clear and convincing standard in Tennessee

2026Standard of Review In a termination of parental rights case, this Court has a duty to determine “whether the trial court’s findings, made under a clear and convincing standard, are supported by a preponderance of the evidence.” In re F.R.R., III, 193 S.W.3d 528, 530 (Tenn. 2006).

2026Standard of Review In a termination of parental rights case, this Court has a duty to determine “whether the trial court’s findings, made under a clear and convincing standard, are supported by a preponderance of the evidence.” In re F.R.R., III, 193 S.W.3d 528, 530 (Tenn. 2006).

2020Unlike the preponderance of the evidence standard, “[e]vidence satisfying the clear and convincing standard establishes that the truth of the facts asserted is highly probable.” In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 861 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

2020Unlike the preponderance of the evidence standard, “[e]vidence satisfying the clear and convincing standard establishes that the truth of the facts asserted is highly probable.” In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 861 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

2013In light of the clear and convincing standard of proof, on appeal, this Court must “distinguish between the specific facts found by the trial court and the combined weight of those facts.” In re Tiffany B., 228 S.W.3d 148, 156 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007).

2012The appellate court applies the clear and convincing evidence standard as follows: In light of the clear and convincing standard of proof, a reviewing court must “distinguish between the specific facts found by the trial court and the combined weight of those facts.” In re Tiffany B., 228 S.W.3d 148, 156 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007).

2016The clear and convincing standard is “more exacting than the preponderance of the evidence standard, [but] it does not require such certainty as beyond a reasonable doubt standard.” O’Daniel v. Messier, 905 S.W.2d 182, 188 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (internal citations omitted) (see also Hughes v. Bd. of Professional Responsibility of Supreme Court of Tennessee, 259 S.W.3d 631, 642 (Tenn. 2008)).

2008In O’Daniel v. Messier, 905 S.W.2d 182 (Tenn.Ct.App.1995), our Court of Appeals defined the clear and convincing standard as follows: While it is more exacting than the preponderance of the evidence standard, it does not require such certainty as the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.

2011“It produces in a fact-finder’s mind a firm belief or conviction regarding the truth of the facts sought to be established.” Id. (citations omitted); see also In re A.D.A., 84 S.W.3d 592, 596 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).

2011“It produces in a fact-finder’s mind a firm belief or conviction regarding the truth of the facts sought to be established.” Id. (citations omitted); see also In re A.D.A., 84 S.W.3d 592, 596 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).

2017In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539, 546 (Tenn. 2002) (citing Hodges v. S.C.

2013In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539, 546 (Tenn. 2002) (citing Hodges v. S.C.

2014In Department of Children’s Services v. D.G.S.L., this Court discussed the relevant burden of proof in cases involving termination of parental rights stating: It is well established that “parents have a fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of their children.” In re Drinnon, 776 S.W.2d 96, 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 , 92 S. Ct. 1208 , 31 L.

2011In Department of Children’s Services v. D.G.S.L., this Court discussed the relevant burden of proof in cases involving termination of parental rights stating: It is well established that "parents have a fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of their children." In re Drinnon, 776 S.W.2d 96, 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 , 92 S. Ct. 1208 , 31 L.

2026To meet the clear and convincing standard of proof, the evidence offered must not be “vague and -8- uncertain,” and there must be “no serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of the conclusions drawn from the evidence.” Id. at 408 (quoting State v. Jones, 450 S.W.3d 866, 893 (Tenn. 2014)).

2025In defining this clear and convincing standard, the court concluded that “to toll the coram nobis statute of limitations, the new evidence of actual innocence, if credited, should leave the court with no serious or substantial doubt that the petitioner is actually innocent.” Id. at 408; see State v. Jones, 450 S.W.3d 866, 893 (Tenn. 2014) (“The clear and convincing evidence standard is more exacting than preponderance of the evidence but less exacting than beyond a reasonable doubt, and it requires that there [be] no serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of the conclusions drawn f

2021While the combined weight of the evidence must meet the clear and convincing standard, facts considered in the best-interest analysis need be proven only “by a preponderance of the evidence, not by clear and convincing evidence.” In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d 533, 555 (Tenn. 2015).

2021While the combined weight of the evidence must meet the clear and convincing standard, facts considered in the best interest analysis need be proven only “by a preponderance of the evidence, not by clear and convincing evidence.” In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d 533, 555 (Tenn. 2015).

2005In re M.W.A., 980 S.W.2d 620, 622 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).

2003"This heightened standard ... serves to prevent the unwarranted termination or interference with the biological parents' rights to their children." In re M.W.A., 980 S.W.2d 620 , 622 (Tenn.Ct.App.1998).

2016The clear and convincing evidence standard defies precise definition, Majors v. Smith, 776 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989), but has been described as a “high evidentiary burden.” In re Alex B.T., No. W2011-00511-COA- R3PT, 2011 WL 5549757 , at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2011); see also In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (explaining the need for the “heightened” standard of proof as due to the stakes of a termination proceeding being “so profoundly high”); Gates v. Williams, No. E2010-01192-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 683935 , at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2011) (describing th

2016The clear and convincing evidence standard defies precise definition, Majors v. Smith, 776 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989), but has been described as a “high evidentiary burden.” In re Alex B.T., No. W2011-00511-COA- R3PT, 2011 WL 5549757 , at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2011); see also In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (explaining the need for the “heightened” standard of proof as due to the stakes of a termination proceeding being “so profoundly high”); Gates v. Williams, No. E2010-01192-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 683935 , at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2011) (describing th

2013See Reid v. State, 197 S.W.3d 694, 705 (stating that “[i]f the clear and convincing standard is adequate to ensure due process in the tolling context, then we deem it proper for purposes of the post-conviction proceeding itself”) (citing State v. Nix, 40 S.W.3d 459, 463-64 (Tenn. 2001)).

2011See Nix, 40 S.W.3d at 464 .

2024The court, recognizing that BG did not testify at the Rule 404(b) hearing, held that “[b]ecause of the inherent unreliability of Ms. Tharp’s hearsay recollections of B.G.’s allegations, the proof does not meet the clear and convincing standard and, as a result, should have been excluded under Rule 404(b).” Id. at 405 .

2018To meet this clear and convincing standard, evidence “must eliminate any ‘serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of the conclusions drawn from the evidence.’” Id. at 692-93 (quoting State v. Sexton, 368 S.W.3d 371, 404 (Tenn. 2012)).

2008See Estate of Acuff, 56 S.W.3d at 536 (setting aside deed on grounds of fraud); Hodges [v. S.C.

2005See Estate of Acuff, 56 S.W.3d at 536 (setting aside deed on grounds of fraud); Hodges, 833 S.W.2d at 901 (award of punitive damages); Pierce v. Flynn, 656 S.W.2d 42, 46 (Tenn.Ct.App.1983) (reformation of a contract).

2026He challenges the severe child abuse finding.3 “Severe child abuse in a dependency and neglect proceeding must . . . be established by clear and convincing evidence.” In re S.J., 387 S.W.3d 576, 587 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012); M.S., 2005 WL 549141 , at *10 (concluding that the clear and convincing standard must be applied because of the ramifications of a severe child abuse finding).

2020In the first instance, as explained by this Court in In re S.J., 387 S.W.3d 576, 591-92 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012): Under the clear and convincing evidence standard, it is important to “distinguish between the specific facts found by the trial court and the combined weight of those facts.” In re Tiffany B., 228 S.W.3d 148, 156 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007).

2024Our supreme court elaborated on the clear and convincing standard in State v. Jones, 450 S.W.3d 866, 893 (Tenn. 2014), as follows: To meet the clear and convincing standard, the trial court must determine that the evidence offered to show the defendant’s involvement in the other crime is not “‘vague and uncertain.’” State v. Fisher, 670 S.W.2d 232, 236 (Tenn. Crim.

2018The clear and convincing standard requires that the evidence offered to show the defendant’s involvement in the other crime is not “‘vague and uncertain.’” State v. Fisher, 670 S.W.2d 232, 236 (Tenn. Crim.

2014To meet the clear and convincing standard, the trial court must determine that the evidence offered to show the defendant’s involvement in the other crime is not “ ‘vague and uncertain.’ ” State v. Fisher, 670 S.W.2d 232, 236 (Tenn.Crim.App.1983) (quoting Wrather v. State, 179 Tenn. 666 , 169 S.W.2d 854, 858 (1943)).

2014To meet the clear and convincing standard, the trial court must determine that the evidence offered to show the defendant’s involvement in the other crime is not “ ‘vague and uncertain.’ ” State v. Fisher, 670 S.W.2d 232, 236 (Tenn.Crim.App.1983) (quoting Wrather v. State, 179 Tenn. 666 , 169 S.W.2d 854, 858 (1943)).

2018“In contrast to the preponderance of the evidence standard, clear and convincing evidence should demonstrate that the truth of the facts asserted is ‘highly probable’ as opposed to merely ‘more probable’ than not.” In re M.A.R., 183 S.W.3d 652, 660 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting In re C.W.W., 37 S.W.3d 467, 474 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)); see Teter v. Republic Parking Sys., Inc., 181 S.W.3d 330, 341 (Tenn. 2005) (noting that the clear and convincing standard “is used to promote important public policy and preserve prior judicial orders” and “in circumstances involving extraordinary remedies”).

2012“In contrast to the preponderance of the evidence standard, clear and convincing evidence should demonstrate that the truth of the facts asserted is ‘highly probable’ as opposed to merely ‘more probable’ than not.” In re M.A.R., 183 S.W.3d 652, 660 (Tenn.Ct.App.2005) (quoting In re C.W.W., 37 S.W.3d 467, 474 (Tenn.Ct.App.2000)); see Teter v. Republic Parking Sys., Inc., 181 S.W.3d 330, 341 (Tenn.2005) (noting that the clear and convincing standard “is used to promote important public policy and preserve prior judicial orders” and “in circumstances involving extraordinary remedies”).

2016Id. at *13 (citing In re M.J.B., 140 S.W.3d 643, 653 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004)).

2016Id. at *13 (citing In re M.J.B., 140 S.W.3d 643, 653 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004)).

2012See Parton, 694 S.W.2d 299, at 803 . 15 The rule, of course, further requires that the evidence be excluded unless the probative value outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice.

2000They are explained in State v. Parton, 694 S.W.2d 299, 303 (Tenn. 1985): First [the trial judge] should have heard the evidence out of the presence of the jury for the purpose of determining whether or not the proof of commission of the prior crime and defendant’s connection therewith met the clear and convincing test mandated in Wrather v. State, supra. If the proof had cleared that hurdle then the final test should have been whether or not its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.

2024Stated another way, we must make our “own determination as to whether the facts, either as found by the trial court or as supported by a preponderance of the evidence, amount to clear and convincing evidence of the elements necessary to terminate parental rights.” In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 524 (citing In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596–97).

2024Stated another way, we must make our “own determination as to whether the facts, either as found by the trial court or as supported by a preponderance of the evidence, amount to clear and convincing evidence of the elements necessary to terminate parental rights.” In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 524 .

2017“Clear and convincing evidence enables the fact-finder to form a firm belief or conviction regarding the truth of the facts, and eliminates any serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of these factual findings.” In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d 586, 596 (Tenn. 2010) (citations omitted). -3- Unlike the preponderance of the evidence standard, “[e]vidence satisfying the clear and convincing standard establishes that the truth of the facts asserted is highly probable.” In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 861 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

2013See, e.g., In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d 586, 596-97 (Tenn.2010) (reviewing the trial court’s findings of fact de novo with a presumption of correctness, followed by a determination of whether the facts provide clear and convincing evidence that supports the parental termination claim); In re F.R.R., 193 S.W.3d 528, 530 (Tenn.2006) (“[Wjhether the trial court’s findings, made under a clear and convincing standard, are supported by a preponderance of the evidence.”); Jones v. Garrett, 92 S.W.3d 835, 838 (Tenn.2002) (applying the “heightened standard” of clear and convincing evidence to the trial

2015In Santosky v. Kramer, the United States Supreme Court determined that' “in any given proceeding, the minimum standard of proof tolerated by the due process requirement reflects not only the weight of the private and public interests affected, but also a societal judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed between the litigants.” 455 U.S. 745, 755 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982).

2015In Santosky v. Kramer, the United States Supreme Court determined that' “in any given proceeding, the minimum standard of proof tolerated by the due process requirement reflects not only the weight of the private and public interests affected, but also a societal judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed between the litigants.” 455 U.S. 745, 755 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982).

2026Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896 , 901 n.3 (Tenn. 1992).

2021Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896 , 901 n.3 (Tenn. 1992).

2016“Clear and convincing evidence eliminates any serious substantial doubt concerning the correctness of the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

2016The clear and convincing standard is “more exacting than the preponderance of the evidence standard, [but] it does not require such certainty as beyond a reasonable doubt standard.” O’Daniel v. Messier, 905 S.W.2d 182, 188 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (internal citations omitted) (see also Hughes v. Bd. of Professional Responsibility of Supreme Court of Tennessee, 259 S.W.3d 631, 642 (Tenn. 2008)).

2002It is axiomatic, therefore, that a lesser standard of proof, such as the clear and convincing standard, may be imposed.”); cf. Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 367-368 , 116 S. Ct. 1373, 1383 (1996). 4 Appellant’s issue IV. -23- Following Leland, the Court has clarified that placing the burden of proving an affirmative defense upon a criminal defendant will only violate due process if proving the affirmative defense necessarily negates any essential element of the offense.

2002It is axiomatic, therefore, that a lesser standard of proof, such as the clear and convincing standard, may be imposed.”); cf. Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 367-368 , 116 S. Ct. 1373, 1383 (1996). 4 Appellant’s issue IV. -23- Following Leland, the Court has clarified that placing the burden of proving an affirmative defense upon a criminal defendant will only violate due process if proving the affirmative defense necessarily negates any essential element of the offense.

2010“The ‘clear and convincing evidence’ standard is more exacting than the ‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard, although it does not demand the certainty required by the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard.” In re M.L.D., 182 S.W.3d at 894 (citation omitted).

2009“Although the ‘clear and convincing evidence’ standard is more exacting than the ‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard, it does not require the certainty demanded by the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard.” In re M.A.B., No. W2007-00453-COA-R3-PT, 2007 WL 2353158 , at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2007) (citing In -4- re M.L.D., 182 S.W.3d 890, 894 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)).

2023In Mansell v. Bridgestone Firestone North American Tire, 417 S.W.3d 393, 411 (Tenn. 2013), the Tennessee Supreme Court considered this statute and defined the clear and convincing standard as follows: “[I]f no evidence has been admitted which raises a serious and substantial doubt about the evaluation’s correctness, the MIRR evaluation is the accurate impairment rating.” 6 The Court in Mansell also gave factors to consider when deciding whether a party rebutted the Registry physician’s statutory presumption of accuracy.

2023Tire, 417 S.W.3d 393, 411 (Tenn. 2013), the Tennessee Supreme Court considered this statute and defined the clear and convincing standard as follows: “if no evidence has been admitted which raises a ‘serious and substantial doubt’ about the evaluation’s correctness, the MIRR evaluation is the accurate impairment rating.” The Court in Mansell also addressed relevant factors to consider when deciding whether a party rebutted the Registry physician’s statutory presumption of accuracy.

2018“The clear and convincing standard is more exacting than preponderance of the evidence but less exacting than beyond a reasonable doubt, and it requires that ‘there [be] no serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of the conclusions drawn from the evidence.’” Jones, 450 S.W.3d at 893 (quoting State v. Kennedy, 152 S.W.3d 16, 18 (Tenn. Crim.

2014The clear and convincing evidence standard is more exacting than preponderance of the evidence but less exacting than beyond a reasonable doubt, and it requires that “ ‘there [be] no serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of the conclusions drawn from the evidence.’ ” State v. Kennedy, 152 S.W.3d 16, 18 (Tenn.Crim.