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85 North Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1979–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Interest of JSgreen2 sentences2002"To balance the competing interests of protecting a mentally ill person and of preserving that person's liberty, our standards of decision require trial courts to use a clear and convincing standard of proof while we use a more probing `clearly erroneous' standard of review." In the Interest of J.S., 530 N.W.2d 331, 333 (N.D.1995). 2002“To balance the competing interests of protecting a mentally ill person and of preserving that person’s liberty, our standards of decision require trial courts to use a clear and convincing standard of proof while we use a more probing ‘clearly erroneous’ standard of review.” In the Interest of J.S., 530 N.W.2d 331, 333 (N.D.1995). | 12 | 14 |
Zundel v. Zundelgreen2 sentences2004The “Bodding doctrine,” relied upon by Judge McGuire, was specifically- rejected by this Court in Zundel v. Zundel, 278 N.W.2d 123, 129 (N.D.1979), because it “would create a burden of proof upon a claimant equivalent to or greater than the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard required in criminal cases.” Instead, this Court said, “under the clear and convincing standard, the evidence must be such that the trier of fact is reasonably satisfied with the facts the evidence tends to prove as to be led to a firm belief or conviction.” Id. at 130 . 2004The “Bodding doctrine,” relied upon by Judge McGuire, was specifically- rejected by this Court in Zundel v. Zundel, 278 N.W.2d 123, 129 (N.D.1979), because it “would create a burden of proof upon a claimant equivalent to or greater than the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard required in criminal cases.” Instead, this Court said, “under the clear and convincing standard, the evidence must be such that the trier of fact is reasonably satisfied with the facts the evidence tends to prove as to be led to a firm belief or conviction.” Id. at 130 . | 5 | 6 |
In Interest of RNgreen2 sentences2002As we have explained in the past, "we will affirm an order for involuntary treatment unless it is induced by an erroneous view of the law or if we are firmly convinced it is not supported by clear and convincing evidence." In Interest of R.N., 513 N.W.2d 370, 371 (N.D.1994). [¶ 14] Section 25-03.1-02(11), N.D.C.C., defines a "person requiring treatment" as: a person who is mentally ill or chemically dependent, and there is a reasonable expectation that if the person is not treated there exists a serious risk of harm to that person, others, or property. [¶ 15] Therefore N.D.C.C. § 25-03.1-02(11 2002As we have explained in the past, “we will affirm an order for involuntary treatment unless it is induced by an erroneous view of the law or if we are firmly convinced it is not supported by clear and convincing evidence.” In Interest of R.N., 513 N.W.2d 370, 371 (N.D.1994). [¶ 14] Section 25-03.1-02(11), N.D.C.C., defines a “person requiring treatment” as: a person who is mentally ill or chemically dependent, and there is a reasonable expectation that if the person is not treated there exists a serious risk of harm to that person, others, or property. [¶ 15] Therefore N.D.C.C. § 25-OS. 1-02(1 | 5 | 5 |
Matter of Disciplinary Action Against Nassifgreen2 sentences2002Disciplinary Bd. v. Nassif, 547 N.W.2d 541, 542 (N.D.1996). 2002Disciplinary Bd. v. Nassif, 547 N.W.2d 541, 542 (N.D.1996). | 5 | 5 |
Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court v. Dvorakgreen2 sentences2002In re Dvorak, 1998 ND 134, ¶ 15 , 580 N.W.2d 586 ; In re Lamont, 1997 ND 63, ¶ 8 , 561 N.W.2d 650 . 2002In re Dvorak, 1998 ND 134, ¶ 15 , 580 N.W.2d 586 ; In re Lamont, 1997 ND 63, ¶ 8 , 561 N.W.2d 650 . | 3 | 6 |
Disciplinary Action Against Raugreen2 sentences1997Disciplinary Action Against Rau, 533 N.W.2d 691, 692 (N.D.1995). 1996Disciplinary Action Against Rau, 533 N.W.2d 691, 692 (N.D.1995). | 3 | 5 |
Disciplinary Action Against Laquagreen2 sentences1997In re LaQua, 548 N.W.2d 372 , 373 (N.D.1996). 1997See, e.g., Disciplinary Action Against LaQua, 548 N.W.2d 372, 373 (N.D.1996). [¶ 12] We granted leave to appeal because the procedural aspects of this case were, on their face, arbitrary and capricious. | 3 | 5 |
Matter of Guardianship of Braatengreen2 sentences1996Matter of Guardianship of Braaten, 502 N.W.2d 512, 518 (N.D.1993). 1996Matter of Guardianship of Braaten, 502 N.W.2d 512, 518 (N.D.1993). | 3 | 3 |
In Re the Revocation of the License of Polkgreen2 sentences2007See Polk, 449 A.2d at 17 ; Grimm, 635 A.2d at 462 . [¶ 31] The legislature has chosen the preponderance of evidence standard for physician discipline and this Court, the governing body for attorneys, has chosen the clear and convincing standard for attorney discipline. 2007See Polk, 449 A.2d at 17 ; Grimm, 635 A.2d at 462 . [¶31] The legislature has chosen the preponderance of evidence standard for physician discipline and this Court, the governing body for attorneys, has chosen the clear and convincing standard for attorney discipline. | 2 | 2 |
Mansukhani v. Pailinggreen2 sentences2005See Mansukhani v. Pailing, 318 N.W.2d 748, 751 (N.D.1982) (holding fitness as a parent is not the test; the test is whether exceptional circumstances exist which require in the child's best interests custody be placed in nonparents rather than a parent, and recognizing a strong psychological parent relationship can constitute exceptional circumstances); Worden v. Worden, 434 N.W.2d 341, 342 (N.D.1989) (holding the test is whether exceptional circumstances exist which require that, in the best interest of the child, custody be placed in a nonparent rather than a biological parent). [¶ 17] We do 2005See Mansukhani v. Pailing, 318 N.W.2d 748, 751 (N.D.1982) (holding fitness as a parent is not the test; the test is whether exceptional circumstances exist which require in the child’s best interests custody be placed in nonparents rather than a parent, and recognizing a strong psychological parent relationship can constitute exceptional circumstances); Worden v. Worden, 434 N.W.2d 341, 342 (N.D.1989) (holding the test is whether exceptional circumstances exist which require that, in the best interest of the child, custody be placed in a nonparent rather than a biological parent). [¶ 17] We do | 2 | 2 |
Worden v. Wordengreen2 sentences2005See Mansukhani v. Pailing, 318 N.W.2d 748, 751 (N.D.1982) (holding fitness as a parent is not the test; the test is whether exceptional circumstances exist which require in the child's best interests custody be placed in nonparents rather than a parent, and recognizing a strong psychological parent relationship can constitute exceptional circumstances); Worden v. Worden, 434 N.W.2d 341, 342 (N.D.1989) (holding the test is whether exceptional circumstances exist which require that, in the best interest of the child, custody be placed in a nonparent rather than a biological parent). [¶ 17] We do 2005See Mansukhani v. Pailing, 318 N.W.2d 748, 751 (N.D.1982) (holding fitness as a parent is not the test; the test is whether exceptional circumstances exist which require in the child’s best interests custody be placed in nonparents rather than a parent, and recognizing a strong psychological parent relationship can constitute exceptional circumstances); Worden v. Worden, 434 N.W.2d 341, 342 (N.D.1989) (holding the test is whether exceptional circumstances exist which require that, in the best interest of the child, custody be placed in a nonparent rather than a biological parent). [¶ 17] We do | 2 | 2 |
Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of the State v. McKennettgreen2 sentences1997Disciplinary Bd. of Supreme Court v. McKennett , 349 N.W.2d 29, 31 (N.D. 1984). 1997Disciplinary Bd. of Supreme Court v. McKennett, 349 N.W.2d 29, 31 (N.D.1984). | 2 | 2 |
Interest of C.A.R.green2 sentences2025“A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if there is no evidence to support it, if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, or if we are left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made.” Id. [¶7] “[W]hen the statutory elements to terminate parental rights are met, the court has discretion, but is not required, to terminate parental rights.” Int. of B.F., 2025 ND 127, ¶ 13 , 23 N.W.2d 718 (quoting Int. of J.C., 2024 ND 9, ¶ 22 , 2 N.W.3d 228 ); see also Int. of C.A.R., 2020 ND 209, ¶ 9 (“If a petitioner meets the clear and convincing standard of proof, then the court has d 2025“A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if there is no evidence to support it, if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, or if we are left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made.” Id. [¶7] “[W]hen the statutory elements to terminate parental rights are met, the court has discretion, but is not required, to terminate parental rights.” Int. of B.F., 2025 ND 127, ¶ 13 , 23 N.W.2d 718 (quoting Int. of J.C., 2024 ND 9, ¶ 22 , 2 N.W.3d 228 ); see also Int. of C.A.R., 2020 ND 209, ¶ 9 (“If a petitioner meets the clear and convincing standard of proof, then the court has d | 1 | 1 |
J.E. v. A.P.green1 sentence2020See Matter of C.D.G.E., 2017 ND 13, ¶ 4 , 889 N.W.2d 863 . | 1 | 1 |
Matter of C.D.G.E.green1 sentence2020See Matter of C.D.G.E., 2017 ND 13, ¶ 4 , 889 N.W.2d 863 . | 1 | 1 |
| In Interest of RMgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Interest of KJLgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Matter of Montgomerygreen | 1 | 1 |
| In the Interest of Rambousekgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In re Chappellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re DA
neutral
2 sentences2007"Balancing the competing interests of protecting a mentally ill person and preserving that person's liberty, requires trial courts to use a clear and convincing standard of proof" while this Court uses "the more probing clearly erroneous standard of review." Id. 2007“Balancing the competing interests of protecting a mentally ill person and preserving that person’s liberty, requires trial courts to use a clear and convincing standard of proof’ while this Court uses “the more probing clearly erroneous standard of review.” Id. | 5 | 2007–2013 |
In Re Jd
green
2 sentences2010Id. 2010Id. | 5 | 2005–2010 |
Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of the State v. Leier
green
2 sentences1999Matter of Leier, 1997 ND 79, ¶ 3 , 562 N.W.2d 741 . 1999Matter of Leier, 1997 ND 79, ¶ 3 , 562 N.W.2d 741 . | 5 | 1999–1999 |
In Re Disciplinary Action Against Dooley
green
2 sentences2001In re Disciplinary Action Against Dooley, 1999 ND 184, ¶ 12 , 599 N.W.2d 619 . [¶ 26] We conclude the hearing panel did not err in failing to recite the burden of proof for Howe’s disciplinary proceedings; the applicable standard is frequently specified in case law and plainly stated in Rule 3.5(C),(D), N.D.R. 2001In re Disciplinary Action Against Dooley, 1999 ND 184, ¶ 12 , 599 N.W.2d 619 . [¶ 26] We conclude the hearing panel did not err in failing to recite the burden of proof for Howe’s disciplinary proceedings; the applicable standard is frequently specified in case law and plainly stated in Rule 3.5(C),(D), N.D.R. | 4 | 2000–2001 |
Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota v. Goetz
green
2 sentences1995Matter of Goetz, 474 N.W.2d 29 (N.D.1991). 1995In the Matter of Goetz, 474 N.W.2d 29 (N.D.1991). | 4 | 1995–1995 |
In re Grimm
green
2 sentences2007See Polk, 449 A.2d at 17 ; Grimm, 635 A.2d at 462 . [¶ 31] The legislature has chosen the preponderance of evidence standard for physician discipline and this Court, the governing body for attorneys, has chosen the clear and convincing standard for attorney discipline. 2007A.2d at 17; Grimm, 635 A.2d at 462 . [¶ 31] The legislature has chosen the preponderance of evidence standard for physician discipline and this Court, the governing body for attorneys, has chosen the clear and convincing standard for attorney discipline. | 3 | 2007–2007 |
In Re Disciplinary Action Against Landon
green
2 sentences2003Disciplinary Board v. London, 1999 ND 202, ¶ 10 , 600 N.W.2d 856 . 2003Disciplinary Board v. London, 1999 ND 202, ¶ 10 , 600 N.W.2d 856 . | 3 | 1999–2003 |
Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of State v. Lamont
green
2 sentences2002In re Dvorak, 1998 ND 134, ¶ 15 , 580 N.W.2d 586 ; In re Lamont, 1997 ND 63, ¶ 8 , 561 N.W.2d 650 . 2002In re Dvorak, 1998 ND 134, ¶ 15 , 580 N.W.2d 586 ; In re Lamont, 1997 ND 63, ¶ 8 , 561 N.W.2d 650 . | 3 | 2002–2002 |
In re Lamont
green
2 sentences2002In re Dvorak, 1998 ND 134, ¶ 15 , 580 N.W.2d 586 ; In re Lamont, 1997 ND 63, ¶ 8 , 561 N.W.2d 650 . 2002In re Dvorak, 1998 ND 134, ¶ 15 , 580 N.W.2d 586 ; In re Lamont, 1997 ND 63, ¶ 8 , 561 N.W.2d 650 . | 3 | 2002–2002 |
In Re Wk
neutral
2 sentences2012“To balance the competing interests of protecting a mentally ill person and preserving that person’s liberty, the district court uses a clear and convincing standard of proof, while we use the more probing clearly erroneous standard of review.” In re W.K., 2009 ND 218, ¶ 12 , 776 N.W.2d 572 . 2012“To balance the competing interests of protecting a mentally ill person and preserving that person’s liberty, the district court uses a clear and convincing standard of proof, while we use the more probing clearly erroneous standard of review.” In re W.K., 2009 ND 218, ¶ 12 , 776 N.W.2d 572 . | 2 | 2012–2012 |
Zander v. Workforce Safety & Insurance
green
2 sentences2004In Zander v. Workforce Safety and Ins., 2003 ND 194, ¶ 11 , 672 N.W.2d 668 , we said: “Clear and convincing evidence” does not require a showing by “100 per cent certainty” or “absolute certainty.” This Court, in a long line of cases, has repeatedly held that clear and convincing evidence means evidence which leads to a firm belief or conviction that the allegations are true. 2004In Zander v. Workforce Safety and Ins., 2003 ND 194, ¶ 11 , 672 N.W.2d 668 , we said: “Clear and convincing evidence” does not require a showing by “100 per cent certainty” or “absolute certainty.” This Court, in a long line of cases, has repeatedly held that clear and convincing evidence means evidence which leads to a firm belief or conviction that the allegations are true. | 2 | 2004–2004 |
In Re JK
green
2 sentences2001In the Interest of J.K., 1999 ND 182, ¶ 10 , 599 N.W.2d 337 . 2001In the Interest of J.K., 1999 ND 182, ¶ 10 , 599 N.W.2d 337 . | 2 | 2001–2001 |
In Re MS
neutral
2 sentences1999In the Interest of M.S., 1999 ND 117, ¶ 5 , 594 N.W.2d 924 . 1999In the Interest of M.S., 1999 ND 117, ¶ 5 , 594 N.W.2d 924 . | 2 | 1999–1999 |
Interest of B.F. & I.F.
neutral
1 sentence2025“A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if there is no evidence to support it, if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, or if we are left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made.” Id. [¶7] “[W]hen the statutory elements to terminate parental rights are met, the court has discretion, but is not required, to terminate parental rights.” Int. of B.F., 2025 ND 127, ¶ 13 , 23 N.W.2d 718 (quoting Int. of J.C., 2024 ND 9, ¶ 22 , 2 N.W.3d 228 ); see also Int. of C.A.R., 2020 ND 209, ¶ 9 (“If a petitioner meets the clear and convincing standard of proof, then the court has d | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Interest of J.C.
green
1 sentence2025“A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if there is no evidence to support it, if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, or if we are left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made.” Id. [¶7] “[W]hen the statutory elements to terminate parental rights are met, the court has discretion, but is not required, to terminate parental rights.” Int. of B.F., 2025 ND 127, ¶ 13 , 23 N.W.2d 718 (quoting Int. of J.C., 2024 ND 9, ¶ 22 , 2 N.W.3d 228 ); see also Int. of C.A.R., 2020 ND 209, ¶ 9 (“If a petitioner meets the clear and convincing standard of proof, then the court has d | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Duff v. Kearns-Duff green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Staley v. Staley green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Duff v. Kearns-Duff green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Sommers v. Sommers green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Wold v. Wold green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| McCarthy v. McCarthy green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Matter of Dosch green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Paulson v. Meinke green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| In Interest of Kupperion green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Crain v. Keenan neutral | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Williams v. Wager neutral | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.