clear and convincing standard in California

2020(Crail v. Blakely (1973) 8 Cal.3d 744, 750 ; Ike v. Doolittle (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 51, 87 (Ike).) The clear and convincing standard, however, “applies only at the trial level.

2019As our Supreme Court has explained, the " 'clear and convincing' " standard was adopted "for the edification and guidance of the trial court, and was not intended as a standard for appellate review." ( Blakely, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 750 , 106 Cal.Rptr. 187 , 505 P.2d 1027 .) The clear and convincing requirement in the trial court does not change the rule on appeal that we consider "conflicting evidence in a light favorable to the judgment, with the presumption the trier of fact drew all reasonable inferences in support of the verdict." ( Hoch v. Allied-Signal, Inc. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 48 , 6

2020J. no bearing whatsoever on appellate review for sufficiency of the evidence.4 Another viewpoint regards an appellate court as obligated to review the record for substantial evidence in a manner mindful of the fact that the clear and convincing standard of proof applied before the trial court.5 This approach recently was 4 The following Court of Appeal decisions have echoed the Witkin treatise’s “disappears” phrasing: Morgan v. Davidson (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 540, 549 ; In re Alexzander C. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 438, 451 ; Parisi v. Mazzaferro (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1227 , footnote 11; In re

2020J. 17 Cal.4th 396, 401 ; People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1126 .)7 7 Insofar as they are inconsistent with our holding, we also disapprove Ian J. v. Peter M., supra, 213 Cal.App.4th 189 , In re Marriage of Ruelas, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th 339 , In re Marriage of Murray, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th 581 , and Patrick v. Maryland Casualty Co., supra, 217 Cal.App.3d 1566 , as well as the Court of Appeal decisions that have described the clear and convincing standard as disappearing on appeal: Morgan v. Davidson, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th 540 ; In re Alexzander C., supra, 18 Cal.App.5th 438 ; Parisi

2021The essential purpose of the hearing is for the court “to provide stable, permanent homes for these children.” (Id., subd. (b); see In re Jose V. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1792 , 1797.) There are seven statutory choices for the permanency plan; the preferred choice is adoption, coupled with an order terminating parental rights. (§ 366.26, subd. (b); see also In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53 [“Legislature has thus determined that, where possible, adoption is the first choice”]; ibid. [where child is adoptable, “adoption is the norm”].) The court selects this option if it “determines . . . b

2021The essential purpose of the hearing is for the court “to provide stable, permanent homes for these children.” (Id., subd. (b); see In re Jose V. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1792 , 1797.) There are seven statutory choices for the permanency plan; the preferred choice is adoption, coupled with an order terminating parental rights. (§ 366.26, subd. (b); see also In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53 [“Legislature has thus determined that, where possible, adoption is the first choice”]; ibid. [where child is adoptable, “adoption is the norm”].) The court selects this option if it “determines . . . b

2021“If the court determines, based on the assessment . . . and any other relevant evidence, by a clear and convincing standard, that it is likely the child will be adopted, the court shall terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adoption.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) “Although a finding of adoptability must be supported by clear and convincing evidence, it [i.e., the determination that it is likely the child will be adopted within a reasonable time] is nevertheless a low threshold . . . .” (In re K.B. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1275 , 1292.) Determination of whether a child is likely t

2021“If the court determines, based on the assessment . . . and any other relevant evidence, by a clear and convincing standard, that it is likely the child will be adopted, the court shall terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adoption.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) “Although a finding of adoptability must be supported by clear and convincing evidence, it [i.e., the determination that it is likely the child will be adopted within a reasonable time] is nevertheless a low threshold . . . .” (In re K.B. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1275 , 1292.) Determination of whether a child is likely t

2020He must do more than show that the facts are probably true.” (Comment, Evidence: Clear and Convincing Proof: Appellate Review (1944) 32 Cal. L.Rev. 74, 75.) Today, the clear and convincing standard applies to various determinations “ ‘where particularly important individual interests or rights are at stake,’ such as the termination of parental rights, involuntary commitment, and deportation.” (Weiner v. Fleischman (1991) 54 Cal.3d 476, 487 , quoting Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston (1983) 459 U.S. 375, 389 ; see also Santosky v. Kramer (1982) 455 U.S. 745, 769 ; Addington v. Texas (1979) 441 U.S

2020He must do more than show that the facts are probably true.” (Comment, Evidence: Clear and Convincing Proof: Appellate Review (1944) 32 Cal. L.Rev. 74, 75.) Today, the clear and convincing standard applies to various determinations “ ‘where particularly important individual interests or rights are at stake,’ such as the termination of parental rights, involuntary commitment, and deportation.” (Weiner v. Fleischman (1991) 54 Cal.3d 476, 487 , quoting Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston (1983) 459 U.S. 375, 389 ; see also Santosky v. Kramer (1982) 455 U.S. 745, 769 ; Addington v. Texas (1979) 441 U.S

2025(In re Marquis D., supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 1827 [holding that the clear and convincing standard of proof applies to the detriment finding under § 361.2].) For all of these reasons, we conclude that the record does not contain substantial evidence supporting the order removing Jayden from Father’s custody or the detriment finding regarding placement with Father.4 DISPOSITION The juvenile court is directed to reinstate dependency jurisdiction.

2015Moreover, applying a clear and convincing standard of proof to remove custody from the custodial parent while denying placement with the noncustodial parent based on a preponderance of the evidence would lead to the anomalous result that a parent who had no connection with the circumstances that brought the child within the jurisdiction of the court could have his or her rights terminated upon a lesser showing than the parent who created those circumstances.” (Marquis, D., supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 1829 .) The nonoffending parent does not have to prove lack of detriment.

2020Terminating Parental Rights Mother contends the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights should be reversed because she and the child shared a beneficial relationship. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) provides, in relevant part, “If the court determines, based on the assessment provided as ordered under subdivision (i) of Section 366.21 . . . , and any other relevant evidence, by a clear and convincing standard, that it is likely the child will be adopted, the court shall terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adoption.” But there i

2020Terminating Parental Rights Mother contends the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights should be reversed because she and the child shared a beneficial relationship. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) provides, in relevant part, “If the court determines, based on the assessment provided as ordered under subdivision (i) of Section 366.21 . . . , and any other relevant evidence, by a clear and convincing standard, that it is likely the child will be adopted, the court shall terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adoption.” But there i

2019(Reader’s Digest Assn. v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 244, 256 ; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254 , 285–286 (Sullivan).) In evaluating whether a plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of facts sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment, “we bear in mind the higher clear and convincing standard of proof.” (Robertson v. Rodriguez (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 347, 358 .) C.

2005(Id. at p. 1167; see New York Times Co. v. *1579 Sullivan, supra, 376 U.S. at pp. 279-280; Copp v. Paxton, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 846 .) To meet the clear and convincing standard, the evidence must be such “ ‘as to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind.’ ” (Annette F. v. Sharon S., supra, at p. 1167.) The reckless disregard test requires a high degree of awareness of the probable falsity of the defendant’s statement. “ ‘There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.’ ”

2023Code, § 115.) “‘Clear and convincing’ evidence requires a finding of high probability.” (In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 919 , superseded by statute on another issue as stated in In re Cody W. (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 221, 229-230 ; accord CACI No. 201.) Courts have also described the standard “as requiring that the evidence be ‘“so clear as to leave no substantial doubt”; “sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind.”’” (In re Angelia P., at p. 919.) Because the statutory requirement that the juvenile court apply the clear and convincing standard to the

2020Code, § 3294, subd. (a)), whether a conservator can withdraw life-sustaining care from a conservatee (Wendland, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 524 ), whether conditions necessary for the nonconsensual, 2 The clear and convincing standard also has been described “as requiring that the evidence be ‘ “so clear as to leave no substantial doubt”; “sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind.” ’ ” (In re Angelia P., supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 919 .) 7 CONSERVATORSHIP OF O.B.

2016Contrary to father’s premise, the clear and convincing standard specified in section 361, subdivision (c) is “for the edification and guidance of the trial court and not a standard for appellate review. [Citations.] ‘ “The sufficiency of evidence to establish a given fact, where the law requires proof of the fact to be clear and convincing, is primarily a question for the trial court to determine, and if there is substantial evidence to support its conclusion, the determination is not open to review on appeal.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Thus, on appeal from a judgment required to be based upon

2016Contrary to father’s premise, the clear and convincing standard specified in section 361, subdivision (c) is “for the edification and guidance of the trial court and not a standard for appellate review. [Citations.] ‘ “The sufficiency of evidence to establish a given fact, where the law requires proof of the fact to be clear and convincing, is primarily a question for the trial court to determine, and if there is substantial evidence to support its conclusion, the determination is not open to review on appeal.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Thus, on appeal from a judgment required to be based upon

2020J. no bearing whatsoever on appellate review for sufficiency of the evidence.4 Another viewpoint regards an appellate court as obligated to review the record for substantial evidence in a manner mindful of the fact that the clear and convincing standard of proof applied before the trial court.5 This approach recently was 4 The following Court of Appeal decisions have echoed the Witkin treatise’s “disappears” phrasing: Morgan v. Davidson (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 540, 549 ; In re Alexzander C. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 438, 451 ; Parisi v. Mazzaferro (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1227 , footnote 11; In re

2020J. 17 Cal.4th 396, 401 ; People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1126 .)7 7 Insofar as they are inconsistent with our holding, we also disapprove Ian J. v. Peter M., supra, 213 Cal.App.4th 189 , In re Marriage of Ruelas, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th 339 , In re Marriage of Murray, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th 581 , and Patrick v. Maryland Casualty Co., supra, 217 Cal.App.3d 1566 , as well as the Court of Appeal decisions that have described the clear and convincing standard as disappearing on appeal: Morgan v. Davidson, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th 540 ; In re Alexzander C., supra, 18 Cal.App.5th 438 ; Parisi

2024(Cynthia D., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 246 .) In 1982, the California Legislature enacted “a more structured framework” for dependency cases, including a clear and convincing standard for removing children from parental custody, status review hearings, reunification services, and permanency planning hearings for children who could not be returned to a parent within 12 to 18 months.

2016In order to terminate parental rights, the court need only 13 make two findings: (1) that there is clear and convincing evidence that the minor will be adopted; and (2) that there has been a previous determination that reunification services shall be terminated.’ (Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242 , 249–250.)” (In re Jasmine T. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 209, 212 .) A. Adoptability Finding “If the court determines, based on the assessment provided as ordered under subdivision (i) of section 366.21, subdivision (b) of section 366.25, and any other relevant evidence, by a clear and co

2023A. Legal Standard The avowed goal of dependency law is to protect children who are physically, sexually or emotionally abused, neglected or exploited. (§ 300.) “Adoption, where possible, is the permanent plan preferred by the Legislature.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 573 (Autumn H.).) Thus, pursuant to section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1), “[i]f the court determines, based on the assessment provided as ordered . . . and any other 7. relevant evidence, by a clear and convincing standard, that it is likely the child will be adopted, the court shall terminate parental rights and ord

2021(In re Fernando M., supra, at p. 534.) Adoption is the preferred option, so long as the juvenile court finds, “by a clear and convincing standard, that it is likely the child will be adopted.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1); In re Autumn H., supra, at p. 573 .) In determining whether it is likely that a child will be adopted, the juvenile court considers whether the child's age, physical condition, and emotional state make it likely that a family willing to adopt the child will be identified, or whether a specific family willing to adopt the child has already been identified.

2023(In re V.L. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 147 , 154.) Of relevance here, “[o]ne ground for removal is that there is a substantial risk of injury to the child’s physical health, safety, protection or emotional well-being if he or she were returned home, and there are no reasonable means to protect the child.” (Ibid., citing § 361, subd. (c)(1).)5 “We review a removal order for substantial evidence notwithstanding the clear and convincing standard used by the juvenile court.” (In re Alexzander C. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 438, 451 .) In applying the standard, “we 5 Section 361, subdivision (c)(1) provides:

2020J. no bearing whatsoever on appellate review for sufficiency of the evidence.4 Another viewpoint regards an appellate court as obligated to review the record for substantial evidence in a manner mindful of the fact that the clear and convincing standard of proof applied before the trial court.5 This approach recently was 4 The following Court of Appeal decisions have echoed the Witkin treatise’s “disappears” phrasing: Morgan v. Davidson (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 540, 549 ; In re Alexzander C. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 438, 451 ; Parisi v. Mazzaferro (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1227 , footnote 11; In re

2020J. no bearing whatsoever on appellate review for sufficiency of the evidence.4 Another viewpoint regards an appellate court as obligated to review the record for substantial evidence in a manner mindful of the fact that the clear and convincing standard of proof applied before the trial court.5 This approach recently was 4 The following Court of Appeal decisions have echoed the Witkin treatise’s “disappears” phrasing: Morgan v. Davidson (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 540, 549 ; In re Alexzander C. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 438, 451 ; Parisi v. Mazzaferro (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1227 , footnote 11; In re

2020J. 17 Cal.4th 396, 401 ; People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1126 .)7 7 Insofar as they are inconsistent with our holding, we also disapprove Ian J. v. Peter M., supra, 213 Cal.App.4th 189 , In re Marriage of Ruelas, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th 339 , In re Marriage of Murray, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th 581 , and Patrick v. Maryland Casualty Co., supra, 217 Cal.App.3d 1566 , as well as the Court of Appeal decisions that have described the clear and convincing standard as disappearing on appeal: Morgan v. Davidson, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th 540 ; In re Alexzander C., supra, 18 Cal.App.5th 438 ; Parisi

2022(In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 , 630–631.) In preparation for the section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court “is required to direct the Agency to prepare an assessment report of the child as part of its report to the court. [Citations.] The assessment report must 11 address the child’s medical, developmental, scholastic, mental and emotional status; analyze the likelihood the child will be adopted if parental rights are terminated; describe the efforts made to identify a prospective adoptive parent or legal guardian for the child; and provide a preliminary assessment of the eligibility

2015(In re Nada R. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1177 .) “The adoptability issue at a section 366.26 hearing focuses on the dependent child, e.g., whether his or her age, physical condition, and emotional state make it difficult to find a person willing to adopt.” (A.A., supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1311.) “It is not necessary that the child already be in a potential adoptive home or that there be a proposed adoptive parent ‘waiting in the wings.’ [Citation.] [¶] Conversely, the existence of a prospective adoptive parent, who has expressed interest in adopting a dependent child, constitutes evidence

2020He must do more than show that the facts are probably true.” (Comment, Evidence: Clear and Convincing Proof: Appellate Review (1944) 32 Cal. L.Rev. 74, 75.) Today, the clear and convincing standard applies to various determinations “ ‘where particularly important individual interests or rights are at stake,’ such as the termination of parental rights, involuntary commitment, and deportation.” (Weiner v. Fleischman (1991) 54 Cal.3d 476, 487 , quoting Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston (1983) 459 U.S. 375, 389 ; see also Santosky v. Kramer (1982) 455 U.S. 745, 769 ; Addington v. Texas (1979) 441 U.S

2020He must do more than show that the facts are probably true.” (Comment, Evidence: Clear and Convincing Proof: Appellate Review (1944) 32 Cal. L.Rev. 74, 75.) Today, the clear and convincing standard applies to various determinations “ ‘where particularly important individual interests or rights are at stake,’ such as the termination of parental rights, involuntary commitment, and deportation.” (Weiner v. Fleischman (1991) 54 Cal.3d 476, 487 , quoting Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston (1983) 459 U.S. 375, 389 ; see also Santosky v. Kramer (1982) 455 U.S. 745, 769 ; Addington v. Texas (1979) 441 U.S

2024“The juvenile court may terminate parental rights only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that it is likely the child will be adopted within a reasonable time.” (In re Carl R. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1060 .) The clear and convincing standard of proof “ ‘requires a finding of high probability.’ ” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989 , 998 (O.B.).) “Although a finding of adoptability must be supported by clear and convincing evidence, it is nevertheless a low threshold” as the court need “merely determine that it is ‘likely’ that the child will be adopted within a re

2019Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) provides, in relevant part, that "[i]f the [juvenile] court determines based upon the [adoption] assessment ... and any other relevant evidence, by a clear and convincing standard, that it is likely the child will be adopted, the [juvenile] court shall terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adoption." In determining the child's adoptability, the court must focus on the child -"whether the child's age, physical condition, and emotional state" lends him or her to finding an adoptive family. ( In re Carl R. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1051 , 1061, 2

2026These facts are unlike those in In re Henry V. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 522 , 529–530, where the dispositional finding was based on a single incident and there was no indication in the record that the court considered the clear and convincing standard.

2025Thus, in assessing this assignment of error, “the substantial evidence test applies to determine the existence of the clear and convincing standard of proof .…” [Citation.]’” (In re Henry V. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 522 , 529.) “In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, our review requires that all reasonable inferences be given to support the findings and orders of the juvenile court and the record must be viewed in the light most favorable to those orders. [Citation.] Those findings and orders may not be disturbed if they are supported by substantial evidence. [Citations.] … ‘Issues of fac

2005Although the court does not initially terminate parental rights when it proceeds under subdivision (c)(3), the Legislature's incorporation of paragraph (1) in this provision is reasonably understood to include the clear and convincing standard. (8) We review the court's decision for abuse of discretion. ( In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295 , 318 [ 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 595 , 867 P.2d 706 ]; In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339 , 1351 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 644 ]; Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2004) ¶ 8:99.6, pp. 8-49, 50.) We must accord the tr

2005Although the court does not initially terminate parental rights when it proceeds under subdivision (c)(3), the Legislature's incorporation of paragraph (1) in this provision is reasonably understood to include the clear and convincing standard. (8) We review the court's decision for abuse of discretion. ( In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295 , 318 [ 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 595 , 867 P.2d 706 ]; In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339 , 1351 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 644 ]; Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2004) ¶ 8:99.6, pp. 8-49, 50.) We must accord the tr

2020J. no bearing whatsoever on appellate review for sufficiency of the evidence.4 Another viewpoint regards an appellate court as obligated to review the record for substantial evidence in a manner mindful of the fact that the clear and convincing standard of proof applied before the trial court.5 This approach recently was 4 The following Court of Appeal decisions have echoed the Witkin treatise’s “disappears” phrasing: Morgan v. Davidson (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 540, 549 ; In re Alexzander C. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 438, 451 ; Parisi v. Mazzaferro (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1227 , footnote 11; In re

2020J. 17 Cal.4th 396, 401 ; People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1126 .)7 7 Insofar as they are inconsistent with our holding, we also disapprove Ian J. v. Peter M., supra, 213 Cal.App.4th 189 , In re Marriage of Ruelas, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th 339 , In re Marriage of Murray, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th 581 , and Patrick v. Maryland Casualty Co., supra, 217 Cal.App.3d 1566 , as well as the Court of Appeal decisions that have described the clear and convincing standard as disappearing on appeal: Morgan v. Davidson, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th 540 ; In re Alexzander C., supra, 18 Cal.App.5th 438 ; Parisi