probability that they are false or do not exist.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 794 ; State v. Bonello, 210 Conn. 51, 66 , 554 A.2d 277 , cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1082 , 109 S. Ct. 2103 , 104 L. | 6 | 1994–2003 |
In re Eden F.
green
2 sentences2000Furthermore, “reasonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible . . . [but] such efforts should not make it impossible to attain reunification in a given case.” In re Eden F., 48 Conn. App. 290, 312 , 710 A.2d 771 (1998), rev’d on other grounds, 250 Conn. 674 , 741 A.2d 873 (1999). 2000Furthermore, “reasonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible . . . [but] such efforts should not make it impossible to attain reunification in a given case.” In re Eden F., 48 Conn. App. 290, 312 , 710 A.2d 771 (1998), rev’d on other grounds, 250 Conn. 674 , 741 A.2d 873 (1999). | 5 | 1998–2000 |
Zabaneh v. DAN BEARD ASSOCIATES, LLC.
green
2 sentences2024Zabaneh v. Dan Beard Associates, LLC, 105 Conn. App. 134, 140 , 937 A.2d 706 (applying plenary review to plaintiff’s claim that the [trial] court improperly required that it, rather than the defendant, bear the burden of proof regarding the existence of permission), cert. denied, 286 Conn. 916 , 945 A.2d 979 (2008); Wieselman v. Hoeniger, 103 Conn. App. 591 , 596-97, 930 A.2d 768 (applying plenary review to claim that although the court applied the clear and convincing standard of proof required to establish a fraudulent transfer, it did so to the wrong party), cert. denied, 284 Conn. 930 , 93 2024Zabaneh v. Dan Beard Associates, LLC, 105 Conn. App. 134, 140 , 937 A.2d 706 (applying plenary review to plaintiff’s claim that the [trial] court improperly required that it, rather than the defendant, bear the burden of proof regarding the existence of permission), cert. denied, 286 Conn. 916 , 945 A.2d 979 (2008); Wieselman v. Hoeniger, 103 Conn. App. 591 , 596-97, 930 A.2d 768 (applying plenary review to claim that although the court applied the clear and convincing standard of proof required to establish a fraudulent transfer, it did so to the wrong party), cert. denied, 284 Conn. 930 , 93 | 4 | 2010–2024 |
Wieselman v. Hoeniger
green
2 sentences2024Zabaneh v. Dan Beard Associates, LLC, 105 Conn. App. 134, 140 , 937 A.2d 706 (applying plenary review to plaintiff’s claim that the [trial] court improperly required that it, rather than the defendant, bear the burden of proof regarding the existence of permission), cert. denied, 286 Conn. 916 , 945 A.2d 979 (2008); Wieselman v. Hoeniger, 103 Conn. App. 591 , 596-97, 930 A.2d 768 (applying plenary review to claim that although the court applied the clear and convincing standard of proof required to establish a fraudulent transfer, it did so to the wrong party), cert. denied, 284 Conn. 930 , 93 2024Zabaneh v. Dan Beard Associates, LLC, 105 Conn. App. 134, 140 , 937 A.2d 706 (applying plenary review to plaintiff’s claim that the [trial] court improperly required that it, rather than the defendant, bear the burden of proof regarding the existence of permission), cert. denied, 286 Conn. 916 , 945 A.2d 979 (2008); Wieselman v. Hoeniger, 103 Conn. App. 591 , 596-97, 930 A.2d 768 (applying plenary review to claim that although the court applied the clear and convincing standard of proof required to establish a fraudulent transfer, it did so to the wrong party), cert. denied, 284 Conn. 930 , 93 | 4 | 2010–2024 |
In Re Dylan C.
green
2 sentences2015Although the standard of proof necessary for such a determination is clear and convincing evidence; see In re Christina M., 90 Conn. App. 565, 583 , 877 A.2d 941 (2005) (legisla- ture’s choice of proof by clear and convincing evidence in termination of parental rights proceedings is consistent with state and federal constitutional mandates), aff’d, 280 Conn. 474 , 908 A.2d 1073 (2006); the court’s use of this higher standard of proof could not prejudice the respondent. ‘‘The clear and convincing standard of proof is substantially greater than the usual civil standard of a preponderance of the 2015Although the standard of proof necessary for such a determination is clear and convincing evidence; see In re Christina M., 90 Conn. App. 565, 583 , 877 A.2d 941 (2005) (legisla- ture’s choice of proof by clear and convincing evidence in termination of parental rights proceedings is consistent with state and federal constitutional mandates), aff’d, 280 Conn. 474 , 908 A.2d 1073 (2006); the court’s use of this higher standard of proof could not prejudice the respondent. ‘‘The clear and convincing standard of proof is substantially greater than the usual civil standard of a preponderance of the | 4 | 2011–2016 |
In re Jason R.
green
2 sentences2022Neither the word reasonable nor the word efforts is, however, defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn. . . . [R]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jason R., 129 Conn. App. 746 , 767-68, 23 A.3d 18 (2011), aff’d, 306 Conn. 438 , 51 A.3d 334 (2012). ‘‘[I]n determining whether the department has made reasonable efforts to reunify a parent and a child or whether there is sufficient evidence that a parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, t 2022Neither the word reasonable nor the word efforts is, however, defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn. . . . [R]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jason R., 129 Conn. App. 746 , 767-68, 23 A.3d 18 (2011), aff’d, 306 Conn. 438 , 51 A.3d 334 (2012). ‘‘[I]n determining whether the department has made reasonable efforts to reunify a parent and a child or whether there is sufficient evidence that a parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, t | 3 | 2013–2022 |
State v. Perez
green
2 sentences2020Neither the word reasonable nor the word efforts is, however, defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn. . . . [R]eason- able efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible. . . . [R]easonableness is an objective standard . . . and whether reasonable efforts have been proven depends on the careful consideration of the circumstances of each individual case. . . . ‘‘This court has applied the general meaning of ‘reasonable’ and stated that [i]t is axiomatic that the law does not require a useless and futile act.’’ (Citation omitted; 2015Neither the word reasonable nor the word efforts is, however, defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn. . . . [R]ea- sonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible. . . . [R]easonableness is an objec- tive standard . . . and whether reasonable efforts have been proven depends on the careful consideration of the circumstances of each individual case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Kyara H., 147 Conn. App. 855 , 872–73, 83 A.3d 1264 , cert. denied, 311 Conn. 923 , 86 A.3d 468 (2014). | 3 | 2014–2020 |
In re Kyara H.
green
2 sentences2020Neither the word reasonable nor the word efforts is, however, defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn. . . . [R]eason- able efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible. . . . [R]easonableness is an objective standard . . . and whether reasonable efforts have been proven depends on the careful consideration of the circumstances of each individual case. . . . ‘‘This court has applied the general meaning of ‘reasonable’ and stated that [i]t is axiomatic that the law does not require a useless and futile act.’’ (Citation omitted; 2015Neither the word reasonable nor the word efforts is, however, defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn. . . . [R]ea- sonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible. . . . [R]easonableness is an objec- tive standard . . . and whether reasonable efforts have been proven depends on the careful consideration of the circumstances of each individual case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Kyara H., 147 Conn. App. 855 , 872–73, 83 A.3d 1264 , cert. denied, 311 Conn. 923 , 86 A.3d 468 (2014). | 3 | 2014–2020 |
In re Samantha C.
green
2 sentences2016Neither the word reasonable nor the word efforts is, however, defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn.... [R]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614 , 632, 847 A.2d 883 (2004). 2016Neither the word reasonable nor the word efforts is, however, defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn.... [R]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614 , 632, 847 A.2d 883 (2004). | 3 | 2016–2016 |
J. Frederick Scholes Agency v. Mitchell
green
2 sentences2010Frederick Scholes Agency v. Mitchell, 191 Conn. 353, 358 , 464 A.2d 795 (1983); and as an intermediate standard; State v. Davis, [ 229 Conn. 285, 293 , 641 A.2d 370 (1994)]; between the ordinary civil standard of a preponderance of the evidence, or more probably than not, and the criminal *280 standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, this characterization does not mean that the clear and convincing standard is necessarily to be understood as lying equidistant between the two. 2010Frederick Scholes Agency v. Mitchell, 191 Conn. 353, 358 , 464 A.2d 795 (1983); and as an intermediate standard; State v. Davis, [ 229 Conn. 285, 293 , 641 A.2d 370 (1994)]; between the ordinary civil standard of a preponderance of the evidence, or more probably than not, and the criminal *280 standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, this characterization does not mean that the clear and convincing standard is necessarily to be understood as lying equidistant between the two. | 3 | 1997–2010 |
Flores v. District of Columbia Rental Housing Commission
green
2 sentences2003Clear and convincing evidence must "induce in the mind of a trier a reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true, that the probability that they are true or exist is substantially greater than the probability that they are false or do not exist." State v. Bonello, 210 Conn. 51 at 66 , cert. den. 490 U.S. 1082 , 109 S.Ct. 2103 , 104 L.Ed.2d 664 (1989). 1998With respect to the first Miller prong, the clear and convincing standard is met only if “the evidence induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true, that the probability that they are true or exist is substantially greater than the probability that they are false or do not exist.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 794 ; State v. Bonello, 210 Conn. 51, 66 , 554 A.2d 277 , cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1082 , 109 S. Ct. 2103 , 104 L. | 3 | 1998–2003 |
In re Amanda A.
green
2 sentences2001"The word reasonable is the linchpin on which the department's [D.C.F.] efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged using the clear and convincing standard of proof . . . [R]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In Re Amanda A., 58 Conn. App. 451 , 455 . (2000). 2001Neither the word reasonable nor the word efforts is, however, defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn. . . . [Reasonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 455 , quoting In re Antonio M., 56 Conn. App. 534, 546 , 744 A.2d 915 (2000). | 3 | 2001–2001 |
In re Antonio M.
green
2 sentences2001Neither the word reasonable nor the word efforts is, however, defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn. . . . [Reasonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 455 , quoting In re Antonio M., 56 Conn. App. 534, 546 , 744 A.2d 915 (2000). 2001Neither the word reasonable nor the word efforts is, however, defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn. . . . [Reasonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 455 , quoting In re Antonio M., 56 Conn. App. 534, 546 , 744 A.2d 915 (2000). | 3 | 2000–2001 |
In re Eden F.
neutral
2 sentences1999Neither the word “reasonable” nor the word “efforts” is, however, defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn. . . . [Reasonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible.’ In re Eden F., 48 Conn. App. 290, 311-12 , 710 A.2d 771 , cert. granted on other grounds, 245 Conn. 917 , 717 A.2d 234 (1998). 1999Neither the word “reasonable” nor the word “efforts” is, however, defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn. . . . [Reasonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible.’ In re Eden F., 48 Conn. App. 290, 311-12 , 710 A.2d 771 , cert. granted on other grounds, 245 Conn. 917 , 717 A.2d 234 (1998). | 3 | 1998–1999 |
| In Re Giovanni C. green | 2 | 2011–2025 |
State v. Jackson
green
2 sentences2025This court has consistently held that the [trial] court, [w]hen making its reasonable efforts determination . . . is limited to considering only those facts preceding the filing of the termination petition . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Caiden B., 220 Conn. App. 326 , 348, 297 A.3d 1025 , cert. denied, 348 Conn. 904 , 301 A.3d 527 (2023). ‘‘The word reasonable is the linchpin on which the department’s efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using the clear and convincing standard of proof. 2024Neither the word reasonable nor the word efforts is, however, defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn. . . . [R]easonableness is an objective standard . . . and whether reasonable efforts have been proven depends on the careful consideration of the circumstances of each individual case. . . . [R]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible. . . . [O]ur courts are 0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 15 In re Jacqueline K. instructed to look to the totality of the facts and circumstances presented in each individual case in deciding whe | 2 | 2024–2025 |
| Myers v. Commissioner of Correction neutral | 2 | 2024–2024 |
| In re Unique R. neutral | 2 | 2022–2022 |
| Papallo v. Lefebvre green | 2 | 2020–2022 |
| Notopoulos v. Statewide Grievance Committee green | 2 | 2020–2022 |
| Shelton v. Statewide Grievance Committee neutral | 2 | 2015–2020 |
| Shelton v. Statewide Grievance Committee green | 2 | 2015–2020 |
| Dacey v. Connecticut Bar Assn. green | 2 | 2003–2019 |
| Gould v. Commissioner of Correction green | 2 | 2012–2019 |
| In Re GS green | 2 | 2019–2019 |
| Fish v. Fish green | 2 | 2011–2018 |
| Vazquez v. Commissioner of Correction green | 2 | 2012–2017 |
| Vazquez v. Commissioner of Correction green | 2 | 2012–2017 |
| Charlton v. Commissioner of Correction green | 2 | 2000–2012 |
| Howard v. MacDonald green | 2 | 2009–2010 |
| Bagoly v. Riccio green | 2 | 2010–2010 |
| Marandino v. Prometheus Pharmacy green | 2 | 2010–2010 |
| Zabaneh v. Dan Beard Associates, LLC green | 2 | 2010–2010 |
| Martinez v. SOUTHINGTON METAL FABRICATING COMPANY green | 2 | 2010–2010 |
| In re Shamika F. green | 2 | 2002–2008 |
| In re Destiny D. green | 2 | 2004–2007 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.