clear and convincing standard in West Virginia

2022Va. 97 , 99 n.1, 375 S.E.2d 568 , 570 n.1 (1988) (explaining that the clear and convincing standard is “intermediate, being more than a mere preponderance, but not to the extent of such certainty as is required beyond a reasonable doubt as in criminal cases”).

2016Dep’t of Highways, 180 W.Va. 97 , 99 n. 1, 375 S.E.2d 568 , 570 n.1 (1988) (explaining that the clear and convincing standard is “intermediate, being more than a mere preponderance, but not to the extent of such certainty as is required beyond a reasonable doubt as in criminal cases.”).

2013To the contrary, the Court has previously addressed the clear and convincing standard in the context of abuse and neglect proceedings as follows: “W.Va.Code, 49–6–2(c) [1980], requires the State Department of Welfare [now the Department of Health and Human Resources], in a child abuse or neglect case, to prove ‘conditions existing at the time of the filing of the petition . . . by clear and convincing proof.’ The statute, however, does not specify any particular manner or mode of testimony or evidence by which the State Department of Welfare is obligated to meet this burden.” Syllabus Point 1,

2013To the contrary, the Court has previously addressed the clear and convincing standard in the context of abuse and neglect proceedings as follows: “W.Va.Code, 49–6–2(c) [1980], requires the State Department of Welfare [now the Department of Health and Human Resources], in a child abuse or neglect case, to prove ‘conditions existing at the time of the filing of the petition . . . by clear and convincing proof.’ The statute, however, does not specify any particular manner or mode of testimony or evidence by which the State Department of Welfare is obligated to meet this burden.” Syllabus Point 1,

2025Additionally, neither in its oral pronouncements nor in its written order did the court acknowledge that DHS’s evidence to support termination of parental rights must be clear and convincing, id., and it is apparent from a review of the record that the court did not employ a clear and convincing standard.

2023Pt. 1, Lengyel v. Lint, 167 W.

2012In fashioning an appropriate sanction, this Court is mindful of its prior holding that, “ ‘[i]n deciding on the appropriate disciplinary action for ethical violations, this Court must consider not only what steps would appropriately punish the respondent attorney, but also whether the discipline imposed is adequate to serve as an effective deterrent to other members of the Bar and at the same time restore public confidence in the ethical standards of the legal profession.’ Syllabus Point 3, Committee on Legal Ethics v. Walker, 178 W.Va. 150 , 358 S.E.2d 234 (1987).” Syllabus Point 5, Committee

2012In fashioning an appropriate sanction, this Court is mindful of its prior holding that, “ ‘[i]n deciding on the appropriate disciplinary action for ethical violations, this Court must consider not only what steps would appropriately punish the respondent attorney, but also whether the discipline imposed is adequate to serve as an effective deterrent to other members of the Bar and at the same time restore public confidence in the ethical standards of the legal profession.’ Syllabus Point 3, Committee on Legal Ethics v. Walker, 178 W.Va. 150 , 358 S.E.2d 234 (1987).” Syllabus Point 5, Committee

2012In fashioning an appropriate sanction, this Court is mindful of its prior holding that, “ ‘[i]n deciding on the appropriate disciplinary action for ethical violations, this Court must consider not only what steps would appropriately punish the respondent attorney, but also whether the discipline imposed is adequate to serve as an effective deterrent to other members of the Bar and at the same time restore public confidence in the ethical standards of the legal profession.’ Syllabus Point 3, Committee on Legal Ethics v. Walker, 178 W.Va. 150 , 358 S.E.2d 234 (1987).” Syllabus Point 5, Committee

2012In fashioning an appropriate sanction, this Court is mindful of its prior holding that, “ ‘[i]n deciding on the appropriate disciplinary action for ethical violations, this Court must consider not only what steps would appropriately punish the respondent attorney, but also whether the discipline imposed is adequate to serve as an effective deterrent to other members of the Bar and at the same time restore public confidence in the ethical standards of the legal profession.’ Syllabus Point 3, Committee on Legal Ethics v. Walker, 178 W.Va. 150 , 358 S.E.2d 234 (1987).” Syllabus Point 5, Committee

1999Notwithstanding the fact that the standard of evidence required for the claims brought by Appellee is indeed a preponderance of the evidence, 27 Appellant, as Appellee observes, even requested the insertion of the terms “preponderance of the evidence” in plaintiffs instruction number 1 and the trial court so modified the instruction. 28 This Court stated in syllabus point one of Muzelak v. King Chevrolet, Inc., 179 W.Va. 340 , 368 S.E.2d 710 (1988), “ ‘Where an objection is made to an instruction for the first time on appeal and such instruction is not so deficient so as to require invocation

1999Notwithstanding the fact that the standard of evidence required for the claims brought by Appellee is indeed a preponderance of the evidence, 27 Appellant, as Appellee observes, even requested the insertion of the terms “preponderance of the evidence” in plaintiffs instruction number 1 and the trial court so modified the instruction. 28 This Court stated in syllabus point one of Muzelak v. King Chevrolet, Inc., 179 W.Va. 340 , 368 S.E.2d 710 (1988), “ ‘Where an objection is made to an instruction for the first time on appeal and such instruction is not so deficient so as to require invocation

1988It concluded that the clear and convincing standard of proof for terminating a parent-child relationship established in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), was not applicable. 7 .

1988It concluded that the clear and convincing standard of proof for terminating a parent-child relationship established in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), was not applicable. 7 .

1984First, as the Kansas Supreme Court stated in In re Rome, 218 Kan. at 206 , 542 P.2d at 684 : "In so grave a matter as depriving a judge of his office or subjecting him to some form of discipline the burden of proof should be no less [than clear and convincing evidence]." See also In re Diener, 268 Md. at 670 , 304 A.2d at 594 ("the severity of the impact ... upon the individual compels the application of the clear and convincing test"); In re Laughlin, 153 Tex. at 190 , 265 S.W.2d at 809 .

1984First, as the Kansas Supreme Court stated in In re Rome, 218 Kan. at 206 , 542 P.2d at 684 : "In so grave a matter as depriving a judge of his office or subjecting him to some form of discipline the burden of proof should be no less [than clear and convincing evidence]." See also In re Diener, 268 Md. at 670 , 304 A.2d at 594 ("the severity of the impact ... upon the individual compels the application of the clear and convincing test"); In re Laughlin, 153 Tex. at 190 , 265 S.W.2d at 809 .

1984First, as the Kansas Supreme Court stated in In re Rome, 218 Kan. at 206 , 542 P.2d at 684 : "In so grave a matter as depriving a judge of his office or subjecting him to some form of discipline the burden of proof should be no less [than clear and convincing evidence]." See also In re Diener, 268 Md. at 670 , 304 A.2d at 594 ("the severity of the impact ... upon the individual compels the application of the clear and convincing test"); In re Laughlin, 153 Tex. at 190 , 265 S.W.2d at 809 .

1984First, as the Kansas Supreme Court stated in In re Rome, 218 Kan. at 206 , 542 P.2d at 684 : "In so grave a matter as depriving a judge of his office or subjecting him to some form of discipline the burden of proof should be no less [than clear and convincing evidence]." See also In re Diener, 268 Md. at 670 , 304 A.2d at 594 ("the severity of the impact ... upon the individual compels the application of the clear and convincing test"); In re Laughlin, 153 Tex. at 190 , 265 S.W.2d at 809 .