clear and convincing standard in Washington

66 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2026 6 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (13)

Case	Followed	Cited
Addington v. Texasgreen scotus · 1979 · cited in 8 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1999–2009 2 sentences 2006The Nguyen decision conflicts with Addington . ¶ 34 The Nguyen majority relied on Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979), to justify a bright-line rule that the clear and convincing standard of proof is constitutionally required whenever an interest at stake is "more important than the interest against erroneous imposition of a mere money judgment." Nguyen, 144 Wash.2d at 525 , 29 P.3d 689 . 2006The Nguyen decision conflicts with Addington . ¶ 34 The Nguyen majority relied on Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979), to justify a bright-line rule that the clear and convincing standard of proof is constitutionally required whenever an interest at stake is "more important than the interest against erroneous imposition of a mere money judgment." Nguyen, 144 Wash.2d at 525 , 29 P.3d 689 .	5	8
cluster 294270green ca4 · 1971 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005 2 sentences 2005“In cases involving individual rights, whether criminal or civil, ‘[t]he standard of proof. . . reflects the value society places on individual liberty.’ ” Addington, 441 U.S. at 425 (alteration in original) (quoting Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153, 1166 (4th Cir. 1971) (Sobeloff, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)). ¶8 The Court noted that it had used the clear and convincing standard to protect particularly important individual interests in civil cases. 2005"In cases involving individual rights, whether criminal or civil, `[t]he standard of proof ... reflects ... the value society places on individual liberty.'" Addington, 441 U.S. at 425 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 (quoting Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153, 1166 (4th Cir.1971) (Sobeloff, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)). ¶ 8 The Court noted that it had used the clear and convincing standard to protect particularly important individual interests in civil cases.	2	2
Painter v. Abelsgreen wyo · 2000 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001 2 sentences 2001See also Painter v. Abels, 998 P.2d 931 (Wyo.2000). [11] Courts in several states have actually found differing standards of proof for discipline of attorneys and physicians not to violate equal protection. 2001See also Painter v. Abels, 998 P.2d 931 (Wyo. 2000).	2	2
State v. Richmangreen washctapp · 1997 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000	2	2
Lessner v. Rubinsongreen pa · 1991 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000	2	2
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.green scotus · 1990 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1991–1995	2	2
Santosky v. Kramergreen scotus · 1982 · cited in 6 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1999–2015 2 sentences 2015However, we and the United States Supreme Court have noted that to terminate parental rights requires a greater standard of proof than preponderance of the evidence.Id.; In re Welfare ofSego, 82 Wn.2d 736, 738 , 513 P.2d 831 (1973); see also Santosky, 455 U.S. at 754 . 13 In this case, we must determine whether a guardianship established under the new statute requires a heightened standard of proof because its effect is similar to the termination of parental rights or whether the preponderance of the evidence standard is sufficient because the effect of a 13 The United States Supreme Court in 2000Furthermore, a clear and convincing standard applies where "the individual interests at stake in a state proceeding are both `particularly important' and `more substantial than mere loss of money.'" Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) (holding that the clear and convincing standard is required in proceedings to terminate parental rights).	1	6
Herron v. KING Broadcasting, Co.green wash · 1989 · cited in 3 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2002–2025 2 sentences 2025Herron v. KING Broadcasting Company, 112 Wn.2d 762, 775-76 (1989). 2002Id. at 775-76 .	1	3
In Re Kindschigreen wash · 1958 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001 2 sentences 2001Dr. Nguyen also asserts the Commission’s process is “quasi-criminal” meriting a higher burden of proof, citing In re Revocation of License of Kindschi, 52 Wn.2d 8, 10, 319 P.2d 824 (1958). 2001Dr. Nguyen also asserts the Commission’s process is “quasi-criminal” meriting a higher burden of proof, citing In re Revocation of License of Kindschi, 52 Wn.2d 8, 10, 319 P.2d 824 (1958).	1	2
Harbert v. Stategreen wash · 1975 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026	1	1
Milan Jankovic v. International Crisis Groupgreen cadc · 2016 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025	1	1
State v. Watkinsgreen wash · 2018 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019	1	1
In Re GAULTgreen scotus · 1967 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (1)

Case	Negative	Cited
Bernard v. Board of Dental Examinersgreen orctapp · 1970 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001 2 sentences 2001But see Bernard v. Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 2 Or.App. 22 , 465 P.2d 917 (1970) (due process requires the clear and convincing standard in professional license revocations involving fraud or misrepresentation) and Van Gordon v. Or. 2001App. 22 , 465 P.2d 917 (1970) (due process requires the clear and convincing standard in professional license revocations involving fraud or misrepresentation) and Van Gordon v. Or.	1	2

Also cited on this issue (66)

Case	Cited	Years
Nguyen v. Department of Health green wash · 2001 2 sentences 2008Id. at 529 . ¶21 Following Nguyen, the court applied the clear and convincing standard of proof in a disciplinary proceeding involving revocation of a nursing assistant’s license. 2006Ed. 2d 323 (1979), to justify a bright-line rule that the clear and convincing standard of proof is constitutionally required whenever an interest at stake is “more important than the interest against erroneous imposition of a mere money judgment.” Nguyen, 144 Wn.2d at 525 .	6	2005–2009
State v. Rhodes green wash · 1979 2 sentences 2005In Rhodes, 92 Wn.2d at 760 , our Supreme Court held that the clear and convincing standard of review enunciated in the JJA was equivalent to beyond a reasonable doubt. 2005In Rhodes, 92 Wash.2d at 760 , 600 P.2d 1264 , our Supreme Court held that the clear and convincing standard of review enunciated in the JJA was equivalent to beyond a reasonable doubt.	5	1983–2006
Nguyen v. STATE HEALTH MED. QUALITY ASSUR. green wash · 2001 2 sentences 2008Id. at 529, 29 P.3d 689 . ¶ 21 Following Nguyen , the court applied the clear and convincing standard of proof in a disciplinary proceeding involving revocation 802 of a nursing assistant's license. 2006*The Nguyen decision conflicts with Addington . ¶ 34 The Nguyen majority relied on Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979), to justify a bright-line rule that the clear and convincing standard of proof is constitutionally required whenever an interest at stake is "more important than the interest against erroneous imposition of a mere money judgment." Nguyen, 144 Wash.2d at 525 , 29 P.3d 689 .	4	2005–2009
Herron v. Tribune Publishing Co. green wash · 1987 2 sentences 2003Tribune Publ’g Co., 108 Wn.2d at 170 . 2003Herron, 108 Wash.2d at 170 , 736 P.2d 249 .	4	2002–2003
Ongom v. Department of Health red wash · 2006 2 sentences 2011Id. at 142 . 2008Ongom, 159 Wn.2d at 136 .	3	2008–2011
In Re Levias red wash · 1973 2 sentences 2019T.J.S.-M. argues this was an improper standard to apply. ¶ 20 T.J.S.-M. asserts that the clear and convincing standard is the civil counterpart to beyond a reasonable doubt in the juvenile context, relying on In re Levias, 83 Wash.2d 253 , 517 P.2d 588 (1973). 2019T.J.S.-M. argues this was an improper standard to apply. ¶ 20 T.J.S.-M. asserts that the clear and convincing standard is the civil counterpart to beyond a reasonable doubt in the juvenile context, relying on In re Levias, 83 Wash.2d 253 , 517 P.2d 588 (1973).	2	2019–2019
In Re WINSHIP green scotus · 1970 2 sentences 2019We agree. ¶ 22 The proposition that T.J.S.-M. argues for-that the clear and convincing standard is equivalent to beyond a reasonable doubt-has its genesis in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S. Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). 2019We agree. ¶ 22 The proposition that T.J.S.-M. argues for-that the clear and convincing standard is equivalent to beyond a reasonable doubt-has its genesis in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S. Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970).	2	2019–2019
Haueter v. Cowles Publishing Co. green washctapp · 1991 2 sentences 2013Further, faced with an opportunity to change the standard of proof in Richmond v. Thompson, 130 Wn.2d 368, 385-86 , 922 P.2d 1343 (1996), this court held, “Neither the common law nor the First Amendment, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, requires proof of any element of a defamation action, other than actual malice, by evidence of convincing clarity.” (Quoting Haueter v. Cowles Publ’g Co., 61 Wn. 2013Further, faced with an opportunity to change the standard of proof in Richmond v. Thompson, 130 Wn.2d 368, 388 , 922 P.2d 1343 (1996), this court held, "Neither the common law nor the First Amendment, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, requires proof of any element of a defamation action, other than actual malice, by evidence of convincing clarity." (quoting Haueter v. Cowles Publ'g Co., 61 Wn.	2	2013–2013
Richmond v. Thompson green wash · 1996 2 sentences 2013Further, faced with an opportunity to change the standard of proof in Richmond v. Thompson, 130 Wn.2d 368, 385-86 , 922 P.2d 1343 (1996), this court held, “Neither the common law nor the First Amendment, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, requires proof of any element of a defamation action, other than actual malice, by evidence of convincing clarity.” (Quoting Haueter v. Cowles Publ’g Co., 61 Wn. 2013Further, faced with an opportunity to change the standard of proof in Richmond v. Thompson, 130 Wn.2d 368, 388 , 922 P.2d 1343 (1996), this court held, "Neither the common law nor the First Amendment, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, requires proof of any element of a defamation action, other than actual malice, by evidence of convincing clarity." (quoting Haueter v. Cowles Publ'g Co., 61 Wn.	2	2013–2013
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. green scotus · 1974 2 sentences 2013Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342 . 2013Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342 .	2	2013–2013
Richmond v. Thompson green wash · 1996 2 sentences 2013Further, faced with an opportunity to change the standard of proof in Richmond v. Thompson, 130 Wn.2d 368, 385-86 , 922 P.2d 1343 (1996), this court held, “Neither the common law nor the First Amendment, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, requires proof of any element of a defamation action, other than actual malice, by evidence of convincing clarity.” (Quoting Haueter v. Cowles Publ’g Co., 61 Wn. 2013Further, faced with an opportunity to change the standard of proof in Richmond v. Thompson, 130 Wn.2d 368, 388 , 922 P.2d 1343 (1996), this court held, "Neither the common law nor the First Amendment, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, requires proof of any element of a defamation action, other than actual malice, by evidence of convincing clarity." (quoting Haueter v. Cowles Publ'g Co., 61 Wn.	2	2013–2013
Ongom v. Dept. of Health red wash · 2006 2 sentences 2011Id. at 142, 148 P.3d 1029 . 2011Id. at 142, 148 P.3d 1029 . ¶ 24 Upon careful reconsideration of its reasoning and effects, we now overrule Ongom. "[O]verruling prior precedent should not be taken lightly." Lunsford v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc., 166 Wash.2d 264, 278 , 208 P.3d 1092 (2009).	2	2008–2011
Bender v. City of Seattle green wash · 1983 2 sentences 2010Bender, 99 Wn.2d at 601 ; Moe, 97 Wn. 1999Lillig v. Becton-Dickinson, 105 Wash.2d 653, 658 , 717 P.2d 1371 (1986); Bender, 99 Wash.2d at 601 , 664 P.2d 492 ; see also Kass v. Great Coastal Express, Inc., 152 N.J. 353 , 704 A.2d 1293, 1294 (1998) (clear and convincing standard applies to all recognized forms of abuse).	2	1999–2010
Chubb v. Department of Social & Health Services green washctapp · 1987 2 sentences 2007Permitting state intervention on a standard of proof lower than a clear and convincing standard is important in providing the necessary flexibility to the State in its attempts to both protect the child and preserve the family.” In re Chubb, 46 Wn. 2007Permitting state intervention on a standard of proof lower than a clear and convincing standard is important in providing the necessary flexibility to the State in its attempts to both protect the child and preserve the family." In re Chubb, 46 Wash.App. 530, 536-37 , 731 P.2d 537 (1987) (factual predicate for dependency need not be proved again in termination proceedings under higher standard of proof), aff'd, 112 Wash.2d 719 , 773 P.2d 851 (1989).	2	2007–2007
Department of Social & Health Services v. Chubb green wash · 1989 2 sentences 2007Permitting state intervention on a standard of proof lower than a clear and convincing standard is important in providing the necessary flexibility to the State in its attempts to both protect the child and preserve the family." In re Chubb, 46 Wash.App. 530, 536-37 , 731 P.2d 537 (1987) (factual predicate for dependency need not be proved again in termination proceedings under higher standard of proof), aff'd, 112 Wash.2d 719 , 773 P.2d 851 (1989). 2007Permitting state intervention on a standard of proof lower than a clear and convincing standard is important in providing the necessary flexibility to the State in its attempts to both protect the child and preserve the family." In re Chubb, 46 Wash.App. 530, 536-37 , 731 P.2d 537 (1987) (factual predicate for dependency need not be proved again in termination proceedings under higher standard of proof), aff'd, 112 Wash.2d 719 , 773 P.2d 851 (1989).	2	2007–2007
State v. Baldwin green wash · 2003 2 sentences 2006State v. Rhodes, 92 Wn.2d 755, 760 , 600 P.2d 1264 (1979), overruled on other grounds by State v. Baldwin, 150 Wn.2d 448 , 78 P.3d 1005 (2003). 2006State v. Rhodes, 92 Wash.2d 755, 760 , 600 P.2d 1264 (1979), overruled on other grounds, ( State v. Baldwin, 150 Wash.2d 448 , 78 P.3d 1005 (2003)). [10] RCW 13.40.230(2). [11] RCW 13.40.150(3) provides the court shall: (h) Consider whether or not any of the following mitigating factors exist: (i) The respondent's conduct neither caused nor threatened serious bodily injury or the respondent did not contemplate that his or her conduct would cause or threaten serious bodily injury; (ii) The respondent acted under strong and immediate provocation; (iii) The respondent was suffering from a mental	2	2006–2006
State v. Baldwin green wash · 2003 2 sentences 2006State v. Rhodes, 92 Wn.2d 755, 760 , 600 P.2d 1264 (1979), overruled on other grounds by State v. Baldwin, 150 Wn.2d 448 , 78 P.3d 1005 (2003). 2006State v. Rhodes, 92 Wash.2d 755, 760 , 600 P.2d 1264 (1979), overruled on other grounds, ( State v. Baldwin, 150 Wash.2d 448 , 78 P.3d 1005 (2003)). [10] RCW 13.40.230(2). [11] RCW 13.40.150(3) provides the court shall: (h) Consider whether or not any of the following mitigating factors exist: (i) The respondent's conduct neither caused nor threatened serious bodily injury or the respondent did not contemplate that his or her conduct would cause or threaten serious bodily injury; (ii) The respondent acted under strong and immediate provocation; (iii) The respondent was suffering from a mental	2	2006–2006
State v. Wilcox green wash · 1979 2 sentences 2005Id. ¶19 In urging that LaBelle provides that a clear and convincing standard applies only in the case of indefinite commitment, the State overlooks the analysis in the case, including the importance attributed to the probable cause hearing under RCW 71.05.240 and its role in protecting the interests at stake, including the individual’s liberty interest, and in reducing the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the individual’s liberty interest. 11 In the case of commitment for mental health treatment and competency restoration under RCW 10.77.090(1)(d), there is no comparable hearing and no dete 2005Id. ¶19 In urging that LaBelle provides that a clear and convincing standard applies only in the case of indefinite commitment, the State overlooks the analysis in the case, including the importance attributed to the probable cause hearing under RCW 71.05.240 and its role in protecting the interests at stake, including the individual’s liberty interest, and in reducing the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the individual’s liberty interest. 11 In the case of commitment for mental health treatment and competency restoration under RCW 10.77.090(1)(d), there is no comparable hearing and no dete	2	2005–2005
In Re the Detention of LaBelle green wash · 1986 2 sentences 2005Id. ¶19 In urging that LaBelle provides that a clear and convincing standard applies only in the case of indefinite commitment, the State overlooks the analysis in the case, including the importance attributed to the probable cause hearing under RCW 71.05.240 and its role in protecting the interests at stake, including the individual’s liberty interest, and in reducing the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the individual’s liberty interest. 11 In the case of commitment for mental health treatment and competency restoration under RCW 10.77.090(1)(d), there is no comparable hearing and no dete 2005Id. ¶ 19 In urging that LaBelle provides that a clear and convincing standard applies only in the case of indefinite commitment, the State overlooks the analysis in the case, including the importance attributed to the probable cause hearing under RCW 71.05.240 and its role in protecting the interests at stake, including the individual's liberty interest, and in reducing the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the individual's liberty interest. [11] In the case of commitment for mental health treatment and competency restoration under RCW 10.77.090(1)(d), there is no comparable hearing and no d	2	2005–2005
Jones v. United States green scotus · 1983 2 sentences 2005However, Wilcox does not control this case for reasons given in Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 , 103 S.Ct. 3043 , 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983), also a case involving the standard of proof for committed of insanity acquittees. ¶ 21 Like this court did in Wilcox , the United States Supreme Court held in Jones that the clear and convincing standard of Addington does not apply in the context of commitment of an insanity acquittee. 2005However, Wilcox does not control this case for reasons given in Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 , 103 S.Ct. 3043 , 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983), also a case involving the standard of proof for committed of insanity acquittees. ¶ 21 Like this court did in Wilcox , the United States Supreme Court held in Jones that the clear and convincing standard of Addington does not apply in the context of commitment of an insanity acquittee.	2	2005–2005
Ettinger v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance green calctapp · 1982 2 sentences 2001In Ettinger v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance, 135 Cal. App. 3d 853, 856 , 185 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1982), the court also presented no constitutional analysis in adopting the clear and convincing standard, holding only it would be “anomalous” for disciplinary proceedings involving physicians to have a lower standard of proof than disciplinary proceedings involving lawyers. 2001In Ettinger v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance, 135 Cal. App. 3d 853, 856 , 185 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1982), the court also presented no constitutional analysis in adopting the clear and convincing standard, holding only it would be “anomalous” for disciplinary proceedings involving physicians to have a lower standard of proof than disciplinary proceedings involving lawyers.	2	2001–2001
Apprendi v. New Jersey green scotus · 2000 2 sentences 2001In Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476 , 120 S.Ct. at 2355 , the Court said that [a]t stake in this case are constitutional protections of surpassing importance: the proscription of any deprivation of liberty without "due process of law," Amdt. 14, and the guarantee that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury," Amdt[.] 6. 2001In Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476-77 , the Court said that [a]t stake in this case are constitutional protections of surpassing importance: the proscription of any deprivation of liberty without “due process of law,” Arndt. 14, and the guarantee that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury,” Arndt 6.	2	2001–2001
Van Gordon v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners green orctapp · 1981 2 sentences 2001State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 52 Or.App. 749 , 629 P.2d 848 (1981) (a license revocation based on fraud requires proof by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence). 2001State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 52 Or.	2	2001–2001
Shafer v. State green wash · 1974	2	2000–2000
Lee v. the Columbian, Inc. green washctapp · 1991	2	1996–1996
State v. Heiskell green washctapp · 1995	2	1996–1996
Ernst Home Center, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers International Union green washctapp · 1995	2	1996–1996
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. green scotus · 1984	2	1991–1995
Krause v. Catholic Community Services green washctapp · 1987	2	1988–1988
Douglas Northwest, Inc. v. Bill O'Brien & Sons Construction, Inc. green washctapp · 1992	1	2026–2026
In Re KR green wash · 1995	1	2025–2025
In Re HJP green wash · 1990	1	2024–2024
Knight v. Knight green washctapp · 2014	1	2024–2024
Lang v. Dental Quality Assurance Commission green washctapp · 2007	1	2021–2021
Brinegar v. United States green scotus · 1949	1	2019–2019
Taufen v. Estate of Kirpes neutral washctapp · 2010	1	2018–2018
In re the Estates of Jones green washctapp · 2012	1	2018–2018
Duc Tan v. Le green wash · 2013	1	2017–2017
Ebling v. Gove's Cove, Inc. green washctapp · 1983	1	2017–2017
Tiger Oil Corp. v. Yakima County green washctapp · 2010	1	2015–2015

Statutes the citing opinions construe

WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 34.05.570 (11) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.160 (9) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.030 (7) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.130 (7) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.020 (7) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.230 (7) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 18.130.010 (6) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 18.130.180 (6) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 2.06.040 (6) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.0357 (5) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.150 (5) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 18.130.050 (5)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 880 (1960–2026) OH 475 (1983–2026) CA 448 (1978–2026) TN 341 (1990–2026) PA 181 (1983–2026) IL 171 (1975–2026) CT 138 (1982–2026) LA 110 (1985–2026) WV 103 (1984–2026) ND 85 (1979–2025) NJ 81 (1966–2026) FL 81 (1982–2026) MN 77 (1985–2025) NM 73 (1988–2025) WA 66 (1980–2026) MD 63 (1982–2023) NY 60 (1979–2026) AZ 58 (1962–2026) DC 51 (1982–2025) CO 51 (1980–2025) OK 50 (1982–2024) UT 50 (1951–2026) ME 49 (1991–2021) IN 47 (1982–2024) ID 45 (1989–2025) MO 45 (1982–2025) MI 36 (1978–2025) VA 36 (1988–2026) OR 35 (1959–2026) SD 34 (1956–2026) GA 31 (1984–2024) KS 30 (1983–2024) NC 28 (1987–2026) RI 25 (1990–2024) SC 24 (1985–2026) AK 24 (1979–2025) WI 23 (1981–2025) HI 21 (1992–2025) MA 21 (1983–2025) DE 20 (1988–2026) MS 19 (1987–2023) IA 18 (1984–2025) AL 16 (1985–2017) NE 14 (1981–2024) VT 14 (1986–2024) NV 13 (1999–2026) WY 11 (1984–2015) AR 10 (1943–2022) NH 8 (1988–2013) KY 8 (1983–2025) VI 3 (2008–2010) MT 2 (1991–2010)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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